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DE RUCNDT #0658/01 1890111
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 080111Z JUL 09

FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6863
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 1103
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 1153
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 2413
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 6423
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8762

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000658 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR USUN/W AND IO/UNP; NSC FOR POWER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2019 
TAGS: PREL KUNR UNGA UNSC GE JA BR IN
SUBJECT: UNGA: UNSC REFORM: P5 MEET TO DISCUSS 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS 
 
REF: STATE 049098 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  P5 Ambassadors met on July 2 to discuss 
intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform. 
The U.S. and Russia encouraged the P5 to coordinate on 
positions, but the U.S. advocated against a uniform P5 
position at this time since the broader membership and not 
the P5 should be driving the negotiations.  All voiced 
openness to a discussion of the intermediate option during a 
third round of intergovernmental negotiations, with some 
noting there also should be a further discussion of the other 
options.  Both Russia and China urged that any future 
overview papers from the Chair not focus exclusively on one 
option over other options.  Russia and China also spoke out 
against a framework resolution to end the 63rd session and 
instead suggested continuing the negotiations into the 64th 
session.  France urged that the momentum be continued into 
the next session.  On the possibility of a future P5 
statement, the Chinese DPR suggested that, if progress on 
negotiations merits it, a possible opportunity to say 
something may be the P5 Foreign Ministers meeting with the 
Secretary General during the UNGA General Debate.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (C) UK DPR Parham hosted a P5 lunch, at the DPR level plus 
experts, on July 2 to follow-up on the May 7 meeting of P5 
Political Directors in London.  He said that the end of the 
second round of intergovernmental negotiations (IGN) afforded 
an opportune time for the P5 to reflect upon the negotiations 
to date and what to expect in the period ahead.  Russian DPR 
Dolgov spoke frankly and at great length throughout the lunch 
about Russia's position on Council reform, thereby covering 
many of the points that would have otherwise been made by 
Ambassador DiCarlo for the U.S. or Chinese DPR Liu, as 
Russia, the U.S., and China share many of the same positions. 
 France was represented at the expert level.  The French 
expert's comments demonstrated the divide on the issue inside 
the P5 between France and the UK on one side and the 
U.S./Russia/China on the other, though Parham minimized the 
UK's differences with other P5 members. 
 
P5 common positions 
------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Ambassador DiCarlo urged the P5 to have coordinated 
positions but not to have a single P5 position because that 
would be detrimental to the negotiating process since the P5 
should not be in the lead.  Russian DPR Dolgov urged the P5 
to articulate common positions when it is helpful, such as 
the P5's individual statements on the veto during the June 
22-23 meeting of the informal plenary.  (Note: He later 
clarified that Russia has not taken completely off the table 
the possibility of the extension of new vetoes in the Council 
since that would be dependent upon the composition of an 
expanded Council.  End note.)  He said the P5 needs to remind 
the membership to focus on what is "implementable and 
achievable" and of the Charter requirement that the entire P5 
needs to ratify Charter amendments (per Article 108 of the UN 
Charter), noting that not all P5 members had spoken out about 
this requirement to date (only the U.S. and Russia have).  He 
justified the need for such uniform statements by saying it 
would push those who are "playing with the exercise to be 
more serious" and also warn those who will try to add on 
other amendments that they should focus only on the matter at 
hand, not on other subjects, for example, the selection of 
the Secretary-General.  Ambassador DiCarlo agreed, saying the 
membership needs to be reminded of the P5's redlines.  In 
terms of a formal P5 position on the subject writ large, 
Dolgov said that Russia is open to a uniform position if it 
focuses on an ultimate solution that can capture the broadest 
possible agreement but does not rush the matter and only when 
all P5 members are ready.  Liu said that while the P5 do have 
differences, they should work together to keep the process 
under control to avoid surprises. 
 
Intermediate option 
------------------- 
 
 
¶4.  (C) UK DPR Parham noted the important link between the 
Council's effectiveness and its perceived legitimacy.  He 
said that while the P5 have different perspectives, all agree 
on the need to keep the process moving forward and one way to 
do that is to have a session on the intermediate option and 
another session on the other options in the third round.  He 
underlined that, to date, the intermediate option is not a 
defined proposal.  He also noted that the UK had demarched 
African capitals in the run-up to the African Union Summit 
and was told, almost uniformly, that there would be no 
likelihood of flexibility emanating from the Summit on the 
Ezulwini Consensus.  The French expert pressed for progress 
on the intermediate option as first suggested by the UK and 
France in March 2008.  He emphasized the need for a Security 
Council reinforced with "key partners" and not the 
intermediate solution proposed by the United for Consensus 
(UFC) bloc. 
 
¶5.  (C) Dolgov said Russia has indicated interest in the 
intermediate option because he does not think either of the 
two other models will obtain the necessary two-thirds 
support.  He did clarify that some proposed scenarios for the 
intermediate option would not be acceptable nationally to 
Russia, so "modalities will matter."  He stressed that if the 
intermediate option is pursued, it should be a permanent 
solution, not a stepping stone, and should include 5-6 year 
terms with the possibility of re-election, not the 15-year 
terms that Germany had suggested.  If there is an expansion 
to 21-22 members, under an intermediate option, it should be 
with the firm understanding that there would not be the 
possibility of future expansion.  If there is a later review 
of the intermediate option, he said, it should not include a 
review of the veto option or working methods -- those should 
no longer be on the table for discussion.  He later clarified 
that those two issues were included only to give something to 
those who were not going to "get anything" from the expansion 
process.  Once the expansion process is completed, there is 
"no need to keep the package intact," he stressed, and they 
should be taken off the table in advance. 
 
¶6.  (C) Liu said that China is open to discussing the 
intermediate option but not ready to narrow down the field of 
available options.  They would like to keep everything on the 
table for the third round because if any one option is pushed 
at this point, they believe it will split the membership, he 
said.  Ambassador DiCarlo said that, while the U.S. does not 
yet have a position on the intermediate option, it is open to 
a discussion of it by the membership during the third round. 
She raised two lingering questions on the intermediate 
option: how to ensure that countries are selected on the 
basis of their positive contributions to the maintenance of 
international peace and security and how can we ensure 
responsible decision-making from longer-term members who are 
constantly running for re-election. 
 
Future overview papers 
---------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Dolgov said that if Ambassador Tanin decides to 
release another overview paper, it should remain his own 
product but should not propose an exclusive focus on only the 
two main proposals.  Chinese DPR Liu said that he had spoken 
to Ambassador Tanin and encouraged him to avoid narrowing 
down any of the options currently on the table and not to 
quantify the number of member states behind each of the 
proposals, as some members had requested.  He urged him to be 
patient and wait for a compromise to emerge from the 
intergovernmental negotiations. 
 
How to transition 
to the 64th session 
------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) On a possible framework resolution to end the 
session, Dolgov said such a resolution would not be helpful 
since it would likely only focus on an expansion of the two 
categories.  Instead, he suggested that the focus be on the 
achievement that intergovernmental negotiations were begun 
during the 63rd session and the recommendation to continue 
those negotiations during the 64th session.  He urged 
 
 
avoiding the "traditional bloodbath" at the end of the 
session since nothing else will be possible except a 
continuation of negotiations into the 64th session.  An 
attempt at anything more, he stressed, would hurt the UN and 
damage future prospects for negotiations.  He urged other P-5 
members to speak individually with the PGA, Ambassador Tanin, 
and the various blocs and urge all to continue moving forward 
in a constructive manner. 
 
¶9.  (C) Liu agreed that it was important to be prepared on 
how to wind up the 63rd session since (1) there would be no 
compromise on a final agreement by then since the African 
Union is likely to retain the Ezulwini Consensus and (2) the 
President of the General Assembly may be keen to get 
involved.  He urged the other P5 members to send the message 
individually that they are opposed to a framework resolution. 
 The French expert urged P5 members to prepare the transition 
to the next UNGA session in order to keep up the momentum and 
said that France believes narrowing the options is in order. 
 
 
Possibility of a P5 statement 
----------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) UK DPR Parham raised the possibility of a P5 
statement.  Chinese DPR Liu suggested keeping the idea open 
and dependent upon the progress of the negotiations.  He 
suggested that a possible opportunity to say something may be 
when the P5 Foreign Ministers meet with the Secretary-General 
during the General Debate in September. 
RICE