VZCZCXRO4662
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0652/01 1880211
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 070211Z JUL 09
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6853
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 1568
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY 0327
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 1873

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000652 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
S/GWI FOR AMBASSADOR VERVEER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UNSC RW SU GC XA
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY OBASANJO SHARES VIEWS ON DRC, SOUTH 
SUDAN 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes 
Obasanjo met with Ambassador Rice on June 29 and the P5 
Belgium on June 30.  He told Rice that neither Rwanda nor the 
DRC wanted to shelter former CNDP leader Nkunda. He suggested 
implementing greater incentives to encourage FDLR combatants 
to return to Rwanda.  Obasanjo said South Sudan still had the 
power to cause regional "mischief" and conveyed the message 
to the USG from South African President Zuma that South 
Africa "wants to work with the U.S. on Zimbabwe."  Obasanjo 
briefed the P5   Belgium on the challenges of integrating the 
DRC military, the need to push the DRC leadership to address 
gender-based violence, and said DRC President Kabila thought 
the UN would coordinate local elections (which the UN is not 
mandated to do).  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) United Nations Special Envoy for the Great Lakes 
Olusegun Obasanjo told Ambassador Rice on June 29 that he was 
seeing mixed success for his efforts as envoy to the Great 
Lakes.  He said former CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda was a "hot 
potato" wanted by neither the DRC nor Rwanda, and suggested 
sending Nkunda to a third country might be the best option. 
Obasanjo said he was encouraging a meeting between DRC 
President Kabila and Rwandan President Kagame in mid-July. 
He suggested strengthening the International Conference on 
the Great Lakes to add stability to the region. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Obasanjo said relations between Rwanda and the DRC 
were improving, and that the DRC had sent the name of its 
proposed ambassador to the Rwandan government.  He thought 
the FDLR rebel group was no longer a potent force but was 
still a major concern after splintering into many groups of 
15-20 combatants each.  Obasanjo said there must be a 
political solution, noting a purely military operation would 
most likely not fully uproot the FDLR from the DRC.  He 
suggested that Rwanda should offer more incentives to former 
combatants to return, reintegrate and resettle in Rwanda. 
Obasanjo warned of the destabilizing potential of expatriate 
FDLR leaders and suggested more be done to restrain their 
propaganda and fund-raising in Europe and North America. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Obasanjo gave Ambassador Rice a copy of the letter 
he sent to DRC President Kabila on 26 June 2009, in which he 
expressed his "shock and horror" at the rapes of female 
inmates by FARDC soldiers during the recent prison unrest in 
Goma.  Referring to the list of five FARDC officers accused 
of gender-based violence in the east that the Security 
Council gave to the DRC government during its visit in May, 
Ambassador Rice said she was disappointed that Kabila had to 
date taken no evident action.  Rice called President Kabila's 
reaction to the Council's concern a "litmus test" of the 
sincerity of his stated intent to address impunity. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Concerning South Sudan, Obasanjo said the 
international community must encourage all parties to accept 
the results of the upcoming election and referendum, 
suggesting South Sudan still had the power to "cause 
mischief" in the region.  He said "if there is to be a 
(North/South) divorce, let's make it an amicable one."  He 
said now is the time to plan for post-referendum action for 
Sudan. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Obasanjo delivered a message from South African 
President Zuma to Ambassador Rice, saying "South Africa wants 
to work with the U.S. on Zimbabwe."  Obasanjo believed Zuma 
is interested in improving relations with the United States. 
 
¶7. (SBU) On June 30, Obasanjo told the P5 and Belgium's 
PermRep that the amalgam of militias incorporated into the 
DRC army in eastern Congo needed to be paid, barracked, and 
disciplined, but the DRC government lacked capacity to 
accomplish any of these requirements.  Obasanjo reported 
300,000 internally-displaced persons (IDPs) had returned home 
since the incorporation of the CNDP into the DRC army, but 
noted an additional 150,000 IDPs had been created because of 
the joint operations against the FDLR.  He said that it may 
be time to put greater emphasis on a political approach to 
the issues of the Kivus, instead of relying solely on 
military operations.    Obasanjo commented that concrete 
benchmarks for security sector reform and for regional 
cooperation would be beneficial. 
 
¶8. (SBU) In response to a question posed by Ambassador 
DiCarlo regarding how to best address the issue of sexual 
violence in the DRC, Obasanjo said all perpetrators of sexual 
violence must be "brought to book," and President Kabila and 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000652  002 OF 002 
 
 
the DRC Minister of Justice must be pressured to take action 
at the highest level to address impunity.  He said the DRC is 
not responding well to the issue of gender-based violence, 
and he encouraged the international community to continue to 
hold the DRC government accountable. 
 
9 (SBU) Responding to a French question regarding elections, 
Obasanjo said President Kabila told him that the UN was 
responsible for conducting regional elections (proposed for 
2009), and that the DRC would conduct the 2011 national 
elections.  Obasanjo said he did not believe the DRC would 
have the capacity to hold the 2011 elections itself, but the 
UN should act now to define its role in upcoming regional 
elections.  (NOTE: The P5   Belgium representatives were 
surprised to hear Kabila's opinion, as no clear mandate 
exists for the UN to be the sole coordinator of regional 
elections. END NOTE). 
 
 
 
RICE