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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000304 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2019 
TAGS: KACT MNUC NATO PREL RS EL EZ ZB
SUBJECT: U.S. DEBRIEFS ALLIES ON THE MOSCOW SUMMIT 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On July 8, Assistant Secretary of State for 
European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon and Assistant 
Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and 
Implementation Rose Gottemoeller briefed the North Atlantic 
Council (NAC) on the outcomes of the recent U.S.-Russia 
summit in Moscow, paying particular attention to the 
discussion related to a START follow-on treaty.  Permanent 
Representatives (PermReps) expressed appreciation for the 
timeliness and clarity of the briefings.  They also asked 
numerous questions on Georgia, offense/defense linkage, 
tactical nuclear weapons, and the Conventional Armed Forces 
in Europe (CFE) Treaty.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------- 
U.S.-Russia Summit - What We Achieved 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In a July 8 briefing to the North Atlantic Council, 
Assistant Secretary Gordon reiterated President Obama's view 
that continuing disagreements between the U.S. and Russia did 
not preclude the nations' ability to "turn the page" and find 
agreement on matters of common concern.  Norway and Spain 
reflected the consensus view of Allies in endorsing the U.S. 
two-track approach of working with Russia on issues of common 
agreement while also being frank about areas of disagreement. 
 
 
¶3. (C) A/S Gordon announced that the U.S. had achieved its 
goals in Moscow without "papering over" lingering 
disagreements.  He noted the surprising success that the U.S. 
had achieved in Moscow, particularly with the Joint Statement 
on Missile Defense (MD).  Heading into the summit, it had 
appeared unlikely that Moscow would cooperate in this 
difficult area.  Moscow had been "testing" the U.S., Gordon 
said, and our principle-based resolve not to give in on 
issues such as the European Missile Defense Site had led to 
Russian cooperation on that issue at the summit.  Also 
noteworthy were the agreement allowing lethal materials to 
pass through Russian territory in transit to Afghanistan and 
the Joint Understanding on further reductions of and 
limitations to strategic offensive arms, affecting both 
warheads and delivery vehicles.  A/S Gordon announced that in 
Spring 2010 the U.S. will host a follow-up summit on nuclear 
security, with Russia hosting a subsequent meeting. 
 
--------------------------- 
The post-START negotiations 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller briefed that the 
summit followed-up the dialogue launched by Presidents Obama 
and Medvedev in London on April 1, informing PermReps that 
much progress had been achieved in the three months that had 
elapsed.  Those achievements included the development of a 
framework and basic substantive points for a new post-START 
treaty, with work on the text to begin the week of July 12 in 
Geneva.  She said that Russia had bought into the basic idea 
of developing a hybrid of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START) and Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) 
treaties, combining the verification mechanisms of START with 
adapted counting mechanisms taken from SORT.  This new hybrid 
treaty would combine the predictability of START with the 
flexibility of SORT.  Instead of just limits on warheads, as 
provided for by SORT, this new hybrid would also allow for 
limits on strategic delivery vehicles, as provided for by 
START.  A/S Gottemoeller stated that perhaps the biggest 
achievement of this summit was that the Russians agreed to a 
modification of the attribution rules of the START Treaty, 
which would allow for more thorough, intrusive verification 
of warheads on delivery vehicles.  Another achievement she 
noted was on the "freedom to mix" proposal, which provides 
that despite prescribed limits on warheads and delivery 
vehicles, each side would maintain the freedom to determine 
its own force structure. 
 
¶5. (C) A/S Gottemoeller admitted that three problem areas 
remained.  First, Russia had raised the issue of "upload 
potential" of warheads or delivery systems.  Second, in 
regards to the offensive/defensive relationship, Russia tried 
to insert a "minor anti-ballistic missile" treaty into the 
 
USNATO 00000304  002 OF 003 
 
 
negotiations, but the United States had insisted that the 
negotiations were only to focus on strategic offensive arms, 
consistent with the London tasking by the two presidents. 
Third, Russia remained concerned about conventional 
long-range or "global strike" systems for which, A/S 
Gottemoeller replied, more transparency would be needed. 
 
¶6. (C) A/S Gottemoeller also briefed the NAC on two issues of 
consequence to the Alliance.  First, the two sides agreed to 
mention in the preamble the strategic inter-relationship 
between offensive and defensive forces.  She made the point 
that this statement did not represent a new bargain, noting 
that this language was included in all previous strategic 
arms agreements, as well as repeated by former President Bush 
in May 2001.  Second, Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller stated 
that sub-strategic nuclear weapons would not be covered in 
current negotiations, but would be included in future 
negotiations following close consultations on this issue 
within the Alliance. 
 
¶7. (C) In response to many questions from Allies on Russia's 
linkage of the U.S. national missile defense so-called "Third 
Site" architecture in Poland and the Czech Republic and the 
development of a new framework agreement, A/S Gordon answered 
that Russia gave up its insistence on the linkage when it saw 
that the U.S. was not prepared to give in on this point.  He 
clarified that any decision to deploy assets to a European 
site will be driven solely by the threat from Iran, and the 
technology and cost-effectiveness of an MD system, all of 
which were the subject of the ongoing U.S. review, and not by 
any third party. 
 
¶8. (C) Some Allies asked if the CFE Treaty was included as 
part of the broader discussion.  A/S Gordon answered that it 
did not form a significant part of the discussion, although 
PM Putin had made familiar arguments that the CFE Treaty was 
unfair to Russia and that Russia should never have ratified 
it.  A/S Gottemoeller reported that she would have a 
bilateral meeting with her Russian counterpart on CFE before 
the end of August, adding that the U.S. would continue to 
consult with Allies. 
 
¶9. (C) In response to numerous questions about Iran, 
Assistant Secretary Gordon said that Russia remained 
unconvinced that applying further pressure and sanctions on 
Iran would deter its nuclear aspirations. 
 
---------------------- 
But Differences Remain 
---------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) A/S Gordon briefed that the U.S. had made clear 
continuing differences with Moscow over Georgia and Ukraine. 
President Obama had flatly rejected any Russian notion of 
privileged spheres of influence within Europe, and President 
Obama had declared that nations remained free to choose their 
alliances as they wish. 
 
-------------------------- 
Where Does this Leave NATO 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) After Spain asked if Russia preferred negotiating 
bilaterally with the U.S. rather than multi-laterally with 
NATO through the NATO-Russia Council,  Canada observed that 
whenever U.S.-Russia relations were on the upswing 
NATO-Russia relations often suffered.  In response to a 
related question by Romania, Assistant Secretary Gordon said 
that the Russians had seemed more forthcoming, practical, 
constructive and ready to move forward in Moscow than they 
had been at the NATO-Russia Council Ministerial meeting in 
Corfu in June.  But the U.S. had no interest in making 
progress in the bilateral forum at the expense of doing so in 
the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). 
 
------------------------------ 
The Medvedev Security Proposal 
------------------------------ 
 
¶12. (C) France asked if Russia elaborated on its proposed new 
European Security Architecture.  Assistant 
Secretary Gordon replied that the Russians only raised it 
 
USNATO 00000304  003 OF 003 
 
 
briefly in response to President Obama's statement that each 
country should have the freedom to choose its own alliances. 
 
------------ 
Human Rights 
------------ 
 
¶13. (C) In response to a question, A/S Gordon briefed that 
the President's speech at the New Economic School addressed 
the need to move beyond the antiquated, 19th century, Russian 
notion of zero-sum geopolitics.  In many of his private 
meetings, as well as in the speech, President Obama had 
raised the issues of democracy and human rights. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14. (C) PermReps roundly praised this "near-real time" 
briefing and the honesty of the Assistant Secretaries before 
the NAC.  Now the task before NATO is to weigh the impact of 
the U.S.-Russia summit and its consequences for the Alliance 
and Europe.  This briefing both informed that debate, and 
paved the way for better cooperation from Allies who 
recognize the United States is committed to NATO and keeping 
its members informed. 
 
¶15. (U) Assistant Secretary Gordon and Assistant Secretary 
Gottemoeller have cleared this message. 
DAALDER