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FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000443 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR 
BAGHDAD FOR HOLCOMBE 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN, DENYER AND CRISTOFARO) 
NSC FOR LUTES 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2019 
TAGS: PARM PREL OPCW CWC IQ
SUBJECT: CWC:  IRAQ ISSUES DURING OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 
SESSION, JULY 14-17, 2009 (EC-57) 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 415 
     ¶B. THE HAGUE 411 
 
Classified By: Janet E. Beik for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
This is CWC-43-09. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) In a series of bilateral meetings 
surrounding Executive Council 57 (EC-57) the week 
of July 13, members of the U.S. delegation met with 
Iraqi Ambassador Siamand Banaa, new Iraqi delegate 
to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW) Muhanned Al-Miahi, Iraqi Foreign 
Ministry official Jwan Khioka, senior OPCW 
Technical Secretariat (TS) officials, and British 
representatives to discuss a range of issues. 
Topics included security for TS officials traveling 
to Iraq, possible assistance to Iraq, and the 
chemical weapons (CW) recovered by the U.S. and UK 
in Iraq before it joined the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC).  It was clear from conversations 
with the Iraqi officials that communications gaps 
between Baghdad and The Hague remain significant 
and likely will continue to slow progress in Iraq's 
implementation of the CWC.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
SECURITY FOR TS PERSONNEL IN IRAQ 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Following their earlier meeting with OPCW 
Deputy Director-General (DDG) John Freeman (UK) on 
July 10 (ref A), Delreps Beik and Smith called on 
Iraqi Ambassador Siamand Banaa on July 13 to 
request a meeting with the Iraqi delegation during 
EC-57.  They were introduced to Muhanned Al-Miahi, 
Iraqi third secretary and newly-designated delegate 
to the OPCW.  Abbas Al-Khafaji, who had previously 
worked OPCW issues in The Hague, has been moved to 
another portfolio.  Ambassador Banaa said Director- 
General Pfirter had phoned him about security for 
the TS team to go to Iraq; Banaa had sent the 
request back directly both to the Foreign Ministry 
and the Deputy Director for Intelligence.  Banaa 
noted the importance of good security under the 
Iraqi authorities, especially given the UN's 
history in Iraq following the bombing of the UN 
office and the death of UN Special Representative 
Sergio Vieira De Mello in 2003.  He advised that 
information about the dates and specific movements 
of the TS team be restricted, with no publicity on 
the visit until after it was completed. 
 
¶3. (SBU) U.S. Delreps, led by EC Representative 
Mikulak, met bilaterally with the Iraqi delegation 
on July 16.  Jwan Khioka and Muhanned Al-Miahi 
attended for Iraq without Ambassador Banaa.  In 
addition to assistance (see below), the question of 
security for the OPCW visits was raised.  Delreps 
stated that security is the responsibility of the 
Iraqi government, and should be handled in Baghdad, 
not The Hague.  They noted that the OPCW has a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the UN that 
includes security provisions; the TS would consult 
the UN for advice and assistance, as necessary. 
Given the UN's MOU with the U.S. for security 
assistance in Iraq, Delreps suggested that that 
document might form the basis for any arrangements 
Qdocument might form the basis for any arrangements 
made for the TS staff, and offered to provide a 
copy of the MOU later. 
 
¶4. (C) On July 17, Ambassador Banaa requested an 
urgent meeting with Delrep Beik and Representative 
Mikulak on short notice.  Khioka and Al-Miahi 
accompanied the ambassador.  Banaa seemed to 
believe that the U.S. was working the security 
issue independently without consulting him, and 
insisted on better coordination.  Delrep repeated 
what had been discussed with Banaa's delegation the 
day before, that security arrangements needed to be 
coordinated in Baghdad between the Iraqi government 
and OPCW, and that OPCW needed to work within the 
UN framework, formally requesting U.S. assistance 
if needed.  Delrep gave the ambassador a copy of 
the UN-U.S. MOU on security in Iraq, which had been 
offered the day before.  Delreps repeated their 
message from the previous meeting that established 
contacts and procedures would be useful as visits 
are planned, as well as clarification on how much 
lead time is necessary for security requests.  To 
Khioka's statement that someone from the American 
Embassy would accompany the TS team, Delreps also 
clarified that the U.S. does not normally 
participate in bilateral TS visits in any country 
and would not expect to do so in Iraq, unless 
invited by the Iraqi government. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In a later telephone call to DDG Freeman, 
Delrep asked if the TS had the UN-U.S. MOU; Freeman 
requested a copy.  He informed Delrep that a letter 
from the Iraqi Ambassador two days earlier had 
contained assurances for security that the TS 
considered sufficient under the Convention.  OPCW, 
he said, will proceed as they normally do, with 
advice and assistance from the UN, and had offered 
new timelines for the team's initial visit. 
Freeman agreed with Delrep that communications all 
around have had gaps and that ongoing coordination 
would be important to move things forward. 
 
---------------------------- 
IRAQI REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) During the July 13 meeting with Ambassador 
Banaa introducing new U.S. (Smith) and Iraqi (Al- 
Miahi) delegates, Banaa briefly described a list of 
requirements that the Government of Iraq intended 
to circulate to prospective donors/partners.  He 
stated that several governments (Germany, Japan, 
Serbia) have expressed interest in assisting Iraq, 
but expressed concern over the lack of planning. 
This list of requirements was later provided by Al- 
Miahi to the U.S. delegation for review (copy 
scanned to ISN/CB). 
 
¶7. (SBU) During the larger July 16 bilateral 
meeting with the Iraqi delegation, Jwan Khioka 
inquired about the status of an official U.S. 
response to the earlier Iraqi request for 
assistance.  Delreps stated that it was under 
consideration and that a response will likely be 
released prior to the upcoming visit this fall of 
Iraqi officials to Washington.  Delreps requested 
that, in addition to General Ali, representatives 
from the Foreign Ministry also join the visit to 
discuss the response initially in Washington, 
Qdiscuss the response initially in Washington, 
followed by a more detailed discussion in October 
in The Hague on the margins of the next Executive 
Council session (EC-58). 
 
¶8. (SBU) Khioka also asked whether the U.S. had 
received a copy of Iraq's detailed plan for 
destruction of its remaining CW.  Delreps replied 
that they had not, but offered to provide comments, 
if requested.  They noted that the CWC destruction 
 
experts are based in Washington; however, Embassy 
Baghdad, or the Delegation in The Hague, could 
forward the destruction plan to appropriate 
Washington offices, as had been done for the draft 
initial declaration. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In a bilateral meeting with Delreps July 
15, Canadian representatives Louis-Philippe 
Sylvestre and Angela Peart expressed an interest in 
providing assistance to the Government of Iraq in 
meeting its CWC treaty obligations.  Sylvestre 
stated that although Canada would likely not be 
able to commit personnel, there is government 
interest in providing equipment and other 
assistance.  The Global Partnership Program is a 
possible vehicle for assistance.  It was originally 
established as a mechanism for providing assistance 
to the former Soviet Union, but it has been 
extended globally.  Sylvestre said coordination 
with the Global Partnership Program has been very 
successful and could work for Iraq.  He fully 
supported having a collective of countries provide 
assistance to Iraq and would be interested in 
discussing this further with the United States and 
the UK. 
 
¶10. (SBU) DDG Freeman informed Delrep that he had 
authorized re-prioritization of the 2009 Budget to 
allow the TS to fund Iraqi participation in UK/U.S. 
training for the National Authority in the UK later 
this year. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
U.S. AND UK RECOVERED CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) As during the last Executive Council (EC- 
56), several countries (Iran, Russia, South Africa) 
raised questions about the U.S. and UK destruction 
of CW found in Iraq before it joined the CWC.  In a 
surprise intervention during the informal meeting 
on destruction July 13, Iraqi Ambassador Banaa 
informed member states that all such questions 
should be directed to his government.  In later 
bilateral meetings, Delreps thanked him for his 
forthright statement, assured him that the U.S. 
would direct any such questions we might receive to 
his delegation, and promised to provide any 
information in response first to his delegation. 
 
¶12. (C) Delreps met privately with OPCW Legal 
Adviser Santiago Onate (Mexico) on July 15 to seek 
his views on the role of the OPCW regarding U.S. 
and UK recovered Iraqi CW.  Onate referred to the 
views he expressed earlier to Delreps (ref B) and 
in his April 2009 conference call with U.S. legal 
counsel Brown (State) and Wager (DoD).  He 
reiterated those views:  the U.S. and UK letters in 
April are not declarations under the CWC; the 
circumstances surrounding the Iraqi CW recoveries 
were not contemplated by the framers of the 
Convention; all of the CWC obligations of a State 
Party could not be met if the recoveries were 
viewed as falling within the provisions of the CWC; 
and, as there was no CWC requirement to report any 
information, any information reported should be 
treated as a voluntary transparency measure.  In 
the meeting, Onate also pointed out that the TS 
Qthe meeting, Onate also pointed out that the TS 
would not be capable of carrying out the supporting 
functions described by the Convention in a 
situation of conflict, as the TS would have neither 
authority nor security, and the location was that 
of a non-State Party to the CWC. 
 
¶13. (C) Onate added that the acceptance by the TS 
 
of an offer by the U.S. and UK to review their 
records would not be considered an inspection and, 
therefore, no inspection report would be issued. 
He stressed that there is no requirement in the CWC 
for such a review.   Any report would simply 
describe the actions the TS had performed, the 
contents of the reviewed documents, and might be 
analogous to the report on the recent Executive 
Council visit to Pueblo and Umatilla.  Onate opined 
that other States Parties would be mostly 
interested in the disposition of the CW.  He 
concluded that the issue was a political question 
as to whether the events would be treated as an 
instance of CWC non-compliance, which would be 
futile, or, taking the South African proposal at 
face value, might provide an opportunity to learn 
what might be useful for similar situations in the 
future.  Onate did question why the U.S. and the UK 
informed the UN Security Council but not the OPCW. 
Delreps pointed out that joint U.S./UK letter to 
the UNSC was in response to the earlier 
resolution's (UNSCR 1483) provision requesting the 
information. 
 
¶14. (C) Delegation legal adviser Gibbs and other 
U.S. and UK delegation members participated in a 
telephone conversation with UK legal counsel Louise 
Symons (MOD) on July 16 regarding the UK's legal 
analysis supporting their Schedule 1 Declaration 
submitted to the TS in April.  Symons believed that 
the CWC applied to the Iraqi CW recoveries but that 
UNSCR 1483 relieved the UK of any possible non- 
compliance.  Gibbs pointed out that, if the 
applicability of the CWC was conceded, future 
recoveries under different circumstances would 
place CWC States Parties in an awkward situation if 
no UNSCR were available.  Symons agreed and stated 
that she had not considered such possibilities. 
She suggested that the UK might be willing to agree 
that events like the recoveries were not 
contemplated when the CWC was negotiated and that 
the CWC therefore would not be "relevant," but she 
said that further discussions would first be 
necessary with UK MOD counsel. 
 
¶15. (C) In discussing the immediate problem, the 
submission of the UK Declaration, it was generally 
felt that an attempt at withdrawal would be 
immediately noticeable and subject to scrutiny. 
Gibbs stated that any solution would be welcome 
that was not prejudicial to the characterization of 
an intended U.S. transparency filing on the 
recoveries.   A possible solution would be informal 
solicitation of a letter from the TS to the UK 
requesting clarification of the nature of the UK 
Declaration,  to which the UK would respond that 
the submission was intended not as a formal 
Declaration but as a transparency measure provided 
in the format most familiar to the TS, that of a 
Declaration.   Gibbs suggested, and Symons agreed, 
that further legal consultations by e-mail would be 
appropriate. 
 
--------------------------- 
RECORDS REVIEW PREPARATIONS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶16. (C) On July 15, Delreps Hoggins, Ozga, Robinson 
Q16. (C) On July 15, Delreps Hoggins, Ozga, Robinson 
and Smith met with Director of Verification Horst 
Reeps (Germany) to discuss the ongoing preparations 
for a visit by the TS to review the U.S. 
destruction records for recovered CW in Iraq.  The 
group identified the first week of September 2009 
as a target date for this activity.  Reeps said he 
does not expect extensive records and understands 
 
that the reporting was conducted in a combat 
situation.  He noted that the team will likely 
comprise just himself and Senior Chem Demil Officer 
Gabriela Coman-Enescu (Romania).  When asked about 
the expected product from this visit, Reeps 
speculated that it could be a joint report prepared 
in a combined effort of transparency by the U.S. 
and the TS.  He stated that the report would be 
internal to the TS and would be delivered to the 
DG; the DG might then make an oral or written 
report on the matter to the Executive Council. 
 
------------------------------ 
PLAN TO INSPECT IRAQI BUNKERS? 
------------------------------ 
 
¶17. (C) On July 16, Delreps Robinson and Smith 
called on Senior Chem Demil Officer Jeff Osborne 
(U.S.).  Osborne explained that he had prepared a 
proposal to the DG detailing how investigation of 
the bunkers in Iraq could be conducted.   He said 
the DG had noted the proposal as a possible tool to 
assist Iraq, if requested.  Osborne was not aware 
of any specific requests from Iraq for assistance 
from the TS.  Delreps expressed considerable 
concern over the potential safety and environmental 
risks of Osborne's proposed fact-finding.  While 
Osborne believes that the TS is qualified to 
perform this task, Delreps wondered whether he had 
current and complete information.  Osborne 
explained that the proposal will not be presented 
to Iraq and that the decision remains with the DG. 
 
----------- 
DEL COMMENT 
----------- 
 
¶18. (C) While the OPCW Technical Secretariat has a 
range of views on Iraq -- from Jeff Osborne 
volunteering to go, to greater caution by those 
responsible for the safety of OPCW staff -- TS 
coordination is controlled by the current Director- 
General and his Deputy. 
 
¶19. (C) On the other hand, messages between the 
OPCW, the Iraqi Embassy in The Hague, and Baghdad 
continue to show major gaps.  The Iraqi 
Ambassador's plea for greater coordination is valid 
internally as well as with the U.S., UK and TS. 
Delreps tried to emphasize in all of their meetings 
with the Iraqi delegation that Iraq must take the 
lead, the U.S. is ready to assist if needed, and 
that the central point for security issues lies in 
Baghdad, while CWC-related questions should include 
The Hague.  Del believes Jwan Khioka got the 
message; we were not so sure about Ambassador Banaa 
or his new delegate, Al-Miahi. 
 
¶20. (C) Donor coordination will likely be needed in 
the future, but it may be too early to put too many 
players into the loop until the Iraqis have the 
basic elements of their implementation plan settled 
with the TS. 
 
¶21. (U) BEIK SENDS. 
 
GALLAGHER