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Viewing cable 09THEHAGUE436, CWC: INDUSTRY CLUSTER MEETINGS, JULY 9, 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09THEHAGUE436 2009-07-20 11:05 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy The Hague
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0436/01 2011105
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201105Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3063
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAC PRIORITY
UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000436 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN, DENYER AND CRISTOFARO) 
NSC FOR LUTES 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL EIND OPCW CWC
SUBJECT: CWC:  INDUSTRY CLUSTER MEETINGS, JULY 9, 2009 
 
REF: A. TS NON-PAPER ON 2A/2A* LOW CONCENTRATIONS 
        QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS (07/08/09) 
     B. FACILITATOR'S DRAFT DECISION ON 2A/2A* LOW 
        CONCENTRATIONS (07/08/09) 
     C. TS NON-PAPER ON OCPF DECLARATION ENHANCEMENTS 
        (07/01/09) 
     D. THE HAGUE 362 
     E. STATE 52991 
 
This is CWC-40-09. 
 
1.   SUMMARY:  Both industry consultations on July 
9 included presentations and discussion of new 
technical data gathered to aid consultations, along 
with a continuation of discussions from the May 
consultations on low concentration limits for 
Schedule 2A/2A* chemicals and enhancements to the 
OCPF declaration regime.  Little progress was made 
in either consultation, and no further steps were 
taken to advance or formulate draft decisions for 
the Schedule 2A/2A* or OCPF consultations.  Though 
some new views were brought forward, delegations 
primarily repeated long-held positions.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------- 
2A/2A* LOW CONCENTRATIONS 
------------------------- 
 
2.   Facilitator Giuseppe Cornacchia (Italy) opened 
the session by introducing the new Executive 
Council Vice-Chair for Industry Issues, Sudanese 
Ambassador Abuelgasim Idris, and then turned the 
floor over to Ken Penman (Senior Information 
Evaluation Officer, Verification Division), who 
provided a briefing on the responses to the 
voluntary questionnaire and the data contained in 
the associated Technical Secretariat (TS) non-paper 
(ref A).  Penman noted that the TS so far has 
received responses from 21 States Parties, 15 of 
whom reported no Schedule 2A/2A* activity above the 
weight threshold.  The remaining six States Parties 
provided responses accounting for fifteen plant 
sites, seven of which are currently declared and 
eight which are not.  Nine currently-declared plant 
sites were included in the results in the non-paper 
based on inspection reporting alone.  A total of 
twenty-four plant sites are included in the 
results.  Results on eight new plant sites came 
from three States Parties, two of which have never 
declared any Schedule 2A/2A* plant sites.  Based on 
open-source information, the TS believes there 
could be an additional 10-15 plant sites.  (DEL 
NOTE:  The Chinese delegate later confirmed to 
Delreps that China had not responded to the 
questionnaire as it already declares all of its 
Schedule 2A/2A* facilities, which would account for 
at least some of the nine currently-declared sites 
not included in questionnaire responses.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
3.   Follow-up discussions on the questionnaire 
results revealed predictable and long-held 
positions.  The UK led off the discussion by 
commenting that it wants maximum transparency and 
visibility.  Gaining sites is attractive while 
losing sites is unattractive.  The UK noted that 
some delegations may view the information as 
partial (given that the results did not account for 
nine of the presently-declared plant sites), but 
contended that the bulk of activities are 
represented.  Addressing Figure 2 of the non-paper, 
the UK indicated it favors the "left side" of the 
table, i.e., the lower concentration thresholds, 
the lowest of which (less-than-or-equal-to five 
Qthe lowest of which (less-than-or-equal-to five 
percent) would capture an additional eight plant 
sites. 
 
4.   The UK comment regarding visibility and 
"favoring the left side" was echoed in varying 
degrees by Australia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Italy, Ireland and Finland.  South Africa noted 
that it regulates at 10% and is flexible to go much 
lower, but inherently believes this is a political 
issue.  South Africa emphasized that these are 
scheduled chemicals and should be dealt with due to 
their relative toxicity.  South Africa commented 
that, compared to the ongoing discussions on OCPFs, 
significant gains can be achieved by setting a 
common threshold for Schedule 2A/2A* chemicals with 
a small impact. 
 
5.   China noted that a 0.5% threshold would add 
eight plant sites, bringing the total of Schedule 2 
plant sites to 169 (a 5% increase).  Since only 21 
States Parties responded and over forty States 
Parties engage in declarable industry activity, the 
increase of Schedule 2 plant sites may be upwards 
of 8%. 
 
6.   Delrep commented that the questionnaire 
results are not particularly surprising and that 
new sites are still captured up to 10%.  Del 
further called for more flexibility and compromise 
on all sides.  Germany noted its flexibility, 
supported the U.S. position and commented that the 
questionnaire data is partial because not all PFIB 
sites have been included.  Thus, it is impossible 
to determine what is gained or lost without all the 
sites included.  Furthermore, Germany argued that 
visibility alone is not an aim in and of itself and 
that the survey was not necessary if the goal is to 
capture the maximum number of plant sites. 
 
7.   Apparently aware that its interventions in the 
May consultations were confusing to many 
delegations, Japan attempted to clarify its 
position and generally explain its goal in the 
"road map" tabled during the previous meeting. 
Japan noted that the information in the non-paper 
alone does not set the grounds for a regulatory 
threshold; the first step still should be to set 
the regulatory objectives.  Although this 
discussion was more concise than the May 
intervention, it did not appear to garner any more 
support from other delegations. 
 
8.   Halfway through the consultation, Cornacchia 
commented that the group's "inclination is to the 
left" where more plant sites are gained.  In an 
attempt to make progress, he suggested narrowing 
the threshold under consideration to a reasonable 
range, proposing 0-10% and asked if there was any 
opposition to this.  When no one else spoke up, 
Delrep stated that the U.S. would not go against 
consensus on narrowing the threshold range under 
discussion; however, having previously noted the 
United States' flexibility to move from 30% down to 
10%, Delrep pointed out that Cornacchia's proposed 
range of 0-10% greatly constrained any further U.S. 
flexibility.  Japan quietly did not support the 
proposal, reiterating its mantra that a logical 
reason is needed to define a particular range. 
 
9.   The consultation took an unexpected turn when 
Russia proposed returning to earlier discussions on 
dealing with each of the three chemicals 
individually, explaining that they are too unique 
to be treated collectively.  Russia acknowledged 
that, though the proposal is not new, it may be 
Qthat, though the proposal is not new, it may be 
time to reconsider this approach.  Japan supported 
the proposal.  Germany commented that the Russian 
proposal may be an easier solution to addressing 
the issue.  Italy reminded delegations that this 
approach was tried and rejected by States Parties 
during the previous consultations facilitated by 
Cornacchia's predecessor.  Though Italy favored 
this path in the past, it would only lead to delay 
at this point.  Delrep commented that the U.S. had 
tabled a differentiated approach previously, which 
had been rejected.  Delrep stated that that, if the 
Russian proposal can advance current discussion, 
the U.S. might reconsider it. However, Delrep 
stressed that, while the U.S. appreciates the 
interest of examining the issue logically, it is 
time to make a decision.  Sharing Italy's concerns, 
the UK (echoed by Australia, Ireland and the 
Netherlands) expressed its preference is to handle 
all three chemicals simultaneously, it can support 
splitting them up if it is quicker.  However, doing 
so would not change the UK's view on appropriate 
thresholds. 
 
10.   Cornacchia then raised his draft decision 
(ref B), and a brief discussion ensued.  He then 
solicited views on forwarding the draft decision to 
the Executive Council as a Conference Room Paper, 
in order to give some official status to the on- 
going consultations, which he explained so far has 
relied on informal non-papers.  The U.S., Australia 
and the UK supported Cornacchia's proposal, but 
India, Japan and Russia opposed it, so Cornacchia 
decided not proceed with asking the TS to make the 
draft decision a Conference Room Paper. 
 
----------------------------- 
OCPF DECLARATION ENHANCEMENTS 
----------------------------- 
 
11.   Facilitator Marthinus van Schalkwyk (South 
Africa) began his consultation with a brief 
introduction before asking Bill Kane (Head, 
Industry Verification Branch) to present the most 
recent TS informal paper on the R factor (ref C). 
Kane noted that the charts in the paper don't 
reveal the whole picture, specifically that 
inclusion of an R factor shifts sites within each 
of the three groupings (i.e., high, medium and low 
relevance).  In 2008, thirty of the 118 inspected 
sites (25%) were in the low relevance category and, 
with the R factor included, 50% of the 118 plant 
sites would be in the low relevance category. 
 
12.   India followed Kane's remarks with a lengthy 
intervention on its objection to the proposed 
approach.  Citing paragraph 9.65 of the report of 
the Second Review Conference (RevCon), India 
commented that the RevCon mandated that additional 
data must not impose any additional declaration 
obligations.  Utilization of voluntary submission 
of R-factor data, however, would adversely impact 
States Parties that do not adopt the proposal 
because it would result in these States Parties 
having higher A14 scores.  India proposed tweaking 
the existing A14 system rather than instituting new 
obligations. 
 
13.   Both China and Iran also cited the report of 
the Second Review Conference in justifying their 
concerns with the proposal.  China commented that 
the additional data brings an additional 
declaration burden and that the proposal needs to 
be looked at in conjunction with the OCPF plant 
site selection methodology. 
 
14.   Brazil, France, the UK, the Netherlands and 
Australia commented that provision of the data 
imposes no real burden and should not be difficult. 
The UK and Australia both noted that their chemical 
industry has responded positively to including the 
additional data in their declarations.  The UK 
Qadditional data in their declarations.  The UK 
opined that it is more burdensome to continue 
inspecting less relevant sites.  Interestingly, the 
Netherlands announced that it has begun calculating 
R-factor scores for all its OCPF sites to ascertain 
the impact, and encouraged other States Parties to 
undertake the same analysis. 
 
15.   Delrep commented that States Parties must 
understand the impact of proposed changes before 
agreeing to adopt them, given that the proposal 
represents a permanent addition to declaration 
forms for thousands of facilities.  The proposal 
should be adopted only if there are clear and 
significant improvements to the selection process; 
at this time, there is no clear indication any 
improvement would be substantial.  Delrep also 
noted that probability of selection is a factor of 
both the A14 score and geographic distribution, and 
that the impact of the R factor may be tempered 
depending on the geographic distribution 
calculation. 
 
16.   Germany repeated its view that, for the sake 
of simplicity, the proposed declaration changes 
could be reduced to one field indicating whether or 
not the process is continuous (as opposed to the 
four fields included in the current proposal). 
Germany encouraged others to consider its proposal 
and comment on it. 
 
17.   Cuba cited paragraph 8 of the non-paper, 
observing that the analysis conducted to date has 
been only for a small fraction of declared OCPF 
sites (118 out of 3,800).  Cuba and France both 
called for a simulation of all declared sites to 
get a better picture of the impact of R-factor 
data.  Kane and van Schalkwyk agreed to consider 
the request.  Peter Boehme (Senior Industry 
Officer, IVB) reminded delegations that the issue 
is only about probability, not certainty.  There 
will always remain some probability, no matter how 
slight, of selecting a low relevance site, such as 
a urea plant, for inspection. 
 
18.   Van Schalkwyk noted the difficulty in moving 
forward at this time and in basing conclusions on 
an evaluation of 118 sites.  Surprisingly, he went 
on to state that nothing could be done if States 
Parties choose to institute the proposal 
voluntarily or if the TS uses the additional 
information in selecting sites for inspection. 
India and France -- although France supports the 
proposal -- responded that discussions should avoid 
encouraging implementation of the proposed changes 
voluntarily or on an ad hoc basis, either by States 
Parties or the TS. 
 
19.   Van Schalkwyk concluded by observing that 
while there is some strong support for adopting the 
R factor, there also is doubt that it constitutes 
real change.  Countering India's opening remarks, 
the facilitator noted that changes to the 
declaration system can be implemented if they solve 
a problem.  The facilitator agreed to explore 
running a simulation for all 3,800 sites but 
commented that if this were done, States Parties 
must accept that it only represents a guess.  The 
facilitator decided not to pursue a draft decision 
until he can ensure there will not be a substantive 
fight over its contents. 
 
20.   BEIK SENDS. 
 
FOSTER