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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 000684 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN, CA/EX 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CASC CLOK CMGT CPAS CVIS CFED
SUBJECT: TFHO1: ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSULAR SECTION'S 
RESPONSE TO THE POLITICAL CRISIS 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00000684  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: The coup against President  Mel, Zelaya on 
June 28th tested the Consular Sections ability to safeguard 
American citizens in a time of political uncertainty.  The 
section proved to be up to the challenge, successfully 
processing hundreds of AmCit calls on the ACS hotline, and 
making efficient use of the warden system and embassy website 
to keep the American population in Honduras and the United 
States updated on the unfolding political situation, and 
travel precautions.  This cable explores the section,s 
response to the political crisis, and takes a look at lessons 
learned from this experience, to better prepare this section 
and other posts for similar emergencies in the future. End 
Summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
ACS Hotline: Responding to the Crisis 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) In the week that followed the coup, the American 
Citizen Services hotline was inundated with over 125 calls 
per day; to handle the high volume, the Consular Section 
closed to all but select emergency American Citizen Services. 
 In the first week, calls were predominantly from AmCits in 
Honduras, seeking embassy advice on evacuation, travel and 
transportation, and general information on the political 
situation.  As the crisis continued to unfold (and receive 
attention from the international media), the number of 
in-country calls were matched in number by calls from the 
United States.  The hotline received calls from family 
members, congressional offices, universities, and church 
groups, inquiring after AmCits in Honduras and the status of 
the U.S. travel policy to the country.  The number of 
coup-related calls decreased substantially in the weeks that 
followed, holding steady for the past 1.5 weeks at around 
five coup-related calls out of the approximately 50 calls the 
ACS phone line receives daily.  Calls in recent days are from 
AmCits in the United 
States, seeking Embassy recommendations for upcoming travel 
to Honduras; though advised on the embassy,s position to 
defer all nonessential travel, these callers have appeared 
reluctant to rethink or postpone their travel arrangements. 
 
------------------------------------- 
The Wardens: Reports from the Field 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (U) About ten days after the coup, the Consular Section 
attempted to individually contact its wardens to better 
assess the aftermath of the crisis (in terms of protest and 
travel restrictions) across Honduras.  In total, 14 wardens 
were reached, representing 9 of the 11 zones in Honduras in 
which the embassy has a warden presence.  Wardens 
representing COPA zone - which includes the tourist site 
Copan - could not be reached, while wardens covering the 
Tegucigalpa zone were not contacted.  Most other wardens 
reported that activity in their zones had calmed down 
substantially from the week following the coup.  The number 
of protests (if they had not died down completely) had 
decreased dramatically, and any protests in the last few days 
had been peaceful.  There were few roadblocks; wardens 
reported buses and commercial vehicles entering and exiting 
their zones without difficulty.  Any military/police presence 
appeared to be nominal.  Wardens in the Bay Islands reported 
calm but expressed concern for tourist businesses due to the 
stream of tourists leaving the islands due to the political 
situation, as well as the embassy,s travel recommendations 
dissuading travel to Honduras. 
 
------------------------------------ 
NIV Activity and Patterns Post Coup 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (U) The Consular Section was closed to Non-Immigrant Visa 
services the week following the coup, re-opening July 7 for 
scheduled interviews.  Officers reported nothing out of the 
ordinary among applicants or their expressed reasons for 
obtaining visas, adding that applicants who have been 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00000684  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
interviewed since the coup were scheduled well before June 
¶28.  Two notable exceptions were interviewed the week of July 
20 when the attorney for the mayor of San Pedro Sula, as well 
as the mayor,s son interviewed for an NIV.  Both sought 
temporary shelter in the US in order to escape the threats on 
their lives following the arrest of the AmCit SPS mayor (he 
was later released).  Also of note, the families of two 
Supreme Court justices requested that their B1/B2 visas be 
"transferred" to their diplomatic passports.  While the 
Consular Section has refused to accept or review any visa 
applications from the de-facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a 
handful of diplomatic visas from the Honduran 
government-in-exile have been approved.  The number of 
referrals has increased as the wait time for a regular 
appointment has increased and pro-Zelaya applicants appear 
nervous about being able to leave the country.  The Consular 
section put in place a procedure whereby all B referrals may 
contact the call center and will automatically be considered 
for an expedited appointment.  Starting July 27th, officers 
will start interviewing regular applicants who scheduled NIV 
interviews after the June 28th coup; however the NIV section 
does not anticipate many applicants requesting visas solely 
because of the political unrest. 
 
----------------------------------- 
American Citizen Services Post-Coup 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) The Consular Section opened only for emergency 
American Citizen Services the week following the coup.  ACS 
issued four CRBAs (Consular Report for Birth Abroad) for 
American citizens leaving the country in light of the 
political unrest.  ACS resumed normal operations July 7.  In 
the two weeks following the coup, the ACS hotline received a 
large number of calls from AmCits in Honduras looking to 
acquire emergency passports.  However, AmCits were informed 
that the embassy would not issue emergency passports for 
reasons related to the coup; such requests would be processed 
within 10 days, the normal turnaround.  Only one emergency 
passport (for a child) was issued specifically for reasons 
related to the political unrest. 
 
--------------- 
Lessons Learned 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (U) Consular staff quickly responded to the needs of 
American citizens in the aftermath of the coup, processing 
hundreds of calls to the hotline, and updating warden 
messages, talking points, and the embassy page in a timely 
manner, effectively upholding the Mission,s goal to enhance 
the security and well-being of American citizens in Honduras. 
 The section emerged with some lessons learned from its 
response to the crisis: 
 
¶7. (U) First, training all LES on the CTF system is 
imperative to a successful response to a crisis in which 
there is a high volume of calls to the ACS hotline.  In the 
week following the coup, there were 5 FSOs and 3-4 ACS LES 
answering the phones at any given time.  However, the high 
volume of calls left those on the hotline with little time to 
effectively log calls into the Crisis Services system in CTF. 
 Meanwhile, other LES in the office, who were available to 
answer calls, were not trained in the CTF system, and 
therefore had no reliable access to our talking points, and 
no way to log calls.  The section,s response was to hold a 
CTF training mid-week for all LES, increasing the 
number of people available to process calls, and freeing FSOs 
to resume visa services the following week. 
 
¶8. (U) Second, in the event that visa services should be shut 
down for an extended period of time, the consular section 
learned the value of maintaining close ties to CSC staff; 
with their assistance, the vast majority of 950 NIV 
applicants had their missed appointments rescheduled within 
72 hours.  This proactive relationship with CSC, as well as 
the prompt press release to Honduran media detailing the 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00000684  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
closure of the section no doubt greatly reduced the number of 
NIV-related calls to the section, thereby creating more time 
to respond to ACS calls. 
 
¶9. (U) Third, NIV realized that it should have opened more 
slots for emergency visa appointments to better accommodate 
applicants who, due to the section,s four-day closure, were 
now under time constraints for their visas. 
 
¶10. (U) Finally, the section observed the importance of 
always having stand-by projects for NIV and IV FSOs.  Even 
with the high volume of calls on the ACS line, the absence of 
visa interviews left officers with a certain amount of 
downtime; having projects (or catch-up work to complete) 
constituted a more effective use of FSOs, time. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (U) The seamless integration of the NIV, IV, and ACS 
sections, in collaboration with the support received from CSC 
and the Department, allowed the section to efficiently and 
successfully serve U.S. citizen interests in a time of 
crisis.  End Comment. 
LLORENS