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DE RUEHSR #0017/01 2100954
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P 290954Z JUL 09
FM AMCONSUL STRASBOURG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0178
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHSR/AMCONSUL STRASBOURG 0189

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STRASBOURG 000017 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/29/2019 
TAGS: PREL PHUM COE FR GG RU
SUBJECT: COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND GEORGIA: LITTLE TO SHOW AFTER AUGUST 
WAR 
 
STRASBOURG 00000017  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Vincent Carver, CG, Strasbourg, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  The Council of Europe (COE) has had a very 
limited effect on post-conflict relations between Russia and 
Georgia.  The "quiet diplomacy" of the COE Commissioner of Human 
Rights has achieved only modest results.   While Georgia may 
seek the suspension of the Russian COE parliamentary 
delegation's credentials in September, we doubt that the COE 
will take such a bold step.  Inside Georgia, the COE's Venice 
Commission has labored to build with Tblisi a constitution that 
meets European standards,and a COE field office in Tbilisi has 
been coordinating local projects with other international actors 
in an attempt to encourage stability.   End summary. 
 
Political Maneuvers and Russian Threats 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The COE's Committee of Ministers' Deputies (resident 
ambassadors) and the COE Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) continue 
to debate "the consequences of the war between Russia and 
Georgia."  The PACE approved a resolution at the end of 
September 2008, denouncing the use of arms by both sides as 
"unacceptable."   Though it established that "truth is a 
precondition for reconciliation," the resolution did not focus 
on concrete investigation procedures.  Instead, the PACE 
implored both Georgian and Russian officials to first respect 
the European Convention on Human Rights and, second, to 
facilitate the work of the international monitors on the ground. 
 This approach - scold the various authorities, plead for the 
respect of COE human rights standards - was repeated in PACE's 
January (Resolution 1648) and April 2009 (Resolution 1664) 
sessions. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Special rapporteurs dispatched by the PACE to report 
on the consequences of the August 2008 war have produced some of 
the only incising statements against the involved parties.  In 
June 2009, they condemned Russia's veto of the continuation of 
the UNOMIG mandate, without which, they claimed, "Abkhazia is in 
danger of slipping into a human rights black hole." 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Then-Chairman of the Committee of Ministers (CM), Carl 
Bildt, presented a voice for the Ministers' Deputies during the 
August conflict.  Before the Deputies reconvened in September, 
the Chairman had urged Russia, Georgia, and the separatist 
administrations to adopt a cease-fire and, later, condemned 
Moscow's recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.  The Chair was likewise quick to reaffirm the 
territorial integrity of Georgia after the "so-called 
parliamentary elections" in South Ossetia in May 2009. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Swedish Chair continued to seek a strong resolution 
from the Deputies calling for the monitoring of all of Russia's 
and Georgia's COE commitments.  In response, the Russian 
Ambassador went on the offensive, threatening privately and 
publicly that Moscow would cease all cooperation with the COE if 
it were placed "on the same level as the aggressor - Georgia." 
Sweden turned over the chairmanship in late November to Spain. 
The Spanish took a more conciliatory approach and managed to 
obtain Russian acquiescence to regular reports from the COE 
Secretary General on the situation in Georgia.  Still, the 
Russians have balked at any COE criticism of their actions. 
 
 
Commissioner of Human Rights - Quiet but active diplomacy 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6. (SBU) Some of the most productive, albeit limited, efforts 
from Strasbourg to reconcile the two camps have come from the 
office of the Commissioner of Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, 
the COE's "quiet diplomat."  Hammarberg visited both Tbilisi and 
Moscow (in addition to conflict areas like Tskhinvali) from 
August 22 to 29, 2008.  Concluding that the war had incited a 
humanitarian disaster, the Commissioner presented six principles 
for the urgent protection of human rights: the right to return; 
the provision of sufficient aid and living conditions for 
refugees and returnees; the de-mining of combat zones; the 
re-establishment of law and order in the "buffer zone"; 
continued exchanges of detainees and POW; and an international 
humanitarian presence in affected areas.  These principles have 
become the COE's benchmarks for human rights progress in the 
Northern Caucasus.  Hammarberg has performed three subsequent 
visits to the region, the most recent in February 2009. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Hammarberg enjoys access to the various authorities 
involved in the Russia-Georgia conflict.  Since August, he has 
held talks with President Saakashvili and his Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, the Speaker of the Russian Duma, the Chairman 
of the Council of the Russian Federation, and the Deputy 
Minister for Foreign Affairs in Moscow.  He has maintained 
contact with FM Lavrov and the de facto PM of South Ossetia, 
Boris Chochiev.  His efforts include close cooperation with the 
Russian Ombudsman, the Georgian public defender, and the de 
 
STRASBOURG 00000017  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
facto Ombudsman in South Ossetia.  Hammarberg discussed further 
humanitarian work with Ilia II, Patriarch of the Georgian 
Orthodox Church.  It is this broad network that has allowed the 
Commissioner to get results - in October he secured the release 
by Georgian authorities of an adolescent Ossetian and his 
father, and in November he ensured the return of a number of 
corpses from Tskhinvali to Tbilisi. 
 
¶8.  (C) Still, Hammarberg has told us he is frustrated with 
continued obstructionism from the Russians and, at times, a lack 
of transparency from the Georgians.  He will continue, however, 
to underscore the importance of meeting his six principles to 
all interlocutors.  It is, indeed, Hammarberg's work and limited 
results that are touted by the COE as evidence of the COE's 
efficacy.  The Russians have seized upon this and threaten 
explicitly to cease "cooperation" with the Commissioner should 
the COE take "punitive measures" against Moscow, including 
equating Russian actions with Georgia's. 
 
Training the EUMM 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (U) One of the other modest results of the COE is the human 
rights training of over 200 European Union Monitoring Mission 
members. 
 
Venice Commission - Working with Georgia 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10. (U) The Venice Commission, the COE's independent advisory 
body on questions of constitutional law, has worked closely and 
consistently with Georgian authorities in the wake of the August 
war.  At the request of the Georgian officials, the Venice 
Commission considered and rendered opinions on two sets of 
constitutional amendments - mostly relating to the powers of the 
Executive and the use of referenda - and the Law on Occupied 
Territories of Georgia.  In June 2009, the Venice Commission 
accepted a request from the Georgian authorities to assess the 
most recent draft of the nation's Imprisonment Code. 
 
COE Field Office - Tbilisi 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶11. (U) The COE's field office in Tbilisi has promoted programs 
to support IDPs, combat violence in schools, and fight 
cybercrime.  It hosted a delegation from the COE Development 
Bank that discussed financing Georgian SMEs and prisons.  A 
resident Human Rights Adviser investigates allegations of human 
rights abuses, coordinates with the national Public Defender's 
Office, and informs not only Hammarberg's office, but other COE 
outfits and the EUMM as well. 
 
European Court of Human Rights - A wave of complaints 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶12. (U) On August 11, 2008, the Georgian government lodged a 
rare state-state complaint against Russia at the European Court 
of Human Rights, the full application for which was submitted in 
February.  While the merits of the case are still under 
consideration, a previous Georgia v. Russia complaint - 
concerning the harassment of the Georgian immigrant community in 
Russia, considered a reprisal for the arrest of four Russians by 
Georgian officials - was recently declared admissible by the 
Court. 
 
¶13. (SBU) By February 2009, 3,300 individual applications had 
been submitted against Georgia by those affected by the 
hostilities in South Ossetia in August 2008.  Several of our 
contacts have characterized the spike in complaints as having 
been orchestrated by Moscow.  At that same point, the Court had 
received 90 individual applications involving 565 alleged 
victims from Georgia complaining about violations perpetrated by 
the Russian Federation.  The Court in Strasbourg has not yet 
made clear how it will handle the overwhelming bulk of these 
cases. 
 
Comment 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶14. (C) The COE's continued discussions on the consequences of 
the August war demonstrate two key items.  The first is that the 
COE can effectively promote its "three pillars" - democracy, 
human rights, and the rule of law - only in permissive 
environments.  The second is the lack of political will from 
many member states, and therefore many in the COE's secretariat, 
to confront Russian aggression and threats.  Rather, many view 
limited engagement with Russia as better than confrontation. 
Despite the reported hope of the Georgian Ambassador to question 
the Russian parliamentary delegation's credentials at the late 
September PACE session, we doubt the COE will take such a 
 
STRASBOURG 00000017  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
"confrontational" stand.  Few here want to risk Russia's ending 
its limited cooperation with Commissioner Hammarberg.  Nor do 
they want Russia to walk away from the COE, even temporarily. 
As one German diplomat here told us, "Do not expect bold 
decisions - we aren't the Security Council, after all. 
CARVER