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DE RUEHSM #0446/01 2021642
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211642Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4538
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000446 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: NEI PREL ECON SENV ENRG EUR RU SW
SUBJECT: BALTIC SEA STRATEGY: A PRIORITY FOR SWEDISH EU 
PRESIDENCY 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Baltic Sea Strategy, a Swedish 
initiative that is one of its EU Presidency priorities, is a 
regional approach to deeper integration of environmental, 
economic, energy/transport, and security regulations and 
practices among the eight EU member states that surround the 
Baltic Sea.  The project will neither allocate additional 
funding nor add new institutions to the region, but will 
focus on better using existing resources by coordinating 
projects and the implementation of EU directives.  Russia 
remains outside the strategy, though negotiations on regional 
issues will continue with Russia through the Northern 
Dimension and between Russia and individual Member States. 
Comment: In the Swedish view, improving the economic 
stability and energy independence of the three former Soviet 
Baltic republics enhances its buffer against Russia.  End 
Comment and Summary. 
 
EU Presidency Priority 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) The Swedish government has highlighted the Baltic Sea 
Strategy (BSS) as one of its priorities for Sweden's upcoming 
EU presidency.  This is a regional approach to deeper 
integration among the eight Member States that border the 
Baltic Sea (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, and Germany), which collectively comprise 
over one-quarter of the EU's population.  It differs from the 
Union for the Mediterranean in that it only includes EU 
member states.  The strategy aims to look at development and 
integration of the region as a whole rather than focusing on 
the individual member states.  During a "Swedish Presidency 
2009" seminar held on May 28-29 by the Swedish Institute of 
International Affairs and the Swedish Institute for European 
Policy Studies, Adrian Solitander, DG Regional Policy of the 
European Commission, said that this is a pilot case for 
possible future regional approaches, such as the Danube. 
 
¶3. (U) The original initiative for the Baltic Sea Strategy 
came from Member States themselves and the European 
Parliament.  The Commission drafted a proposal on this topic 
and presented its action plan on June 10, and in its June 
18-19 meeting, the European Council endorsed it.  There will 
be a Ministerial Conference on the Baltic Sea Strategy in 
Stockholm on September 17-18.  The Swedish government hopes 
that consensus on a final plan will be reached at the 
European Council meeting in October. 
 
¶4. (U) The BSS is one of the few declared Swedish EU 
Presidency priorities in which Swedish efforts alone could 
lead to concrete deliverables.  Therefore, a concerted push 
on the BSS is likely during the Presidency.  One challenge is 
to market the Baltic Sea Strategy to the EU as a whole, while 
mollifying Russia, the ninth country bordering the Baltic. 
Rikard Bengtsson of Lund University suggested at the May 
28-29 seminar that framing the Baltic Sea Strategy in terms 
of its environmental rather than economic aspects would make 
non-Baltic member states more receptive; the EU appears to be 
marketing the strategy this way. 
 
Basic Strategy 
-------------- 
 
¶5.  (U) The strategy advocates pooling resources and 
advancing cooperation by coordinating implementation of EU 
directives in the areas of environment, transportation, and 
trade.  The BSS does not require such cooperation, but offers 
cooperation as a multiplier for allocated funds and creation 
of policy.  Even though the plan does not call for capital 
infusion to the region, there is hope that coordination under 
BSS will lead to greater effectiveness of existing EU support 
funds, some 50 billion euros from structural funds allocated 
to the region between 2007 and 2013 in 80 different projects. 
 
Environmental Cooperation 
------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) The eight nations will also work more closely on 
maritime and environmental issues, such as eutrophication, 
overfishing, and algal blooms.  These are critical to the 
region since the Baltic Sea is a shallow inland water system 
with limited circulation, which makes pollution a bigger 
issue than in other bodies of water.  Experts say that if a 
major oil spill occurred here, it would take over 20 years 
for the water to replenish itself.  Some environmental 
projects include phasing out phosphates in detergents, 
creating more effective fishing controls, and reducing the 
negative effects of fertilizers.  Each Member State has been 
put in charge of several of these associated projects; for 
example, Sweden will take the lead on decontaminating ship 
wrecks and nuclear weapons on the Baltic Sea floor. 
 
Economic Cooperation 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000446  002 OF 002 
 
 
-------------------- 
 
¶7.  (U) The Swedish government, as stated in its June 23 
"Work Programme for the Swedish Presidency," hopes that the 
Baltic Sea Strategy will help members of the region work 
together to meet the challenges of the financial crisis, 
which has deeply impacted these countries.  Economic 
cooperation in the region will include drafting similar 
legislation to implement EU directives that deal with 
internal market issues as well as several concrete projects 
to develop energy markets, infrastructure, and transport 
systems, including the construction of a new railway from 
Warsaw to Tallinn.  Other economic projects include creating 
larger joint initiatives in the areas of research, 
innovation, and entrepreneurship; working with small 
businesses; removing trade barriers; and increasing 
investments in IT and electronic communication. 
 
Security Cooperation 
-------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) Security coordination will focus on cooperation to 
prevent cross-border crime, with a special emphasis on human 
trafficking and organized crime.  The BSS aims to create a 
coordinated maritime surveillance system, which will provide 
for monitoring and joint surveillance of the Baltic as well 
as information and intelligence sharing between the BSS 
states.  The BSS would seem to entail only "soft" security 
cooperation rather than military-to-military cooperation, and 
MOD officials have told us there is no specific mil-mil 
cooperation envisioned under the BSS.  They add, however, 
that the type of common sea operating picture called for 
under the BSS would be an extremely important for their 
defense planning. 
 
No Real Role for Russia 
----------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) The Baltic Sea Strategy does not include a direct role 
for Russia.  According to presenters at the May 28-29 
seminar, Russia is skeptical of the BSS and Sweden will be 
pressed to develop the BSS without raising Russian 
suspicions, especially on the sensitive issue of energy. 
Negotiations with Russia on regional issues will still take 
place through the Northern Dimension, the EU's program for 
coordinating on regional issues with non-EU member states 
Norway, Iceland, and Russia.  The BSS is not meant to replace 
this, though DG Solitander stated that this strategy may 
encourage a more flexible approach among Member States in 
dealing with Russia in regional issues where a clear 
EU-Russia partnership does not yet exist, such as integration 
of maritime surveillance in the Baltic. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The BSS is the latest in a number of public and 
private fora geared at enhancing cooperation among the Baltic 
Sea states since the end of the Cold War.  Like earlier 
initiatives - and extensive bilateral cooperation between the 
Nordics, and their formerly communist neighbors - the BSS is 
aimed at deepening the integration of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania into the west and reducing the amount of leverage 
that Russia can exert over them.  In the Swedish view, 
improving the economic stability and energy independence of 
the three former Soviet republics enhances its buffer against 
Russia, Stockholm's traditional if often unenunciated threat. 
Defense Minister Sten Tolgfors publicly highlighted the 
Baltic dimension of Sweden's new defense policy in his 3 July 
speech, stressing the need for joint maritime surveillance to 
guard against environmental and military threats. Sweden and 
the other Nordic countries, whose banks have considerable 
investments in the three Baltic states, will also gain 
directly from economic improvement there and from 
environmental initiatives that are popular with publics fed 
up with swimming among algal mats. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Comment Continued: Given Sweden's small size and 
the many external factors that could scuttle its other 
headline EU presidency goals -- procuring global agreement on 
climate change and ameliorating the effects of the financial 
crisis -- we expect Stockholm to work quietly but steadily on 
getting the BSS off the ground.  In Stockholm the strategy is 
coordinated by the deputy minister for European Affairs, but 
lobbying by Swedes in Brussels will be key to ensuring 
continued EU support for the initiative, perhaps laying the 
groundwork for its extension to other regions.  Creating 
other EU-only zones of cooperation may also work to assuage 
possible Russian fears of western collusion against Moscow. 
SILVERMAN