VZCZCXYZ0022
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #2438 1941527
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131511Z JUL 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 072438 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PTER KDRG KU
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY FRIED MEETING WITH KUWAITI AMBASSADOR 
 
CLASSIFIED BY S/E DANIEL FRIED. REASONS 1.4 (B)& (D). 
 
REF: KUWAIT 613 
 
¶1. SUMMARY:  In a July 9 meeting, S/E for the Closing of Guantanamo 
Detention Facility Daniel Fried told Kuwaiti Ambassador Sabah that 
the U.S. has deep security concerns  regarding the return of Kuwaiti 
detainees, stemming from  the 2008 suicide bombing in Mosul, Iraq 
carried out by  former Kuwaiti detainee Abdullah al-Ajmi. 
Understanding the importance of the issue to the GOK, particularly on 
the eve of the Amir's August 3 visit, Fried expressed satisfaction 
with the establishment of the rehabilitation center, but noted that 
it is yet untested and an additional (and very real)issue is 
effective GOK security monitoring and travel restrictions imposed on 
the detainees.  Acknowledging  that two of the four Kuwaitis are 
under consideration for USG prosecution, Sabah stressed the high 
priority the GOK placed on the return of the other two.  He 
understood USG reservations, but noted that despite the fact that the 
GOK had done all the U.S. had asked (provided guarantees, established 
a rehabilitation center) it did not appear to be enough, and asked 
what more the GOK needed to do. 
 
¶2. (S/NF) Fried requested information regarding al-Ajmi's actions 
leading up to his travel to Iraq, including an assessment of "what 
went wrong."  On monitoring and travel restrictions, Fried raised the 
idea of an arrangement between the detainees' counsel and the GOK in 
which the detainee voluntarily agrees to not seek a passport for a 
period of time and agrees to monitoring, asking whether such an 
arrangement would be enforceable under Kuwait law.  Sabah said he 
would seek answers to queries on monitoring, travel restrictions, and 
enforceability of a detainee counsel-GOK arrangement.  Both agreed to 
a follow-up meeting the week of July 19, as Sabah would not be 
available next week, when the Amir arrives at his home in New Jersey. 
  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Special Envoy for the Closing of the Guantanamo Bay 
Detention Facility Daniel Fried met with Kuwaiti Ambassador Sheikh 
Salem al-Sabah on July 9 at the latter's request to discuss the 
release of the four remaining Kuwaiti detainees at GTMO.  In opening, 
Ambassador Sabah underscored the high priority of this issue to the 
GOK.  Noting that in previous USG-GOK meetings, the USG told the GOK 
that it needed to establish a rehabilitation center. Ambassador Sabah 
said he was happy to report that the rehabilitation center is 
"complete," adding that Ambassador Jones had recently toured the 
facility (reftel).  He hoped that this rehabilitation center 
fulfilled USG requirement as a prerequisite to effect the return of 
the detainees.  He understood that two are under consideration for 
USG prosecution, but Kuwait would be grateful for the return of the 
other two. 
 
¶4. (S/NF) Sabah said that the return of the detainees will be the 
number one issue the Amir of Kuwait will raise with President Obama 
when they meet on August 3. Sabah said he hoped that it would be 
possible to gain custody of the detainees either before, during, or 
shortly after the visit. 
 
¶5. (S/NF) Ambassador Fried thanked Ambassador Sabah for his 
presentation of the issue and straightforward request for the return 
of the detainees.  Acknowledging the establishment of the 
rehabilitation center, Fried said that a number of troubling issues 
remained, foremost being the April 2008 suicide bombing carried out 
by former Kuwaiti GTMO detainee Abdullah al-Ajmi in Mosul, Iraq. 
The incident was a terrible example of a serious security failure 
somewhere in the GOK. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) Referring to the November 2007 GOK response to DOD 
questions on security measures for returned detainees, Fried noted 
the comprehensive response was made six months before the suicide 
bombing.  The rehabilitation center is new and untested, he said, but 
the real issue is what happens after the detainees leave the center 
and what steps need to be taken to prevent another suicide bombing. 
That would be devastating, said Fried.  The interagency is 
deliberating this issue, but has not reached a firm conclusion. 
 
¶7. (S/NF) Sabah said the GOK was shocked and devastated by the 
suicide bombing.  It could have been carried out in Kuwait, making 
al-Ajmi a threat to Kuwait as well.  The GOK has no excuses for the 
actions of al-Ajmi, but Kuwait is a country of laws.  The GOK could 
not hold al-Ajmi without grounds nor could it deny him a passport. 
When the eight detainees were returned, they were incarcerated, 
interrogated, and then put on trial.  The GOK had "nothing  from DOD" 
to present in court, thus their cases were dismissed and they were 
released. 
 
¶8. (S/NF) Reiterating that the USG requested the rehabilitation 
center, Sabah said the GOK made significant efforts to get the center 
established, noting resistance to the project.  Sabah pledged the GOK 
will monitor the detainees, as well as hold their families 
responsible for their conduct.  He said the families of the remaining 
four detainees already provided the GOK with signed pledges to that 
effect and the GOK had passed them on to DOD in late 2007 prior to 
the visit of President Bush to Kuwait in early 2008. S/GC deputy 
Ricci asked if the family pledges are enforceable in a Kuwaiti court. 
 Sabah said Kuwait is a small community where everyone knows each 
other.  People keep their word. Politely exasperated, Sabah noted 
that the GOK had given to DOD the guarantees it sought, as well as 
constructed the rehabilitation center DOD had requested.  "Is there 
something else that the USG would like us to do?" he asked. 
 
¶9. (S/NF) Fried asked Sabah if there are any provisions in Kuwaiti 
law that would permit the GOK to withhold a passport for a period of 
time.  On monitoring, he queried Sabah on GOK capacity and resources 
it could devote to the task. Fried then raised the idea of an 
arrangement concluded between the detainees' counsel and the GOK with 
the USG acting as a disinterested party, in which the detainee would 
voluntarily agree to a travel restriction, as well as monitoring. 
 
¶10. (S/NF) Sabah reiterated the enormous pressure on the GOK from the 
detainees' families, who have lawyers in Kuwait and in the U.S. Sabah 
pointed out that there was no rehabilitation center at the time of 
the previous detainees' return.  He claimed that al-Ajmi was a 
peaceful person before his detention in Guantanamo.  He said his 
American lawyer could attest to his mental deterioration over the 
course of his detention.  Sabah underscored the GOK desire to bring 
"the boys" home.  The other seven who returned, he said, are getting 
on with their lives and some had gotten married. 
 
¶11. (S/NF) In response to Fried's query on how al-Ajmi made his way 
to Iraq, Sabah said he would obtain that information.  Fried said it 
was important that this be investigated.  President Obama has a 
responsibility for the security of the U.S.  Kuwait is a friend, 
Fried said, and Sabah has made a serious request which will be 
deliberated.  In the context of this serious request, is the GOK 
willing to consider any measure available and consistent with Kuwaiti 
law for monitoring post-release from the rehabilitation center. 
Returning to the idea of an arrangement through detainees' counsel on 
voluntary agreement to not seek a passport, S/GC deputy Ricci asked 
Sabah if such an agreement would be enforceable under Kuwaiti law. 
 
¶12. (S/NF) "We're orbiting around monitoring and passports," Sabah 
said, noting that the GOK had established the rehabilitation center, 
but it was still insufficient for the USG to warrant return of the 
detainees.  The suicide bombing had an impact on the return of the 
detainees, Fried reiterated.  He advised Sabah that they would not be 
having this meeting if it weren't for the existence of the center. 
There is no counter terrorism legislation and there probably won't be 
any.  The center is untested and is not likely to be tested by August 
¶3.  Fried said that we must proceed forward carefully.  He would 
discuss the issue with the interagency to convey that Kuwait is 
"serious." 
 
¶13. (S/NF) Sabah said that the GOK has done all that the U.S. has 
asked but now more is required.  It is frustrating for Kuwait.  Fried 
said the center would be more of a plus for Kuwait if it were tested. 
 "Give us the two and we'll test it," Sabah rejoined. 
 
¶14. (S/NF) Fried said that both the U.S. and Kuwait will have to work 
intensely in the weeks ahead and deliberate within our respective 
governments.  Sabah agreed that he would obtain answers to questions 
on monitoring, travel restrictions, and enforceability of 
GOK-detainee counsel arrangements.  Fried invited Sabah to meet with 
him again next week to discuss follow-up and more ideas.  Sabah 
agreed, but requested they meet the week of July 19, as the Amir is 
scheduled to arrive at his house in New Jersey next week.  Fried 
agreed.  Upon conclusion of the meeting, Sabah impressed again on 
Fried the importance of this matter to Kuwait. 
CLINTON