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FM AMCONSUL SHENYANG
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INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1812
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0041
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUCGEVC/JOINT STAFF WASHDC 0101
RHHJJAA/JICPAC PEARL HARBOR HI 0073
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0196
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000137 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2019 
TAGS: CH ECON KN KS PGOV PREF PEL RS
SUBJECT: CHINESE VANADIUM SEIZURE FOLLOW-UP 
 
REF: SHENYANG 134 
 
Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL STEPHEN B. WICKMAN. RESONS 1.4 B/D 
 
¶1. (C)Summary. On July 30 Congenoffs went to Dandong to 
observe land port inspections and meet with Foreign Affairs 
Office (FAO) officials regarding the discovery of an attempt 
to smuggle vanadium concealed in fruit containers (reftel). 
Officials clarified that the vanadium had actually been 
discovered on July 22 (not July 24) and that the case is now 
being handled by the Anti-Smuggling Bureau. Through business 
contacts, CGOffs heard that a worker at a Dandong 
chemical-export company had helped procure the vanadium. No 
other details were available. CGOffs observed that 
DPRK-licensed vehicles underwent much more scrutiny than 
their Chinese equivalents.  Land port authorities seemed 
caught off guard by our presence. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C)On July 30 Pol/Econ Chief called on Dandong FAO 
Consular Chief Jiang and Deputy Zhao to discuss the recent 
interception of vanadium at Dandong Land Port.  When we noted 
Dandong Port officials, unwillingness to meet with us, Jiang 
apologized, demurring that high-level Port Authority 
officials were on travel in Shenyang and Dalian or  busy 
with pressing matters of the port., Jiang noted that he was 
authorized to speak on behalf of the Land Port Authority and 
would  provide us with any information we might need. 
 
Definitely Not Bananas. 
 
¶3. (C) According to the FAO, Dandong officers discovered the 
vanadium during a routine inspection of outbound vehicles on 
July 22, not July 24, as has been widely reported. The X-ray 
machine through which the trucks are scanned showed that the 
contents  were not bananas,, as the export declaration 
stated, and thus the cargo underwent further inspection. 
Secondary inspection confirmed the shipment to be a suspect 
metallic substance in glass containers. Following their 
routine procedures, Dandong officials forwarded the materials 
to the Dalian Port Authority, which oversees the Dandong, for 
testing and confirmation.  Dalian authorized the release of 
information on the discovery on July 27. The delay in making 
the information public, the FAOs opined, was a function the 
internal confirmation process, not political maneuvering. 
Investigation Underway. 
 
¶4. (C) Jiang reiterated the routine nature of the discovery, 
explaining that per Chinese export rules, vanadium is a 
tightly controlled item.  Exporters may apply for permits to 
export the metal legally, but not to the DPRK.  Jiang 
recalled that some international companies had recently 
complained about how Chinese producers control this metal. 
While unable to provide the name of the export company 
implicated in the smuggling attempt, Jiang said this is the 
first time the company in question has ever been cited in any 
smuggling case of any kind.  According to the law, Jiang 
said, the company,s license will be yanked and further 
action would ensue. The Chinese Anti-Smuggling Bureau will 
now conduct a thorough investigation as to how the operation 
proceeded. 
 
¶5. (C) Officials do not yet have details on how the purchase 
was carried out, and the level of the Chinese export 
company,s involvement.  A CGOff contact in Dandong,s export 
industry told us a Dandong chemical-products export company 
executive named Jun Wang had procured the vanadium.  Our 
contact had no further information on how the vanadium made 
its way into the discovered banana boxes or how many other 
individuals may have been involved. 
 
Why All the Attention? 
 
¶6. (C) When asked about the UN 1874 implications of the bust, 
the FAO said customs officers believe the case to be nothing 
special, the result of routine inspections and unrelated to 
any political overtures.  Dandong authorities are 
uncomfortable with the high level of media attention the case 
has received and blamed an overzealous media for blowing such 
a routine discovery out of proportion.  The FAOs also griped 
at length about  troublesome South Korean media, reports 
that are  just rumors that cause trouble and make our work 
difficult. 
 
Seeing for Ourselves 
 
SHENYANG 00000137  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Prior to and after meeting with the FAO, CGOffs went 
to the Dandong Land Port Inspection yard to observe traffic. 
Morning traffic, mostly empty or lightly-loaded trucks from 
the DPRK, was normal (in accord with our prior observations 
at the port).  DPRK trucks predominated, and a number of 
company agents were lined up awaiting the completion of 
official port authority inspection and clearance.  Afternoon 
traffic was comprised chiefly of empty Chinese-licensed 
trucks. The disparity in the level of scrutiny given the 
Chinese-licensed trucks coming from the DPRK and those 
bearing DPRK licenses was like night and day.  DPRK cargo and 
passenger vehicles were thoroughly inspected inside and out, 
passengers and drivers were asked to exit the vehicles to 
allow closer inspection, and on one occasion, the engine was 
examined.  One North Korean family and their Chinese driver 
were audibly griping to each other about the delay in the 
inspection of their Mercedes SUV. While by no means a cursory 
check, the inspection of the Chinese-licensed trucks was less 
thorough. Inspectors, however, did look inside the vehicles 
and open the doors. 
 
¶8. (C) Initially, the land port authorities seemed surprised 
by our presence, which had not been previously coordinated 
with the Liaoning Provincial FAO.  Within a minute of 
entering the inspection area, an officer asked why we were 
present and kept a watchful eye on our movements around the 
area.  Plainclothes surveillance was almost immediate, and 
officials from inside the administration area came out on 
occasion, noting our presence.  That being said, we were not 
asked to leave and we were allowed to walk around and observe 
as much as we wanted, including a close inspection of a 
large, DPRK-bound flatbed full of Chinese tile and wall 
materials. 
 
WICKMAN