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DE RUEHRB #0589/01 1911407
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FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0389
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 0193
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 0230
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0146
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0946

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000589 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA, NEA/MAG AND IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019 
TAGS: PREL PBTS WI AG UNSC NO MO
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA UN ENVOY ROSS IN RABAT: PUBLIC 
PROGRESS, PRIVATE PROBLEMS 
 
REF: A. ALGIERS 0642 (NOTAL) 
     ¶B. RABAT 0541 (NOTAL) 
 
RABAT 00000589  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1 
.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  UNSYG Personal Envoy for Western Sahara 
Christopher Ross left Morocco after his second visit June 30, 
without final agreement on proposed informal talks.  Despite 
positive statements in public, neither place nor date has 
been agreed for the informals, designed to re-launch 
UN-sponsored negotiations, stalled for almost a year and a 
half.  Apparently, after learning that the UNSYG's Envoy had 
brought no reply from Bouteflika on better bilateral 
relations, King Mohammed VI declined at the last minute to 
see Ambassador Ross.  MFA contacts also told us that despite 
Algerian assent to attend the informals (as sought Ref B), 
the GOM now wanted assurances the GOA would "fully" 
participate, and asked Ross for a roadmap of how the 
informals would lead to negotiations.  The Polisario 
announcement that it would go to a Vienna meeting made it 
difficult for the GOM to agree, but Ross has other 
prospective venues.  While in Rabat, Ross also saw Arab 
Maghreb Union (AMU) Secretary General Habib Ben Yahya to talk 
regional integration and met rising politician and royal 
friend Fouad Ali El Himma.  The Moroccans agreed with Ross to 
follow up in New York.  They have asked for engagement by the 
USG and the other Friends with Algeria.  A diplomatic push 
for flexibility by both countries might help get the process 
back on track.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Positive Spin on a Diplomatic Curveball 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri was joined by 
external intelligence service chief and de facto national 
security advisor Mohamed Yassine Mansouri and MFA Director 
General for Multilateral Relations Ambassador Affairs Nasser 
Bourita for extended meetings July 29 with Personal Envoy of 
the Secretary General (PESYG) Ambassador Christopher Ross, 
who was accompanied by staffers from DPA and DPKO.  They were 
joined at dinner by CORCAS head Kalihenna Ould er Rachid, who 
also met with them separately.  Ould er Rachid was boosted by 
his party's recent victory in local council elections in 
Laayoune, the capital of Western Sahara.  Ross and delegation 
also met with Minister of Interior Chakib Benmoussa.  In 
remarks to the press, Fassi Fihri declared Morocco was 
willing to participate in the informals. 
 
¶3.  (C) According to a July 1 readout from local UN ResRep 
Mourad Wahba, the meeting produced Moroccan agreement to 
attend the informal meetings proposed by Ross, but with a 
condition:  that Algeria openly participate, albeit 
informally.  (Note:  Ref A reported that Algeria had accepted 
to join the informal talks, which the Moroccans had sought 
per Ref B.  End Note.)  Algeria had not agreed to the profile 
that the GOM has demanded as a condition.  Neither date nor 
site was fixed but Ross has a good offer from Norway to host 
the talks, which still could take place in early August. 
 
¶4.  (S) Ross was kept on tenterhooks until the very last 
minute about whether he would have a meeting with King 
Mohammed VI.  The meeting ultimately did not happen.  It is 
likely that in his preparatory meetings with the Foreign 
Minister, Ross was not able to report that he had a direct 
answer from President Bouteflika, despite two intervening 
visits to Algiers, to the proposals on bilateral ties Ross 
had carried in February from the King to the Algerian 
President. 
 
--------------------- 
What a Moroccan Wants 
--------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) MFA Director General for Multilateral Affairs Nasser 
Bourita, a GOM expert on the Western Sahara issue, 
subsequently told PolCouns that the King had already accepted 
the informal round in principle during the envoy,s visit in 
February.  However, Morocco still had questions that it 
needed Ross to clarify; Algerian agreement to attend as 
observers only was not sufficient.  In informals normally all 
would participate in the discussions.  Algeria needed to 
participate fully, if informally. 
 
¶6.  (C) Bourita said Morocco also wanted from Ross a vision, 
 
RABAT 00000589  002 OF 003 
 
 
in effect a roadmap of where the informal will lead, before 
agreeing.  Would there be multiple informals?  Was there a 
target date for negotiations?  Would the informals produce an 
agenda?  He feared the informals could turn into a whole new 
process/format.  Finally, he said the GOM remained unhappy 
with the Vienna location, since it was announced by the 
Polisario.   Why should the GOM accept a Polisario fait 
accompli?  The Polisario's announcement showed that the Front 
would not respect the confidentiality that Ross wanted for 
the informal talks. 
 
---------- 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Ambassador Bourita said Ross would continue to work 
details with the parties and the Friends in New York on the 
many open questions; these include the level of the informal 
meetings, which could be below the ministerial level of 
Manhasset.  On July 9, Bourita re-convoked PolCouns to 
underscore Moroccan interest in substantive Algerian 
participation in the informals, to include on bilateral 
issues.  He requested that the USG and other Friends engage 
with Algeria to urge flexibility.  PolCouns recalled 
traditional Algerian reticence, and hoped that Morocco could 
avoid putting at risk the informals, and a re-start of the 
long stalled negotiating process. 
 
----------------------------- 
Ross's Side Meetings in Rabat 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) At the embassy,s suggestion, Ross took the 
initiative to meet Arab Maghreb Union Secretary General Habib 
Ben Yahya, who briefed him on AMU efforts to promote 
low-level economic functional regional integration.  In his 
remarks to the press, Ross spoke of his efforts to promote 
integration, referring to the part of his mandate to enhance 
Moroccan-Algerian relations. 
 
¶9.  (C) On June 28, Ross, his team and PolCouns met 
informally with Fouad Ali El Himma, the closest friend of 
King Mohammed VI and the driving force behind the new Party 
of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM).  The PAM, although 
created only a year ago, won the most seats in recent local 
council elections.  PAM Party Secretary General Mohammed 
Sheikh Biadillah, a Sahrawi and former Minister of Health, 
joined the meeting at El Himma's residence.  In addition to 
domestic politics, they detailed their failed efforts to 
defeat the political machine of Kalihenna Ould er Rachid, 
current Chairman of the Royal Sahara Council (CORCAS), in the 
municipal elections in Laayoune, capital of Western Sahara. 
While winning not a seat in the capital, the PAM was able to 
unite the opposition, and Biadillah himself, a former 
Polisario leader, was elected deputy chairman of the council 
of Samara, another town near the berm.  He and El Himma 
indicated that PAM would continue to work against the 
Kalihenna clan.  (Note: Ross had in February conveyed to the 
GOM Polisario objections to Kalihenna being a member of the 
GOM delegation.  End Note.)  That evening, at the embassy's 
July 4 reception, Ross met some Sahrawis from this side of 
the berm, helping him gain perspective on the views of 
residents of the Western Sahara territory, which he has so 
far not visited. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10.  (C) The visit led to the first public acceptance by the 
GOM of the proposed informal meeting, although it had earlier 
agreed in principle.  It is unclear whether GOM conditions 
and objections over details reflect issues of principle or 
pique; it may have moved the goalposts on its conditions for 
the talks.  The Moroccans surely remain concerned that their 
efforts to improve the environment with Algeria continue to 
get nowhere, despite Ross, efforts on his wider mandate.  It 
is far from certain that these questions can be resolved in 
time to permit the convening of the informals before 
mid-August.  Any later runs the risk of being disrupted by 
Ramadan, which would carry them into the September UNGA 
timeframe.  It is not certain that even with delegations 
limited to two, that Morocco would not use one seat for 
Kalihenna or another pro-Morocco Sahrawi.  For now, the 
discussion shifts to the corridors of the UN.  Encouragement 
by the Friends of flexibility from both the Algerians and the 
 
RABAT 00000589  003 OF 003 
 
 
Moroccans could help get this still-elementary stage in the 
rebirth of Western Sahara negotiations and inter-Mahgreb 
dialogue back on track.  End Comment. 
 
 
***************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco 
***************************************** 
 
Jackson