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FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
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INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 6981
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN 1096
RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 9349
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PRETORIA 001392 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019 
TAGS: PREL ZIM NI SF
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH CRITICIZES SOUTH AFRICA'S 
FOREIGN POLICY 
 
PRETORIA 00001392  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR RAYMOND L. BROWN. REAS 
ONS 1.4(B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  On 24 June, the Institute for Security 
Studies hosted a debate on the role of human rights in South 
Africa's foreign policy under newly elected President Jacob 
Zuma.  Keynote speakers included Ken Roth, Executive Director 
of Human Rights Watch in New York, who described South 
Africa's foreign policy under Mbeki as hypocritical and 
retrograde, and Dr. Siphamandla Zondi of the Institute for 
Global Dialogue (IGD), who argued that South Africa's 
policies have been consistent, misunderstood, and no more 
hypocritical than those of any other Western nation.  The 
debate ended with Zondi's prognostication that any foreign 
policy the Zuma administration pursues will have to first and 
foremost benefit South Africa domestically.  In the process, 
Zondi dismissed Roth's hope that South Africa regain its 
former reputation as a global human rights champion.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) On 24 June, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 
hosted a seminar to discuss South Africa's past and future 
emphasis on human rights in its foreign policy.  Ken Roth, 
Executive Director of Human Rights Watch in New York, 
reflected on what he considers South Africa's tarnished 
reputation when it comes to human rights, while Dr. 
Siphamandla Zondi of the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) 
argued that South Africa's principle-based foreign policies 
have gotten them nowhere and that foreign policy under Zuma 
will seek to bring home tangible benefits to South Africans 
first and promote ANC ideology second. 
 
------------------------------------- 
SOUTH AFRICA'S MORAL HIGH GROUND LOST 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Roth was highly critical of South Africa's foreign 
policy over the past decade, squarely laying the blame on 
former President Mbeki's feet for squandering South Africa's 
greatest asset, which was its ability to appeal to others 
from a moral high ground.  Mbeki, he said, will be best known 
in the human rights community for "cozying up" to Mugabe and 
to a lesser extent for his denialist views on HIV/AIDS.  Roth 
did give some credit to Mbeki for his desire to level the 
international playing field, but believes his goal, however 
laudable, was overshadowed by his refusal to acknowledge 
human rights abuses around the world. 
 
¶4. (C) Roth also spoke at length about what he considers 
South Africa's disastrous two-year rotation on the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) from 2006 to 2008, calling 
its positions on certain issues "retrograde."  Roth said, "It 
was as if the 1990's never happened; South Africa used 
arguments that even Russia and China won't use anymore and 
that is that human rights are not a security issue and thus 
do not belong in the UNSC."  As a result, he said the human 
rights community, which had such high hopes for South Africa, 
now considers South Africa a huge disappointment and no 
longer an ally.  South Africa, he said, has morphed into a 
version of every other country on the council, including the 
US, with contradictory and hypocritical foreign policy goals. 
 
 
---------------- 
BUT NOT ALL LOST 
---------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Roth argued that South Africa's domestic human rights 
record is something to be proud of and that international 
policies have not been all bad.  He gave Mbeki credit for his 
Qpolicies have not been all bad.  He gave Mbeki credit for his 
work in conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts on the 
continent, including mediation efforts in Burundi and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.  South Africa's role in 
encouraging 30 African countries to sign up to the 
International Criminal Court was also monumental, he said, as 
was South Africa's influence in getting the African Union to 
officially reject anyone on the continent who comes to power 
through a coup. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
MBEKI PERSONIFIED FOREIGN POLICY, NOT DEFINED IT 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6. (C) According to Dr. Zondi, however, Mbeki should not be 
made the scapegoat for South Africa's foreign policies since 
 
PRETORIA 00001392  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Mbeki did not make foreign policy in a vacuum, but rather 
articulated the ANC's foreign policy.  Using this logic, he 
argued that Zuma's presidency will not necessarily lead to a 
sea change in foreign policy direction.  As examples, Zondi 
noted that the ruling ANC party--not Mbeki--has never been 
willing to name and shame, always sought greater South-South 
cooperation, and always had an unwavering faith in the belief 
that diplomacy can solve the world's problems.  In this vein, 
ANC foreign policy has had some continuity since Mandela was 
President.  Zondi argued that people have been blinded to 
this fact because they see Mandela as a messiah and Mbeki as 
the devil.  He went on to say that the departure from making 
human rights South Africa's number one foreign policy 
priority began under Mandela when he chose to support China 
over Taiwan and Indonesia over East Timor. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY GOES DOMESTIC 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Zondi believes South Africa's foreign policy under 
Zuma will be driven by three factors.  First, the ANC is 
under pressure to show domestic dividends from foreign 
policy.  Zondi noted that 15 years after apartheid, people 
are still languishing in poverty and asking why their lives 
are not better.  An unnamed Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation (DICO) official echoed this comment 
from the audience, saying, "The international beauty of South 
Africa's transition is lost on the average South African." 
Zondi complained that countries with worse human rights 
records like Angola receive more international assistance and 
more foreign direct investment than South Africa.  Second, 
the ANC still believes that the world's power is unbalanced 
and needs to be redistributed.  Zondi added that Western 
nations often use human rights as a romantic notion to cover 
up their own self-interests and South Africa is criticized 
for pointing this out.   Third, the ANC feels an obligation 
to help other African countries.  Underlying all of these 
demands is South Africa's unwillingness to act alone after 
South Africa was ostracized by other African nations for 
criticizing former Nigerian President Abacha in 1995.  Zondi 
believes that while on the UNSC, South Africa learned 
valuable lessons, namely that it cannot change the world, 
that it should not take any country's support for granted, 
and that politics is dirty.  Zondi added that South Africa 
got into the UNSC boxing ring with the US and UK and was 
surprised when it was hit in the face. 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
LOOKING AHEAD: BRIGHT SPOTS OR ONE-OFFS? 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Roth believes that he has already seen some subtle 
differences in South Africa's foreign policy under Zuma: 
 
-- Pretoria reversed its original decision under interim 
President Motlanthe not to grant the Dalai Lama a visa; 
 
-- Pretoria objected to the arrest of Burmese opposition 
leader Aung San Suu Kyi, with Deputy Foreign Minister Ebrahim 
Ebrahim going so far as to offer to send a delegation to 
facilitate negotiations; 
 
-- Pretoria expressed concern about potential human rights 
abuses by the Sri Lankan government, but Roth noted that when 
it really mattered at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), 
Pretoria's "final delivery lacked" when it voted for a 
QPretoria's "final delivery lacked" when it voted for a 
watered down resolution; 
 
-- Zuma appeared willing to stand by South Africa's legal 
obligations as a member of the Rome Statute by warning 
Sudanese President Bashir that he would be arrested if he 
came to Pretoria for Zuma's inauguration.  Roth noted that 
this is in sharp contrast to Mbeki, who argued for an Article 
16 deferral to put off Bashir's prosecution for another year. 
 (COMMENT: In fact, the Zuma administration does not want 
Bashir arrested either and has argued Bashir's arrest would 
not lead to a solution to the political crisis in Sudan.  END 
COMMENT) 
 
-- South Africa showed a level of leadership at the African 
Union not seen under Mbeki when South Africa worked the 
corridors and invoked a simple procedural rule at a recent AU 
meeting that prevented non-member states pushing for a 
 
PRETORIA 00001392  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
rejection of the Bashir indictment. 
 
¶9.  (C) Roth, however, noted that Zimbabwe appears to be a 
mixed bag.  Zuma has publicly stated that some leaders should 
not stay on forever, with many believing that he was 
referring to Zimbabwean President Mugabe.  Additionally, 
South Africa has relaxed visa requirements for Zimbabweans. 
However, Roth noted the idea of amnesty is "ludicrous," 
especially in the case of Zimbabwe where Mugabe is not 
honestly implementing the Global Political Agreement, Prime 
Minister Tsvangirai is a figurehead, and security forces are 
still committing abuses.  More disturbing, the lack of 
progress in Zimbabwe is not on SADC's agenda, which is 
chaired by South Africa. 
 
---------------- 
CHALLENGES AHEAD 
---------------- 
 
¶10. (C) As for foreign policy challenges ahead of South 
Africa, Roth listed Somalia and the threat of international 
prosecutions, security in eastern Congo, and ongoing conflict 
in Darfur.  Roth remarked that South Africa needs to change 
its policy of supporting a deferral for Bashir, and Zimbabwe, 
which needs to be pushed toward a genuine sharing of power, 
an equal share of policymaking, and respect for human rights. 
 Roth also hopes that South Africa will be willing to play a 
more constructive role at the UNHRC, but more specifically by 
replacing Egypt and Algeria as leaders of the African bloc. 
 
¶11. (C) Zondi believes South Africa needs to balance 
pragmatism, human rights, democracy, good governance, and 
realpolitik -- i.e., driven by South Africa's national 
interests. More specifically, he believes first that South 
Africa should try to draw concessions from superpowers, not 
change them.  Second, South Africa should place a greater 
emphasis on diplomacy, collectives, and multilateral fora. 
Third, South Africa should give greater attention to human 
rights but not blindly, adding that public and economic 
diplomacy should be equally considered.  Fourth, South Africa 
should pursue restorative justice, not punitive justice 
unless for peace, i.e. South Africa should push for more 
truth and reconciliation commissions, amnesties, and other 
conditions that lead to durable peace.  (NOTE: Roth took 
great exception to Zondi's suggestions, noting that the world 
has moved beyond TRCs and that no dictator has ever stepped 
down when offered amnesty.  Dictators step down, he said, 
only after they lose the capacity to rule.  The more 
regularized justice is applied, the more effective it will 
be.  END NOTE) 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) The ANC's foreign policy ideology, namely loyalty to 
other liberation movements, desire to be viewed as an African 
brother rather than regional hegemon, commitment to 
decision-making by consensus in multilateral fora, and 
South-South cooperation, have not changed.  Most or all of 
these goals, however, at some point have naturally come into 
conflict with the agendas of international human rights 
activists, especially the goal of promoting African 
solidarity which has at times come at the expense of human 
rights and accountability.  Moreover, the ANC and Zuma are 
facing a dissatisfied public that is calling for tangible 
government benefits in the form of jobs, houses, and improved 
social services, not improving other countries' human rights 
records.  Given that there is little public engagement on 
Pretoria's foreign policy stances, much less its positions on 
QPretoria's foreign policy stances, much less its positions on 
human rights, Zuma and the ANC are not likely to face any 
significant domestic pressure -- outside of opposition 
denuciation, editorials, op-eds, and NGO critiques -- to 
change  these stances either. As a result, South Africa is 
likely scale back some of its activities in the foreign 
policy arena, but this does not necessarily preclude new 
doors from opening for the USG to pursue mutually beneficial 
goals. 
CONNERS