VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPL #0205/01 1880943
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 070943Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4635
INFO RUEHAN/AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO 0832
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 3059
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT LOUIS 000205 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR PM/SNA, L/PM, AF/RSA, AF/E 
OSD FOR GENERAL COUNSEL 
ANTANANARIVO FOR DAO 
NAIROBI FOR KUSLO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2019 
TAGS: MARR PREL MASS MOPS SE
SUBJECT: SEYCHELLES SOFA IN THE FINAL STRETCH 
 
REF: A. 2008 PORT LOUIS 570 
     ¶B. 2008 PORT LOUIS 642 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Virginia M. Blaser for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) A U.S. inter-agency delegation met with Government of 
Seychelles (GoS) stakeholders in early July to discuss issues 
associated with the proposed Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA). The discussions, which were built on multi-level 
country team lobbying efforts over the past two years, led to 
GoS agreement to take the entire US-cleared October 2008 SOFA 
proposal to Cabinet as early as this week. The President's 
Principal Secretary predicted the SOFA would pass the cabinet 
and a favorable diplomatic note will be given to the Embassy 
shortly after cabinet approval, thereby concluding the SOFA. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARY FRAMES THE SITUATION 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶2. (C) On July 1, Charge met with Principal Secretary to the 
President, Jean Paul Adam, who indicated that the President 
had designated him the SOFA "troubleshooter-in-chief." 
Charge encouraged Adam's continued involvement in the SOFA 
deliberations, and set up a follow-up meeting between Adam 
and U.S. delegation (USDEL), composed of U.S. Embassy Port 
Louis Political Officer Quentin Barber; Colonel Jon L. 
Lightner, Legal Counsel, U.S. Africa Command; and Colonel 
James Jacobson, Deputy Foreign Policy Advisor, U.S. Africa 
Command. Charge asked Adam to brief the delegation on any 
anticipated questions or concerns which would be raised by 
GoS stakeholders in discussions scheduled for the following 
day. 
 
¶3. (C) USDEL met with Adam later the same day.  In 
confidence, Adam flagged immunities (criminal jurisdiction) 
and sovereignty as the main issues that he anticipated would 
need to be addressed by the USDEL during subsequent meetings. 
Adam further explained that if left to the President alone, 
the SOFA would be passed tomorrow, and that the President had 
already conducted lobbying efforts to urge GoS ministers who 
may be opposed to the SOFA to be "pragmatic" and not 
overreact to "emotive" issues such as sovereignty. Adam 
stated that due to this preliminary presidential lobbying of 
the Cabinet and the Attorney General, he did not foresee any 
insurmountable problems that would impede progress on the 
SOFA, provided the USDEL could clarify some questions 
concerning implementation. Adam said that the GoS recognizes 
that its April 2009 counter-proposal was "unacceptable to the 
USG" and that the GoS representatives would discuss the 
October 2008 SOFA text proposed by the USG during meetings 
with the USDEL. 
 
¶4. (C) Referencing the U.S. SOFA with Cyprus, Adam asked what 
could be done to provide "comfort letters" after a SOFA is 
concluded in order to assuage concerns raised by certain 
ministries. After discussion, it became clear that Adam 
referred to implementing arrangements (IAs) specifically 
authorized by Article 12 of the proposed October 2008 SOFA. 
When it was explained that such IAs could address any 
concerns with greater detail and specificity, Adam said he 
expected no problem with getting the proposed October 2008 
SOFA through the AG and the Cabinet.  (NOTE: Unlike the 
Cabinet of Ministers, the AG is a constitutional position 
that does not fall under presidential authority. END NOTE. ) 
 
--------------- 
THE DISCUSSIONS 
--------------- 
 
¶5. (U) On July 2 the USDEL met with a GoS delegation for 
discussions regarding the proposed SOFA. The GoS delegation 
consisted of Attorney General (AG) Ronny Govinden, the AG's 
State Counsel Krishnan Labonte, and two MFA attorneys, Sandra 
Michel and Jacques Belle. Though invited, the Seychelles 
People's Defense Forces (SPDF) representative chose not to 
attend. The AG was present for the start of discussions, but 
quickly departed for other "urgent business," leaving State 
Counsel Labonte to represent his office.  Upon the AG's 
departure, the remaining participants progressed line-by-line 
through the text of the SOFA as proposed by th US in October 
¶2008. At the end of the last discssion session, GoS 
participants said that the USDL successfully addressed all 
GoS concerns. 
 
---------- 
MAIN TOPICS 
----------- 
 
¶6. (C) As redicted by Adam, the major issues raised by theGoS legal team were sovereignty, immunities/criminl 
jurisdictions, and IAs. Other matters discussedincluded 
questions about taxes, contracting, trasportation, and 
customs. 
 
a. (C) Sovereignty: ith regard to sovereignty questions 
posed by theGOS, USDEL responded that the SOFA was not a 
"prsence agreement," and that the GoS retains its soveeign 
authority to approve or disapprove any propsed U.S. activity 
or eent in Seychelles. Embassy provided supplemental 
ocumentation concerning ship visits and aircraft cearances 
to the MFA representatives to illustrat prior and current 
practice of the need to gain oS approval before the U.S. 
military conducts an activity or event in Seychelles. The 
SOFA would ot change such approval procedures, USDEL 
clarifed. 
 
b. (C) Immunities: By providing a detailed xplanation, with 
examples, of the comprehensive ature and operation of the 
Uniformed Code of Miltary Justice (UCMJ), USDEL assuaged GoS 
concerns hat the SOFA provided complete immunity of US 
pesonnel from the criminal jurisdiction of Seychelle. GoS 
participants appeared satisfied with USDELresponse regarding 
immunities. 
 
c. (C) Implemeting Agreements: The last major issue 
discussed was the ability to enter into IAs, as authorized by 
Article 12 of the SOFA. During the discussions, the GoS 
participants recognized that Article 12 provided an effective 
mechanism to address matters that might require greater 
specificity or detail, and that any IAs could be put in place 
after a SOFA was completed. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The GoS representatives commented, at the 
conclusion of the meetings, that these discussions had 
allayed their concerns and improved their understanding of 
the proposed SOFA and aspects of its implementation. With 
this knowledge they felt they could now effectively address 
concerns cabinet members might raise during future GOS 
internal discussions on the matter. 
 
---------------------------- 
FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH ADAM 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) On July 3, the USDEL met again with Adam, who 
reiterated that he expected no problems with the proposed 
October 2008 SOFA getting through the Cabinet this time. Adam 
stated that since USDEL successfully addressed all GoS 
questions through the prior days' discussions, the GoS was 
prepared to finalize the SOFA. Adam reassured the USDEL that 
the AG's absence from the discussions was not something to be 
concerned about, as he had personally spoken to the AG, who 
had voiced no objections to the USG October 2008 SOFA 
proposal. Adam anticipated that the SOFA might be presented 
to the Cabinet within the next two to three weeks, but 
possibly as early as Wednesday July 8. He emphasized that the 
SOFA would need to be agreed upon through an exchange of 
notes due to the need for the President to avoid sending the 
SOFA through Parliament for its approval. 
 
¶9. (C) In a 6 July follow-up discussion with Charge, Adam 
confirmed that the SOFA would be put to Cabinet on Wednesday, 
8 July, and that a diplomatic note affirming GoS recognition 
of the October 2008 SOFA proposal would follow soon 
thereafter. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) The conclusion of a SOFA with the United States is 
clearly a priority for President Michel. He is investing his 
own political equities to ensure the successful conclusion of 
the agreement. While  political in-fighting could cause 
delays, or derail our success to date, Post believes the 
President's intentions are sincere.  He appears to have lined 
up the necessary minimum cabinet support to move the SOFA 
forward. We remain optimistic, therefore, that the SOFA will 
soon be approved and that Post will receive the promised 
diplomatic note which, per Article 15, would put the 
US-cleared and preferred agreement into force. 
BLASER