P 171011Z JUL 09
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8114
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 
CIA WASHDC
CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000148 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR: SCA/EX; DS/EX; DS/IP/SCA; DS/TIA/ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/17/2019 
TAGS: ASEC PTER PK CASC
SUBJECT: PESHAWAR CONVENES EAC ON JULY 17, 2009 REGARDING RECENT 
THREAT REPORTING AND ATTACKS 
 
REF: A. PESHAWAR 145 
     ¶B. TDX-315/046510-09 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate 
Peshawar, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (c), (d) 
 
 
¶1. (S//NF) Post convened an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) 
meeting on July 17, 2009 to assess recent militant attacks and 
other security incidents, Peshawar-specific threat reporting and 
the al-Zawahri (al-Qaeda) video statement.  The EAC concluded 
that the security situation in Peshawar remained tenuous with 
clear indications of active, well coordinated hostile 
surveillance against US-interests and known al-Qaeda and Taliban 
groups operating in close proximity to Peshawar with significant 
capabilities and an intent to target Consulate facilities, 
personnel and movements. Although security resources are being 
established to mitigate many of the threats present in Peshawar, 
continued deficiencies in securing Consulate staff and 
facilities remain. Pending RSO Peshawar initiatives were 
discussed by the EAC and will be re-prioritized accordingly. 
Principal Officer (PO), Regional Security Office (RSO), Regional 
Affairs Office (RAO), Office of Defense Representative Pakistan 
(ODRP) and Management Office (MGT) were represented. 
 
¶2. (S//NF) RSO initiated the EAC by providing an overview of the 
following recent events: 
 
(a) International Carriers Suspend Operations on July 15, 2009: 
For the third time in two months, operations at the Peshawar 
International Airport (PEW) were suspended. Reports indicate 
this suspension, limited to non-Pakistani carriers, was in 
response to increased open source reporting on Peshawar's 
security situation. RSO sources believe most carriers will 
resume services within one week. Post is coordinating with 
Embassy Islamabad to issue a revised Warden message. 
 
(b) Rocket Attack on July 15, 2009: Seven (7) rockets were fired 
from an unknown direction into the Old City of Peshawar 
impacting at least three different locations between 3 and 6 
miles from the Consulate. 
 
(c) Assault on Police Station on July 15, 2009: Militants 
conducted an infantry-style, smalls arms attack against a 
Frontier Police Station in Chamkani, Peshawar (5 miles east of 
Consulate). Police repealed the attack and reported no injuries. 
 
(d) UNHCR Official Killed on July 16, 2009: A United Nations 
High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) was killed in an apparent 
kidnapping attempt from the UNHCR Office in Hayatabad, Peshawar 
(5 miles west of Consulate) near the Kacha Gari internally 
displaced persons (IDP) camp. One guard may also have been 
injured in this attack. 
 
(e) Armed Robbery Outside Consulate on July 15, 2009: During 
daylight hours an armed robbery occurred adjacent to one of the 
Consulate's entrances and was witnessed by RSO security elements. 
 
¶3. (S//NF) RSO provided an assessment of these incidents as they 
relate to Consulate operations in the extent that although 
reports indicate adversaries believe that most Consulate 
personnel have relocated to Islamabad, the security environment 
remains critical and that any changes that increase the 
Consulates activities would correspondingly raise risk. 
Initiatives that will mitigate some of the threats against 
Peshawar's operations were outlined; but RSO reiterated that 
those without any immediate actionable countermeasures, such as 
home/work travel between University Town and the Consulate would 
remain critical vulnerabilities. Measures that are underway 
include: establishment of a Worldwide Personal Protective 
Services (WPPS) contract for protection and emergency response 
teams (pending legal review); rotational painting and acquiring 
lower profile vehicles; physical security upgrade projects at 
the Consulate and Khyber Club Residential Complex; hardening of 
residential safe havens; additional security checkpoints in 
University Town; and establishing a sub-station for police 
providing direct support. These measure are assessed as critical 
in securing Consulate facilities/residences and lowering the 
profile of Consulate operations, though in the interim, all 
potential measures available to RSO Peshawar have been 
implemented. 
 
¶4. (S//NF) PO noted threat reporting that had accurately 
identified the Consulate's use of two (2) vehicle movements 
to/from the housing cluster. Single vehicle movements for all 
Consulate personnel will only be possible once the WPPS contract 
is fully operational in Peshawar. The advantage of single 
vehicle movements with appropriate drivers/security staff is an 
enhanced ability to blend into local traffic. 
 
¶5. (S//NF) Lastly, Peshawar RSO reported that an increase in 
surveillance detection reporting had been witnessed over the 
past several weeks. Although this rise could be related to 
increased intelligence reporting indicating surveillance, that 
greater SD deployments may be a factor in the uptake in 
reporting. RSO will continue to monitor the security situation 
and report any anomalies to the EAC. 
 
¶6. (S//NF) Discussion regarding the status of PEW international 
flights reiterated the findings from REFTEL A. Post remains 
prepared to support Islamabad re-routed flights and will 
coordinate with all arriving/departing personnel as necessary. 
The EAC considered a Post policy to restrict Consulate personnel 
using flights between PEW and Islamabad International Airport 
(ISB) but determined that no changes were required due to a lack 
of routine flights, advantages of ground travel and weighed risk 
to all forms of travel. 
 
¶7. (S//NF) RAO provided the EAC a review of several recent 
reports and the overall situation in Peshawar. Key reports 
discussed by the EAC include REFTEL B that reaffirmed the 
presence of al Qaeda groups in Peshawar conducting active--and 
often very accurate--reporting on the Consulate operations, 
namely movements to/from University Town. RAO assessed that 
al-Qaeda and Taliban groups have demonstrated increasingly 
brazen and new modus operandi that includes remaining in 
populated areas for protection despite raids, increasing numbers 
and movements of foreign fighters in/around Peshawar and 
conducting surveillance for attacks in spite of increased 
Government of Pakistan (GoP) offensive efforts. The EAC agreed 
with the assessment that the most likely form of attack would 
target the Khyber Club Complex or movements in/out of University 
Town, but that key adversaries are seeking high value/impact 
attacks. RSO concurred and highlighted these two targets remain 
the most vulnerable. 
 
¶8. (S//NF) The EAC then discussed potential impact from the al 
Qaeda video statement released on July 15th by senior al Qaeda 
commander Ayman al-Zawahri.  The EAC noted the Pakistan centric 
content of the video, namely calling upon all Pakistani's to 
join the Jihad and statements linking key GoP institutions with 
corruption and US collaboration. Although no reaction has been 
seen in Peshawar related to this video, the EAC will continue to 
monitor the atmospherics and make additional adjustments to the 
Consulates profile as warranted. 
 
¶9. (S//NF) The PO re-affirmed the EAC's decision to relocate 
Consulate personnel to Islamabad.  Relocated Consulate personnel 
will remain in Islamabad until these measures are in-place but 
increased day trips for key political interactions would be 
allowed. 
 
¶10. (S//NF) The EAC concluded that all appropriate measures 
within Post's capability were being taken to respond to 
Peshawar's security environment and threats. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The Point of Contact for this information is Acting 
Regional Security Officer Stephen J. Marquette. 
 
 
TRACY