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P 161310Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5213
INFO AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L OUAGADOUGOU 000569 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S CARSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2019 
TAGS: PTER PREL ML AL UV FR UK GE
SUBJECT: A REGIONAL APPROACH TOWARDS AQIM 
 
Classified By: Classified by Samuel C. Laeuchli, Charge d,Affaires, 
for Reasons 1.4 (B&D) 
 
¶1. (C/NF) The recent spate of hostage-taking, murder and 
military counter measures in the Sahel Region have brought to 
the forefront the need for concerted action against AQIM. 
Responding to these events, the countries of the region, 
particularly Mali, appear to be eager to take concrete 
actions against AQIM.  Given that terrorist acts have 
occurred in Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger and that 
other regional players have been involved to a greater or 
lesser extent in the issue, it is clear that any solution to 
the problem of AQIM must be a regional one.  This has been 
underscored on multiple occasions by regional leaders 
themselves.  The fact that AQIM terrorists move unhindered 
across the countries and borders of the region also argues 
for a regional approach. 
 
2.(C/NF)  Although Burkina Faso is a somewhat peripheral 
actor in these events, it has functioned in a mediating 
capacity in both conflict resolution and hostage issues.  It 
would certainly play a secondary role in any regional 
solution, but nonetheless we would like to propose some 
thoughts on what a regional solution might look like and 
suggest some steps as to how we might get there. 
 
¶3. (C/NF)  The goal of any regional approach should be 
focused on changing the situation on the ground.  This means 
that AQIM must be deprived of safe havens in any of the 
countries in the region through the application of military 
pressure based on political resolve.  Also, AQIM should be 
deprived of sources of supplies, fuel, food and perhaps most 
importantly, funding.   We also need to cut off AQIM from 
receiving support from local populations.  To achieve these 
goals, two things need to happen.  The militaries and 
governments in the region need to acquire the capacity and 
resources to carry out these operations and the countries 
need to cooperate with each other in order to be truly 
effective.   At this point, neither of these two conditions 
is being met.  The United States, working together with like 
minded developed countries and the countries of the region, 
can help create them both. 
 
¶4. (C/NF) Why not TSCTP/OEF-TS?  This effort cannot be 
successful if undertaken by the United States alone.  To 
begin with, if we act without international partners, the 
countries of the region will be highly suspicious of our 
motives and will refuse to cooperate or will work against us. 
 In addition, if other donors are left out, they may be 
suspicious of our motives and presence and advise regional 
countries to resist U.S. initiatives.  It will be very 
difficult for the U.S. working alone to cajole the countries 
of the region to work together, and history bears out that so 
far this effort has not succeeded.  We will need to leverage 
the resources and political capital other countries could 
bring to bear.  Any effective coalition in the region should 
include the key countries of the region, beginning with Mali 
and Algeria but if things progress as desired, eventually 
bringing in Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso 
and perhaps Libya, but should also include former colonial 
powers France and the UK plus more international actors such 
as Canada, and perhaps Japan and Germany.   The UK and Canada 
are already preparing to increase their presence in the 
region. 
 
¶5. (C/NF) Such a coalition, perhaps called "Friends of the 
Sahel" (FOS) could develop and implement a joint strategy to 
combat AQIM.  Elements of the strategy could include 
strengthening the military capacity of the concerned 
countries, joint patrols and information sharing to monitor 
and control the borders between the countries, allowing hot 
pursuit across borders or planning joint operations against 
AQIM units. The strategy could also include broader, more 
efficient intelligence sharing, information exchange on 
terrorist financing and supply routes, cutting off supplies 
of resources such as vehicles, gas, and communications 
equipment, as well as working together on lessons learned and 
leadership data on key extremists.  Other countries in the 
region, including Burkina Faso, could be involved in helping 
curbing weapons and drug trafficking, and could provide other 
political and logistical support to the effort.  There should 
be regional cooperation on the military, police, gendarme and 
intelligence levels. 
 
¶6. (C/NF)  A related set of requirements would focus on 
development in the region.  Local populations, even where 
limited in number, would have to see the benefits of turning 
their back on AQIM and integrating more fully into national 
and international economic and political structures.  This 
requires greater effort to provide both infrastructure and 
services, including food security, health care and education, 
in the region.  This effort should be integrated and 
coordinated with other donors to provide maximum effect. 
 
¶7. (C/NF)  The way ahead.  Should the U.S. government agree 
to such a strategy, one way of moving ahead would be to get 
certain key G-8 allies on board with our approach. This 
should initially be done bilaterally in capitals and 
Washington to build a coalition around the idea.  Then there 
should be initial meetings with these allies as a group, and 
after that bringing in the countries of the Sahel region. 
This initial group of G-8 partners could work with us to 
bring the regional actors on board.  This process could 
culminate in a Foreign Ministers, level meeting where a text 
would be finalized outlining both a general approach and what 
concrete actions needed to be taken.  Then of course it would 
take continued engagement and resources on the part of the 
U.S. and our partners to keep the efforts on track, but there 
would be a solid framework for further action, leading, if 
successful, to the incapacitation of AQIM in the region. 
 
 
LAEUCHLI