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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000428 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MR
SUBJECT: MAURITANIAN ELECTION CHRONICLES FOR JUNE 30: 
MOVING FORWARD WITH THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION 
 
REF: NOUAKCHOTT 423 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 
 
¶1.  (C)  The Contact Group met the afternoon of June 29.  AU 
Ambassador Annadif said that, despite previous confidence 
expressed by Prime Minister Laghdaf, the three parties had 
not yet been able to reach agreement concerning the civil 
society members of the National Independent Electoral 
Commission (CENI) and had asked to meet with the ICG. 
Annadif also reported that the three minor candidates in the 
earlier planned June 6 election -- Kane Hamedou Baba, 
Ibrahima Sarr and Sghair Ould M'Bareck, had demarched him to 
complain that they had been disadvantaged by the pause in the 
election process from June 6 to July 18 -- having already 
spent most of their funding in the earlier round.  They asked 
that the ICG in some way reimburse their earlier expenses to 
give them an equal chance.  Charge noted this seemed a "very 
Mauritanian" request noting that the candidates were in some 
way advantaged by having had more time to campaign including, 
for a few, the chance to campaign abroad.  Others took the 
concern more seriously and wondered whether the GNU could 
reimburse at least some of the earlier expenses.  Charge 
noted that might set the precedent for reimbursing Aziz' 
earlier costs and it was generally accepted the GNU route 
would never win consensus.  The EC and UN reps steered well 
clear of providing any direct assistance to any of the 
candidates. 
 
¶2.  (C) Maouloud complains about the HSC communique:  The 
morning of the 30th, the FNDD's Maouloud complained to 
Annadif and ICG about the Superior National Defense Council's 
(former High State Council) communique, stressing that it was 
political and that it had not used the wording agreed upon in 
Dakar (Ref A).  Annadif used a very condescending tone with 
Maouloud and stated there was nothing he could do.  PolOff 
highlighted that four days of intense high-level negotiations 
in Dakar had been necessary to agree on acceptable wording 
for both parties and that it was appalling that the HSC had 
dismissed these efforts by not publishing the consensual 
press release adopted in Dakar.  Annadif said, without much 
conviction, that he would bring it up with the interim 
President of the Republic. 
 
¶3.  (C)  CENI selection process:  PolOff attended meetings in 
the evening of June 29 and the morning of June 30 to assist 
the majority (Charge was involved in a memorial service for 
deceased American Chris Leggett and a subsequent security 
meeting), the FNDD and the RFD in consensually choosing three 
civil society members to serve as National Independent 
Electoral Commission (CENI) president, vice president and 
consensual civil society member.  Note:  According to the 
Dakar Accord, each party to the crisis submits four members 
and the three parties consensually choose the president, vice 
president and an extra member.)  General Aziz's 
representative Ould Horma struck a discordant note from the 
beginning by saying his camp wanted to keep current CENI 
president and vice-president because, from a technical point 
of view, it would disrupt CENI operations to change these key 
positions at the last minute.  He also advanced that his camp 
should be entitled to naming the president and vice president 
because the opposition was naming eight CENI members whereas 
the majority only had four.  For the FNDD and RFD, this 
proposal is unacceptable because the individuals leading 
CENI, though reputed and competent, agreed to participate in 
legitimizing the coup through unilateral elections.  They 
insisted there were other competent people who they would be 
willing to consider.  Annadif tried to convince the FNDD and 
RFD to change their position.  PolOff noted that the Dakar 
Accord calls for CENI leadership "that can't be contested by 
any of the three poles," that the RFD and FNDD had 
sufficiently established their reservations concerning 
current CENI leadership and that the group should work with 
Aziz's camp to find other acceptable candidates.  In the 
spirit of consensus, mediator Annadif asked the three parties 
to draft a list of ten acceptable names each to then focus on 
choosing names common to the three lists.  Horma, after 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000428  002 OF 002 
 
 
spending almost thirty minutes outside the room consulting 
with someone on the phone, rejected this method and requested 
that Annadif consults with civil society to get candidate 
names, arguing that the FNDD and RFD could introduce 
"political" and partial candidates.  Annadif ended the 
meeting by dismissing Horma's request as being too time 
consuming and asking the three parties to bring a list of 
acceptable candidates the next day. 
 
¶4.  (C)  CENI selection process continued:  General Aziz's 
representative Ould Horma opened the June 30 meeting with 
exactly the same position he had the previous evening.  The 
FNDD and RFD provided a common list of candidates.  PolOff, 
instructed by Charge, pointed out that General Aziz had 
stated the CENI composition was not a huge issue for him and 
that we did not understand why it had suddenly become 
problematic.  She also expressed, in response to Horma's 
claim that the majority was entitled to naming the president 
and vice president, that one could argue from a check and 
balances perspective they did not because they already 
controlled fifty percent of the government and the Prime 
Minister.  Annadif asked the Mauritanians to step outside and 
pushed back on PolOff's comments saying they were 
obstructionist.  PolOff noted Horma was being obstructionist 
by insisting on keeping an unreasonable position contrary to 
the Accord, delaying the formation of CENI, trying to change 
the rules of the game at the last minute, and refusing to 
comply with Annadif's simple request to submit ten names. 
Horma was brought back in the room and Annadif asked him to 
please comply and propose the names, which he originally 
refused.  In meetings with the FNDD and RFD, Annadif tried 
several other options -- for instance letting the Aziz camp 
name the President while they name the other two members. 
Maouloud pushed back emphatically saying that the CENI was 
the only lever of balance available given an Interim 
President that had cooperated with the HSC, Aziz's former 
Prime Minister still in power, an effective minority in the 
Council of Ministers, and a group of governors named by Aziz. 
 Moine caught the ICG's attentions noting that, while 
everyone now is resolved to accepting the July 18 election 
date, further delays in seating the CENI would necessarily 
cause technical delays pushing that date back.  Finally, it 
was agreed that the ICG would follow a proposal put forward 
by Maouloud that, failing consensus on the three civil 
society members, Annadiff would ask the Prime Minister to 
confirm the CENI members that had already been submitted by 
the three parties so the CENI could start work and leave the 
president and vice president question pending for further 
consideration.  Horma said he would do his best to get a list 
of ten names so the three civil society members could be 
resolved. 
 
¶5.  (C) Other Issues:  Col. Ely Ould Mohamed Vall has 
registered his candidacy apparently with documentation 
showing he has resigned -- causing the Aziz camp to already 
say the resignation is irregular because it would have had to 
have been routed through and approved by the military High 
Command.  It is understood that Vall secured written 
acceptance of his resignation by President Abdallahi during a 
visit he made to Lemden a few months ago.  The issue will 
certainly go to the Constitutional Council for decision. 
Charge highlighted to Annadiff that the issue was potentially 
serious since there were divided loyalties between Aziz and 
Vall within the various military and security forces that 
could be aggravated no matter how the Council decides. 
 
HANKINS