VZCZCXRO7035
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0471/01 2010853
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 200853Z JUL 09 ZDK ZUI REPORTED ZES-2
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0019
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1493
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 000471 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFIYCP TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOTS GENERALLY UPBEAT IN 
MEETINGS WITH DAS BRYZA 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 402 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 438 
     ¶C. NICOSIA 456 
     ¶D. NICOSIA 457 
 
NICOSIA 00000471  001.3 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4( 
d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Like their Greek Cypriot (G/C) counterparts, 
Turkish Cypriots voiced optimism regarding the UN-brokered 
peace process, muted by a cognizance of the magnitude of the 
task ahead and serious divergences between the sides, in 
discussions with EUR DAS Matthew Bryza during his June 29-30 
visit. Turkish Cypriot (T/C) leader Mehmet Ali Talat 
reaffirmed his adherence to the "federal" basis of the 
present process and bluntly stated that "he was not seeking a 
confederation."  He voiced concern that G/C leader Demetris 
Christofias, not willing to risk his popularity, might shy 
away from the tough, painful decisions needed to reach a 
compromise. Talat believed that issues of territory and 
property would prove the biggest sticking point going 
forward, not the Turkish military.  Talat also said that 
arbitration would be unavoidable but, unlike the Annan Plan, 
could be reduced to a minimal level. He also sought the 
appointment of a US Envoy for Cyprus.  T/C lead negotiator 
Ozdil Nami was ebullient, both about the June 26 deal to open 
the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point and concerning the 
recent visit of EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, 
who, Nami argued, laid down a December 2009 marker as a 
realistic finish for negotiations. Nami, while supporting the 
federal framework of the new state, noted that "it is not 
written anywhere that the average citizen has to feel that he 
is in a federation." He also gave a tour d'horizon of the 
negotiating chapters covered. "TRNC Prime Minister" and 
nationalist National Unity Party Leader Dervish Eroglu voiced 
support for Talat and the process, but stressed that the T/Cs 
were not "obligated" to reunite and complained of Greek 
Cypriot bad faith and intransigence. For his part DAS Bryza 
applauded the progress achieved to date, urged the need for 
flexibility and compromise, and said the USG was ready to 
assist should the sides request help. End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Talat: "Not seeking a confederation!" 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In response to DAS Bryza's relating of G/C unease, 
Talat bluntly stated, "We are not seeking a confederation." 
He noted that he had already agreed with Christofias to a 
single, indivisible sovereignty, single citizenship, and 
single international personality, all hall marks of a 
federation, not a confederation. Thus, even if a majority of 
the competencies were allocated to the constituent states, by 
definition the new state would not be confederal for the 
aforementioned reasons. Talat, however, said that if the G/Cs 
accepted a 4/3 ratio of representation in federal bodies, 
then the Turkish Cypriots would concede more competencies, 
such as health, agriculture and fisheries. 
 
¶3. (C) Regarding the "coming into being" kf T`E *dwc0`pE$Q 
Tal`0, Uh+ hAd f)VeL !n In0drTaef nft(d Tg0hcedQQTo fgPm dhe ,d3 sta0d$the 
opposite. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Talat: Christofias wants "backing of all" 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Talat, in response to Bryza's query, said that 
Christofias was limited in his flexibility because of his 
penchant to maintain widespread backing, including of his 
restive, solution-skeptical coalition partners EDEK and DIKO. 
He added that Christofias indeed wants a solution, but might 
not be able to "manage it" unless he mustered the courage to 
take the tough choices that might endanger his "85% 
popularity." Talat also said that Christofias was unduly 
influenced by the sensationalist, largely anti-solution G/C 
 
NICOSIA 00000471  002.3 OF 004 
 
 
press. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Talat: Need arbitration for the "final step" 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Talat said that despite convergence in many areas, it 
would be near impossible to ink a deal without arbitration, 
which Christofias vehemently opposed. "Without arbitration, 
we will not be able to take the final step," Talat argued. He 
said that the G/Cs were fixated on the Annan Plan, where the 
Greek Cypriots at Burgenstock refused to negotiate, making 
the role of UN arbitration ("splitting the difference") that 
much more important. This time, however, the sides were 
negotiating in good faith; thus, the need for arbitration 
would be minimal, and only come at the very end. Talat, 
however, was quick to point out that he did not want EU 
arbitration, but preferred the US or the UN. To that end, he 
asked for the appointment of a US Special Envoy in response 
to DAS Bryza's question regarding possible US contributions 
to the process. Bryza said that the USG was considering the 
appointment of an envoy but had made not a final decision. 
 
¶6. (C) Regarding the timing of a solution, Talat expressed 
concern that the clock was running out, especially with 
Turkey's EU Accession report card and the Ankara Protocol 
Implementation review looming at the end of 2009. In an break 
from his past line, however, Talat said that if T/C public 
support could once again be mobilized, then his time line for 
a solution, which is fMw beT $n2eLdr/`ePt9 aLd 
dePr)dgPq, LgT !n Mb3drUc4hkLaQd DuPc)b`ArlyQ 
 
,-%),!%,)Q%-),%%-,%%,)%-),%%-,)%,)-Q 
 
`eI2 N2Er(n9Edw)d`7. (A! D1rcis( CYp2hoT ,d!D Le#ntIa4nrGXd)l La)h Uas #LeAr(hQQ3`tIs`haD Ui0h T`! a@aLh0x Mf d`E 3h`Esd+ `AmidrQ13& Afd 1Q7Q. "AT 1`sdIf"hcUlp tM 0da@`e agreement and said the T/Cs "would 
not ask" about the origin of other (G/C) funds as long as 
they went through UNDP. Nami warned, however, that the 
Limnitis/Yesilirmak opening should remain a one-off CBM to 
avoid "straying" from the main negotiations. 
 
8.(C) Nami was equally pleased by public and private message 
of EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso to "finish the 
talks by the end of 2009" during his June 25 visit to the 
island (Note: In a June 25 speech before the Cypriot 
Parliament, Barroso said that 2009 "should be the right 
moment to achieve a settlement." End Note). Privately, Nami 
said Barroso told Christofias and Talat at a lunch in the 
buffer zone, attended also by Nami and G/C negotiator George 
Iacovou, that the present process "could not be repeated" and 
that the EU would accommodate "whatever the sides agree on." 
Barosso also, Nami said, pledged to try to be "equidistant" 
between the sides despite the RoC's EU membership. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
Nami: "Not written you have to feel you are in a federation" 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Nami reaffirmed his strong support for the federal 
parameters of the present UN-brokered process, but in 
response to DAS Bryza's question regarding G/C charges of 
confederal tendencies, he rhetorically quipped, "Where is it 
written that the average citizen has to feel he is in a 
federation?"  Nami then gave a brief synopsis of the work 
done to date on five of the six negotiating chapters. His 
accounting is, in places (EU Affairs and the Economy, for 
example), far more optimistic than the one Iacovou gave Bryza 
per Ref C. 
 
--Governance: All resolved but for election of the president 
(T/Cs want communal voting while G/Cs demand a single ticket) 
and representation in the lower house (T/Cs want 1/3 of the 
seats and a requirement to secure 1/4 of Turkish seats to 
forward legislation to the Senate, while G/Cs will agree to 
 
NICOSIA 00000471  003.3 OF 004 
 
 
only 1/4 of the seats and simple majority to send legislation 
to the upper house); 
 
--Property: Inability to draft joint paper due to 
"categorical" G/C position that original owner has right of 
first refusal, "full stop." (Note: T/Cs want a mixed property 
regime of exchange, retur., afD #nepe*baTa-n Tgb% det!b-ifedQQQ@i a b)cMm)tfAl 
hfDe0d*DeLd boAr$ aacmb HfE 0nQQ-dpua,l9-aer!ddp2h*capl%S& E.d Lg4d)QQ 
-,EU Qf&Aapb)-FM )`jMr `2Mbld)s Af` mAb+b AgLf!rgEfcd;Q 
 
)-EAo*nmY%)@hQo nk eAj+b Qt1mbLi.g blMc+b,)n# tUn `gLi#ieQQ 
!ccMb hfE 4n U`%d(Erd(d Ag-`%Tenb9 bEl+ngQ 4n T`e "edEr!l mrQ 
T`E #nfQd)dqEf0 3Tatd;QQQ 
-,Per2h4Mry* IfAb)liTq dodpa"d Hg)np; financial cost of plan; 
 
--Security and Guarantees: Cannot discuss guarantees at this 
stage, but can tackle other issues like federal police, for 
example. Need to work out format, including determining when 
the guarantor powers will enter the negotiations (Note: The 
sides started their discussion of this chapter on July 9. End 
Note). 
 
------------------- 
Nami: Going Forward 
------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Going forward, Nami urged the US and other countries 
to encourage Christofias, much as Barroso did, to try to 
finish the negotiations by the end of 2009. "More people need 
to warn the G/Cs about 'natural calendars,'" he added. He 
also thought that an off-island CYPROB conference, possibly 
at a prestigious university like Harvard, might provide a 
non-threatening forum for Greek Cypriots to brainstorm about 
bridging proposals and discuss "day after" scenarios in terms 
of financing, for example. Finally, Nami made a plea that an 
off-shore gas deal, signed between the RoC and Noble Energy, 
a US-based company, be "put on hold" so as not to damage the 
negotiations since, he argued, natural resources are a 
federal competency that the G/Cs should not "usurp" 
unilaterally. 
 
¶11. (C) For his part, DAS Bryza said that the USG would 
continue to keep a close eye on the process but, before doing 
anything, such as appointing an envoy, we would consult with 
both parties and the UN so as to "do no harm." He noted that 
every day that passes without a solution hurts the interests 
of everyone, whether Cyprus (the continued division of 
island) or Turkey (gumming up its EU Accession Bid). 
Regarding off-shore hydrocarbon exploration, Bryza said that 
while he could understand Nami's concern not to damage the 
process, the USG would protect the interests of any US 
company and its legal right to conclude private business 
deals. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Eroglu: Solution Desired, Not Obligatory 
---------------------------------------- 
¶12. (C) "TRNC PM" and nationalist UBP-leader Dervish Eroglu 
stated his support for the ongoing negotiation process, "in 
spite of any rumors to the contrary."  Admitting that the 
sides have reached real achievements, Eroglu nevertheless 
stressed continued G/C intransigence inspired by a desire  to 
wring concessions out of Turkey in the run-up to its end-2009 
EU Accession Progress Report. Eroglu stressed that while 
Turkey may seek EU membership, it certainly has other 
options*just like the Turkish Cypriots, who are not 
obligated to reunite with the Greek Cypriots.  Eroglu also 
suggested that the US, as a way to pressure the Greek 
Cypriots revisit UNSCR 550 (1984) calling on all states not 
to recognize the "TRNC." 
 
¶13. (C) Touching on the economic situation, Eroglu noted that 
problems exist, primarily due to excessive commitments made 
by the previous "government," especially regarding spending 
 
NICOSIA 00000471  004.3 OF 004 
 
 
for public sector wages and social transfer payments. 
According to Eroglu, the "TRNC" is currently running a 470 
million TL  (USD 305 million) deficit, but this will be 
reduced by a combination of spending cuts and Turkish aid; 
following Eroglu,s recent trip to Ankara, a "plan" has been 
put in place through which Turkey will provide emergency aid 
and Turkish Cypriot authorities will cut spending. 
 
¶14. (C) Bryza responded that any heavy-handed tactics would 
backfire; rather, the USG had to impress upon the Greek 
Cypriots that every day without a solution complicates the 
ultimate reunification of the island.  If the present 
negotiation process ends, Bryza said, Turkey will not get in 
to the EU, and this, in turn, would remove Turkey,s greatest 
incentive for a solution. Conversely, Bryza pointed out that 
a Cyprus breakthrough could also energize the accession 
process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Urbancic