Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09NICOSIA471, CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOTS GENERALLY UPBEAT IN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09NICOSIA471.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NICOSIA471 2009-07-20 08:53 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Nicosia
VZCZCXRO7035
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0471/01 2010853
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 200853Z JUL 09 ZDK ZUI REPORTED ZES-2
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0019
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1493
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 000471 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFIYCP TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TURKISH CYPRIOTS GENERALLY UPBEAT IN 
MEETINGS WITH DAS BRYZA 
 
REF: A. NICOSIA 402 
     B. NICOSIA 438 
     C. NICOSIA 456 
     D. NICOSIA 457 
 
NICOSIA 00000471  001.3 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4( 
d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Like their Greek Cypriot (G/C) counterparts, 
Turkish Cypriots voiced optimism regarding the UN-brokered 
peace process, muted by a cognizance of the magnitude of the 
task ahead and serious divergences between the sides, in 
discussions with EUR DAS Matthew Bryza during his June 29-30 
visit. Turkish Cypriot (T/C) leader Mehmet Ali Talat 
reaffirmed his adherence to the "federal" basis of the 
present process and bluntly stated that "he was not seeking a 
confederation."  He voiced concern that G/C leader Demetris 
Christofias, not willing to risk his popularity, might shy 
away from the tough, painful decisions needed to reach a 
compromise. Talat believed that issues of territory and 
property would prove the biggest sticking point going 
forward, not the Turkish military.  Talat also said that 
arbitration would be unavoidable but, unlike the Annan Plan, 
could be reduced to a minimal level. He also sought the 
appointment of a US Envoy for Cyprus.  T/C lead negotiator 
Ozdil Nami was ebullient, both about the June 26 deal to open 
the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing point and concerning the 
recent visit of EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, 
who, Nami argued, laid down a December 2009 marker as a 
realistic finish for negotiations. Nami, while supporting the 
federal framework of the new state, noted that "it is not 
written anywhere that the average citizen has to feel that he 
is in a federation." He also gave a tour d'horizon of the 
negotiating chapters covered. "TRNC Prime Minister" and 
nationalist National Unity Party Leader Dervish Eroglu voiced 
support for Talat and the process, but stressed that the T/Cs 
were not "obligated" to reunite and complained of Greek 
Cypriot bad faith and intransigence. For his part DAS Bryza 
applauded the progress achieved to date, urged the need for 
flexibility and compromise, and said the USG was ready to 
assist should the sides request help. End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Talat: "Not seeking a confederation!" 
------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) In response to DAS Bryza's relating of G/C unease, 
Talat bluntly stated, "We are not seeking a confederation." 
He noted that he had already agreed with Christofias to a 
single, indivisible sovereignty, single citizenship, and 
single international personality, all hall marks of a 
federation, not a confederation. Thus, even if a majority of 
the competencies were allocated to the constituent states, by 
definition the new state would not be confederal for the 
aforementioned reasons. Talat, however, said that if the G/Cs 
accepted a 4/3 ratio of representation in federal bodies, 
then the Turkish Cypriots would concede more competencies, 
such as health, agriculture and fisheries. 
 
3. (C) Regarding the "coming into being" kf T`E *dwc0`pE$Q 
Tal`0, Uh+ hAd f)VeL !n In0drTaef nft(d Tg0hcedQQTo fgPm dhe ,d3 sta0d$the 
opposite. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Talat: Christofias wants "backing of all" 
----------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Talat, in response to Bryza's query, said that 
Christofias was limited in his flexibility because of his 
penchant to maintain widespread backing, including of his 
restive, solution-skeptical coalition partners EDEK and DIKO. 
He added that Christofias indeed wants a solution, but might 
not be able to "manage it" unless he mustered the courage to 
take the tough choices that might endanger his "85% 
popularity." Talat also said that Christofias was unduly 
influenced by the sensationalist, largely anti-solution G/C 
 
NICOSIA 00000471  002.3 OF 004 
 
 
press. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Talat: Need arbitration for the "final step" 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Talat said that despite convergence in many areas, it 
would be near impossible to ink a deal without arbitration, 
which Christofias vehemently opposed. "Without arbitration, 
we will not be able to take the final step," Talat argued. He 
said that the G/Cs were fixated on the Annan Plan, where the 
Greek Cypriots at Burgenstock refused to negotiate, making 
the role of UN arbitration ("splitting the difference") that 
much more important. This time, however, the sides were 
negotiating in good faith; thus, the need for arbitration 
would be minimal, and only come at the very end. Talat, 
however, was quick to point out that he did not want EU 
arbitration, but preferred the US or the UN. To that end, he 
asked for the appointment of a US Special Envoy in response 
to DAS Bryza's question regarding possible US contributions 
to the process. Bryza said that the USG was considering the 
appointment of an envoy but had made not a final decision. 
 
6. (C) Regarding the timing of a solution, Talat expressed 
concern that the clock was running out, especially with 
Turkey's EU Accession report card and the Ankara Protocol 
Implementation review looming at the end of 2009. In an break 
from his past line, however, Talat said that if T/C public 
support could once again be mobilized, then his time line for 
a solution, which is fMw beT $n2eLdr/`ePt9 aLd 
dePr)dgPq, LgT !n Mb3drUc4hkLaQd DuPc)b`ArlyQ 
 
,-%),!%,)Q%-),%%-,%%,)%-),%%-,)%,)-Q 
 
`eI2 N2Er(n9Edw)d`7. (A! D1rcis( CYp2hoT ,d!D Le#ntIa4nrGXd)l La)h Uas #LeAr(hQQ3`tIs`haD Ui0h T`! a@aLh0x Mf d`E 3h`Esd+ `AmidrQ13& Afd 1Q7Q. "AT 1`sdIf"hcUlp tM 0da@`e agreement and said the T/Cs "would 
not ask" about the origin of other (G/C) funds as long as 
they went through UNDP. Nami warned, however, that the 
Limnitis/Yesilirmak opening should remain a one-off CBM to 
avoid "straying" from the main negotiations. 
 
8.(C) Nami was equally pleased by public and private message 
of EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso to "finish the 
talks by the end of 2009" during his June 25 visit to the 
island (Note: In a June 25 speech before the Cypriot 
Parliament, Barroso said that 2009 "should be the right 
moment to achieve a settlement." End Note). Privately, Nami 
said Barroso told Christofias and Talat at a lunch in the 
buffer zone, attended also by Nami and G/C negotiator George 
Iacovou, that the present process "could not be repeated" and 
that the EU would accommodate "whatever the sides agree on." 
Barosso also, Nami said, pledged to try to be "equidistant" 
between the sides despite the RoC's EU membership. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
Nami: "Not written you have to feel you are in a federation" 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
9. (C) Nami reaffirmed his strong support for the federal 
parameters of the present UN-brokered process, but in 
response to DAS Bryza's question regarding G/C charges of 
confederal tendencies, he rhetorically quipped, "Where is it 
written that the average citizen has to feel he is in a 
federation?"  Nami then gave a brief synopsis of the work 
done to date on five of the six negotiating chapters. His 
accounting is, in places (EU Affairs and the Economy, for 
example), far more optimistic than the one Iacovou gave Bryza 
per Ref C. 
 
--Governance: All resolved but for election of the president 
(T/Cs want communal voting while G/Cs demand a single ticket) 
and representation in the lower house (T/Cs want 1/3 of the 
seats and a requirement to secure 1/4 of Turkish seats to 
forward legislation to the Senate, while G/Cs will agree to 
 
NICOSIA 00000471  003.3 OF 004 
 
 
only 1/4 of the seats and simple majority to send legislation 
to the upper house); 
 
--Property: Inability to draft joint paper due to 
"categorical" G/C position that original owner has right of 
first refusal, "full stop." (Note: T/Cs want a mixed property 
regime of exchange, retur., afD #nepe*baTa-n Tgb% det!b-ifedQQQ@i a b)cMm)tfAl 
hfDe0d*DeLd boAr$ aacmb HfE 0nQQ-dpua,l9-aer!ddp2h*capl%S& E.d Lg4d)QQ 
-,EU Qf&Aapb)-FM )`jMr `2Mbld)s Af` mAb+b AgLf!rgEfcd;Q 
 
)-EAo*nmY%)@hQo nk eAj+b Qt1mbLi.g blMc+b,)n# tUn `gLi#ieQQ 
!ccMb hfE 4n U`%d(Erd(d Ag-`%Tenb9 bEl+ngQ 4n T`e "edEr!l mrQ 
T`E #nfQd)dqEf0 3Tatd;QQQ 
-,Per2h4Mry* IfAb)liTq dodpa"d Hg)np; financial cost of plan; 
 
--Security and Guarantees: Cannot discuss guarantees at this 
stage, but can tackle other issues like federal police, for 
example. Need to work out format, including determining when 
the guarantor powers will enter the negotiations (Note: The 
sides started their discussion of this chapter on July 9. End 
Note). 
 
------------------- 
Nami: Going Forward 
------------------- 
 
10. (C) Going forward, Nami urged the US and other countries 
to encourage Christofias, much as Barroso did, to try to 
finish the negotiations by the end of 2009. "More people need 
to warn the G/Cs about 'natural calendars,'" he added. He 
also thought that an off-island CYPROB conference, possibly 
at a prestigious university like Harvard, might provide a 
non-threatening forum for Greek Cypriots to brainstorm about 
bridging proposals and discuss "day after" scenarios in terms 
of financing, for example. Finally, Nami made a plea that an 
off-shore gas deal, signed between the RoC and Noble Energy, 
a US-based company, be "put on hold" so as not to damage the 
negotiations since, he argued, natural resources are a 
federal competency that the G/Cs should not "usurp" 
unilaterally. 
 
11. (C) For his part, DAS Bryza said that the USG would 
continue to keep a close eye on the process but, before doing 
anything, such as appointing an envoy, we would consult with 
both parties and the UN so as to "do no harm." He noted that 
every day that passes without a solution hurts the interests 
of everyone, whether Cyprus (the continued division of 
island) or Turkey (gumming up its EU Accession Bid). 
Regarding off-shore hydrocarbon exploration, Bryza said that 
while he could understand Nami's concern not to damage the 
process, the USG would protect the interests of any US 
company and its legal right to conclude private business 
deals. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Eroglu: Solution Desired, Not Obligatory 
---------------------------------------- 
12. (C) "TRNC PM" and nationalist UBP-leader Dervish Eroglu 
stated his support for the ongoing negotiation process, "in 
spite of any rumors to the contrary."  Admitting that the 
sides have reached real achievements, Eroglu nevertheless 
stressed continued G/C intransigence inspired by a desire  to 
wring concessions out of Turkey in the run-up to its end-2009 
EU Accession Progress Report. Eroglu stressed that while 
Turkey may seek EU membership, it certainly has other 
options*just like the Turkish Cypriots, who are not 
obligated to reunite with the Greek Cypriots.  Eroglu also 
suggested that the US, as a way to pressure the Greek 
Cypriots revisit UNSCR 550 (1984) calling on all states not 
to recognize the "TRNC." 
 
13. (C) Touching on the economic situation, Eroglu noted that 
problems exist, primarily due to excessive commitments made 
by the previous "government," especially regarding spending 
 
NICOSIA 00000471  004.3 OF 004 
 
 
for public sector wages and social transfer payments. 
According to Eroglu, the "TRNC" is currently running a 470 
million TL  (USD 305 million) deficit, but this will be 
reduced by a combination of spending cuts and Turkish aid; 
following Eroglu,s recent trip to Ankara, a "plan" has been 
put in place through which Turkey will provide emergency aid 
and Turkish Cypriot authorities will cut spending. 
 
14. (C) Bryza responded that any heavy-handed tactics would 
backfire; rather, the USG had to impress upon the Greek 
Cypriots that every day without a solution complicates the 
ultimate reunification of the island.  If the present 
negotiation process ends, Bryza said, Turkey will not get in 
to the EU, and this, in turn, would remove Turkey,s greatest 
incentive for a solution. Conversely, Bryza pointed out that 
a Cyprus breakthrough could also energize the accession 
process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Urbancic