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OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #1873/01 2030955
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 220955Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4313
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001873 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KG GG AZ AR RS
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS JULY 7 MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN: 
NAGORNO-KARABAKH, CENTRAL ASIA, GEORGIA, UKRAINE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  In a meeting with U/S Burns July 7, on the 
margins of the President's visit to Moscow, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Grigoriy Karasin said he was optimistic about the 
chances of a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  He 
urged the U.S. and Russia to be transparent on dealings in 
Central Asia, and stressed that Moscow "hoped" that the new 
U.S. deal on Manas would be for temporary transit purposes 
for Afghanistan and not a permanent military establishment. 
The latter would be seen as almost as provocative to Moscow 
as NATO enlargement.  He acknowledged that Deputy PM Sechin 
and Defense Minister Serdyukov were in Bishkek, without 
specifying the nature of their trip.  Karasin said Russia 
supported continuation of the Geneva process for Georgia, but 
reiterated arguments that Tbilisi was playing a political 
game rather than seeking to stabilize the situation. U/S 
Burns countered Karasin's claim that Russia was seeing U.S. 
military support for Georgia, stressing that U.S. efforts 
were currently focused on training.  Karasin expressed 
concern at growing nationalism in Ukraine and perceived 
efforts by Kyiv to politicize differences with Russia over 
the Black Sea Fleet.  He urged A/S Gordon and A/S Blake to 
visit Moscow for bilateral meetings soon.  End summary. 
 
Nagorno-Karabakh 
---------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Karasin told U/S Burns he was "unusually optimistic" 
about the chances for resolving the conflict in 
Nagorno-Karabakh.  He said he thought there was a good 
possibility the two Presidents would reach an agreement on 
the issues of refugees and the Lachin corridor.  He liked the 
idea of a U.S.-Russia-France statement at the G8, and thought 
that if the Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents could reach 
agreement on the principles at their meeting in Moscow on 
July 17, it would be a very important achievement. 
 
¶3. (C) Karasin commented that the Turkey-Armenia new "love 
affair" had Baku nervous, but said it was good and we should 
welcome it.  He praised the work of the Minsk Group and said 
he would be interested in any new ideas the U.S. could 
suggest on how to proceed. 
 
Central Asia 
------------ 
 
¶4. (C) U/S Burns told DFM Karasin that he would be traveling 
to Central Asia following the G8 Summit in Italy. Karasin 
said the recent events in Urumqi showed how fragile the 
stability in that part of the world was.  China was even more 
stable than the Central Asian countries, and Urumqi was 
dangerous because of the possible domino effect in other 
regions.  He said the U.S. and Russia should assess together 
the challenges in Central Asia and consider each other's 
priorities in the region. 
 
¶5. (C) Karasin noted that Russia wanted to play its own role 
with the Central Asian countries, but they also had their own 
interests with Russia. Russia had many more contacts with 
Central Asia than before; President Medvedev and PM Putin 
were actively engaged, and had visited the region several 
times.  The leaders of the countries would likely be in 
Moscow for the Presidents' Cup horse races July 17-18, and it 
was possible that Medvedev would visit the region, including 
perhaps Tajikistan, at the end of July.  Russia was 
politically involved, but was trying to develop more economic 
and trade ties, and believed that more business and projects 
should follow. 
 
¶6. (C) Karasin wryly commented that the Central Asian 
countries often tried to play the U.S. off against Russia and 
vice-versa.  The U.S. and Russia should be transparent, blunt 
and understand each other's "maneuvers" regarding the region. 
 "Competition should be fair and contribute to stability in 
the region."  He also commented that Russia had been 
suspicious of U.S. efforts to put Central Asian countries 
with Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and other countries in the 
region.  Russia did not agree that they had similar problems 
and issues, but was concerned that the problems in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan - Islamic fundamentalism, narcotics 
trafficking, extremism, and instability - would eventually 
migrate to Central Asia.  He asked whether the U.S. really 
thought Central Asian nations could do more to solve the 
problems in Afghanistan.  U/S Burns said there were obvious 
 
MOSCOW 00001873  002 OF 003 
 
 
differences between the Central Asian states and those of 
South Asia, but emphasized the practical value of cooperation 
on issues like electricity and trade, and the importance of 
overflight and transit arrangements in Central Asia for our 
common stake in stability in Afghanistan. 
 
Manas 
----- 
 
¶7. (C) Karasin stressed that Russia hoped the new U.S. 
agreement with Bishkek was for "transit" and not for a 
"permanent military establishment."  The latter would "touch 
Russia's strategic interests," and would be seen as a "second 
variant" to NATO enlargement - not as serious as NATO but 
similar in its impact on Russian security.  He said the deal 
we reached seemed to be about 90 percent the same as the 
previous arrangement.  U/S Burns said that the transit 
arrangements were similar, but the security and financial 
aspects were different.  He emphasized that we have no 
interest in permanent military bases in the region.  Karasin 
acknowledged that Deputy PM Sechin and Defense Minister 
Serdyukov were in Bishkek, but merely said he hoped they 
would "bring some concrete results back" without specifying 
the nature of their trip. 
 
Georgia 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) Karasin said that Tbilisi needed to "change its 
political philosophy."  Georgia wanted to be an enemy to all 
its neighbors, and could act with impunity because it felt 
that it was supported by the major powers.  This was a 
dangerous attitude, Karasin warned.  Tbilisi should realize 
that it would be better to search for "friendly language" 
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and even with Russia. 
 
¶9. (C) Moscow had "honestly" supported efforts - and spent 
long, sleepless nights - to find solutions on the OSCE and UN 
monitors, Karasin said, but it was "clear that Georgia had 
been given the choice in Vienna, New York, and Geneva between 
stability and playing a political game, and had chosen the 
latter." 
 
¶10. (C) U/S Burns countered Karasin's claim that Russia was 
seeing U.S. military support for Georgia, stressing that U.S. 
efforts were currently focused on training.  Karasin said 
Russia now had border guards in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
and knew there "wouldn't be an avalanche of recognitions," 
but there needed to be some new ideas.  Moscow would continue 
to support Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's economic and social 
development, but needed "normal behavior" from Tbilisi. 
 
¶11. (C) Karasin emphasized that at the OSCE, Russia had not 
pressed for two completely separate missions, but for two 
missions reporting to the same chief in Vienna.  The same was 
true at the UN, but Tbilisi "preferred instability," he 
claimed. 
 
¶12. (C) Russia believed the Geneva process should continue, 
Karasin said, because it gave an opportunity for the Abkhaz 
and South Ossetians to face the Georgians, and it was in all 
our interests to promote such continued communication. 
 
Ukraine 
------- 
 
¶13. (C) Karasin said he generally shared the view that the 
political and economic situation in Ukraine was a mess, and 
that the leadership needed to stop squabbling among 
themselves and focus on efforts to overcome the problems. 
U/S Burns stressed that our main interest in Ukraine right 
now was stability. 
 
¶14. (C) Karasin said that initially, Moscow had been 
concerned about the scheduling of the elections for January 
17, since it was likely all the candidates would use 
end-of-year gas issues with Russia in their campaigns. 
Moscow was increasingly concerned about two issues: 
perceived growing "nationalism" in Ukraine, as evidenced by 
events at the 300th anniversary of the battle of Poltava; and 
second, efforts to politicize differences over Sevastopol and 
the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) and to link them to the U.S. and 
NATO.  The practical difficulties over the BSF could easily 
be resolved, Karasin argued, but Kyiv kept trying to 
politicize the issue.  Still, Karasin said, the relationship 
 
MOSCOW 00001873  003 OF 003 
 
 
was "normal," with a lot of contacts, and Russia still 
considered Ukraine as "close and friendly."  Karasin 
contended that "if we could sweep away the artificial flavor 
of Ukrainian bad nationalism, it would be better for 
everyone." 
 
¶15. (C) On gas issues, Karasin said the signing of the accord 
between the EU and Ukraine, with no Russian input two days 
before the Brussels conference, had been "peculiar."  It was 
clear the EU, Ukraine and Russia had to get together and 
settle the gas transit problems; it could not be done without 
Moscow.  (He added with a twinkle that corruption in the 
energy sector was much worse in Ukraine than in Russia). If 
both sides were serious, they needed to be transparent. 
Russian officials, particularly Putin, were very clear 
(though he noted that Gazprom chief Alexey Miller was less 
so), but Ukraine had no logic; it wanted the supply but did 
not want to pay. 
 
A/S Gordon 
---------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) Several times, Karasin said Moscow would very much 
welcome visits by A/S Gordon and A/S Blake to Moscow and 
looked forward to meeting with them soon. 
BEYRLE