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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START UNGA
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA 
(SFO-GVA-III):  (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, JULY 22, 
2009, AFTERNOON SESSION 
 
REF: GENEVA 616 (SFO-GVA-III-001) 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-III-002. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  July 22, 2009 
                Time:  3:30 - 5:30 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) The Russian Delegation continued its presentation of 
papers and proposals initiated during the morning session 
(REFTEL), focusing on basing of strategic offensive arms 
(SOAs) outside the national territory of the Parties, and 
proposed language for the START Follow-on Treaty's preamble 
and final provisions.  On basing SOAs outside of national 
territory, the Russian Delegation sought information on why 
the United States objected to the concept of limiting SOAs 
within the continental portion of each Side's national 
territory, and asked whether the United States had plans for 
such basing.  The Russian Delegation also proposed a set of 
notifications concerning the temporary deployment of heavy 
bombers, as well as notification of large-scale exercises 
involving heavy bombers. 
 
¶4.  (S) Regarding the Treaty's preamble, the Russians 
explained that their proposal was consistent with ideas 
discussed during previous sessions, and included a 
formulation on the "unbreakable link" between SOA reductions 
and missile defense deployment, as well as a statement that 
the deployment of ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear 
configuration impacted strategic stability.  Regarding 
concluding provisions, the Russians explained that their 
proposal was generally consistent with language from the 
START Treaty, although it included a statement that 
"qualitative and quantitative" increases in missile defense 
capabilities could provide justification for treaty 
withdrawal under the supreme national interest clause. 
 
¶5.  (S) The Russian Delegation also outlined a proposal for a 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that would 
be based on UNGA Resolution 59/94 dated December 17, 2004, 
entitled "Bilateral Strategic Nuclear Arms Reductions and the 
New Strategic Framework," that had been jointly proposed by 
Russia and the United States.  The Russian Delegation noted 
that the 2004 resolution had been very useful, and a similar 
resolution prior to the 2010 Review Conference for the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) would likewise be 
useful. 
 
---------------------------- 
BASING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE 
ARMS OUTSIDE OF THE PARTIES' 
NATIONAL TERRITORIES 
---------------------------- 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Antonov presented the following paper, which included 
an attachment with specific treaty text proposals, regarding 
the basing and temporary deployment of strategic offensive 
arms beyond the national territory of each Side. 
 
Begin text: 
 
                                  Official Translation 
 
                                  To be Turned over to the 
                                  U.S. Side 
 
                                  Paper of the Russian Side 
                                  July 23, 2009 
 
            On Basing and Temporary Stationing of 
            Strategic Offensive Arms Outside the 
              National Territory of Each Party 
 
     In accordance with the Joint Understanding of the 
Russian and U.S. Presidents on strategic offensive arms 
issues, of July 6, 2009, which instructs the negotiators to 
include in the text of the new treaty a provision on basing 
strategic offensive arms exclusively on the national 
territory of each Party, the Russian side would like to 
outline in more specific terms its approaches to this issue, 
which we regard as one of the key elements of the future 
agreement. 
 
     The Russian side notes that in its June 16, 2009 
"Comments" on the Russian side's views regarding the new 
treaty the U.S. "does not object to the concept of locational 
restrictions for SOAs," including a restriction on basing 
SOAs outside the national territory of each Party. 
 
     At the same time, the U.S. side particularly stipulates 
in the above-mentioned paper that it rejects the narrowing of 
this restriction to the "continental portion" of the national 
territory of the Parties, as we initially proposed at these 
negotiations.  In this connection, we cannot but have certain 
concerns as to what is behind this U.S. approach. 
 
     As you know, one of the significant differences between 
SOAs and other types of weapons is their range, which, from a 
military standpoint, makes it easier to solve the problem of 
selecting a basing location for such weapons.  During the 
term of the START Treaty there have been no precedents for 
basing either Russian (Soviet) or U.S. SOAs outside the 
continental portion of national territory. 
 
     In this context we would like to ask the U.S. side the 
following:  does the U.S. plan to establish SOA facilities or 
base SOAs outside the continental portion of its national 
territory?  What is the reason for its apprehensions 
concerning such a restriction? 
 
     We also have a number of questions for the U.S. side in 
connection with information that is becoming available, to 
the effect that the U.S. is carrying out measures in 
preparation for launching the LV-2 launch vehicle from Meck 
Island (the Marshall Islands in the Pacific Ocean), which is 
 
 
 
declared as a "space launch facility" under the START Treaty. 
We would remind the U.S. side that at the JCIC session in 
June of this year the Parties agreed to consider the LV-2 
launch vehicle being assembled on the basis of the first 
stage of the Trident I SLBM as a START accountable Trident I 
SLBM.  Furthermore, the Marshall Islands, including Meck 
Island, are not U.S. territory since they have the status of 
a state "freely associated with the U.S." and, from a legal 
standpoint, they are an independent country.  Could the U.S. 
side comment on this situation, given both Parties' intention 
to retain in the new treaty the START provision on not 
stationing SOAs outside national territory? 
 
     The Russian side reaffirms that our approach does not 
envisage a ban on temporary stationing of heavy bombers 
outside national territory. 
 
     We note that such an approach is consistent with the 
U.S. side's views on this issue, expressed in the 
aforementioned U.S. paper, where the U.S. "does not object to 
inclusion of provisions similar to those in the START Treaty 
that would address the temporary stationing of heavy bombers 
outside national territory."  In this context, we take into 
consideration the fact that the U.S. side is proposing to 
work out less stringent notification requirements in this 
regard. 
 
     At the same time, we propose that a special regime be 
established for heavy bombers with long-range nuclear ALCMs 
or other nuclear armaments directly on them.  Specifically, 
there would be a ban on stationing heavy bombers with 
long-range nuclear ALCMs or other nuclear armaments outside 
the continental portion of national territory. 
 
     The Russian side is prepared to provide the U.S. with 
its proposals on specific wording for the provisions on 
basing and temporary stationing of SOAs outside the national 
territory of each Party for inclusion in the text of the new 
treaty on strategic offensive arms (attached). 
 
                                             Attachment 
 
                Proposals of the Russian Side 
            for the Wording of the Provisions on 
       Basing and Temporary Stationing of SOAs Outside 
            the National Territory of Each Party 
       to be Included in the Text of the New Treaty on 
                  Strategic Offensive Arms 
 
     In the body of the text: 
 
     Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall 
not be based outside the national territory of each Party. 
 
     In the event of temporary stationing of a heavy bomber 
outside national territory, a notification concerning 
movement of items subject to the limitations provided for in 
this Treaty shall be provided. 
 
     Each Party undertakes not to station heavy bombers with 
long-range nuclear ALCMs or other nuclear armaments outside 
 
 
the continental portion of national territory. 
 
     In an annex to the Treaty: 
 
     Each Party shall provide to the other Party, inter alia, 
the following notifications concerning movement of items 
subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty: 
 
     (a)  Notification, no later than 24 hours after a visit 
of a heavy bomber has exceeded 24 hours in duration, of the 
visit of such an airplane to the location visited.  Such 
notification shall include, for each location visited:  the 
number, by type, category, and, if applicable, variant, of 
the heavy bombers that are visiting; the air base, heavy 
bomber flight test center, production facility for heavy 
bombers, or training facility for heavy bombers, at which 
such airplanes are based; the location such airplanes are 
visiting; and the date and time of arrival. 
 
     (b)  Notification, no later than 48 hours after 
departure, of the conclusion of the visit of a heavy bomber, 
notification of which has been provided in accordance with 
paragraph (a) of this Section.  Such notification shall 
include, for each location visited by such airplanes:  the 
number, by type, category, and, if applicable, variant, of 
the heavy bombers that have concluded the visit; the location 
visited by such airplanes; the air base, heavy bomber flight 
test center, production facility for heavy bombers, or 
training facility for heavy bombers, at which such airplanes 
are based; and the date and time of departure. 
 
     (c)  Notification, no less than 48 hours in advance of 
the beginning of a major strategic exercise involving heavy 
bombers, of the beginning of such an exercise.  Such 
notification shall include:  the air bases for heavy bombers 
that are involved in the exercise; and the date and time of 
the beginning of the exercise. 
 
     (d)  Notification, no later than 24 hours after the 
completion of a major strategic exercise involving heavy 
bombers, about which a notification has been provided in 
accordance with paragraph (c) of this Section, of the 
completion of that exercise.  Such notification shall include 
the date and time of the completion of the exercise. 
 
End text. 
 
¶7.  (S) Following Antonov's presentation of the Russian paper 
and proposed treaty text, Elliott asked whether Russia sought 
to prohibit the deployment of heavy bombers capable of 
carrying LRNA and other nuclear armaments, or whether Russia 
sought to prohibit the deployment of heavy bombers actually 
carrying such weapons.  Antonov clarified that Russia's 
proposal was to prohibit deployments beyond the continental 
portion of each party's national territory of heavy bombers 
actually carrying nuclear weapons. 
 
¶8.  (S) Warner commented that he looked forward to seeing the 
Russian Federation's written paper.  He stated that the U.S. 
Delegation would further investigate the question regarding 
possible plans to deploy strategic offensive arms beyond the 
 
 
continental United States.  The initial U.S. reaction to the 
idea of further limiting the deployment of heavy bombers to 
the continental portion of national territory was that this 
proposal had not been useful, but the United States would 
consider it further. 
 
¶9.  (S) Regarding exercise notifications, Warner asked 
whether such notices were proposed only for exercises that 
went beyond the continental portion of a country's national 
territory, or if the proposal was for any large-scale 
exercise.  Antonov responded that the delegations could 
discuss the issue further after the United States had time to 
review Russia's written proposals. 
 
------------------------- 
CLARIFICATION ON THE LV-2 
FROM THE JCIC PERSPECTIVE 
------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) Regarding Russian questions raised on the LV-2 in 
the Russian paper on basing of SOAs outside of national 
territory, Taylor responded that he looked forward to 
studying Russia's written proposals and specific questions. 
As he understood the Russian Delegation's presentation, 
Russia was concerned about the deployment of LV-2 on Meck 
Island.  This was an issue discussed within the JCIC, and 
included issues associated with both space launch facilities 
and space launch vehicles.  The issue of identifying a space 
launch facility outside of a Party's national territory was 
discussed extensively in the JCIC, and restrictions and 
limitations were put in place for the utilization of such 
facilities.  One restriction was to prohibit the basing of 
strategic offensive arms at such a facility.  A space launch 
vehicle taken to such a facility would remain under the 
control of the owning Party, and any items remaining after 
the launch would be returned.  This would not prohibit the 
movement of a space launch vehicle outside national territory 
as long as proper notification was provided.  Under START, 
Meck Island was a declared space launch facility outside the 
national territory of the United States.  The LV-2 was a 
ballistic missile that incorporated the first stage of a 
Trident I.  Per Joint Statement 21, a ballistic missile that 
incorporated the first stage of a ballistic missile of a 
specific type was accountable as a ballistic missile of that 
type.  The United States, therefore, considered the LV-2 
accountable as a Trident I.  All necessary data had been 
provided to Russia.  Any movement of the LV-2 to Meck Island 
would be done with notification provided in accordance with 
START and, therefore, would not be in violation of the Treaty. 
 
¶11.  (S) Antonov replied that this issue would likely be 
discussed further in the JCIC. 
 
--------------------- 
RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR 
THE TREATY'S PREAMBLE 
--------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) Antonov previewed specific Russian proposals for the 
treaty's preamble by noting that there were two schools of 
thought for approaching the START Follow-on Treaty.  One was 
 
 
to focus on the most difficult issues first.  The other was 
to focus on the areas where there existed some agreement. 
Russia had adopted a hybrid approach and, with regard to the 
preamble, Russia had developed its proposal drawing from both 
U.S. and Russian concepts, and placing these in a logical 
construction.  He read the following Russian-proposed 
preamble. 
 
Begin text: 
 
                               Official Translation 
 
                               To be Turned over to the 
                               U.S. Side 
 
                               Paper of the Russian Side 
                               July 23, 2009 
 
               Draft Preamble to the New Treaty 
                 on Strategic Offensive Arms 
               (Proposals of the Russian Side) 
 
     The Russian Federation and the United States of America, 
hereinafter referred to as the Parties, 
 
     Committed to the historic goal of freeing humanity from 
the nuclear threat and consistently implementing the 
obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the 
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968; 
 
     Endeavoring to help reduce the role and importance of 
nuclear arms in ensuring international security and 
expressing support for global efforts in the field of 
non-proliferation; 
 
     Continuing along the path of strengthening strategic 
stability and forging a new strategic relationship based on 
mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation; 
 
     Considering it necessary to bring the nuclear postures 
of the Russian Federation and the United States of America 
into alignment with our countries' post-Cold War relationship 
- no longer enemies, no prospect of war between us, and 
cooperating where mutually advantageous; 
 
     Considering the stabilizing influence on the global 
situation brought about by the radical and variable reduction 
of nuclear arsenals at the turn of the 21st century; 
 
     Noting that there is an indissoluble interrelationship 
between the reduction of strategic offensive arms and the 
deployment of missile defense systems; 
 
     Agreeing that ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear 
configuration have an impact on strategic stability; 
 
     Taking into account the fact that the Treaty Between the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of 
America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991 (the START Treaty) has been 
implemented in full; 
 
 
 
     Noting that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have completely fulfilled the 
obligations assumed in accordance with the Protocol to the 
Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and 
the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation 
of Strategic Offensive Arms of May 23, 1992; 
 
     Fully appreciating the contribution of the Republic of 
Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to the cause 
of general and complete nuclear disarmament and strengthening 
international peace and security as non-nuclear-weapon states; 
 
     Seeking to maintain continuity and provide new impetus 
to the process of reducing and limiting nuclear arms while 
maintaining the safety and security of their nuclear 
arsenals, and with a view to multilateralization of this 
process in the future; 
 
     Desiring to create a mechanism for verifying compliance 
with the obligations under this Treaty, based on the 
procedures that were perfected in the START Treaty, and 
supplemented by transparency and confidence-building measures; 
 
     Guided by the principle of equal security and believing 
that global challenges and threats require continued use of 
qualitatively new approaches to interaction on the whole 
spectrum of strategic relations, 
 
     Have agreed as follows... 
 
End text. 
 
¶13.  (S) Gottemoeller thanked Antonov and asked about the 
statement that Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had fully 
fulfilled their obligations under START.  Specifically, for 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan, there were START-accountable items 
that had yet to be eliminated. 
 
¶14.  (S) Antonov replied that it was a good question  but 
that, from his perspective,  it was important to be clear 
that the other START Treaty Parties had fulfilled their 
obligations; otherwise it would lend credence to their 
arguments that they be part of the START Follow-on 
negotiations.  Instead, he suggested that the work on 
eliminations under the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program continue and, for the purposes of recognizing their 
contributions, the United States and Russia note that the 
other START Parties have complied with their obligations. 
 
¶15.  (S) Gottemoeller elaborated that her point was that the 
single statement in the Russian-proposed preamble recognizing 
the denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine may 
be sufficient without commenting on the legal status of START 
implementation, where there could be some questions. 
 
----------------------- 
RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR 
THE TREATY'S CONCLUDING 
PROVISIONS 
----------------------- 
 
 
 
¶16.  (S) After recognizing the hard work of the Russian 
Delegation's legal advisor prior to the negotiating session, 
Antonov read the following Russian proposal for the Treaty's 
concluding provisions. 
 
Begin text: 
 
                                  Official Translation 
 
                                  To be Turned over to the 
                                  U.S. Side 
 
                                  Paper of the Russian Side 
                                  July 23, 2009 
 
        Draft Concluding Provisions of the New Treaty 
                 on Strategic Offensive Arms 
               (Proposals of the Russian Side) 
 
     ¶1.  This Treaty shall be subject to ratification and 
shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of 
instruments of ratification. 
 
     ¶2.  This Treaty shall be concluded for 10 years. 
 
     ¶3.  Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. 
Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with 
the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty. 
 
     ¶4.  The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to 
make changes in the provisions of the Annex to this Treaty 
that do not effect substantive rights and obligations under 
the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Consultative 
Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without 
resorting to the procedure of making amendments, set forth in 
paragraph 3 of this Article. 
 
     ¶5.  Each Party shall, in exercising its national 
sovereignty, have the right to terminate this Treaty if, in 
its view, further compliance with the Treaty will jeopardize 
the Party's supreme interests, inter alia in the event of a 
quantitative and qualitative buildup in the capabilities of 
missile defense systems. 
 
     ¶6.  A Party that has decided to terminate this Treaty 
shall inform the other Party of its decision through 
diplomatic channels at least three months prior to 
termination of this Treaty, specifying the extraordinary 
events that it regards as having jeopardized its supreme 
interests. 
 
     ¶7.  As of the date of its entry into force, this Treaty 
shall supersede the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and 
the United States of America on Strategic Offensive 
Reductions of May 24 2002, which shall terminate as of that 
date. 
 
     This Treaty will be registered pursuant to Article 102 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
 
End text. 
 
¶17.  (S) Gottemoeller asked Brown for his initial reaction, 
to which he replied that the text was well done. 
Gottemoeller noted that the U.S. Delegation would have 
additional comments during the next day's meetings, including 
regarding the Russian formulation for the supreme national 
interest withdrawal clause. 
 
-------------------------------- 
RUSSIAN-PROPOSED UNGA RESOLUTION 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶18.  (S) Antonov asked the U.S. Delegation to consider a 
Russian proposal for a bilateral resolution for presentation 
to the U.N. General Assembly regarding U.S.-Russian bilateral 
strategic offensive arms reductions and the new framework for 
bilateral relations.  He stated Russia had reviewed UNGA 
resolution 59/64 from December 17, 2004, on this subject, and 
believed that it was very useful, noting its inclusion of 
several figures regarding reductions in the area of strategic 
offensive arms.  Russia believed an updated resolution would 
be useful ahead of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.  He then 
read the following Russian-proposed UNGA resolution: 
 
Begin text: 
 
                                  Official Translation 
 
                                  To be Turned over to the 
                                  U.S. Side 
 
                                  Paper of the Russian Side 
                                  July 23, 2009 
 
                    On a Draft Resolution 
       "Bilateral Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Arms 
        and the New Framework for Strategic Relations" 
 
     In order to ensure broad international support for the 
efforts being undertaken by our countries in the field of 
disarmament and non-proliferation, we propose to the U.S. 
side jointly submitting a draft resolution entitled 
"Bilateral Reductions in Strategic Nuclear Arms and the New 
Framework for Strategic Relations" to the First Committee of 
the UNGA during the upcoming session of the General Assembly. 
 We already submitted such a draft in 2004 at the 59th 
Session of the UNGA. 
 
     The Russian side considers it appropriate to use as a 
basis the text of Resolution 59/94 of December 3, 2004, and 
reflect in it the following additional points: 
 
     -- the nature of the strategic relations between Russia 
and the U.S. (equal security, trust, openness, cooperation, 
and predictability); 
 
     -- the upcoming completion of the operation of the 
Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions and the 
implementation of its provision on reduction of the sides' 
strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200; 
 
 
 
     -- fulfillment of the START Treaty obligations by all 
the Parties, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine; 
 
     -- the beginning of the negotiations between Russia and 
the U.S. to work out a new treaty on strategic offensive arms; 
 
     -- the obligations under Article VI of the NPT; 
 
     -- the need for early entry into force of the CTBT; 
 
     -- support for the FMCT negotiations; 
 
     -- a call to other states to join in the nuclear 
disarmament efforts of Russia and the U.S. and to do their 
utmost to support the development of the disarmament process. 
 
     We would ask the U.S. side to present its views in this 
regard.  If there are no objections in principle, we would be 
willing to prepare the draft of such a resolution for 
consideration at the next round of negotiations. 
 
End text. 
 
¶19.  (S) Antonov proposed that if the United States agreed, a 
more complete resolution could be developed by August, but 
reiterated the basis would be the 2004 UNGA resolution. 
 
¶20.  (S) Gottemoeller replied that this idea had been 
considered in Washington and that, in general, the Russian 
proposal was a good idea.  She asked how the Russian proposal 
would relate to a possible resolution initiated by the P-5. 
 
¶21.  (S) Antonov replied that the resolution on bilateral 
reductions and relations would shed more light on common 
U.S.-Russian objectives.  It would provide a broader context 
for U.S.-Russian leadership, and demonstrate U.S.-Russian 
resolve specifically in the area of nuclear disarmament.  He 
did not believe the P-5 document would be submitted to the 
General Assembly.  However, the Russian-proposed document 
could assist in the development of the P-5 document. 
 
¶22.  (S) Gottemoeller again commented that it was a good idea 
that was also being considered in Washington, but that so far 
Washington had not focused on any potential details.  It 
would be important, however, to continue to shed light on 
U.S.-Russian disarmament efforts. 
 
--------------------- 
INITIAL DISCUSSION OF 
WORK PLAN FOR START 
FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS 
---------------------- 
 
¶23.  (S) In reviewing the next day's agenda, Gottemoeller 
noted that an important agenda item would be to agree on a 
work plan and timeline for negotiating text for the Treaty 
and its protocols.  Antonov replied that the Presidents had 
provided clear instructions.  He was prepared to meet daily 
if there was substance to discuss.  However, he believed the 
United States would need time to develop its response to the 
 
 
Russian papers.  Russia would provide additional papers, but 
time was needed for each Side to do its homework.  Not all of 
the experts were at the negotiating sessions, nor was the 
leadership that would ultimately need to approve proposals. 
The key issue was not the frequency of the meetings but the 
substance of them.  He commented that Ambassador Beyrle had 
scared the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) staff when he 
asked whether Antonov would be up to the task of leading the 
START Follow-on negotiations for Russia.  The MFA leadership 
wanted to know if the United States wanted Antonov replaced. 
 
¶24.  (S) Gottemoeller replied that if such a query were made 
by Ambassador Beyrle, its intent would certainly not have 
been to suggest that the United States sought to replace 
Antonov.  She made the point that organizational issues were 
boring but necessary, and she wanted to ensure that the 
Russian Delegation understood U.S. thinking with regard to 
the work in Geneva over the coming months. 
 
¶25.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- Russia: 
 
    -- Russian Paper On Strategic Missile Systems in a 
Non-nuclear Configuration, dated July 22, 2009; and 
 
    -- Russian Paper On the Interrelationship between 
Strategic Offensive and Strategic Defensive Arms, dated July 
22, 2009. 
 
¶26.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
A/S Gottemoeller 
Amb Reis 
Mr. Brown 
Mr. Buttrick 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. Connors 
Mr. Dunn 
Mr. Elliott 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Siemon 
Mr. Taylor 
Dr. Warner 
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int) 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Amb Antonov 
Mr. Belyakov 
Mr. Izrazov 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Kuznetsov 
Mr. Leontiev 
Mr. Luchaninov 
Mr. Malyugin 
Mr. Neshin 
 
 
 
Col Novikov 
MGen Orlov 
Mr. Pischulov 
Mr. Rudenko 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Shevchenko 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Trifonov 
Mr. Vasiliev 
Ms. Vodopolov 
Col Zaitsev 
Mr. Gayduk (Int) 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
¶27.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
GRIFFITHS