VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDO #0467/01 2031347
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221347Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9274

UNCLAS DOHA 000467 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
FROM AMBASSADOR LEBARON FOR U/S KENNEDY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AFIN AMGT MG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR U/S KENNEDY 
 
¶1. (U) Embassy Doha welcomes your visit to Qatar. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Your visit is one of great importance to us, as it signals 
top management concern for our Embassy at a time where we are 
building a strategic partnership with Qatar to implement the 
President's vision of a new beginning with Muslim communities.  We 
understand that the primary purpose of your visit is to provide 
consultation and advice on integrating ILiAD with U.S. Embassy 
operations.  Accordingly, we discuss ILiAD immediately below, 
followed by other internal issues.  Paragraph 18 identifies the key 
areas where we seek your help.  We end with a brief (unclassified) 
assessment of the U.S.-Qatar relationship. 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
INTEGRATED LINGUISTIC ACTIVITY DOHA (ILiAD) 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Integrated Linguistic Activity-Doha (ILiAD) is the US 
government's premier Middle East regional center for linguistic 
expertise.  It is a a confederation of three USG agencies: 
 
-- DIA Combined Media Processing Center-Qatar (CMPC-Q) 
 
-- DNI Open Source Center-Doha (OSC-D) 
 
-- FBI National Virtual Translation Center-Qatar (NVTC-Q) 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) The ILiAD collects foreign materials and publicly available 
information.  It also delivers accurate translations services for 
national and operational customers.  Finally, it provides extensive 
news monitoring throughout the Gulf and Yemen. 
 
¶5. (SBU) As you know, we are in the process of finalizing a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to bring ILiAD's operations fully 
under Chief of Mission (COM) authority, at ILiAD's request.  We look 
forward to reviewing the current draft with you and seek your 
support and advice on finalizing an agreement. 
 
----------------------- 
EMBASSY STAFFING ISSUES 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Embassy Doha has grown markedly since the start of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.  Beginnings in 2005 three new 
agencies have joined the Mission - Foreign Commercial Service (FCS), 
Legal Attache (LEGATT), and Open Source Center - and existing staff 
has grown.  However, our needs are now even greater, and developing 
our Embassy requires sufficient American and LES human resources to 
accommodate our Mission's growth. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The positions of Financial Management Officer and Human 
Resource Officer are currently combined.  In response to a June 18 
NEA inquiry into splitting the positions, Embassy Doha concluded 
that the growth of the U.S. presence in Qatar has substantially 
increased workloads to the point that splitting these positions is 
warranted. 
 
¶8. (SBU) In Doha's 2011 Mission Strategic Plan (MSP), Post 
reiterated the need for the following American and LES positions: 
 
------------------ 
AMERICAN POSITIONS 
------------------ 
 
-- An additional State Public Diplomacy Officer in the Public 
Affairs Section will permit the Mission to expand Qatari-funded 
exchange programs, deepening the human relationships that are the 
core of the bilateral relationship in every field. 
 
-- Because the Embassy's sole Economic Officer can no longer manage 
the ever growing demands generated by the bilateral energy and 
financial relationships, we are requesting an additional Economic 
Officer. 
 
-- The need for additional consular staff is also clear and we seek 
the addition of an American Vice Consul. 
 
-- Beyond traditional State Department staffing, Embassy Doha's 
Legal Attace is at the center of the Mission's law enforcemen 
cooperation and, here too, the growing workloadsuggests we need an 
Assistant Legal Attache as son as possible. 
 
-- And as the security workload has increased, the Embassy requires 
another Assistant Regional Security Officer. 
 
------------- 
LES POSITIONS 
------------- 
 
-- Currently, Doha lacks an employee who is responsible for meeting 
the Department's requirements for property inventories.  In 
accordance with FAM regulations, Doha must establish a LES NEPA 
ClEsk position to fulfill these responsibilities. 
 
-- The increased demands of the CENTCOM forces in Qatar, combined 
with a growing security assistance portfolio, require a new driver 
and new translator to support the Senior Defense Representative and 
the OMC and DAO functions he will supervise. 
 
-- In addition to the one American Consular Officer position, LES 
Consular Assistant and Consular Pre-Screener positions are needed. 
These two LES positions were requested in the 2011 MSP. 
 
-- Without a doubt, rapid growth in Qatar and its motivation to 
become a key regional player have increased the workload on Mission 
Doha.  Consequently, the Human Resources Office (HRO) requires 
additional manpower to support the increased number of US agencies 
present in Doha.  In particular, HRO requires one additional HRO 
Clerk to provide administrative support. 
 
----------------------- 
LES COMPENSATION ISSUES 
----------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Achieving goals outlined in the most recent 2011 MSP would 
be impossible without competent and motivated personnel, both 
Americans and FSNs, to staff our Mission.  Doha just learned from 
HR/OE that we are scheduled for a September 2009 salaries and 
compensation review by Birches Group. 
 
¶10. (SBU) LE Staff Compensation in Doha continues to be an extremely 
sensitive matter.  Doha's LE Staff feel they are underpaid.  Post 
Management now believes (after two salary increases this fiscal 
year) that LE Staff base pay is currently above the most recent 2008 
comparator organization survey results. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Local staff report that the cost of housing and the 
general increase in prices is their number one concern. A 
survey by Embassy Doha's Financial Management office revealed that 
from 2005-2006, LES paid an average of 167 percent of their housing 
allowance for housing, or two-thirds more than they receive from 
Post. Likewise, inflation over the same period caused a 15 percent 
rise in the costs of other expenses beyond salary increases. A 
separate analysis revealed that from 2001-2007, LES salaries 
increased between 9-24 percent (depending on grade), with an average 
increase across all grades of 17 percent. At the same time, however, 
Qatar's inflation was over 50 percent during the same time period, 
while rents increased by at least by 116 percent. 
 
¶12. (SBU) In July 2006, a State/HR Comprehensive Wage Survey 
revealed that the Embassy's salary and benefits packages lagged far 
behind the local comparators surveyed. This evidence suggests that 
other employers in Qatar are responding faster to demands for higher 
salaries because of their greater flexibility to respond to market 
forces. Embassy Doha employs 95 LES from 21 countries, but not a 
single Qatari. Many LES have lived in Qatar for years, whereas 
others came more recently, lured by financial opportunities. 
However, what seemed a profitable opportunity several years ago has 
turned into a financial burden with many employees in debt and 
struggling to make ends meet. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Last year we reached a "tipping point" when working in 
Doha stopped being financially profitable for most of LES, and we 
lost many valued employees with years of experience as a result. The 
only thing which has saved Embassy Doha so far from losing more LES 
to other employers is the difficulty of transferring sponsorship 
under Qatari law and the fear of deportation if a sponsorship 
transfer request is denied by Qatar labor authorities.  Ironically, 
pressing Qatar for liberalization of its sponsorship rules is one of 
Embassy Doha's top human rights priorities. 
 
-------------- 
CHANCERY LEASE 
-------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) The Embassy currently does not own property in Qatar and 
thus must rent.  The current leased compound, dating from 1999, is 
approaching capacity, and every time a modification is made for 
operational or security reasons - such as the addition of the Marine 
House in 2005 - future rent increases.  Because land prices are the 
principal driver of construction costs in Qatar, the long-term 
solution for Embassy Doha is to seek property at no cost from 
Qatar's Government on which would be built a USG-owned Embassy 
compound with money appropriated by Congress.  As real estate prices 
in Qatar's will only get higher as the country continues its torrid 
pace of development, Embassy Doha submitted an estimate for the 
construction of a new embassy compound in FY2008 with the goal of 
having Doha placed on the priority list for the Office of Overseas 
Buildings Operations in FY2009.  Even prior to FY-2008, Doha 
requested OBO to consider the Embassy for replacement. 
 
¶15. (SBU) The Chancery was first leased on January 8, 1999 at USD 
1,200,000.  The annual rent increased from USD 1,200,000 to USD 
2,000,000 as per agreement by appraisers appointed by USG and the 
Landlord.  In 2006, Embassy Doha requested a new embassy compound, 
which was rejected due to the lack of funding in OBO at that time. 
Although we have (barely) enough space to accommodate the new 
requested positions, future expected growth cannot be accommodated 
absent substantial construction to our current leased facility or 
the construction of a new, larger building. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Post Management has learned through sources close to the 
current Chancery Landlord that there are plans to double the USD 2 
million lease payment when the present lease contract expires on 
January 7, 2011. 
 
------------------------------- 
DOHA NEW EMBASSY COMPOUND (NEC) 
------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) The Mission has urged the Government of Qatar to identify 
a parcel of land to donate to the U.S. Government to construct a new 
Embassy and Chief of Mission Residence, replacing the existing 
short-term leased properties.  When we receive permission, MGT will 
work with the Office of Overseas Building Operations to develop and 
approve a construction plan on a USG-owned property that would 
improve the quality of life in the work place for staff and increase 
staff security and customer service for those operations that deal 
heavily with the public. 
 
----------------------------- 
HOW YOU CAN HELP EMBASSY DOHA 
----------------------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) Your efforts to finalize rapidly an MOU to bring ILiAD's 
operations under COM authority would be appreciated. In addition: 
 
-- We seek your help in persuading OBO to identify funding for a NEC 
in Doha and move quickly to build/complete it.  The need for this 
will only grow as the costs of leasing our current space continue to 
soar.  Since a new NEC is years away, as an interim solution we seek 
your support for a space planning assessment of how best to maximize 
space in our current Chancery. 
 
-- We also look to you for funding to bring on board additional 
American staff, as referenced above and previously requested in our 
MSP. 
 
-- Ultimately, our greatest current need is to improve the 
compensation package for our LES.  Your assistance is critical in 
scheduling a survey team to visit Doha as soon as possible and 
finding funding to fill the gaps we expect that survey to identify. 
 
 
In summary, you are coming to Doha at a time when the Government of 
Qatar has a heightened awareness of its energy resources' importance 
to other countries.  Doha is clearly growing rapidly, and as such, a 
new Embassy Compound is now a necessity; not a "wishful thought". 
With the influx of USG agencies establishing a presence in Qatar, 
the current facility no longer is sufficient.  The sections 
immediately below explain why. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
A GROWING QATAR HAS LED TO A GROWING EMBASSY 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) U.S. and Qatari approaches to regional issues sometimes 
differ, but the U.S. has a strong interest in working with Qatar to 
develop a relationship based on shared principles. 
 
¶20. (SBU) The Embassy will pursue this objective by continuing to 
engage Qatari officials on a range of foreign policy issues, 
including Iraq, Iran, and Arab-Israeli peace.  In support of U.S. 
policy in Iraq, we will continue our efforts to persuade Qatar to 
formally forgive Iraq's debt, expand diplomatic relations, and take 
other public steps to show support for the Iraqi government.  More 
broadly, we will encourage Qatar to be a generous and responsible 
provider of foreign assistance in the Middle East and beyond. 
 
¶21. (SBU) U.S. businesses play an important role in Qatar, which is 
now one of our largest trade and investment partners in the region, 
and about 100 U.S. firms now operate in Qatar. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Though our current strategic military relationship with 
Qatar is only about a decade old, our two countries are now bound 
together closely and will only become more important to each other 
as Qatar's wealth, U.S. energy needs, and bilateral security 
interests grow.  Our strategic relationship has had a considerable 
impact on Embassy Doha's goals and priorities, and the accompanying 
fiscal and personnel needs must be addressed in FY 2010 and beyond. 
 
--------------------------- 
The U.S.-Qatar Relationship 
--------------------------- 
 
¶23. The breadth and depth of Qatar's relationship with the U.S. is 
impressive, especially for a country the size of Connecticut, with 
roughly two million inhabitants, of whom only about 225,000 are 
actually Qatari citizens. 
 
-- Because it is so small and its energy resources so large, Qatar 
now has an annual per capital income of over $70,000 (one of the 
highest in the world).  Qatar's national revenues will continue 
growing despite the global economic crisis, although their upward 
trajectory will be moderated by a drop in commodity prices. 
 
-- The U.S.-Qatar economic relationship is vital.  U.S. energy 
companies have invested tens of billions of dollars in the oil and 
gas industry here. Qatar, which holds the third largest natural gas 
reserves in the world after Russia and Iran, is expected to become 
in 2010 one of the most important suppliers of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) to the U.S. market. 
 
-- Our educational and cultural relationship with Qatar is strong 
and growing. Qatar has committed itself like few other Arab states 
to modernizing its educational system, and has turned decisively to 
the United States for help.  Qatar has imported branch campuses of 
six U.S. universities, including Texas A&M, Carnegie-Mellon, 
Weill-Cornell Medical School, Georgetown, Virginia Commonwealth and 
Northwestern.  At the elementary and secondary levels it is 
instituting a U.S. model of charter schools. 
 
-- Al Jazeera, the television network with an Arabic-speaking 
audience of some 60 million and a potential English-speaking 
audience of 100 million, is based in Doha and funded by the State of 
Qatar.  The network's coverage, particularly by its Arabic service 
on issues important to the United States, has long been an irritant 
in our bilateral relationship.  We nevertheless recognize the value 
of USG officials appearing on Al Jazeera in order to ensure that 
official U.S. voices are heard in the Arab world and broader region. 
 
 
 
 LEBARON