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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 CARACAS 000817 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ENERGY FOR CDAY AND ALOCKWOOD, DOE/EIA FOR MCLINE 
HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
TREASURY FOR RJARPE 
COMMERCE FOR 4332/MAC/WH/JLAO 
NSC FOR RKING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2019 
TAGS: EPET EINV ENRG ECON VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA: RECENT EXPROPRIATIONS' IMPACT ON THE 
OIL SECTOR 
 
Classified By: Economic Counselor Darnall Steuarat, for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Recent oil service sector expropriations in 
Venezuela targeted two diverse groups: (1) water injection 
and natural gas compression operations related to crude oil 
production; and (2) launch operators on Lake Maracaibo that 
had organized and threatened to strike over PDVSA's arrears. 
Both types of expropriation will affect negatively 
Venezuela's oil production levels. 
 
¶2. (C) The expropriation of the Lake Maracaibo launch 
operators will however have a broader economic impact on the 
communities on the Eastern side of the lake where most of 
these firms operated.  The economic ripples of the seizures 
are already being felt at nearly all levels of the regional 
economy: from casual workers who used to work for the launch 
operators to the catering companies that used to provide 
subsidized meals to launch company workers to the food 
vendors that supported the catering companies.  The central 
government will now have greater economic control in Zulia 
state, a state that has steadfastly been in opposition to 
Chavez.  Since the recent expropriations, locally owned 
companies have stopped complaining publicly about lack of 
payments.  All involved know that PDVSA is the source of the 
payments problems, but no one is willing to protest against 
the state-run petroleum company.  Some protests continue, but 
instead target the next rung down on the ladder, i.e., the 
large private service companies that are also behind on 
payments to many of their providers due to PDVSA's lack of 
payments.  In the meantime, PDVSA has successfully deferred 
the arrears it owed to the expropriate companies to the 
future.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Why These Expropriations 
------------------------ 
¶3. (C) The recent oil service sector expropriations targeted 
three market segments: (1) water, natural gas, and steam 
injection services, (2) water and natural gas compression 
services, and (3) launch operations on Lake Maracaibo.  While 
most interlocutors speculate that the GBRV's initial target 
was the launch operators, the passage of the National 
Assembly's oil services expropriation law on May 7 followed 
by the immediate seizure of Williams' Wilpro subsidiary seems 
to indicate the GBRV was responding to a default notice by 
Williams which would have taken effect on the same date.  In 
fact, the new law appears to target both (1) the Lake 
Maracaibo launch operators, and (2) Williams' Wilpro and Wood 
Group's Simco injection operations.  Wood Group filed a 
ninety-day default notice with PDVSA first on December 1, 
2008 (expired February 28, 2009) and its operations were 
quietly seized by PDVSA on March 4.  On April 29, Williams 
announced publicly that it had taken a $241 million non-cash 
charge to net income on its operations in Venezuela.  Its 
default notice was set to go into effect on May 7.  The 
National Assembly introduced on May 5 and passed on May 7 the 
oil services sector expropriation law, effectively giving the 
GBRV the right to seize the Wilpro operations prior to it 
going into default.  PDVSA officials, accompanied by a 
Venezuelan judge and the National Guard, began the 
expropriation of Wilpro assets at midnight the night of May 
7-8, hours after Chavez promulgated the new law. 
 
¶4. (C) On Saturday, January 24, many of the now expropriated 
launch operators on Lake Maracaibo met with PDVSA to discuss 
the outstanding payments.  At that time, PDVSA officials 
pushed the launch operators (the majority of which were 
domestic companies who claimed they were ready to strike), to 
bring in offshore dollars to maintain operations.  PDVSA also 
 
CARACAS 00000817  002 OF 005 
 
 
asked for a detailed personnel list with the offer that it 
might consider paying the laborers directly.  On January 27, 
PDVSA seized the ENSCO 69 drill rig in PetroSucre, an action 
that might have caused the launch operators to reconsider 
taking any coordinated action against PDVSA.  It is highly 
likely, however, that PDVSA began drawing up plans to deal 
with them at that time.  One Embassy source posits that the 
threat of concerted action by the launch operators caused the 
GBRV to believe the private sector would seek to shut down 
oil operations in the West.  According to his theory, this 
raised memories of the oil strike (which was more successful 
in the west than in the east), and caused Chavez to seek to 
strike out against the private sector.  Thus, while the new 
oil services sector law was likely timed to the Williams 
default, it provided the perfect vehicle for the GBRV to go 
after the western launch operators as well. 
 
¶5. (C) Another U.S. firm, Exterran, has been affected by this 
wave of expropriations.  As of June 6, PDVSA had completed 
the expropriation of its Venezuela assets, which provided 
natural gas compression and injection and electric power 
generation services for many oil field projects throughout 
Venezuela.  Exterran was a minority partner with Wood Group 
in Simco and a minority partner with Williams in Wilpro.  In 
addition, Exterran had 214 electric power and other units 
spread throughout Venezuela's oil sector (including in 
Maracaibo, Apure, Anaco, El Tigre, Maturin, and Corocoro). 
To date, the Ministry for Energy and Petroleum has not named 
Exterran in a published expropriation resolution.  The 
seizure of these assets, however, may yet have an even more 
negative impact on Venezuelan oil production. 
 
Economic Impact of Expropriations:  In Zulia 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶6. (C) The GBRV expropriations of oil service companies on 
Lake Maracaibo is already hurting local economies dependent 
on providing services to the expropriated private companies 
and will eventually impact oil production negatively. 
Several businesspeople whose launch companies were seized 
told PetAtt and visiting Washington energy analyst the week 
of June 2 that PDVSA was operating their boats and some had 
already broken down.  Since the seized companies all had 
spare vessels prior to expropriation, these initial 
breakdowns will have little impact because PDVSA now has 
spare boat capacity.  The businessmen pointed out, however, 
that while PDVSA has spare capacity now, it is only a matter 
of time before it runs out of functional vessels and will 
have no one to call on to provide transport services on the 
lake.  PDVSA will then face significant challenges moving 
crews and supplies out onto Lake Maracaibo to operate and 
maintain the thousands of wells and other oil facilities. 
 
¶7. (C) On June 1-2, casual workers formerly employed as 
needed by the expropriated launch companies, protested 
PDVSA,s failure to hire them in Ciudad Ojeda (eastern side 
of Lake Maracaibo and the base for many of the launch 
companies.  Rafael Ramirez, Minister of Energy and Petroleum, 
PDVSA President, and Zulia state head of Chavez,s PSUV 
political party, reportedly distributed 300 PDVSA 
identification cards effectively employing the lucky 
recipients.  He also sponsored a food distribution for 
displaced workers.  One Chavista protester held a sign that 
read, "Chavez ) We are with you, but we are hungry."  Press 
reports indicate PDVSA claims it will process a thousand new 
workers per week from the expropriated firms until all are 
hired. 
 
¶8. (C) A member of the Ciudad Ojeda Chamber of Commerce told 
PetAtt and visiting Washington energy analyst that the 
 
CARACAS 00000817  003 OF 005 
 
 
expropriations would affect nearly 75% of the population of 
the oil-dependent region.  He broke the economic impacts down 
into three levels.  In the first level, those directly 
expropriated,   he included 60-70 companies and 9,600 
workers.  The second level of the economic pyramid includes 
800 micro, small, and medium-sized companies that provided 
goods and services directly to the first level expropriated 
companies and employ some 20,000 workers.  The third level 
and base of the pyramid includes a further 5,000 micro, small 
and medium-sized companies and cooperativas (coops) that are 
indirectly related to the expropriated companies, and employ 
some 80,000 workers.  This image of an economic pyramid 
depicts the general impact on the local economy of the 
expropriations.  The economic ripples of the seizures are 
already being felt at nearly all levels of the regional 
economy: from casual workers who used to work for the launch 
operators to the catering companies that used to provide 
subsidized meals to launch company workers (PDVSA does not 
provide such benefits) to the food vendors that supported the 
catering companies.  In fact, the central government will now 
have greater economic control in Zulia state, a state that 
has steadfastly been in opposition to Chavez. 
 
Impact of Expropriations on Other Service Companies 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶9. (C) The expropriations have helped PDVSA postpone some of 
its outstanding debt, but it still owes billions more to 
other service companies.  PDVSA continues to trickle payments 
out in an apparently haphazard manner; one firm reported that 
it believes PDVSA has set up a committee to oversee payments 
and there is likely a strategy in play to keep companies on 
life support and working.  The impact of PDVSA not paying is 
hurting not only the service company but also its 
subcontractors.  Companies such as Halliburton are limiting 
payments to their own suppliers and service providers, as 
they are not receiving any significant payment streams from 
PDVSA.  Halliburton (and others) is downsizing its staff, 
limiting operations, and cutting costs.  We believe that the 
majority of international service companies have been told by 
their home offices that they will no longer receive external 
financial support.  Most firms have prioritized maintaining 
worker wages.  With whatever funds are leftover, they parcel 
out some money to their service providers and supply chain by 
prioritizing who they think needs a cash infusion the most. 
This situation continues down through the oil sector 
hierarchy.  Both of Halliburton's bases in Maracaibo and 
Maturin were shutdown for several days in June due to 
protests outside their gates by second and third level 
companies in its supply chain.  Companies and workers know 
PDVSA is the source of payments issues, but no one is willing 
to protest against PDVSA; instead, they have targeted the 
next rung on the ladder. 
 
Continuing Payments Issues? 
--------------------------- 
¶10. (C) Since the initial May oil sector expropriations, 
public complaints from oil service companies and media 
stories focusing on PDVSA's daunting arrears have largely 
disappeared.  The private sector seems to have learned a hard 
lesson about the GBRV,s likely reaction to such complaints 
from this round of expropriations.  Companies continue to 
struggle with payments from PDVSA trickling out at levels 
less than 10% of total owed. 
 
¶11. (C) PDVSA's financial report for 2008, released in 
February 2009, indicated it carries nearly $14 billion in 
debt to service companies.  There is no other public figure 
available on the debt owed to the expropriated service 
 
CARACAS 00000817  004 OF 005 
 
 
companies.  Roughly, we believe the outstanding debt owed to 
expropriated international firms was Williams $100 million, 
Wood Group $130 million, Exterran $130 million, and Tidewater 
$35 million.  These might represent the largest debts owed to 
expropriated companies.  According to a Petroleum Chamber 
director, PDVSA owed Chamber member companies $300 million. 
Thus, the expropriations of these companies might suggest 
that PDVSA has not eliminated or postponed a majority of its 
outstanding arrears.  It has only postponed payment until a 
future point when the parties involved agree to a negotiated 
settlement for seized assets.  Instead, PDVSA may have 
significantly increased its liabilities through the 
expropriations by assuming the private companies' liabilities 
and the need to pay compensation for the assets. 
 
¶12. (C).  According to the May oil services sector law, 
companies will be compensated for seized assets at book 
value.  According to local energy lawyers, this law 
contradicts the Venezuelan constitution and other laws that 
indicate compensation for expropriated assets should be fair 
market value.  The new law also provides that labor and 
environmental liabilities will be discounted from the amount 
of the compensation to be paid to the affected parties. 
Owners of expropriated assets indicated to PetAtt and 
visiting Washington energy analyst that they believe they 
will be fortunate &to walk away with the shirts on their 
backs8 once the government has subtracted labor and 
environmental costs from the book value of their assets. 
Some speculated that, with the new law,s pricing formula, 
they might have to pay the GBRV just to settle the 
expropriations. 
 
¶13. (C) COMMENT: Regardless of the political or economic 
background to the latest oil service sector expropriations, 
the common denominator is that the action conforms with the 
GBRV's playbook ) push current financial troubles into the 
future, regardless of the actual mid to long-term costs of 
this strategy.  Western firms claim that by the Fall of 2009 
they will shut down unless they receive substantial payments 
of current arrears and they believe that if they shut down 
the apocalypse will occur in Venezuela.  For its part, the 
GBRV believes firms will flock to Venezuela just because of 
the country's huge oil reserves.  There is likely too much 
crude oil in Venezuela to believe that this industry will 
implode, but if it continues, its current trajectory it will 
resemble Cuba's decimated sugar industry.  If Western firms 
decide they cannot continue in Venezuela, we should expect to 
see the GBRV turn more towards China and other "like-minded" 
countries to develop the Venezuelan oil industry.  The 
problem the GBRV will have is that these "alternative" 
companies are looking for economic and not political 
opportunities.  CNPC and Petropars both operate out of a 
profit motive, just like ConocoPhillips and Exxon Mobil.  In 
the meantime, companies are continuing to work to develop 
these reserves, albeit at a lower level of efficiency brought 
about by partnering with PDVSA and with smaller profit 
margins.  But for how long?  Private sector cries that this 
situation is unsustainable make sense from an entrepreneurial 
standpoint, but do not reflect the political agenda of 
Chavez's 21st Century Socialism.  END COMMENT 
 
¶14. (SBU) For more background on topics mentioned above, 
please see the following cables:  payments to service 
companies - CARACAS 136, CARACAS 214, CARACAS 239, CARACAS 
288, CARACAS 362, CARACAS 428, CARACAS 440, CARACAS 541, 
CARACAS 545, CARACAS 548; mission creep in PDVSA ) 2008 
CARACAS 473; PDVSA's financial situation ) CARACAS 564, 
CARACAS 282, 2008 CARACAS 276, 2007 CARACAS 2346; 
nationalizations inside and outside the oil sector - 2007 
 
CARACAS 00000817  005 OF 005 
 
 
CARACAS 1281, 2007 CARACAS 2013, 2008 CARACAS 1690, CARACAS 
581, CARACAS 592, CARACAS 644, CARACAS 707, CARACAS 725. 
 
CAULFIELD