VZCZCXRO3611
OO RUEHLMC
DE RUEHEK #0706/01 1821225
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011225Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2398
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3154
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1441
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 3489
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2875
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000706 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR U/S BURNS FROM CHARGE LITZENBERGER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' VISIT TO 
KYRGYZSTAN 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lee Litzenberger, Reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
¶1. (C) Embassy Bishkek warmly welcomes the visit of Under 
Secretary Burns, SCA A/S Blake, DASD Sedney, and NSC Senior 
Director McFaul to Bishkek o/a July 12.  In recent years, 
Manas Air Base has been the central issue in the bilateral 
relationship.  On June 9, President Obama wrote to President 
Bakiyev, acknowledging the important contribution of 
Kyrgyzstan by hosting operations at Manas, but also 
expressing his hope that the relationship between our 
countries will grow and expand in areas beyond security 
cooperation.  President Obama further wrote that he hoped in 
the near future to send "senior representatives of my new 
Administration to explore concretely how we can expand and 
deepen all the dimensions of our bilateral relationship."  On 
June 25, the Kyrgyz Parliament ratified the two agreements to 
establish the new Transit Center at Manas, but, despite 
making a public statement that the new arrangement was in 
Kyrgyzstan's national interest, President Bakiyev has delayed 
signing the agreements into law.  Assuming that the Manas 
agreements enter into force, your visit will provide an 
opportunity to emphasize to the Kyrgyz the importance we 
place on our bilateral relationship, as well as to discuss 
expanding economic cooperation and investment, increasing 
exchanges, and promoting closer political ties.  The 
President's letter resonated with the Kyrgyz, who hope that 
the Transit Center arrangement will usher in expanded 
economic and trade relations with the U.S. 
 
¶2. (C) We have sent separate issue papers to cover Manas, the 
July 23 presidential election, and the state of civil society 
in Kyrgyzstan.  Following is an overview of other key 
political, economic, and security issues. 
 
POLITICAL OVERVIEW 
------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Since its independence nearly 18 years ago, Kyrgyzstan 
has been noteworthy for the relative openness of its 
political discourse and vibrancy of its civil society. 
Although still the leader in the region, Kyrgyzstan remains a 
fledgling democracy.  It boasts a political opposition, an 
independent press that occasionally criticizes the 
government, and credible freedoms of religion, speech and 
assembly.  However, recent trends find the government dialing 
back on these basic rights. 
 
¶4. (C) Over the past two years, President Bakiyev has moved 
to consolidate political power and to divide and suppress the 
opposition.  A Bakiyev-proposed new version of the 
constitution, adopted through a flawed referendum in October 
2007, strengthened the power of the presidency.  Deeply 
flawed elections in December 2007 gave Bakiyev's new Ak Jol 
party control of the parliament, with only token 
representation from opposition parties. 
 
¶5. (C) Since then, the government has pushed new legislation 
limiting public assemblies, regulating the content and 
language used in broadcast media, and restricting activities 
of religious groups.  Opposition political parties face 
ongoing harassment, and the government actively uses criminal 
charges to threaten opposition leaders. 
 
¶6. (C) Flush with Russian cash and concerns over winter 
energy shortages having passed, the Bakiyev administration 
arranged for a presidential election on July 23, one year 
ahead of schedule.  With the opposition failing to unite 
behind a single candidate, and with vast administrative 
resources deployed on behalf of the incumbent, Bakiyev's 
re-election is a foregone conclusion.  Following early 
threats to limit the number of international observers for 
the election, the government relented and has allowed a full 
 
BISHKEK 00000706  002 OF 003 
 
 
OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission. 
 
ECONOMIC OVERVIEW 
----------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Under Bakiyev, state budget expenditures -- including 
salaries and pensions -- have grown steadily, but poverty 
remains widespread.  This year, Kyrgyzstan has benefited from 
significantly increased financial support from the 
international financial institutions and other donors.  Most 
significantly, the Russian government has provided a $150 
million grant and a $300 million low-interest loan.  With 
much of its financial system isolated from global markets, 
Kyrgyzstan has weathered the effects of the global economic 
downturn relatively well.  The IMF projects economic growth 
at only 0.9% for 2009, but inflation appears to be under 
control, after spiking to over 30% during 2008.  There is 
concern, however, that the economic slowdown in Russia and 
Kazakhstan will affect workers' remittances, which amount to 
an estimated $1 billion, or 20-25% of Kyrgyzstan's GDP, 
annually. (Russia and Kazakhstan provide jobs for nearly 1 
million Kyrgyz workers, or over one third of the workforce.) 
In addition, pervasive corruption at all levels of government 
is a barrier to economic development, effective service 
provision, and foreign investment. 
 
BORDER ISSUES 
------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The absence of demarcated and delineated borders 
between Kyrgyzstan and its Tajik and Uzbek neighbors fuels 
ongoing clashes between residents and each government's 
border services.  In addition, the government is 
hyper-sensitive to the threat of Islamic separatism in the 
South.  In May, IMU/IJU militants launched attacks on Uzbek 
security facilities on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, and an 
additional militant blew himself up outside a police station 
in Andijon.  The Uzbek government claimed that these attacks 
were launched from Kyrgyz soil.  In June, Kyrgyz security 
forces located and clashed with IMU/IJU militants linked to 
the May attacks in Uzbekistan in various villages in southern 
Kyrgyzstan, resulting in the deaths of nine militants and one 
police officer.  In addition, 
 
U.S. ASSISTANCE 
--------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The U.S. has a range of active bilateral assistance 
programs, including IMET, FMF, EXBS, INL, and a Millennium 
Challenge Threshold Program.  USAID is providing over $20 
million in assistance to Kyrgyzstan, with programs in 
economic growth, health care, education, and democracy and 
governance.  The Kyrgyz government, however, is deeply 
suspicious of some democracy programming, believing that the 
U.S. uses these programs to fund the political opposition, 
destabilize the country, and foster "color revolutions." 
Government hardliners complain about the National Democratic 
Institute and other democracy implementers as being biased 
against the government and interfering with domestic 
politics. 
 
MEETINGS WITH KYRGYZ OFFICIALS 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Although your visit falls on a weekend during the 
presidential election campaign, it is likely that the 
delegation will meet with President Bakiyev.  In his June 24 
response to President Obama's letter, Bakiyev welcomed the 
suggestion to send a "high-ranking delegation," and he hoped 
to "make more active Kyrgyz-American relations in the 
political, economic, trade, investment, and other fields of 
cooperation."  Bakiyev is not likely to offer specific 
suggestions on how to enhance cooperation in these areas, 
 
BISHKEK 00000706  003 OF 003 
 
 
however. 
 
¶11. (C) Bakiyev is certain to raise his "Bishkek Initiative," 
a proposal to host an international conference on security 
and stability in the Central Asia region, including 
Afghanistan, for which he will be seeking U.S. support.  Your 
expression of interest in at least hearing more details about 
how the Kyrgyz envision this initiative will please Bakiyev. 
If by the time of this meeting we have not delivered an 
update on the results of the investigation, Bakiyev is likely 
to raise the Ivanov shooting.  Bakiyev can be expected to 
assert that democracy is flourishing under his rule and the 
upcoming election will be free and fair.  He will want to 
focus prospectively, and will hope to hear from you ways to 
increase U.S. investment and how to open the way for Kyrgyz 
participation in reconstruction contracts in Afghanistan.  He 
will also be listening for any hint of the possibility to 
meet with President Obama on the margins of UNGA, or, better 
yet, an invitation to Washington. 
 
¶12. (C) The delegation will almost certainly meet with 
Foreign Minister Sarbayev.  Sarbayev has been the key Kyrgyz 
government official dealing with the new Manas arrangements, 
and he engineered the strategy for rolling out the new 
agreements in parliament and for the public.  Since assuming 
his post late January, Sarbayev has also shown an interest in 
maintaining strong bilateral relations, claiming he is 
defending against hardliners in the government who want to 
orient Kyrgyz policy exclusively toward Moscow. 
 
¶13. (C) We look forward to briefing you on the latest 
developments after the delegation's arrival in Kyrgyzstan. 
LITZENBERGER