O 010120Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4950
INFO CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
NSC WASHDC
AIT TAIPEI 7340
CIA WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI

S E C R E T BEIJING 001827 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, ISN. JOINT STAFF FOR J5 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2034 
TAGS: PREL PARM MOPS CH TW
SUBJECT: 2009 U.S.-PRC DEFENSE CONSULTATIVE TALKS (DCT) 
SMALL GROUP SESSION (U) 
 
Classified By: Classified by ADCM William Weinstein.  Reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S)  Summary: Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief 
of the PLA General Staff, stretched what was to be a sixty 
minute Small Group session with Ms. Michele Flournoy, Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP), into ninety minutes, 
and focused his remarks on objecting to U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan and reconnaissance operations in China,s Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ).  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  LTG Ma told USDP he had researched her background 
and read some of her writings.  He referenced his role as PLA 
delegation head during the last DCT with her predecessor 
Ambassador Eric Edelman, and expressed willingness to work 
with her to exchange views on a range of issues, including 
the importance and necessity of developing the 
military-to-military relationship, and removing barriers and 
problems.  Secretary Gates told him at the Shangri-La 
Dialogue that their two heads of state reached an important 
political consensus on improving the military-to-military 
relationship, Ma reported, and it is up to the two of them to 
come up with ideas for specific measures. 
 
¶3. (C)  LTG Ma described the DCT as the first high-level 
military-to-military exchange of the Obama administration. 
Bilateral relations are fairly satisfactory, he observed, but 
since the London summit there is a need to develop the 
military component.  The DCT can be used to add an improved 
military-to-military dynamic as a stabilizing element to the 
overall bilateral relationship.  LTG Ma referenced the 
working level delegation the PLA sent to Washington in 
advance of the talks as demonstrating the importance both 
sides attach to the DCT, and urged that this practice be 
continued. 
 
¶4. (C)  USDP thanked LTG Ma for the welcome and referenced 
his escorting of Secretary Gates during the latter,s 
November 2007 trip to China, as well as LTG Ma,s 
conversations with Secretary Gates at the Shangri-La Dialogue 
in Singapore.  Based on LTG Ma's remarks USDP believed both 
sides were starting out from the same premise, namely the two 
presidents' agreement to improve the military-to-military 
component of a positive, cooperative and comprehensive 
bilateral relationship.  The Obama administration is intent 
on putting the relationship on a more cooperative footing and 
focusing on shared interests, including Asia-Pacific 
security, nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and counter 
piracy, USDP stated.  Both sides should come to the talks in 
this spirit and look for a common way forward for the 
military-to-military agenda. 
 
¶5.  (S)  Turning to North Korea, USDP reassured LTG Ma that 
the U.S. seeks to implement the recent UN Security Council 
resolution (UNSCR) in a responsible and non-confrontational 
manner, and asked what actions China intends to take to 
implement it, given China,s proximity to North Korea and the 
volume of trade across the border.  We are at a fork in the 
road, she stated, and the U.S. is deeply concerned with North 
Korea's apparent determination to acquire both 
intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.  If 
North Korea continues down the path it is on, she added, it 
will lead to regional instability as other countries react. 
USDP expressed interest in discussing ways the U.S. and China 
might work together to persuade North Korea not to continue 
down that path. 
 
¶6. (S)  LTG Ma thanked USDP for being very straightforward 
and for focusing on what is clearly one of the United 
States, biggest security concerns.  He welcomed and approved 
of the U.S. attitude on taking a responsible and 
non-confrontational approach on UNSCR 1874.  LTG Ma cautioned 
that he did not want to say too much on this topic as it 
would be covered the following day, and that the small group 
should be used for discussing things that are not convenient 
to talk about in the full DCT session.  In principle China is 
also interested in taking a responsible and 
non-confrontational approach, LTG Ma commented, adding that 
China shares the U.S. concerns about potential instability, 
and that the two sides have no problems or differences on 
this issue. 
 
¶7.  (C)  LTG Ma then returned the discussion to the military 
relationship, and cited three big obstacles in that 
relationship: 1) Taiwan; 2) U.S. reconnaissance operations; 
and 3) Section 1201 of the U.S. Congress and the National 
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000 (NDAA 2000) 
(which restricts DoD,s interactions with the PLA in twelve 
specific areas). 
 
¶8.  (C)  We both know the latest suspension in the 
relationship began with your arms sales to Taiwan last 
October, LTG Ma stated, and the relationship is still not 
fully resumed today.  He added that some in the U.S. Defense 
Department claimed China overreacted to this sale, and China 
has to make these people truly understand its concern. 
Taiwan arms sales bear on China's most sensitive core 
interest, LTG Ma claimed, and damage China's sovereignty and 
security interests.  There have been recent positive 
developments in both cross-Strait relations and in U.S.-China 
relations, he observed, and warned that both would be 
undermined by further arms sales.   The two sides of the 
Strait are working toward a formal end to the state of 
hostility between the two and reaching a peace agreement, LTG 
Ma continued.  Arms sales would send the wrong signal to 
secessionist forces, and neither side wants to see Taiwan 
tensions affect the overall U.S.-China strategic 
relationship, he concluded. 
 
¶9. (C)  USDP clarified that the U.S. is pleased to see the 
reduction of tension across the Strait.  The Obama 
administration is continuing the policy that has been in 
place for 30 years, based on the One China Policy, Three 
Joint Communiqus and the Taiwan Relations Act, she stated. 
There will be no change to these.  We would like to see 
improvement in relations, she continued, and we oppose 
unilateral actions by any party that would lead to increased 
tensions.  In principle, the U.S. remains supportive of 
ensuring Taiwan has self defense capabilities, she added.  In 
practice, the new administration has not yet made specific 
decisions on arms sales.  I suggest that we note this as an 
area of concern and move on to the next topic LTG Ma would 
like to discuss, USDP advised. 
 
¶10. (C)  "I haven't finished."  LTG Ma replied.  He urged 
both sides to approach this issue from a political, 
comprehensive and global strategic perspective.  Taiwan arms 
sales have undermined the foundation for military-to-military 
relations, he alleged.  It is the root cause of the problem, 
and has created a vicious cycle, he continued.  Additional 
arms sales will cross a red line for China, LTG Ma warned, 
and China will issue a strong reaction.  The U.S. (through 
Taiwan arms sales) is solely responsible for undermining the 
foundation of the military-to-military relationship, he 
accused, and DoD officials, actions and statements indicate 
the U.S. doesn't value or cherish that relationship.  You are 
not sincere in cooperating with China, LTG Ma charged, and 
added that the U.S. cares only about its own interests and 
concerns and tries to dominate the military-to-military 
relationship.  By calling what China perceives to be its 
legitimate reaction an overreaction, and by blaming China for 
missed opportunities, some in DoD are demonstrating contempt 
for the military-to-military relationship, LTG Ma added. 
 
¶11. (C)  If we pursue a defense relationship, LTG Ma 
continued, we should think about what its purpose is and what 
kind of principles it should be based on.  We are willing to 
cooperate with you, he added, but not without principles.  We 
value the relationship but we will not beg for it, LTG Ma 
maintained. 
 
¶12. (C)  USDP registered the strong concern LTG Ma expressed 
on this issue, and explained that the Defense Department 
would like to find a way to move forward in our relationship 
with the PLA.  We can deal with strong differences in a way 
that does not prevent us from engaging in a continuous 
dialogue, she added.  Our two presidents have charged us to 
find a way forward, USDP reminded LTG Ma, and to broaden and 
deepen cooperation and find common interests even in the face 
of differences. 
 
¶13. (C)  LTG Ma agreed, and hoped that DoD would take a long 
term perspective, honor its commitments regarding relations 
with the PLA, and abandon old practices of unilateral 
domination.  USDP interrupted to explain that neither she nor 
Secretary Gates use words like "hegemony" or "domination" 
with regard to China.  LTG Ma replied that he hopes DoD will 
play a role in controlling, gradually reducing and stopping 
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.  DoD,s pursuits of a positive 
military-to-military relationship with the PLA on the one 
hand and arms sales to Taiwan on the other are mutually 
exclusive, he alleged.  This requires political wisdom on the 
part of the U.S., LTG Ma added.  Regarding high-level 
exchanges for the remainder of 2009, including Vice Chairman 
of the Central Military Commission General Xu Caihou's visit 
to the U.S., Secretary Gates' visit to China, and Chief of 
the Army Staff General Casey's visit to China, the PLA hopes 
there will not be new arms sales to Taiwan, particularly F-16 
C/D or Blackhawk helicopters, LTG Ma warned, adding that a 
positive climate is required for those visits to proceed. 
 
¶14.  (C)  USDP explained that the U.S. does not link these 
two issues in the way LTG Ma suggested.  Advancing the 
military-to-military relationship should be our main focus, 
she urged, based on common interests and cooperation.  China 
should take a leadership role in improving the cross-Strait 
dynamic, USDP suggested. 
 
¶15.  (C)  LTG Ma then turned to the issue of U.S. 
reconnaissance operations in China,s EEZ.  "I recognize that 
these incidents are not in China's territorial waters", LTG 
Ma said, "but in the EEZ, which is a grey area in legal 
terms."  It is highly likely that miscalculations on either 
side could spark an incident or an accident, he warned.  We 
signed the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) in 
1998, LTG Ma recalled, but over the past 11 years the 
mechanism failed to play an effective role.  China has made a 
number of representations to the U.S. on the legal 
perspective, he added.  It is an issue of military security 
and mutual trust.  Such intensive, wide-ranging and 
long-duration reconnaissance missions reflect a Cold War 
mindset, LTG Ma charged, and are not conductive to a 
positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship. 
Statistically, the frequency and intensity of your missions 
against China are greater than for any other part of the 
world, he alleged, and are more intense than the operations 
the U.S. directed against the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War.   I know what you are doing and why you are doing it, 
LTG Ma added.  But from a strategic perspective, the Cold War 
has long since ended and cross-Strait tensions are easing; 
therefore these tactical maneuvers are not consistent with 
the United States' declared strategic goals.  Why then is the 
U.S. doing this, LTG Ma asked rhetorically. 
 
¶16. (C)  LTG Ma cited Murphy's Law, and noted that British 
and French submarines have run into each other and a U.S. 
supply ship once struck a British submarine in the Cape of 
Good Hope.  And this is between allies, he exclaimed.   These 
are international waters and your ships have a right of 
passage, LTG Ma conceded, but added that China's ships also 
have rights, and the greater the frequency of U.S. 
operations, the greater the likelihood of a collision.  There 
is a difference between focusing on gradually reducing and 
eventually stopping activities, he continued, and on setting 
up safety measures.  They are equally important, LTG Ma 
declared, and only by combining confidence building measures 
and safety measures can we appropriately solve the issue.  I 
hope the Defense Department will consider concrete measures 
such as reducing the frequency of missions or adjusting their 
"intensity," LTG Ma concluded. 
 
¶17. (C)  USDP noted a measure of agreement between the two 
sides in LTG Ma,s remarks, in that both the U.S. and China 
exercise freedom of navigation rights in international 
waters.  The U.S. ability to operate in China's EEZ is 
critical to our situational awareness in Asia, where we have 
key national interests, she advised.  We share your concern 
over accidents and incidents, USDP added, and we need to 
revitalize the MMCA to enable it to deal with these when they 
arise.  We are pleased that in recent incidents both sides 
have taken care that the situation does not escalate, USDP 
continued.  I share your interest in confidence building 
measures, she added, and the U.S. would like to see greater 
transparency and openness in China's military as a means of 
building confidence.  Because of our democratic system the 
U.S. is very transparent and open, as is evidenced in our 
reports to Congress, USDP observed.  The more open both sides 
can be transparent, the more confidence and mutual 
understanding can be built over time, she concluded.  Some of 
China's activities, in particular the development of 
anti-satellite and anti-ship capabilities cause concern in 
the U.S. because we don't know what you are doing, USDP 
explained, adding that a dialogue on these issues would 
contribute to understanding. 
 
¶18. (C)  LTG Ma insisted the U.S. maintains two different 
standards for transparency.  Someone recently told him that 
DoD is suggesting that NDAA 2000 makes the U.S. more 
transparent, an idea he found to be incredible. 
 
¶19. (C)  USDP explained that 1) Congress is an independent 
branch of the U.S. government, and will write legislation the 
way it sees fit, and 2) the Secretary of Defense makes a 
determination as to whether a potential activity can proceed. 
 There is much more we can do within the parameters of the 
legislation, USDP continued.  Growth in the relationship, and 
a demonstration of meaningful cooperation between our two 
militaries, could also change the views of some in Congress 
overtime, USDP said. 
 
¶20. (U)  U.S. Participants: 
 
Michele Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
Michael Schiffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
East Asia 
Xanthi Carras, Office of the Secretary of Defense Country 
Director for China 
Jim Brown, Interpreter 
 
¶21. (U)  PRC Participants: 
 
Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of the PLA 
General Staff 
Major General Qian Lihua, Director, Ministry of National 
Defense Foreign Affairs Office (MND/FAO) 
Lieutenant Colonel Wu Qian, Staff Officer, MND/FAO 
Lieutenant Colonel Chu Weiwie, Interpreter, MND/FAO 
 
¶22. (U) Under Secretary Flournoy has cleared this cable. 
 
 
GOLDBERG