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Viewing cable 09BEIJING1821, 2009 U.S.-CHINA DEFENSE CONSULTATIVE TALKS (DCT),

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BEIJING1821 2009-07-01 00:38 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beijing
O 010038Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4932
INFO CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
NSC WASHDC
AIT TAIPEI 7324
CIA WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIJING 001821 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, ISN. JOINT STAFF FOR J5 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2034 
TAGS: PREL PARM MOPS CH TW
SUBJECT: 2009 U.S.-CHINA DEFENSE CONSULTATIVE TALKS (DCT), 
SESSION 1: MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONS 
 
Classified By: Classified by ADCM William Weinstein.  Reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C)  During the first session of the 10th U.S.-PRC Defense 
Consultative Talks (DCT) held June 23-24 2009 in Beijing, 
both the U.S. and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
delegations affirmed that presidents of the two countries had 
charged them with improving the military-to-military 
relationship.  Beyond that, the PLA delegation focused on 
obstacles to improving the relationship while the U.S. 
delegation sought to identify areas of common interest and 
opportunities for further cooperation.  The two sides 
discussed guiding principles for the military-to-military 
relationship, and listed several high-level exchanges to 
pursue in the remainder of 2009.  End Summary. 
 
PLA Perspectives on the Military-to-Military Relationship 
-------------------- 
 
2. (C)  Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of the 
PLA General Staff led off the first session, noting that 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) Michele 
Flournoy's visit marked the 10th round of Defense 
Consultative Talks (DCT) between the two defense 
establishments and the first to be held under the Obama 
Administration.  He remarked that the thirty years of 
military-to-military relations had experienced "twists and 
turns" and promised that the two sides would have a "frank 
and pragmatic" exchange of views.  He expressed hope that 
through joint efforts China and the United States would be 
able to push the bilateral relationship forward. 
 
3. (C)  USDP expressed hope that the two sides would be able 
to explore how defense relations could contribute to the 
overall goal of building a positive, cooperative and 
comprehensive bilateral relationship as President Barack 
Obama and President Hu Jintao discussed during their April 
meeting in London.  President Obama wants to chart a "new 
course" in relations, she assured LTG Ma.  She noted that 
recent military contacts between the two sides have already 
led to significant developments, and the meeting between LTG 
Ma and Secretary Gates at the Shangri-la Dialogue in 
Singapore have helped to increase understanding. 
Acknowledging that military-to-military ties have indeed 
experienced ups and downs, USDP noted that the purpose of the 
ongoing round of talks was to set relations on the right 
course.  Although it was natural to disagree, she assured LTG 
Ma that President Obama wants to build a broader strategic 
relationship in which the two sides can overcome 
difficulties. 
 
The Taiwan Issue and Military-to-Military Relations 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
4. (C)  LTG Ma acknowledged that the U.S. sometimes complains 
that the PRC always raises the topic of Taiwan in bilateral 
dialogues, adding that he finds the U.S. recitation of its 
one China policy based on the Three Joint Communiqus and the 
Taiwan Relations Act to be the more tiresome response.  He 
urged the U.S. delegation to listen "patiently and carefully" 
to his presentation that they might "hear something new."  He 
then proceeded to recite standard talking points on Taiwan: 
the Taiwan issue remained the central issue of U.S.-China 
relations and is inseparable from military-to -military ties. 
 Both sides agreed that the defense relationship lags behind 
other aspects of the overall bilateral relationship and that 
it is often caught in a vicious cycle of "progress and 
suspension."  To LTG Ma, the root cause of this problem is 
the Taiwan issue, particularly U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.  As 
evidence, he noted that all suspensions in 
military-to-military ties, except those following the 
Belgrade Embassy bombing in 1999 and the EP-3 incident in 
2001, occurred as a result of Taiwan arms sales. 
 
5. (C)  Despite recent improvements in cross-Strait 
relations, the Taiwan issue remained China's "core interest" 
and its "most important security issue," LTG Ma declared. 
Therefore, China can not be silent on U.S. arms sales and is 
forced to make a strong reaction.  China has "serious 
concern" over reports that the U.S. was contemplating selling 
F-16 C/D fighters to Taiwan, LTG Ma warned.  He also remarked 
that it is "difficult to understand" how the U.S. was 
considering selling Blackhawk helicopters to Taiwan when it 
refused even to provide spare parts for Blackhawks sold to 
China in the 1980s after China requested such parts following 
the May 2008 earthquake in Sichuan province.  Further U.S. 
arms sales to Taiwan would undermine the "historic change" in 
cross-Strait relations, inflate the arrogance of supporters 
of Taiwan independence, and disrupt the overall relationship, 
LTG Ma warned.  He urged the U.S. to "properly handle" the 
Taiwan issue and "break the cycle" of starts and stops in 
military-to-military relations. 
 
6. (C)  LTG Ma also complained about high-level U.S.-Taiwan 
military contacts, alleging that U.S.-Taiwan military ties 
were closer than those between the U.S. and China.  Taiwan's 
"so called" Defense Minister or Vice Defense Minister visits 
the United States each year to attend the U.S. Defense 
Industries Conference to discuss arms sales, LTG Ma noted, 
and he claimed that the United States was providing help in 
developing Taiwan's C4ISR system.  Taiwan's de facto military 
attache received better reception in the Pentagon than MG 
Zhao, LTG Ma complained.  He then pointed to recent reports 
alleging that U.S. Marines will provide security for the new 
American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) building in Taiwan and 
that Taiwan Military Police will guard Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) offices in Washington. 
 All of those actions, according to LTG Ma, were designed to 
increase Taiwan's capability to resist unification by force 
and encourage Taiwan independence.  Warming to his subject, 
LTG Ma suggested that the U.S. criticized China's military 
relations with sovereign states such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, 
but disregarded China's opposition to U.S. military ties with 
Taiwan. 
 
7. (C) LTG Ma pointed to the Asia Pacific Center for Security 
Studies' (APCSS) practice of "alternating" invitations to the 
mainland and Taiwan to attend its courses as another obstacle 
for improving the U.S.-PRC military-to-military relationship. 
 LTG Ma took great offense at the suggestion that since India 
and Pakistan attend APCSS courses together, so perhaps China 
and Taiwan should "set aside disputes" and do the same.  LTG 
Ma suggested that such a parallel was "absurd" and showed "a 
lack of common sense" since India and Pakistan are sovereign 
nations while Taiwan is an integral part of China.  The 
Center's actions appeared to LTG Ma as designed to create 
"one China, one Taiwan," something China can never accept. 
 
U.S. Welcomes Relaxation of Tensions 
------------------------------------ 
 
8. (C)  USDP responded to LTG Ma's lengthy presentation by 
stressing that the United States very much welcomes the 
relaxation of tensions across the Taiwan Strait.  She 
commented that the United States and China have both helped 
to reduce those tensions.  The United States maintains its 
one China policy based on the three joint communiqus and the 
Taiwan Relations Act.  She made clear that the United States 
does not support Taiwan independence and remains opposed to 
unilateral action to change the status quo by either side. 
Washington hopes for a peaceful resolution that is acceptable 
to the people of both sides of the Strait.  The United States 
will continue to make articles available for Taiwan's self 
defense, USDP affirmed, but for now the new administration is 
reviewing proposals in the normal process and has not yet 
made a decision. 
 
9. (C)  USDP commented that the Taiwan issue will take a long 
time to resolve and it is unreasonable to hold U.S.-China 
military-to-military relations hostage in the meantime.  As 
for LTG Ma's allegation about the closeness of U.S.-Taiwan 
military ties, USDP said that there is simply "no comparison" 
between the high level military contacts between China and 
the U.S. and the minimal contacts between the U.S. and Taiwan 
militaries.  Responding to LTG Ma's complaints about APCSS, 
USDP took note of China's sensitivity but clarified that 
APCSS invites the PRC to every high-level course.  She 
assured LTG Ma that the U.S. delegation registered China's 
concerns regarding Taiwan.  David Shear, State Department 
Director for China and Mongolia Affairs, added that no 
decision has been made regarding security arrangements for 
the new AIT building. 
 
Guiding Principles for the Military Relationship 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
10. (C)  Turning to the next item on the agenda, LTG Ma 
stressed the importance of establishing guiding principles 
for military-to-military ties to help each side better 
understand the other's goals for the relationship.  He 
commented that the traditional definition of "allies or 
enemies" is not appropriate for describing the relationship. 
China does not see any other country as a threat or an 
adversary and does not look to create enemies.  China does 
not threaten others, but neither does it want to be contained 
by others, LTG Ma maintained.  Nevertheless, China is not 
nave and does not have terribly high hopes or expectations 
for military ties, owing to different political systems. 
Recalling the "honeymoon" period of the 1980s when the two 
sides collaborated against the Soviet Union and the U.S. sold 
China Blackhawk helicopters and F-8 upgrades, LTG Ma 
commented that "friendship is temporary, but interests are 
permanent."  The U.S. and China share many interests, 
including trade, climate change, nonproliferation, 
counterterrorism, and humanitarian relief, LTG Ma observed. 
These common interests can be the foundation for the defense 
relationship.  LTG Ma reviewed the four principles the PLA 
had previously proposed to guide the relationship:  mutual 
respect, mutual trust, reciprocity, and mutual benefit, and 
asked if the U.S. had a response to his proposal. 
 
11. (C)  USDP agreed that common interests should anchor the 
military relationship and that the two sides could benefit 
from a discussion of guiding principles for that 
relationship.  She deferred to Michael Schiffer, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for East Asia, to 
address the PLA's proposal.  DASD Schiffer expressed 
appreciation for LTG Ma's comments, noting that there was a 
lot of common ground and that the principles of reciprocity 
and mutual benefit are consistent with the U.S. position. 
DASD Schiffer noted that the two countries also shared the 
goal of establishing mutual respect and mutual trust, 
cautioning that both must make certain that they are using 
the terms in the same way. 
 
12. (C)  DASD Schiffer then proposed two additional 
principles.  The first was continuous dialogue to ensure 
uninterrupted communication between the two militaries.  The 
second principle was mutual risk reduction, building on the 
Defense Telephone Link and the Military Maritime Consultative 
Agreement (MMCA) to reduce the potential for miscalculation 
or misunderstanding.  DASD Schiffer then proposed 
establishing a working group to discuss these principles and 
allow the two sides to more fully understand each other. 
DASD Schiffer admitted that results could not be guaranteed, 
but the two sides could seek to reach consensus by the fall 
in time for planned high-level meetings. 
 
13. (C)  LTG Ma expressed appreciation for the U.S. response, 
noting that the U.S. had in 2003 proposed the principles of 
equality, transparency, and consistency as appropriate for 
guiding the military relationship.  He agreed in principle to 
commissioning a working group, but said that there should be 
no deadline for progress because reaching an agreement might 
take some time.  He acknowledged that there would be 
differences in how to interpret the principles, but 
appreciated the U.S. side's taking his proposal seriously. 
 
14. (C)  LTG Ma rhetorically asked "what is wrong with 
respect," arguing that it connotes a two way street in which 
neither side is dominant.  He then launched into a lengthy 
complaint about the treatment of PLA delegations at airport 
security checks in the United States, adding that he was 
convinced that this was a political rather than a technical 
issue.  USDP assured LTG Ma that the problem was poor 
communication between the Defense Department and the 
Department of Homeland Security, and that dignitaries from 
other countries had encountered similar problems.  LTG Ma 
replied that to his knowledge, the only other dignitaries 
that had difficulties were from the Middle East and South 
Asia.  He sarcastically remarked that perhaps China was in a 
"special category" with North Korea, Iraq, Iran, the Taliban, 
and Bin Laden.  "We are guests of the Defense Department, not 
terrorists," LTG Ma observed, adding that if such incidents 
continued to happen, he would have to limit the number of PLA 
visitors to the United States. 
 
15. (C)  LTG Ma further noted that reciprocity is an 
international principle that China did not create but by 
which it is willing to abide.  However, the twelve 
restrictions in Section 1201 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (NDAA 2000) makes it 
difficult for the PLA to be open with the U.S.  Noting the 
differences in political systems, he commented that the 
National People's Congress would not pass similar legislation 
against the United States.  He insisted that the PLA has made 
"huge efforts" to be transparent to the United States, 
including by allowing the U.S. to send the first foreign 
delegation to visit the headquarters of the PLA Second 
Artillery and the Command and Control Center of the Nanjing 
Military Region. 
 
Proposed High Level Military Contacts for 2009 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
16. (C) Brigadier General Joseph Callahan, Joint Staff Deputy 
Director for Politico-Military Affairs - Asia, wrapped up the 
first session by outlining the U.S. proposal for high level 
exchanges for the rest of the year.  These include Central 
Military Commission Vice Chairman General Xu Caihou's visit 
to the U.S. in late October or early November, Chief of the 
PLA General Staff General Chen Bingde's visit to the U.S. in 
October, the USPACOM Commander's visit to China in late July, 
PACFLEET Air Force Commander's visit to China in the summer, 
U.S. Army Chief of Staff's visit to China in August, PLA Navy 
Commander Admiral Wu's visit to the U.S. in October, PLA Air 
Force Commander General Xu's visit to the U.S. in October, 
the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff's visit to China in 
November, and the Marine Forces Pacific Commander's visit to 
China in July or September. 
 
17. (C)  USDP added that it would also be appropriate to have 
a PLA representative attend the Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue in Washington in late July.  Responding to the 
overall list, LTG Ma said that because of preparations for 
the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic 
of China and of the PLA Air Force, it would be difficult to 
carry out so many visits to the United States.  Nonetheless, 
he noted that General Xu's visit was "very important" and 
would go forward.  He also welcomed the U.S. Army Chief, 
USPACOM Commander and the U.S. Air Force Chief to visit 
China, and said China hopes that Secretary Gates and Chairman 
Mullen would visit in 2009.  He also offered that Jinan 
Military Region Commander General Pan would be able to visit 
the United States this year.  LTG Ma concluded by noting that 
China holds a positive attitude toward high level military 
visits and is willing to continue discussions on the matter. 
 
18. (U)  U.S. Participants: 
 
Michele Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) 
Dan Piccuta, Charge d'Affaires 
Michael Schiffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(DASD) for East Asia 
David Shear, EAP/CM, Department of State 
Brig Gen Joseph Callahan, Deputy Director for 
Politico-Military Affairs - Asia, Joint Staff J5 
Brig Gen William Uhle, USPACOM Deputy J5 
RDML Bradley Gerhrke, U.S. Defense Attach in Beijing 
John Plumb, OSD Principal Director for Nuclear and Missile 
Defense Policy 
Craig Mullaney, OSD Principal Director for Central Asia 
Robert Gromoll Acting Director for Regional Affairs ISN, 
Department of State 
 
19. (U)  PRC Participants 
 
Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of the PLA 
General Staff 
Major General Qian Lihua, Director, Ministry of National 
Defense Foreign Affairs Office (MND/FAO) 
Major General Yang Hui, Director, Intelligence Department, 
PLA General Staff Department 
Rear Admiral Yi Changzhi, Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA Navy 
Major General Zhu Chenghu, Director, Department of 
International Strategic Studies, PLA National Defense 
University (NDU) 
Senior Captain Guan Youfei, Deputy Director, MND/FAO 
Senior Colonel Wang Kebin, Deputy Director, Operations 
Department, PLA General Staff Department 
Major General Zhao Ning, PRC Defense Attache in Washington 
Senior Captain Li Ji, Director, North American and Oceania 
Bureau, MND/FAO 
Councilor Ma Zhanwu, North American and Oceania Affairs, MFA 
Lieutenant Colonel Chu Weiwei, Interpreter, MND/FAO 
 
20. (U)  USDP has cleared this cable. 
 
 
GOLDBERG