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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGUI 000157 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C; PARIS FOR KANEDA; LONDON FOR LORD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR ECON CT
SUBJECT: CATCH 22 ON DISARMAMENT - WHY DDR IS NOT LIKELY TO WORK IN 
THE CAR 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The international community and the government 
of the Central African Republic (CARG) have attached much 
importance to Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration 
(DDR) as the solution to the Central African Republic's (CAR) 
long running conflict. This would appear logical - disarm the 
rebels and reintegrate them back in to a peaceful society. This 
process, promoted by the United Nations (UN) in the Central 
African Republic (CAR) has been beset by problems such as the 
slow roll out of the program, mismanagement of funds by the 
government (CARG) and difficulty raising funds from the 
international community. Despite an agreement reached in April 
that produced a list of rebels to be disarmed and the recent 
acceptance by the CARG to use money granted by the Economic 
Community of Central African States (CEMAC) for DDR for its 
expressed purpose, Post fears that observers are placing too 
much faith in the process as a solution to the CAR's ills. Until 
the CARG has the means, and more importantly, the will, to fill 
the vacuum left behind by disarmed groups, both on a security 
and economic front, the effort is unlikely to accomplish its 
goals. And beyond that is the overarching problem that the CAR 
is effectively a failed state - there is simply no economy into 
which former combatants can be "reintegrated." Post fears that 
the DDR process will merely give a small number of people some 
money to live on for a few months before they take up arms 
again. This telegram provides a glimpse of the reality on the 
ground. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The town of Kaga Bandoro is a microcosm for the 
pitfalls DDR. Devastated economically by the passage of then 
rebel leader Francois Bozize's army in 2003, Kaga Bandoro 
suffers from the presence of two armed groups who effectively 
end the control of the CARG some five kilometers from the city 
center.  The Army for the Restoration of the Republic and 
Democracy (APRD), the traditional rebel group of the region and 
signatory to the DDR process lives in an uneasy coexistence with 
a heavily armed group of Chadian bandits led by a man named Baba 
Lade. With a tiny  gendarmerie presence, the town is at the 
mercy of those groups, though MICOPAX, a regional peacekeeping 
body is able to assure a modicum of stability if not order 
(Note: POLOFF witnessed a boy beaten by bandits being inspected 
by the commander of the MICOPAX detachment as the Gendarmes were 
powerless to respond). The local Prefect, akin to a governor, is 
so reduced in authority that he is often limited to being a 
spectator (NOTE: After a flair up in violence between Lade and 
the APRD, the Prefect provided good offices for this peace 
conference in June 2009) 
 
¶3. (SBU) The realities of life in the CAR create a dangerous 
Catch-22 which renders disarmament very unlikely: 
 
-- The APRD, and groups like it, cannot disarm until general 
instability ceases. In many parts of the north, they are, 
ironically, the only elements of order. If they were to disarm, 
local and trans-border groups like Baba Lade's, who fund 
themselves through road banditry and illegal ``taxation'' of 
livestock, will run rampant. Only a capable and motivated 
Central African Army (FACA), gendarme, and police force can 
provide a better alternative than the rebels. The people of the 
north have suffered the civil war of 2003 that devastated all 
economic life in northern CAR and then a dangerous rebellion 
that has touched most parts of the country above the 6th 
parallel. With some CARG support, many towns have produced stout 
self defense militias to counter the threat posed by the rebels 
and bandits. These groups are appear to be effective, but they 
cannot replace a real police/military force, backed up by a 
functional system of justice. 
 
-- Because the DDR project focuses on those who have taken up 
weapons against the CARG and promises economic development 
``later'', there is a dangerous possibility of new rebel groups 
forming to milk the system if they become impatient with the 
pace of development. Embassy Bangui reported previously that 
people are currently seeking to be recognized as rebels so they 
may be demobilized (Bangui 124). There is also the prospect that 
score settling and revenge killings may cause disarming rebels 
to be attacked, thus pushing them to rearm. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) COMMENT: The fundamental problem of the CAR is at 
 
BANGUI 00000157  002 OF 002 
 
 
least thirty years of weak and corrupt governments that have 
failed (if they even attempted) to forge a national consensus 
and develop the country. Rebel groups are merely one symptom of 
the disease of poor governance - not the root cause of 
instability. Similarly, cross border adventures into the CAR by 
Chadians and Sudanese are not symptoms of the spread of the 
Chad/Sudan/Darfur conflict. Most Chadians and Sudanese who are 
active in the CAR are here as opportunists or at the invitation 
of various CAR factions looking for experienced help. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) COMMENT: The position of President Bozize, as 
expressed most directly to the United Nations in the person of 
Undersecretary for Political Affairs Pascoe and newly arrived 
Special Representative of the Secretary General Saleh-Work 
Zwede, (PROTECT BOTH) is that: 
 
-- DDR is the answer to the CAR's problems, but, 
-- DDR is the responsibility of the International community, not 
the CARG. 
 
Not surprisingly, both told the Ambassador that they were 
surprised by this response and attitude. Thus one ended their 
visit, and one begins their mission very, very disappointed by 
the CARG's position. (Zwede, in particular, seemed shaken.) 
 
More specifically, Bozize insists that he has done all he need 
do: 
 
-- He held the "Dialogue Politique Inclusive" (Inclusive 
National Political Dialogue) 
-- He formed a "Government of National Unity." 
-- He agreed to allow the CEMAC funds to be used for DDR. 
 
No local observer accepts any of these efforts at face value. 
(Post reporting has already outlined the weakness of all of 
these efforts.) 
 
¶6.  (SBU) COMMENT: Thus short term infusion of cash may have 
some benefits, but the final R - Reintegration- cannot be left 
solely to the international community as there will simply never 
be enough donor money to fix this country. The DDR process is 
not the answer to ills of the CAR except as part of a larger 
CARG commitment to national reconciliation, economic recovery, 
and poverty reduction; a commitment that the CARG has, thus far, 
shown no willingness to make. END COMMENT 
COOK