VZCZCXRO2466
PP RUEHBZ RUEHGI
DE RUEHGI #0152/01 1881719
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 071719Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0976
INFO RHMFISS/AFRICOM
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0180
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0283
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0293
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0194
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0138
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0473
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0459
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0125
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0455
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1231

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000152 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
USUN FOR DMUERS 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: PESSIMISM STILL THE ORDER OF THE DAY FOR NORTHEASTERN CAR 
 
REF: 09 BANGUI 114 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On June 21, 2009, Birao, Central African 
Republic (CAR) was attacked for the second time in a month as 
Kara tribe gunmen and the Goula tribe and Central African 
Military (FACA) defenders of the town battled for supremacy. 
This follows a similar attack on Birao on June 6 (BANGUI 114) 
accelerating the worrying spiral of violence in Northeastern CAR 
that has left at least thirty dead among the attackers, 
defenders, and civilians. While the Kara have been the 
traditional rulers of Birao for over one hundred years, their 
militancy is a new development and they may be making a push to 
secure military and political victories before the rains shut 
down movement until November. Despite a peace commission sent to 
Birao, and an apparent ceasefire deal reached, Post worries that 
the Central African Government (CARG) has neither the 
military/political capacity, nor the will, to take control of 
the area and the issue. Furthermore, we do not believe that 
MINURCAT has the mandate or anywhere near the force necessary to 
play a decisive role. The humanitarian consequences may be dire. 
 END SUMMARY 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Birao Half Empty, A ``New Rebel'' Formed 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The June 21 assault on Birao was perpetrated by the 
same Kara armed group that attacked the town on the June 6 and 
has recently announced that it is named the Union of the 
Democratic Movements for Unity (UMDR). This group is a function 
of an internal split in the Kara community of the Vakaga and 
should be noted that it is not a rebel group in the traditional 
sense but it rather a movement of tribal vengeance fused with 
local political brinksmanship. The former Mayor of Birao, Ahmed 
Mustafa, appears to be using a simmering tribal conflict between 
the Goula and Kara based on revenge killings to gain a political 
advantage over a fellow Kara, and most recent mayor of Birao, 
Abdurrahman. While there is certainly an ethnic flavor to the 
violence, the direction of the fighting - away from the Goula 
villages south of Birao and toward to mixed ethnicity city 
itself - suggests the fighting has more than ethnic score 
settling behind it. According to multiple sources, Mustafa and 
Abdurrahman have been competing for supremacy of the city (which 
controls the vital link to Sudan through which all goods to the 
Vakaga pass) for at least a year. Recently, Abdurrahman called 
in members of the UFDR (Union of Democratic Forces for Unity and 
a majority Goula group) to protect his interests in the city and 
UMDR attacked those forces as a reaction. Further evidence in 
support of this thesis is that the Kara communities who support 
Abdulrahman remain in Birao while those that support 
Mustafa/UMDR have fled. Thus, while the Kara and the Goula have 
legitimate grievances against each other, an essentially village 
against village polemic is being used by Birao politicians to 
further their political agendas. 
 
¶3. (SBU) On June 22, the UFDR announced the pullout of its 
forces, though about ten fighters remain to care for wounded at 
the local hospital.  This suggests two things: 
 
-- The Goula leadership does not feel the price they are paying 
to protect Abdurrahman is worth the punishment it has taken, and, 
 
-- The UFDR may be fracturing and the consolidation is a move by 
the leadership in Tiringoulu to keep a closer eye on their 
elements. 
 
As postulated in BANGUI 114, UFDR leaders in the Ouanda Djalle 
area have reportedly split from Damane's control and have 
threatened to take up arms against the government and/or the 
Kara. Post has yet to see a manifestation of this, but it is 
none the less very worrying. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The pull out of Birao by the UFDR has a number of 
distressing elements to it: 
 
-- The UFDR is the last remaining element of order in the city. 
The FACA is incapable/unmotivated and law 
 
BANGUI 00000152  002 OF 003 
 
 
enforcement/peacekeeping is out of MINURCAT's rules of 
engagement (NOTE: The start of the Togolese force's mandate has 
been ``catastrophic'' according to one NGO. They deployed to 
Birao without any ammunition, setting back the mission some 
critical days. Additionally, on June 21, they returned to base 
when faced with the firefight in the town instead of ensuring 
the safety of humanitarian workers in Birao as is their charge). 
Worse, the specter of ethnic strife also looms as accounts are 
settled from previous violence. 
 
-- Multiple sources have now confirmed that elements of Sudanese 
Kara/Ta'asha have joined those already in the CAR in the two 
attacks on Birao. Multiple sources also claim that among them 
are horseback mounted warriors who are said to ``Janjaweed''. It 
is impossible to tell at the moment if this is a pseudonym for 
Sudanese warriors on horseback in general (the opinion of the 
Sudanese Ambassador in Bangui) or if these are same Janjaweed of 
Darfur notoriety who have come to the CAR for loot.  What is 
certain is that there are figures that are profiting from the 
lawlessness and conflict to pillage and steal from the 
surrounding area. 
 
-- The precarious security situation in Birao will lead to 
obvious humanitarian fallout. As it stands now, an NGO on the 
ground estimates that half of the town's population has fled and 
that there are 1,000 displaced (IDPs) in the immediate area. The 
IDPs are almost exclusively Kara who sought refuge after 
reprisal attacks were made upon them by Birao's other 
inhabitants. 
 
-- Furthermore, due to the panic created by the violence, it is 
feared that farmers in the area will not be able to plant their 
crops during the rainy season and that a food shortage is likely 
in 2010. This was confirmed to POLOFF during a UN sponsored trip 
to Birao on July 2, 2009. Additionally, humanitarian workers 
confirm that they have already distributed food aid meant to 
last until November. This has created concerns that as 
inhabitants know there is food in humanitarian worker's care; 
residents of Birao may turn against those workers if food 
becomes too scarce. 
 
¶5. (SBU) A delegation lead by CAR Minister of the Interior 
Oueifio, visited Birao on July 2, 2007 and is said to have 
secured a ceasefire. He gave 4 million CFA (8,700 USD) in blood 
money to the Kara to quell the violence and both sides have 
agreed to an arbitrated solution. Mediation efforts are 
allegedly to be headed by President Bozize, but no date has been 
set for his trip to Birao. (N.B. the Ambassador has long urged 
President Bozize to engage personally, base on the 
recommendations made by the Sultan of Ndele during the 
Ambassador's visit to that city in February, 2009.) A Prefet has 
been sent from by Bangui and he will act as both Prefet and 
Mayor until elections are held in March. Regardless, until 
mediations are begun and elections are held, both sides will 
remain armed and apprehension will reign. The displaced Kara 
have not yet returned from the bush, and until Post sees this, 
we will not be comfortable making an optimistic prognostication 
of peace in the area. 
 
¶6. (SBU) COMMENT Post still maintains that the worst of the 
violence is likely to come after the rains. The evolving 
situation in Birao and the prospect of further violence in Ndele 
(SEPTEL) pose two major problems for the CAR: 
 
-- The rains and continued violence will block any large scale 
humanitarian aid to an already remote area. Further violence 
will only exacerbate the already critical humanitarian situation 
in the CAR overall, setting back development in this desperately 
poor country. 
 
-- The next months are crucial in the CAR considering that 
preparations for elections, called for by March/April 2010, are 
already behind schedule. Continued instability and a perceived 
threat from the north will either distract the CARG from the 
task at hand, or worse, give it a convenient excuse to postpone 
the ballot. As previously stated, it is expected that the 
 
BANGUI 00000152  003 OF 003 
 
 
President personally mediate the Kara/Goula conflict and if he 
fails to do so, the Vakaga risks being subject to continued 
conflict. 
 
Post believes that, given the CARG's lack luster efforts at 
peacemaking and its military's lack of capacity, pessimism is 
still the order of the day. The CARG has, thus far, displayed 
very little political acumen or leadership, especially in the 
Vakaga. We fear that the grievances in the north, which go back 
at least a decade, will likely fester through the rainy season 
and will, unless addressed with unseen good faith, engulf the 
region yet again before the end of 2009. END COMMENT 
COOK