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Viewing cable 09BANGKOK1569, THAI-CAMBODIAN BORDER DISPUTE: TENSIONS INCREASE,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BANGKOK1569 2009-07-01 10:46 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bangkok
VZCZCXRO3500
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #1569/01 1821046
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011046Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7396
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7231
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 9799
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 5613
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1738
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0022
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001569 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS TH CB
SUBJECT: THAI-CAMBODIAN BORDER DISPUTE: TENSIONS INCREASE, 
DRIVEN BY NATIONAL POLITICS, BUT GOOD LOCAL COOPERATION 
 
REF: BANGKOK 1487 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Tensions between Thailand and Cambodia in 
regard to their border dispute have increased recently after 
the Thai Cabinet decided to renew its objection to the World 
Heritage Committee's (WHC) listing of the Preah Vihear 
temple, based on a unilateral Cambodian submission in 2008, 
in the run-up to the latest WHC meeting in Seville. 
Following the Cabinet's decision, Thai officials have noted 
to us what they believe to be inflammatory comments by 
Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, and both sides had 
reportedly reinforced troops in the vicinity of the temple 
area and the 4.6 square km of disputed territory.  Deputy 
Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban and Defense Minister Prawit 
Wongsuwan traveled to Phnom Penh June 27 to meet with 
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen to try to ease tensions, and 
on July 1 the Thai Army confirmed to us that the number of 
Thai troops in the disputed area would be reduced.  The chief 
Thai negotiator in the Joint Border Committee (JBC) 
underscored Thai determination to press forward with 
demarcation activities in less controversial border stretches 
to build confidence and trust, while stressing that 
demarcation would take a long time; local officials report 
good on-the-ground cross-border cooperation with Cambodian 
counterparts. 
 
2. (C) Comment: DPM Suthep's hastily arranged visit with Hun 
Sen appears to have calmed heightened tensions.  The border 
issue looks to remain a difficult issue for the Abhisit 
coalition government, however.  Critical comments last year 
by then opposition Democrats and their supporters of the 
signing of a joint communique in support of the World 
Heritage Committee's listing of the Preah Vihear temple by 
the pro-Thaksin party that was in power have backed the 
Abhisit government into a corner on this issue. 
 
3. (C) Comment, cont: With so much of the government's focus 
on domestic Thai politics, and a full resolution of 
Thai-Cambodia border disputes years off (given technical 
challenges in demarcating the rugged terrain) and a lack of 
political will in both capitals, we continue to believe that 
the best course of action for the USG is to continue to urge 
both sides to peacefully solve the border dispute through 
bilateral talks.  To appear to take sides in the matter, or 
to be seen as pushing for progress faster than the two sides 
are willing to achieve on their own, could be used for 
advantage by one side or the other in the current dispute. 
We will work with our Defense Attache Office on gathering 
more information on the Thai military's actions in regard to 
the border dispute. End Summary and Comment. 
 
DPM SUTHEP'S VISIT WITH HUN SEN EASES TENSIONS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
4. (C) Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban and Defense 
Minister Prawit Wongsuwan June 27 met with Cambodian Prime 
Minister Hun Sen in Phnom Penh to address tensions that have 
intensified after the Thai Cabinet decided June 16 to renew 
objections to the World Heritage Committee's (WHC) 2008 
listing of the Preah Vihear Temple based on a Cambodian 
petition.  Colonel Werachon Sukondhapatipak, Director of the 
Royal Thai Army's (RTA) Foreign Liaison Division, confirmed 
for us July 1 that the RTA would reduce the number of Thai 
troops in the 4.6 square kilometer disputed area as the 
Bangkok Post had quoted Thai Army Commander General Anupong 
Paojinda.  Anupong said that Suthep, Prawit and Hun Sen had 
agreed on a troop reduction that would bring the number of 
troops down to the number in place before the reinforcements 
had been called after tensions heightened in recent weeks. 
Werachon pointed out that, while the situation had not 
returned to normal, tensions were lower so the RTA had 
decided to reduce the number of troops to signal good will. 
Werachon had told us June 28 that the RTA had sent a 
battalion of heavy artillery and a company of special warfare 
troops to reinforce Thai positions near the temple.  Those 
deployments were in response to recent Cambodian troop 
increases that included Special Forces soldiers, Werachon 
said. 
 
BANGKOK 00001569  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
5. (SBU) Tensions between the two nations had increased after 
the Thai Cabinet decided to renew its objection to the WHC's 
inscription of the Preah Vihear temple at meetings the week 
of June 22 in Seville, Spain.  Prime Minister Abhisit 
Vejjajiva publicly reiterated June 26 that Thailand's 
objection to the Preah Vihear inscription only pertained to 
the WHC and not Cambodia.  Abhisit has said that the temple 
should be jointly listed so as to promote peace and stimulate 
economic development in the area.  The RTG also claimed that 
the WHC should re-examine the listing because the Cambodian 
government had not yet fulfilled the conditions required by 
the 2008 WHC decision.  In particular, the Thai government 
was concerned that Cambodia had not yet established and 
convened an International Coordinating Committee (ICC) with 
Thailand's participation, nor had Cambodia provided relevant 
information and documents, including detailed maps and the 
buffer zone of the inscribed property. 
 
RTG CLAIMS CAMBODIAN TROOP BUILDUP 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) The Ambassador raised the ongoing border dispute 
during a June 22 meeting with MFA Permanent Secretary 
Virasakdi Futrakul and stressed USG hopes that the conflict 
would be resolved peacefully and diplomatically.   Virasakdi 
explained that Thailand's contention was with the process by 
which the WHC had listed the temple in 2008, and that the RTG 
hoped that a more cooperative approach could be taken. 
 
7. (C) Virasakdi told the Ambassador that the Cambodian 
military had recently increased the number of troops in the 
area of the temple.  Three thousand Cambodian troops were 
located within the temple grounds or in the area directly 
around it, and another five thousand troops were in reserve 
nearby, he alleged.  The troop buildup was alarming to the 
RTG because it appeared that Cambodian intentions were to 
achieve a three-to-one advantage over the number of Thai 
troops.  Virasakdi said he had been told by the Thai military 
that this ratio was necessary to conduct offensive operations 
against troops that were in defensive positions.  Thailand 
understood that Cambodia had recently sent heavy weapons to 
the area and the Thai government had heard that Cambodia had 
recently asked China for MANPADS, Virasakdi said. 
 
8. (C) Virasakdi told the Ambassador that Defense Minister 
Prawit had recently discussed the situation with his 
Cambodian counterpart and had reiterated that Thailand had no 
intention of raising tensions or provoking further clashes. 
However, Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong's June 20 
comments that his government welcomes engaging on the issue 
militarily, diplomatically, and internationally or through 
peaceful negotiations, but that Cambodia would also welcome 
further border fighting if Thailand wanted to send troops to 
Cambodia, were unnecessarily inflammatory, in Virasakdi's 
view.  Virasakdi told the Ambassador that it was possible 
that Cambodia wished to orchestrate further clashes between 
the two sides' militaries in hopes of bringing the issue to 
the UNSC. 
 
JOINT BORDER COMMISSION HOPES FOR EASING OF TENSIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
9. (C) During a June 26 meeting with Vasin Teeravechayan, 
Thai Chair of the Thai-Cambodian Joint Boundary Commission 
(JBC) and retired Ambassador to South Korea, we reiterated 
USG hopes that the border dispute would be solved through 
diplomatic means and asked Vasin how long he thought it would 
take for the JBC to demarcate disputed border stretches. 
Vasin told us that the basis of the current disagreement was 
that the Cambodians continued to build residential, 
commercial, and religious structures in the disputed area 
around the Preah Vihear temple despite an agreement by the 
two governments to avoid activities in the disputed 4.6 
square kilometers until the border could be demarcated. 
Cambodia had ignored repeated Thai protests regarding this 
issue.  Vasin said he hoped Suthep's visit with Hun Sen would 
succeed in toning down inflammatory rhetoric that had 
emanated from Phnom Penh. 
 
 
BANGKOK 00001569  003 OF 003 
 
 
10. (C) Vasin admitted that the border issue was very 
sensitive, as the conflict had become subordinate to domestic 
politics on both sides of the border.  For example, in 
recognition of the political sensitivity of Foreign Minister 
Kasit Primoya's 2008 forceful comments against Hun Sen on the 
issue, Vasin's official title had been changed from advisor 
to the Foreign Minister to advisor to the Foreign Ministry. 
Vasin stressed that working level relations among JBC members 
and the military were good.  For example, the local Thai and 
Cambodian military commanders were long-time friends and 
communicated often. 
 
11. (C) Vasin acknowledged that the RTG and Cambodia 
approached resolving the problem differently.  Thailand hoped 
to build mutual confidence by addressing demarcation issues 
along other areas of the Thai-Cambodian border away from 
Preah Vihear in hopes that success elsewhere along less 
contentious areas would lead to a more cooperative approach 
to the disputed area around the temple.  In 2009, a joint 
survey team was to work on the more than 100 kilometers in 
Sector 5, spanning border pillars 1 to 23 west of Preah 
Vihear, and possibly start work in Sector 6, covering border 
pillar one eastward to Preah Vihear.  The agreed plan of work 
in Sector 5 is to find the existing pillars first, create 
auto-photo maps, agree on a walking survey, and add new 
border pillars.  The process of fixing missing border markers 
and demarcating the actual 798 kilometer border, based on 
century old maps of a less-precise scale (1:200,000), 190 
kilometers of no border pillars, and the rough terrain would 
be a lengthy and laborious process, he stressed.  Cambodia, 
however, appeared to have made the border dispute in the area 
of the temple a high priority in its foreign policy goals, 
Vasin said. 
 
GOOD RELATIONS AMONG LOCALS ALONG BORDER 
---------------------------------------- 
 
12. (C) During a June 17-19 trip along the Thai-Cambodian 
border well to the west and south of the disputed area, we 
were repeatedly told by government officials, local people, 
and police and military representatives that relations with 
Cambodian counterparts were good.  Thai Marine Commandant 
Vice Admiral Suwit Thararoop, the lead for the Thai task 
force responsible for border security in Chantaburi and Trat 
provinces, told us that he had a very good relationship with 
his Cambodian counterparts.  For example, the local Cambodian 
commander had closely coordinated with Suwit to maintain 
peace and stability at border crossings when clashes broke 
out last year at Preah Vihear.  Furthermore, lower level 
officials from both countries regularly conduct joint patrols 
against illegal logging and smuggling, Suwit said.  The heart 
of matter, Suwit said, was politics in Bangkok and in Phnom 
Penh. 
 
13. (C) At Klongyai, on the Thai border with Cambodia's Koh 
Kong province, the Thai Navy Captain in charge of the local 
border coordination committee said that relations were good 
and the two sides' border security officials cooperated 
closely.  In addition, the two sides' navies and fishing 
industries did not have problems, despite large areas of 
overlapping sea claims. 
 
14. (SBU) In Buriram, a border province closer to Preah 
Vihear temple, local academics and politicians told us that, 
despite some nationalistic sentiments among older Thais in 
the region, the temple issue was not important for local 
people.  The academics told us that people believed that the 
temple belonged to Thailand because it had been agreed by the 
French and Siam (Thailand) that the border would be 
delineated based on the watershed (and locals believed the 
steep drop-off defined the watershed's edge).  Despite this 
belief, most in Buriram were not interested in pushing the 
claim, rather they wanted a peaceful resolution soon as this 
would likely increase tourism in the area. 
JOHN