VZCZCXRO5107
PP RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1910/01 1951346
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141346Z JUL 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3924
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001910 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2019 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PTER PINS KCRS IZ
SUBJECT: PRT SALAH AD DIN:  GOI INVOLVEMENT IN SAMARRA 
ANGERS SUNNIS 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 1705 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 624 
 
Classified By: PRT Salah Ad Din Leader David Stewart for reasons 1.4 (b 
). 
 
(U) This is a PRT Salah ad Din (SAD) reporting cable. 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Since the terrorist bombing of the Al-Askari 
Shrine (Golden Mosque) in 2006 pushed the country to the edge 
of Sunni-Shi'a civil war, the Government of Iraq (GOI) has 
taken a direct role in Samarra's security.  Since the 
bombing, the city has made remarkable progress in 
establishing security and strengthening its civil society and 
basic governance.  With this progress has come a desire among 
local (Sunni) Samarrans for greater control over local 
affairs.  Sunnis in Samarra also think that the largely Shi'a 
GOI's involvement in the city is a Shiite power-grab, using 
security restrictions as leverage to bring the local economy 
under Shi'a control.  The SAD Provincial Council (PC) views 
the GOI's involvement as a serious encroachment on its 
authority and an attempt by Iraqi Shiites and Iran to take 
Samarra away from the Province.  END SUMMARY. 
 
GOI SECURITY FORCES OPERATING IN SAMARRA 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Following the terrorist bombing of the Golden Mosque 
in 2006, the Prime Minister's Office moved a National Police 
(NP) force to Samarra and established the Samarra Operations 
Command (SOC) to secure the Mosque and the historic area 
around it during the restoration process, and secure the city 
against terrorist attacks.  The SOC commander, Major General 
(MG) Rasheed, has partnered with CF for the past several 
years to take responsibility for security in the city, an 
effort that has also been supported by Sons of Iraq (SOI) 
units. 
 
SUNNI SAMARRANS WANT TO MANAGE THEIR OWN SECURITY 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶3. (C) Local officials insist that the city now enjoys good 
security and it is time for the NP to move out.  There is 
deep concern among Sunni Arab Samarrans that the SOC is now 
essentially a GOI effort to control Sunnis in that city and 
to further Shi'a aims.  At the same time, significant 
progress is being made in standing up the Samarra Joint 
Coordination Center (JCC), which will be critical going 
forward in coordinating all security forces (national and 
local) in Samarra. The JCC cannot succeed without clear, 
visible support from MG Rasheed, which has not been 
forthcoming. The close personal relationship between MG 
Rasheed and the SAD Provincial Chief of Police, who 
inappropriately ignores city officials and deals directly 
with the General on city matters, further empowers the SOC. 
 
PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS WANT COALITION FORCES TO STAY 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶4. (C) Provincial officials share Sunni Arab Samarrans' view 
that NP must depart Samarra, but they are not as confident 
that local Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are ready to maintain 
security.  In a May 24 meeting with the PRT Team Leader and 
Coalition Forces (CF), the PC Chairman, Ahmed Abdullah, (AKA 
Abu Mazin, whose immediate past position was Governor's 
Assistant for Security Affairs) requested that CF not 
withdraw from Samarra, as they are still needed to maintain 
security.  He said that both the Samarra City Council and the 
PC would rather have CF stay in the city until the SOC is 
closed and NP leave the city. 
 
¶5. (C) While being careful to affirm respect for Iraq's law 
and Constitution, Abu Mazin voiced strong resentment towards 
the continued NP presence.  "It's not right that the shrine 
gets more security and attention from the Central Government 
Qgets more security and attention from the Central Government 
than the citizens do.  Samarrans don't want national security 
forces from Baghdad stationed there any longer...They want to 
take Samarra from us.  We are knocking on all the peaceful 
doors first" in order to get the outside security forces out 
of Samarra, "but if that doesn't work we may take other 
actions... Samarra is not a district of Baghdad or Iran, and 
I won't take orders from them either."  Despite his clear 
frustration, Abu Mazin was hopeful that a constructive 
solution could be found. 
 
GOI FAILS TO INTEGRATE SAMARRA SOI FORCE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Local resentment of what Sunni Samarrans see as the 
NP's role as an "occupying force" is complicated by a large 
number of local out-of-work SOI members. Over the past two 
years seven SOI units comprising 2,400 defenders have been 
 
 
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