VZCZCXRO5087
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDH RUEHHM RUEHKUK RUEHPW
DE RUEHGB #1816 1880945
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 070945Z JUL 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3818
INFO RUCNDMI/HUMANITARIAN DEMINING COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001816 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/I/POLMIL, NEA/I 
DEPT ALSO FOR PM/WRA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2019 
TAGS: KHDP PARM PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI AGREEMENT ENABLES DEMINING TO CONTINUE 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 1798 
 
Classified By: A/PMA W. S. Reid for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Iraqi ministries signed an interagency 
agreement (MOU) without fanfare July 5 that will enable NGOs 
and companies to continue humanitarian demining in Iraq, 
according to Ministry of Environment (MOEnv) Deputy Director 
Dr. Kamal Latif.  The breakthrough ends a six-month 
bureaucratic dispute that halted significant demining work 
(reftel).  The agreement re-activates the Directorate of Mine 
Action (DMA), headed by Dr. Kamal, who seeks to develop it 
into a professional, civilian agency with close ties to the 
Department, the UNDP, and other international funders. 
However, the MOD retains significant power under the MOU to 
block organizations or projects that it finds objectionable, 
Dr. Kamal explained.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Deputy Director Kamal visited the Embassy July 6 to 
share the promising news with emboff and to discuss demining 
initiatives in Iraq.  Dr. Kamal sent a signed scanned copy of 
the MOU in Arabic by email July 7.  Despite negative media 
attention to the demining deadlock (reftel), there were no 
plans for a public signing or media event.  Dr. Kamal said he 
preferred to show demonstrable progress in demining before 
highlighting the agreement publicly.  Quick to focus on 
operational issues, he requested information about training 
opportunities for demining professionals and promised emboff 
that he would work as an intermediary to resolve disputes 
between the Iraqi military and NGOs. 
 
¶3.  (C) Reftel conveyed two concerns: a) the ministries would 
not sign a MOU, or b) they would sign a MOU, but one with a 
clause allowing MOD representatives sit on the boards of 
demining companies.  Neither happened, according to Dr. 
Kamal.  The latter scenario -- a "flawed MOU" -- threatened 
to discourage demining operations.  According to Dr. Kamal, 
MOD consented instead to modify the clause defining the MOD 
representatives as "observers" rather than "participants." 
(Note: The MOU will be translated into English by Embassy 
linguists shortly. End note.)  Dr. Kamal also was confident 
that he could negotiate changes and improvements to the 
agreement over time. 
 
¶4.  (C) Comment: This positive turn of events comes with 
caveats.  It remains to be seen if MOD will approve the 
vetting of particular organizations, such as the Iraqi Mine 
Clearance Organization (IMCO), a U.S.-supported NGO, or its 
projects.  The Political-Military Affairs Section plans to 
maintain close working relationship with Dr. Kamal and DMA to 
monitor whether or not demining projects are actually 
permitted, which organizations are allowed to operate, and 
under what conditions.  Dr. Kamal reiterated concerns 
reported by UNDP contacts that the rift between MOD and IMCO 
Executive Director Zahim Mutar was irremediable, and that 
major restructuring of IMCO would be necessary for it to 
continue with significant demining work in Iraq.  The Section 
will seek to engage MOD Legal Advisor Dr. Ghaleb, together 
with Dr. Kamal, to discuss the future of IMCO and develop 
even stronger relationships among MOD, MOEnv, DMA and the 
Embassy.  The Section will also coordinate with UN 
representatives to put one of their demining projects forward 
as a test case of Iraq's new system of managing mine action 
projects.  End comment. 
HILL