VZCZCXRO5086
PP RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1798/01 1861111
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZDK CTG SEVERAL SERVICES
P 051111Z JUL 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3794
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0811

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001798 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/I/POLMIL, NEA/I 
DEPT ALSO FOR PM/WRA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/04/2019 
TAGS: IZ KHDP PARM PGOV PREL PTER UNDP
SUBJECT: DEMINING DEADLOCK STARTING TO GIVE WAY? 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 1700 
 
BAGHDAD 00001798  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Acting Political-Military Affairs Counselor W. S. Reid f 
or reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Iraqi ministries nudged closer July 1 to 
signing an interagency agreement (MOU) that would allow 
humanitarian demining to continue in Iraq.  The Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) ordered the cessation of demining activities in 
December 2008 citing security concerns, but subsequent 
bureaucratic turf battles have turned the temporary freeze 
into a protracted, de facto ban.  The UN mounted pressure on 
the GOI to lift the de facto ban during May and June, while 
the Embassy engaged all sides to craft a workable solution. 
The UN's push culminated July 1 when UNAMI Acting Special 
Representative of the Secretary General (A/SRSG) Andrew 
Gilmour "strongly urged" the MOD to allow demining to restart 
before a 50-person audience of government officials, 
international funders, and news media.  Deputy Minister of 
Environment (MOEnv) Dr. Kamal Latif told the same gathering 
that the need was urgent and that MOEnv stood ready for 
action.  GOI internal players say they now see two likely 
outcomes: either a flawed MOU giving MOD excessive power or a 
reaffirmed deadlock that will increase international scrutiny 
and require the PM's attention.  This debate could lead us to 
a policy decision in the near future.  End summary. 
 
An Imperfect Solution is Likely 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The impasse exists because the draft MOU that would 
unlock the de facto ban also gives MOD the right of first 
refusal over demining operations and could therefore impede 
international support that is humanitarian in nature.  Senior 
MOD Advisor Major General Mohan al Furayji has said he will 
insist on a MOU that gives the MOD vast authority over 
demining, telling emboffs June 26 that the Iraqi military was 
solely responsible for, and very capable of, demining Iraq. 
Other actors see a way forward:  Deputy Minister of the 
Environment Latif privately confirmed July 1 that the MOD had 
been intransigent and dismissive of civilian involvement 
during internal negotiations, but MOEnv was likely to sign a 
flawed MOU if need be.  UNDP representative Kent Paulusson 
advised against conceding to MOD demands but ultimately 
concluded that immediate progress was needed to salvage 
humanitarian demining in Iraq.  Latif and Paulusson agreed to 
a strategy that, if the flawed MOU is signed, then Iraqi 
NGOs, MOEnv, and UNDP would start cooperative, visible 
operations to demonstrate their technical ability, and 
subsequently seek to improve the legal arrangements. 
 
How Pressure Built Up 
--------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) During the first half of 2009, Iraqi ministries 
jockeyed to shape future demining operations.  Emboffs 
reminded GOI officials repeatedly during this negotiation 
period that failure to reach an agreement was hampering 
U.S.-funded humanitarian programs and imperiling their 
future.   The Weapons Removal and Abatement Office (PM/WRA) 
supports demining with grants to NGOs and contracts to 
companies that total USD20 million per year.  During April 
and May, emboffs also engaged the UNDP and our grantees to 
devise ways to build official and public support for demining 
programs.  Consultations intensified during a multi-agency UN 
Mine Action Team (UNMAT) visit from May 15 - 19.  Emboffs 
joined the UNMAT May 17 for a meeting with GOI's Drug and 
Qjoined the UNMAT May 17 for a meeting with GOI's Drug and 
Demining Coordinating Committee chaired by Ali Abd al Amir al 
Yassery, a senior advisor to the PM.  The UNMAT and NGO 
representatives made it clear they would increase the public 
and institutional pressure on GOI, while we emphasized that 
U.S.-funded demining programs needed to operate normally -- 
and soon -- or funds risked being re-programmed elsewhere. 
 
From Impasse to MOD Power Play 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) After the UNMAT visit, al Yassery told emboffs May 27 
that the Prime Minister's Office had called for the MOD, 
MOEnv, and Ministry of Interior (MOI) to negotiate an 
agreement that would re-establish a mine action authority and 
a demining policy council, both under the MOEnv.  Al Yassery 
promised a MOU within weeks.  However, MOD modified the 
proposed resolution to give itself extensive oversight, 
authority to vet all demining companies, and veto power over 
all demining projects and organizations.  Paulusson told 
emboff June 23 of his special objection to clause 2(a) 
calling for MOD's "participation on boards of directors" of 
 
BAGHDAD 00001798  002 OF 002 
 
 
private companies (to include NGOs), which he said would 
deter demining in general and contravene international norms, 
laws, and corporate bylaws in specific.  This dispute has 
left the MOEnv and MOD mired in stalemate, though with a 
flawed MOU ready to be inked if MOEnv concedes. 
 
Scrutiny Increases, MOD Sees No Benefit in Compromise 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶5.  (U) International news reports on the demining deadlock 
appeared June 2 and quoted UNDP's criticism that GOI's de 
facto ban had failed to prevent human suffering or improve 
Iraq's economic and agricultural prospects.  The articles 
singled out MOD for blame and cited claims that corrupt 
officials were trying to "get a cut from international aid 
budgets."  A July 2 AP Wire story on A/SRSG's comments 
increased attention to the de facto ban.  In June engagements 
with GOI officials, emboffs cited not only international 
concerns and prospects of lost funding, but also media 
scrutiny. 
 
¶6.  (C) Senior MOD Advisor MG Mohan has not budged.  MG Mohan 
welcomed emboffs on June 26 to discuss stalled demining 
operations and asserted that the Iraqi military should 
perform or otherwise control all demining operations and that 
international organizations doing humanitarian demining were 
seeking to benefit themselves.  MG Mohan claimed that the 
military knows where all explosive remnants of war (ERW) are 
located and has the know-how and capacity to remove them.  MG 
Mohan stated that he was not asking for money and did not 
need help.  (Comment: In the same breath, however, MG Mohan 
said that the U.S. should "give equipment and training to 
us," instead of to the NGOs.  End comment.)  MG Mohan claimed 
to have information on terrorists infiltrating some NGOs and 
criticized the NGO that PM/WRA helped create, and has since 
supported, the Iraqi Mine Clearance Organization (IMCO), but 
provided no evidence to substantiate these claims. 
 
¶7.  (C) Comment: The Embassy now is considering how to 
diversify the deployment of PM/WRA resources as we 
simultaneously develop an approach to encourage GOI to lift 
the de facto ban on humanitarian demining.  MG Mohan's 
suspicions about our grantee IMCO, whether genuine or 
personally motivated, will not go away.  PM/WRA will likely 
have to shift resources among our Iraqi grantees and develop 
new projects, such as in the KRG where NGO demining is 
welcome.  MG Mohan's significant influence as chief advisor 
to MinDef has made the ban on humanitarian demining durable. 
Even if MG Mohan drops his objections to international 
involvement, a more difficult problem to overcome may be 
broader skepticism within GOI of NGOs in general (reftel). 
MOD resistance may need to be met with sustained efforts to 
explain humanitarian demining, as we also consider the 
effectiveness of engagement at higher levels.  If the 
MOD-backed MOU is signed and UNDP and local NGOs accept half 
a loaf by working within its framework, we face the dilemma 
of a U.S. policy not to abide by "prevailing local practice" 
by pulling back programs or to join international funders in 
seeming to support a policy that could ingrain GOI bias 
against NGOs and limit our longer term demining assistance 
options.  End comment. 
HILL