VZCZCXYZ0007
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #1018/01 1971002
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161002Z JUL 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0226
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0171
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 6740
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3892
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001018 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2019 
TAGS: CY PREL TU UNFICYP US
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA: CYPRUS SETTLEMENT MUST HAVE 
TRANSITION PERIOD 
 
REF: NICOSIA 456 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons: 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  MFA Undersecretary Apakan told DAS Bryza 
and the Ambassador July 13 that Turkey: 
-- continues to support the Cyprus negotiating process; 
-- is committed to a solution if there is a referendum; 
-- views the guarantee system as "vital"; 
-- insists on genuine bizonality; 
-- believes any solution must entail a significant transition 
government that could last as long as 36 months.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) In a July 13 meeting with DAS Bryza and the 
Ambassador, MFA Undersecretary Apakan underscored that Turkey 
continues to support the Cyprus negotiating process "to the 
end of this year" and that this would be reiterated to 
Turkish Cypriot leader Talat in bilateral discussions.  Talat 
had arrived in Ankara earlier that day.  Apakan said that 
Turkey would also support a solution if there is a 
referendum.  He added, however, that the "vital" system of 
Treaties of Guarantee must remain in place.  The MFA could 
not bring a "wrong solution" to the GOT, let alone to the 
Parliament.  The guarantee system would be Turkey's only bond 
to the island when both sides become an EU country.  Apakan 
then went into detail on the somewhat mumbo-jumbo but very 
serious Turkish position of principle about maintaining the 
Hellenic-Turkic balance in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the 
guarantees being the final part of the "Lausanne System" 
to secure Turkish rights, establish links to the Turkish 
community, and protect Turkish rights (presumably to high sea 
access). 
 
¶3.  (C) Apakan said that the post-settlement Cyprus must also 
be "genuinely" bizonal, which means that the process by which 
it emerges is important (reflecting Turkey's view that the 
new constituent state will not be a continuation of the 
Republic of Cyprus).  Therefore, a transition period is 
needed.  This period would allow Turkey to withdraw its 
troops and hand over territory.  This transition government 
would led jointly by ROC President Christofias and Turkish 
Cypriot leader Talat.  Ushering in a "real peace" requires 
going step by step, he said, as laid out in the Annan Plan. 
The economy needs to be balanced and harmonized.  The 
transition period could be 36 months or 20 months, as 
proposed in Annan, but possibly shorter. 
 
¶4.  (C) Increasingly animated, Apakan asserted that he was 
not trying to "create difficulties," but believed strongly 
that a well-planned transition would smooth out potential 
problems.  It was not a new idea.  We could check previous UN 
documents.  The island would need to find new homes for those 
persons who would be required to move.  If there were no new 
residences, the resettlement could not take place.  DAS Bryza 
questioned whether sorting out these transitional 
arrangements would take considerable time, and asked if this 
means an additional new round of negotiations on a set of 
governance issues for a new political entity, keeping in mind 
that negotiations on governance issues for a new constituent 
state had already proven lengthy and difficult.  Negotiating 
a whole new set of governance provisions seemed incompatible 
with Apakan's expressed desire to secure a Cyprus agreement 
by the end of 2009.  Apakan replied flatly that "if there is 
no transition, there is no settlement."  This had been told 
to Talat.   If both sides say "yes" to a referendum on 
December 10, then Talat and Christofias could govern the 
settlement -- as Cypriots.  But they need time. 
 
¶5.  (C) DAS Bryza said we understand that the Turkish Cypriot 
goal remains a new constituent state with a distinct and new 
international personality, and that Talat seems to have full 
room to negotiate except for the guarantees.  Apakan replied 
that territory and guarantees must be considered at the very 
end of the negotiations, so that the proposed power-sharing 
arrangement could be seen.  This has been true since the 
1980s, he said.  He added that a new EU Protocol is needed to 
replace Protocol 10, to ensure the new constituent state will 
enjoy derogations from EU law to protect Turkish Cypriot 
interests in ensuring the new state is bizonal.  We also need 
a meaningful answer to the question of what happens if the 
referendums fail, he noted.  What would be the role of the 
Turkish Cypriots?  Bryza noted that the U.S. was working with 
its European allies to plan for a successful outcome of the 
negotiations.  Apakan expressed Turkey desire for a reference 
to UNSYG Kofi Annan's 28 May 2004 report on Cyprus, which 
outlined the whole talks and the Annan Plan's fate -- which 
 
the UNSC had failed to adopt.  DAS Bryza pointed out that 
this report had been vetoed by the Russians.  He urged that 
Ankara help change the Russian view.  "They want a lot from 
you," he said.   Apakan emphasized that the Turkish Cypriots 
felt cheated by the EU and must not be cheated by the U.N. as 
well.  The USG is a leading country, with the U.K., he said. 
"You can find a way." 
 
¶6.  (C) DAS Bryza said he had asked Christofias to consider 
not holding a referendum in the Greek Cypriot community, 
because so many G/C's now seem inclined to vote "ohi" (no), 
regardless of the actual content on the settlement agreement, 
and instead allow himself to be judged by Cypriot voters in 
the next election for the settlement that emerges. 
Christofias did not support that idea, and said he was 
confident of a "yes" vote.  Apakan noted that if AKEL and 
DESY both support the referendum, then it would pass. 
 
¶7.  (C) Apakan said he was in favor of a speeded up process. 
He said Ankara supports arbitration and wants "a calendar." 
Bryza said there may be a point at the end of negotiations 
when some mechanism may be needed to bridge final 
differences.  Such a mechanism should not apply pressure, but 
should instead provide creative ideas.  During Bryza's visit, 
DISY Leader Anastasiades had proposed the appointment of a US 
envoy who could lead a team of wise people who could generate 
such deadlock-breaking ideas.  Apakan gave no comment but 
said the ultimate settlement must entail genuine 
power-sharing and equality.  This is the reason there has not 
been a settlement to date, he said: the Greek Cypriots "don't 
like to share."   Bryza said the Greek Cypriots are looking 
to the Annan Plan more than they admit in public, and that 
Christofias has been making an effort to ensure that Turkish 
Cypriot interests are protected. 
 
¶8.  (C) Apakan asked if the USG would appoint a Cyprus 
Coordinator.  Bryza was noncommittal but commented that he 
liked the idea of an envoy who could provide ideas to the 
negotiators during the endgame.  Bryza said he had found the 
mood on Cyprus more positive during his visit the previous 
week to the island, largely because of the opening of 
Yesilirmak (Limnitis) crossing.  In addition, the Greek 
Cypriots feel an incentive to negotiate seriously, as they 
look ahead to Talat's election next April. 
 
¶9.  (C) COMMENT:  Apakan has been appointed as Turkey's 
permanent representative to the United Nations, and is not 
expected to remain in his current position past mid-August. 
Accordingly, he may have seen this as his parting shot on the 
Cyprus issue and felt compelled to emphasize that getting to 
"yes" would not be as simple as agreement on the design of a 
united Cyprus -- but must build in a transitional framework 
as well.  He also seemed intent on flagging for us that 
Ankara believes the negotiations need to wrap up within this 
calendar year, contrary to some projections that extent well 
into 2010.  Negotiating a transitional government and 
wrapping up negotiations by 2009 are probably incompatible 
goals. 
 
¶10.  (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
JEFFREY