VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNO #0227/01 1551521
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041521Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3025
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0592
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6390
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0573
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 0370
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0897
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0409
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHFMISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0915

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000227 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS TO NAVCENT POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019 
TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS EWWT PBTS ZR SO XA
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: NATO COUNTER-PIRACY: FISH OR CUT 
BAIT TIME 
 
REF: A. BRUSSELS 751 
     ¶B. USNATO 202 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C/NF) This is an Action Request.  See para 14. 
 
¶2. (C/NF) SUMMARY: At the strong urging of the United States, 
NATO is moving forward with planning for a long-term 
counter-piracy operation.  At the same time, 
Allies--including the U.S.--have been tepid in their 
willingness to actually contribute to the mission.  NATO will 
host a Force Generation conference on June 10.  If the U.S. 
and its Allies are unwilling to announce contributions at 
this conference, the NATO operation will be either 
significantly scaled-back, delayed, or canceled.  Because 
U.S. policy makers have advocated this operation, we strongly 
recommend that the U.S. pledge a significant contribution at 
the conference to demonstrate U.S. leadership.  We also 
recommend demarching Allies in capitals, urging them to 
contribute as well.  We believe that the U.S. should also 
consider proposing moving Combined Task Force 151 under a 
NATO flag, as well as considering what contributions the U.S. 
could make to a NATO maritime capacity building effort.  The 
failure of this mission would have strategic implications 
beyond the counter-piracy mission, corroding NATO's role as 
the key trans-Atlantic link on security issues.  END SUMMARY 
 
 
 
Progress on a NATO Counter-piracy Mission 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C/NF) At the strong urging of the United States, NATO has 
been working hard to develop a robust and long-term 
counter-piracy mission.  The Military Committee has recently 
endorsed the Concept of Operations (ConOps) for such a 
mission, naming it Operation Ocean Shield.  We expect this to 
be raised with Defense Ministers on June 11. 
 
But Lack of Forces Threatens it... 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C/NF) NATO Allies, however, have not yet been forthcoming 
in pledging forces for this mission.  Many of our European 
Allies have claimed that because they are already 
participating in the EU's Atalanta counter-piracy mission, 
they will be unable to contribute to a NATO mission (ref A). 
A May 22 SHAPE conference designed to get a sense of what 
Allies might be willing to contribute was described as 
disappointing, leading the Chairman of the Military Committee 
to argue that if the situation did not change the planned 
NATO mission would likely either have to be significantly 
scaled back, delayed, or canceled. 
 
Is the U.S. Serious About a NATO Mission? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C/NF) While it would be tempting to blame this lack of 
interest entirely on our European Allies, the U.S. has also 
been unwilling to fully commit to participation in a NATO 
operation.  At the May 22 meeting, the U.S. was only prepared 
to say that it was "considering" moving a ship from the 
Standing NATO Maritime Group to the NATO counter-piracy 
mission, as well as possibly providing some logistics and 
intelligence support. 
 
¶6. (C/NF) This lack of commitment conflicts with the 
Administration's strong statements of support for a NATO 
mission.  In the run-up to the NATO Summit in April, for 
example, the Washington interagency instructed this Mission 
 
to fight for communique language in support of a long-term 
NATO role in counter-piracy: a battle we won.  A May 13 press 
release by the Department said that the U.S. "actively" 
supported the expansion of NATO counter-piracy efforts; 
Acting Assistant Secretary Mull used similar language when 
testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
April 30. 
 
Fish or Cut Bait Time 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (C/NF) On June 10, SHAPE will host a formal force 
generation conference.  If this conference fails to generate 
needed contributions, the proposed NATO mission will likely 
be dead before it has even begun. 
 
¶8. (C/NF) At the June 3 North Atlantic Council meeting, 
Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer stressed that the failure 
of NATO to act on this matter only two months after NATO 
Heads of State and Government--including President Obama--had 
agreed to do so would be unthinkable.  He strongly rebuked 
those Allies who had been arguing that their contributions to 
the EU mission would prevent them from also contributing to a 
NATO mission, pointedly telling PermReps to look at Alliance 
inventories because there are significantly more ships in 
Allied navies than the few ships that are taking part in 
Atalanta. 
 
¶9. (C/NF) For similar reasons, if the United States--as one 
of the main advocates of a NATO counter-piracy role--is 
unable or unwilling to contribute to a NATO mission, the 
missi/Q"Q+QQQ$?QNZthe end match our words. 
 
Getting Things Back on Track 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C/NF) Assuming the United States does want to see a 
robust NATO role in counter-piracy, we believe that the 
following minimum steps will need to be taken: 
 
-- the United States will need to make a firm pledge of U.S. 
forces at the June 10 Force Generation conference.  At a 
minimum, this will need to include the forces the U.S. said 
it was considering contributing at the May 22 conference 
(i.e. moving its vessel from the Standing NATO Maritime 
Group, as well as contributions of certain logistics support 
-- including oilers).  We should also include other 
contributions we could make.  The Secretary General has noted 
the need, for example, for Maritime Patrol Aircraft. 
 
-- if the U.S. is willing to contribute, it should demarche 
Allies in capitals prior to the June 10 Force Generation 
conference, urging them to also make commitments at the 
conference.  Following the Secretary General's lead, we 
should make clear that the U.S. does not accept the argument 
that their contributions to an EU operation prevents them 
from also contributing to a NATO operation.  We should remind 
them that they are the ones who have argued that the European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) would not be undertaken in 
a manner that was competitive with NATO and that it was upon 
that basis that we supported the development of ESDP. 
 
A Bolder Proposal: Some Recommendations 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C/NF) We also believe that the United States should 
 
consider proposing the movement of Combined Task Force 151 
into the NATO Mission.  Of the five nations currently 
contributing to CTF 151, three (the U.S., UK, and Turkey) are 
NATO Allies.  The other two (South Korea and Singapore) are 
already working with NATO in other areas, particularly 
Afghanistan.  South Korea, for example, is defined as one of 
NATO's Partners Across the Globe, and NATO has developed a 
Tailored Cooperation Package with it.  Other NATO partners, 
such as Russia and Japan, are operating independently in the 
region, but may be willing to contribute to a NATO operation. 
 Russia, in particular, has already expressed an interest in 
working with NATO on this issue and may well raise the 
possibility at the June 27 NATO-Russia Foreign Ministerial. 
Using TF 151 as the core of a NATO counter-piracy mission, 
might therefore have a knock-on effect of aiding 
counter-piracy coordination, putting more and more ships 
under a NATO flag and making use of the interoperability 
which has been developed between NATO and NATO partner 
forces. 
 
¶12. (C/NF) An important part of the NATO Summit decision on 
counter-piracy was that NATO would examine the issue of 
maritime capacity building in the region.  In support of this 
decision, we would recommend that Washington consider what 
contributions the U.S. could make to NATO maritime capacity 
building--through AFRICOM, for example. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13. (C/NF) If the Force Generation conference fails, it is 
likely that the NATO mission will, as well.  While that would 
be bad enough, this will have even greater strategic 
consequences.  Certain EU Allies will be emboldened to 
further place EU commitments ahead of their NATO commitments, 
corroding NATO's role as the key trans-Atlantic link and 
weakening U.S. influence in Europe. 
 
Action Request 
-------------- 
 
¶14. (C/NF) We request that Washington take the steps 
identified in para 10 above, providing a robust U.S. 
commitment at the June 10 Force Generation conference and 
demarching Allied capitals to the same.  Moreover, we ask 
that Washington  also seriously consider our proposals in 
paras 11 and 12. 
DAALDER