VZCZCXRO0225
OO RUEHAST RUEHDH RUEHHM RUEHLN RUEHMA RUEHPB RUEHPOD RUEHTM RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKO #1253/01 1550754
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 040754Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3455
INFO RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO CITY 0636
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 5669
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9648
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 4381
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 1979
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 6716
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 8182
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 4912
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3541
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5410
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC 8637
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY IA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/USFJ

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001253 
 
DEPT FOR OES/IHB AMBASSADOR LOFTIS 
DEPT FOR EAP/J, EAP/EX, CA 
USDA PASS TO APHIS, FAS FOR BURDETT 
HHS PASS TO CDC 
HHS FOR OGHA 
DEPT PASS TO AID/GH/HIDN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFLU AEMR AESC CASC EAGR KFLO TBIO KSAF KPAO PREL
PINR, AMGT, MG, JA 
SUBJECT: LESSONS LEARNED FROM H1N1 OUTBREAK IN JAPAN 
 
REF: A) STATE 54435; B) TOKYO 1171 and previous 
 
TOKYO 00001253  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified.  Please handle accordingly. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  Effective coordination among multiple agencies at 
Post, our five consulates general, and United States Forces Japan 
(USFJ) helped the Mission to prepare for the spread of H1N1 in 
Japan, inform official and non-official Americans in Japan of 
developments, and report to Washington on Japan's response to the 
outbreak.  Embassy tripwires were a helpful guide for Post's 
Emergency Action Committee (EAC), but Post took action based on the 
specific characteristics of the H1N1 outbreak.  The EAC linked in 
Consulate and USFJ officers by teleconference.  Post relied on USG 
and GOJ information sources and Department guidance in disseminating 
information, including via two warden messages.  Clarifying GOJ 
procedures regarding quarantined Amcits helped us to better respond 
to Americans' inquiries; however, users at Post reported some 
difficulties with the Consular Task Force (CTF) application.  The 
Embassy helped USFJ to arrange virus sample testing at a GOJ lab; a 
step that saved USFJ both time and resources and showcased 
cooperation between the Japanese government and the U.S. military in 
Japan.  Washington messages helped to keep open markets for pork and 
sustain the GOJ's positive and constructive approach on pork imports 
and sales.  New cases of H1N1 continue to be reported in Japan.  End 
Summary. 
 
Mission Japan H1N1 Coordination Efforts 
--------------------------------------- 
¶2.  (SBU) Mission Japan's H1N1 Task Force, led by the Econ Section's 
ESTH Unit and including Embassy offices and five consulates general, 
worked in close coordination with Washington agencies, USFJ, and the 
GOJ to keep official and non-official Americans in Japan informed of 
developments, prepare for the spread of the disease, and report on 
Japan's response to the outbreak.  Personnel from the different 
offices and agencies in Mission Japan had daily contact with 
officials at Foreign Affairs, Health, Agriculture, Transportation, 
and other Ministries to engage and report on Japan's 
rapidly-changing border screening and quarantine procedures.  The 
Mission's five consulates general reported to the Embassy on actions 
taken by local governments, airports, private companies, hospitals, 
and educational institutions throughout Japan.  Post's Economic 
Section coordinated the Mission's regular front-channel H1N1 updates 
to Washington. 
 
Post Management 
--------------- 
¶3.  (SBU) Post's Emergency Action Committee (EAC) reviewed Embassy 
tripwires originally set for a possible outbreak of Avian Influenza 
or SARS in considering actions to respond to the H1N1 outbreak. 
While the tripwires were a useful guide, the EAC considered actions 
in light of the fact that the outbreak originated in North America, 
rather than in Asia.  The EAC met prior to a five-day holiday 
weekend to identify specific triggers for further action should the 
situation change during the Embassy's closure.  To ensure staff and 
families had information over the long weekend, Post sent a notice 
to all staff and arranged for round-the-clock broadcast of the 
Department's pandemic influenza video on the residential compound 
television channel.  Once H1N1 had appeared in Japan, the EAC met 
via teleconference with officers from the Mission's five constituent 
posts and U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) to coordinate action and 
preparations for the spread of H1N1 in Japan. 
 
American Citizens and Consular 
------------------------------ 
¶4.  (SBU) Post's Consular Section relied closely on 
 
TOKYO 00001253  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
frequently-updated USG and GOJ Internet sources to convey timely 
information on the H1N1 outbreak to Americans in Japan.  Post 
disseminated information in accordance with Washington guidance and 
the "no-double standard" policy, including links to official 
information sources via Post's ACS webpage, ACS newsletters, and two 
warden messages that followed the useful template produced by 
CA/OCS/ACS. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Although many Americans arriving in Japan were delayed by 
Japanese airport screening procedures, and a number were 
quarantined, Post received few phone calls regarding the procedures 
or the GOJ's H1N1 response.  The limited number of inquiries 
suggests U.S. and Japanese media coverage of quarantine procedures, 
along with Post's efforts to disseminate information, went a long 
way towards informing the traveling public.  Among the Americans who 
did contact Post about screening procedures, many sought assurances 
from the Embassy that Japan's relatively strict procedures were 
being applied fairly and in accordance with law. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Although Post had already been in direct contact with 
relevant GOJ offices, Post needed to ask the GOJ to clarify 
procedures for notifying the Embassy of Americans, including U.S. 
service members on SOFA status, detained in quarantine procedures 
and for allowing Americans held in quarantine access to telephones. 
Embassy efforts to reach out to quarantined Americans and their 
families and friends helped to ease the situation.  Regular contact 
with representatives of U.S. and other international airlines 
provided helpful insights into airport screening delays and the 
impact of the H1N1 outbreak on travelers to and from Japan. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Users at Post reported the Consular Task Force (CTF) 
application was awkward to use and did not allow Post to designate 
the specific locations of cases.  As each location in the CTF 
application required coordination with the Department, the 
rapidly-evolving situation led us to use other tools to track our 
cases.  The utility of the CTF application would be enhanced if 
posts were able to designate their own locations in the 
application. 
 
Coordination with U.S. Military 
------------------------------- 
¶8.  (SBU) The Embassy coordinated with USFJ and the GOJ to update 
U.S. military bases in Japan on GOJ border procedures in order to 
mirror GOJ efforts with arriving air and sea passengers.  When a 
suspected H1N1 case was reported at Yokota Air Base May 1, the 
Embassy coordinated with USFJ and the GOJ to test the virus sample 
at Japan's National Institute for Infectious Diseases.  The test 
results confirmed the following day that the virus was not H1N1, 
allowing USFJ to release quarantined passengers and enabling Japan 
to swiftly reassure the public that the U.S. military had not 
brought the H1N1 virus into Japan.  While Post and USFJ worked with 
the GOJ to establish procedures for utilizing local laboratory 
capacity during the H1N1 outbreak, Post will continue to coordinate 
with the GOJ to clarify the process to help in dealing with any 
future events. 
 
USG Messages Supported GOJ's Stance on Pork Trade 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
¶9.  (SBU) Public comments by senior USG officials praising the GOJ's 
scientific approach to the trade in pork meat was extremely 
important in supporting Japanese policy makers' decisions.  Japan is 
the largest export market for U.S. pork, buying $1.5 billion 
annually. 
 
ZUMWALT