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FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1713
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0241
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4859

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001078 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2019 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KBTS UNSC UNOMIG RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: DIPLOMATIC PARTNERS DISCUSS UNOMIG WITH 
A/S GORDON 
 
REF: A. TBILISI 1073 
     ¶B. STATE 59890 
     ¶C. USUN 583 
     ¶D. TBILISI 984 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tfft for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  In a June 11 meeting with European 
ambassadors and heads of the three monitoring missions, EUR 
Assistant Secretary Philip Gordon reviewed the state of 
UNOMIG renewal negotiations and possible ways forward. 
Everyone agreed that losing UNOMIG had potentially serious 
disadvantages for Georgia, but protecting key principles -- 
notably the international community's explicit affirmation of 
Georgian territorial integrity -- was also important. 
Although the meeting participants did not fully agree on just 
how much of a risk the closure of UNOMIG presented, they did 
agree that Georgia must ultimately be allowed to make the 
final decision on what was acceptable -- and that Russia must 
be blamed for a failure to achieve a new resolution. 
Although some argued for continuing to try to reach a 
compromise, all recognized that a deal was unlikely, and a 
technical rollover might be the best hope at this point.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Participants in the meeting with A/S Gordon and 
Ambassador Tefft included the following: British Ambassador 
Denis Keefe; French Ambassador Eric Fournier; German 
Ambassador Patricia Flor; Head of the EU Monitoring Mission 
(EUMM) Hansjoerg Haber; OSCE Deputy Head of Mission Gottfried 
Hanne; and UN Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG) Johan Verbeke. 
 
IF UNOMIG GOES, WHAT DO WE LOSE? 
 
¶3. (C) To begin, A/S Gordon asked his colleagues what Georgia 
would lose if the UN mission closed down.  SRSG Verbeke 
answered first, saying that the single most significant 
feature of UNOMIG is the signal it sends to the world that 
Georgia still has an unresolved conflict.  If UNOMIG closes, 
the rest of the world could pay less and less attention to 
Georgia's concerns over time.  Although he admitted that the 
UN had done little to resolve the conflict in its fifteen 
years of existence, he said that closure might send the 
(incorrect) message that the conflict had finally been 
resolved -- and this was precisely the impression the 
Russians wanted to convey.  Ambassador Flor echoed this 
point, also seeing great symbolic value in the very existence 
of UNOMIG. 
 
¶4. (C) Several interlocutors expressed concern about the 
impact on the local population, in particular in Gali. 
Ambassador Flor noted that another exodus of newly displaced 
persons into undisputed Georgian territory was possible; 
Ambassador Keefe expressed the same concern.  Keefe 
acknowledged, however, that there was some debate on the 
extent of the threat, especially considering that the local 
population faces difficulties even with a UN presence. 
Ambassador Tefft pointed out that in the past, many Gali 
residents had left for undisputed Georgia, then returned, 
suggesting that it is difficult to predict just how the 
locals will react.  Flor added that a UN departure would also 
close one of the few windows we have on the situation inside 
Abkhazia, so that it would be far more difficult to stay 
informed about the true state of affairs. 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Keefe also said that closure would put 
Georgia and Russia in more of a direct confrontation and 
would risk upsetting what he called a "delicate balance" 
between the sides.  He suggested that the Georgians, with 
Qbetween the sides.  He suggested that the Georgians, with 
their absolute focus on protecting the principle of 
territorial integrity, might not fully appreciate all the 
possible ramifications of a UN departure.  A/S Gordon and 
Ambassador Tefft responded that their conversations with the 
Georgians on the topic, in which they pushed the Georgians on 
this very point, had convinced them that the Georgians had 
indeed thought the issue through quite thoroughly (ref A). 
Keefe also noted that a UN departure could jeopardize such 
international structures as the Geneva process; EUMM Head 
Haber echoed this concern, pointing to the Joint Incident 
Prevention and Response Mechanism as another potential 
casualty. 
 
DO WE GAIN ANYTHING -- OR AT LEAST NOT LOSE TOO MUCH? 
 
¶6. (C) Even while enumerating the potential disadvantages of 
a UN departure, SRSG Verbeke also noted that there might be 
some advantages as well.  In particular, he said that 
 
TBILISI 00001078  002 OF 003 
 
 
cancelling the mission -- especially considering the kind of 
language that Russia was likely to demand -- would avoid 
legitimizing the Russian presence inside Abkhazia. 
Ambassador Fournier did not say that a closure would have 
advantages, but he did downplay the disadvantages, suggesting 
it would not be the end of the world.  He shared a message 
sent to French officials around the world from President 
Sarkozy, in which Sarkozy said that defending core 
principles, in particular territorial integrity, was the most 
important thing.  Sarkozy suggested that UNOMIG should be 
seen "not as a jewel, but a tool" -- a potentially useful 
one, but not an end in itself. 
 
¶7. (C) EUMM Head Haber said that, from the perspective of the 
EUMM, the departure of UNOMIG would not actually change too 
much on the ground.  He said that at that point the EUMM 
would become first and foremost a tripwire.  A/S Gordon asked 
whether the EUMM would in fact stay if the UN left; Haber 
said it certainly would in the short- to medium-term.  He 
said it would be important, however, for the EU to avoid 
making long-term commitments in order to keep both the 
Georgian and the Russian sides honest.  In his view, one of 
the EUMM's biggest contributions is its firm policy of 
non-recognition of the territories, which will not change and 
which does not require any concessions by Georgia.  In other 
words, although Georgia would likely have to make certain 
concessions to keep a UN presene, it does not have to make 
any to keep the EUMM. 
 
WHAT NEXT? 
 
¶8. (C) Ambassadors Flor and Keefe both advocated for 
continuing to push for an acceptable substantive resolution. 
They both acknowledged that reaching a compromise text that 
all sides -- including both the Russians and the Georgians -- 
could accept would be difficult, but they both felt strongly 
that the risks of losing UNOMIG were considerable, and all 
parties should therefore make every effort to find a 
solution.  SRSG Verbeke suggested that it was possible to 
protect basic principles and renew the mission; in fact, he 
said, salvaging the mission would itself support those same 
principles, because the existence of the mission sends a 
strong message on the unresolved nature of Georgia's 
territorial conflicts.  Acknowledging the Georgians' 
legitimate concern about maintaining the UNSC's commitment to 
the country's territorial integrity, Verbeke said that, 
although the Russians would certainly not accept a direct 
reference to territorial integrity, they might accept an 
indirect one via reference to UNSC Resolution 1808. 
 
¶9. (C) A/S Gordon said that, even if the Russians were to 
accept a reference to 1808, the acceptability of a resolution 
would also depend on what else it contained, noting for 
example the Georgians' interest in references to the Sarkozy 
agreements.  SRSG Verbeke and Ambassador Flor offered a note 
of caution on that point, explaining that in their draft the 
Russians had finessed those reference very cleverly.  Thus, 
if their text survived, the Russians could argue that 
compliance with the ceasefire and its implementing measures 
could be considered not the primary benchmark, but only one 
of several -- and thereby maintain a position that it is in 
compliance with the resolution and mandate (if not with the 
ceasefire). 
 
¶10. (C) All participants, including Flor and Keefe, agreed 
Q10. (C) All participants, including Flor and Keefe, agreed 
that ultimately the Georgians must be the ones to decide if a 
mandate is acceptable or not, and all parties should respect 
Georgia's decision.  A/S Gordon and Ambassador Fournier also 
argued strongly for the importance of putting the blame for a 
failed negotiation on the Russians, and everyone agreed. 
Fournier noted that this point had been part of Sarkozy's 
message to French officials.  A/S Gordon said that the worst 
case scenario would be a strenuous effort on the part of 
western partners to find language acceptable to the Russians, 
but which the Georgians decided they could not accept: then 
the Georgians would be isolated, the Russians would perceive 
that the international community is prepared to bend over 
backwards to please them, and last but not least, there would 
be no UN mission. 
 
¶11. (C) All participants agreed that achieving a text 
acceptable to both Georgia and Russia at this point was 
unlikely, and another technical rollover may therefore be the 
best we can hope for.  SRSG Verbeke noted that technical 
rollovers are not historically used for extended periods of 
time -- and at seven months and counting, UNOMIG's ongoing 
technical extensions are therefore a historical achievement. 
Everyone also agreed that even a technical rollover text 
 
TBILISI 00001078  003 OF 003 
 
 
would require at least a reference to UNSC Resolution 1808, 
as the previous two resolutions have had, but it was not 
clear that the Russians would accept such a reference. 
 
¶12. (C) A/S Gordon suggested that, if the UN mission in 
Georgia does close, the international community might need to 
get creative about maintaining its attention to the 
situation.  He proposed that the partners consider making a 
coordinated effort to raise Georgia in the UNSC every year 
anyway, even if a mission is lacking, as a way to keep the 
conflicts on the world's front burner.  EUMM Head Haber 
agreed with this approach, saying that the EU will do so 
anyway in its periodic reviews of the EUMM.  Verbeke 
cautioned that adding a new item every year to the UNSC 
agenda was not so easy, but Ambassador Tefft thought that the 
Georgians themselves would find a way to keep everyone's 
attention. 
 
¶13. (U) A/S Gordon did not have the opportunity to review 
this telegram prior to his departure. 
TEFFT