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OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #1073/01 1620921
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 110921Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1706
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0238
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4856

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001073 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2019 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KBTS UNSC UNOMIG RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: FM VASHADZE DISCUSSES UNOMIG WITH A/S 
GORDON 
 
REF: A. STATE 59890 
     ¶B. USUN 583 
     ¶C. TBILISI 984 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  In a June 10 meeting focused almost 
exclusively on the UN negotiations, Georgian Foreign Minister 
Grigol Vashadze made clear that Georgia would stick to its 
redlines, even if it meant ultimately killing a UN mission in 
Georgia.  EUR Assistant Secretary Philip Gordon pushed back 
hard, challenging Vashadze to consider what the loss of a UN 
mission would actually mean; Vashadze made clear that Georgia 
had considered that issue very carefully, and it believed 
that the limited impact UN has on the ground, which Russia 
undermines anyway, is not worth any erosion in the 
international community's recognition of Georgia's 
territorial integrity.  Gordon sketched out the best mandate 
possible in the current environment, and Vashadze showed 
little willingness to accept even that.  Recognizing that the 
negotiations are at an impasse, Vashadze proposed a technical 
rollover as a way to put the burden squarely on the Russians 
either to accept a continuation or to be the ones to kill the 
mission.   Gordon said that the worst possible outcome would 
be for Georgia and the U.S. to end up in different places. 
End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) A/S Gordon, accompanied by the Ambassador, began the 
UNOMIG discussion by saying that the worst possible outcome 
would be for Georgia and the U.S. to end up at different 
places in the negotiations.  He therefore wanted to discuss 
details with Vashadze in order to have a clear idea of what 
might be possible.  He noted that right now, the process 
seems to be an impasse, with both Russia and Georgia laying 
down demands that seem to irreconcilable.  He encouraged 
Vashadze to be as flexible as possible, because it looks 
extremely unlikely that a resolution and mandate that respect 
Georgia's stated redlines can be reached.  In particular, he 
said a direct reference to Georgia's territorial integrity 
would not pass (it might be possible to include an indirect 
reference via UNSCR 1808, although even that was unsure); a 
name including Georgia would not pass; and no operative 
paragraph based on the Sarkozy agreements is likely to pass. 
 
¶3. (C) FM Vashadze made clear that Georgia is prepared to 
kill a mandate that it believes undermines Georgia's 
territorial integrity, rather than compromise that 
fundamental principle for the sake of a continued UN presence 
in Abkhazia.  A/S Gordon pushed hard on this, asking in 
several different ways whether the Georgians had considered 
the impact on the ground of the loss of a UN mission. 
Vashadze responded that the Georgians had been discussing 
this intensively since January (just before the previous 
"technical rollover plus" was passed), and that yes, the 
government was well aware of what this position meant.  The 
limited security protections on the ground were not worth the 
international legal concessions Georgia would have to make. 
He noted that the current UN mission is not doing much to 
protect the security of Abkhazia or its population, and a new 
mission would not either.  The Russians are already violating 
the existing mandate, and they would violate a new mandate 
beginning on day one.  A/S Gordon noted that at least there 
would be a mandate, the violations of which could be 
recorded; Vashadze countered that there is a Sarkozy-brokered 
Qrecorded; Vashadze countered that there is a Sarkozy-brokered 
ceasefire agreement, the violations of which are being 
recorded -- but without having any impact on Russian 
behavior.  Deputy FM Giga Bokeria noted that a mission with 
executive police, and a fully demilitarized zone, would be 
far more likely to make a real difference in the lives of the 
local population, and the Georgians would have to think 
carefully about such a proposal -- but that is notwhat is on 
the table. 
 
¶4. (C) Vashadze also pointed out that the EU Monitoring 
Mission (EUMM) will still be in place.  A/S Gordon replied 
that we have heard that the Europeans cannot afford to leave 
their monitors all by themselves without a UN mission in 
place; Vashadze said the Georgians were hearing different 
things from the Europeans.  In fact the Estonian FM had told 
him just the day before that the EUMM would stay no matter 
what happened with UNOMIG, and they had received other such 
messages from elsewhere.  Vashadze and Bokeria both suggested 
that the Europeans may be making such statements in order to 
encourage the U.S. and Georgia to be more flexible.  Vashadze 
also noted that compromising on territorial integrity in the 
mandate would open the government to intense criticism within 
Georgia, criticism that Bokeria said would be quite valid, 
because the government would not have done its duty to 
 
TBILISI 00001073  002 OF 003 
 
 
protect the country.  Both noted that virtually everyone 
associated with the 1994 Moscow Agreement, which enabled 
Russia to begin this process of undermining Georgia's 
territorial integrity, ended up an internal political outcast. 
 
¶5. (C) Early in the meeting, Vashadze sketched out a 
compromise deal the Georgians could live with: reference to 
UNSCR 1808 and all previous resolutions; a name with Georgia; 
and clear basis in the Sarkozy agreements.  Absent these 
elements, Vashadze said Georgia could not accept a mandate. 
After considerable discussion, the Assistant Secretary 
sketched out what he thought would the best deal possible 
right now (although making clear that he could not guarantee 
even these points): a reference to UNSCR 1808; a reference to 
the Sarkozy agreements in the preambular language and in the 
call for a UNSYG report on their implementation; but no 
reference to Georgia in the name.  He then asked if the 
Georgians could live with such a resolution/mandate. 
Vashadze did not quite say no, but he said it would be very 
difficult.  He and Bokeria both explained that giving up 
Georgia in the name would be a huge step backward for Georgia 
and a huge victory for Russia in its quest to erode Georgia's 
territorial integrity.  Although the Georgians found the 
reference to 1808 (versus an explicit reference to 
territorial integrity) acceptable in the previous technical 
rollover resolution, they would find it harder to accept in a 
resolution establishing a whole new mission; again, it would 
be a huge step backward for them and a huge victory for the 
Russians, especially if at the same time Georgia did not 
appear in the name. 
 
¶6. (C) Vashadze recognized that it is unlikely that language 
acceptable to both Russia and Georgia could be found at this 
point.  He therefore proposed a technical rollover.  He said 
that Georgia was prepared to go it alone, killing an 
unacceptable mandate even if the U.S. decided it could not 
afford to jeopardize an improved relationship with Russia and 
therefore supported a compromise resolution.  However, he 
said that if the U.S., and ideally the Europeans, were 
willing to stand with Georgia and propose a technical 
rollover, then Russia would find itself in the position of 
either going along or being the one to kill a second 
international mission within a few months.  He predicted that 
Russia will panic if the U.S. hangs tough and presents Russia 
with that choice.  If a technical rollover passes, Vashadze 
noted that we will have retained the name of UNOMIG, the 
presence of a UN mission (which not only protects security 
but reminds the world there is an ongoing conflict), and 
Georgia's claim to territorial integrity, while avoiding 
legitimizing Russia's "new reality." 
 
¶7. (C) A/S Gordon did not commit to taking Vashadze's 
suggestion and pursuing a technical rollover.  He did repeat 
his statement that the worst possible case would be for the 
U.S. and Georgia to end up at different places, because in 
that scenario, first, the U.S. would appear unwilling to 
stand up to Russia and Georgia would be blamed; and second, 
there would be no UN mission.  He also said that ultimately, 
the Georgians must be the ones to judge what is best for 
their country.  Finally, if the mission is not renewed, he 
said we are better off if Russia is the one blamed.  Vashadze 
Qsaid we are better off if Russia is the one blamed.  Vashadze 
provided the draft text of a technical rollover resolution, 
which he proposed could serve as a proposal to present to the 
Russians, possibly even directly from the U.S. (see paragraph 
8).  A/S Gordon noted that the Russians might not even accept 
the technical rollover language; Vashadze repeated that at 
least the Russians would then be the ones to kill the UN 
mission.  Vashadze said that other than a technical rollover, 
he saw two other possibilities: kill the mission, or table 
the German draft (an option he thought the Europeans would be 
unlikely to pursue). 
 
GEORGIAN DRAFT TEXT OF TECHNICAL ROLLOVER 
 
¶8. (SBU) Vashadze provided the following draft text. 
 
(Begin text.) 
 
The Security Council 
 
Recalling all its previous resolutions on Georgia, including 
resolutions 1808 of 15 April 2008 (S/RES/1808), 1839 of 9 
October 2008 (S/RES/1839) and 1866 or 13 February 2009 
(S/RES/1866), 
 
Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 18 May 
2009 (S/RES/254), 
 
 
TBILISI 00001073  003 OF 003 
 
 
1) Decides to extend the mandate of the UN mission for a new 
period terminating on 25 September 2009; 
 
2) Requests the Secretary-General to further elaborate the 
recommendations concerning the security regime on the ground 
and future activities of the UN mission by September 1, 2009, 
taking into account future deliberations at the Geneva 
Discussions of July 1, 2009 and afterwards; 
 
3) Decides to temporarily leave in force the security regime 
set forth in the resolution 1866 of 13 February 2009 
(S/RES/1866); 
 
4) Decides to remain actively seized of this matter. 
 
(End text.) 
 
¶9. (U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Gordon. 
TEFFT