O P 180322Z JUN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 
INFO USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 062952 
 
 
GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/17/2019 
TAGS: PARM MNUC PREL SIPDIS
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD): GUIDANCE FOR 
THE BALANCE OF THE 2009 SESSION 
 
REF: A) STATE 48065; B) GENEVA 401; C) GENEVA 425 
 
 
1.(U) CLASSIFIED BY ISN/MNSA OFFICE DIRECTOR MARGUERITA 
RAGSDALE, E.O. 12958, REASONS 1.5 B AND D 
 
¶2.  (U) The CD Delegation should draw on the following 
for the balance of the 2009 CD session. 
 
Objectives 
------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Now that the CD has adopted its 2009 program 
of work (Ref B), the U.S. goal is to ensure that work in 
2009 adequately sets the stage for a smooth resumption 
of the CD's activities when the 2010 session begins next 
January.  Detailed, substantive negotiations on a 
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), the highest U.S. 
priority in the CD, are expected to be possible at that 
time.  The U.S. does not want to see a repeat of the 
1998-99 experience, in which FMCT negotiations began at 
the end of the 1998 session, only to founder at the 
beginning of the 1999 session. 
 
¶4.  (C) Since the Delegation has reported that the 
consensus behind the CD's program of work remains 
fragile, it will be important to begin substantive work 
on all aspects of the CD's agenda as soon as possible in 
¶2009.  This will establish as solid a track record on 
FMCT negotiations as possible, and help demonstrate that 
the program adopted in CD/1863 is working and deserves 
to be renewed in 2010.  The CD's annual report to the 
UNGA should document this substantive work.  The goal is 
to establish that the CD is firmly back at work, and 
deter potential trouble makers from trying to derail the 
CD when the 2010 session begins.  To this end, the 
Delegation should avoid establishing procedural or 
substantive red-lines in response to the proposals of 
others, if those proposals are consistent with CD/1863. 
For proposals pushing the envelope, the Delegation 
should point out that the U.S. is still developing its 
positions on various issues and seek instructions from 
Washington. 
 
Issues 
------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Following are points on selected issues on which 
the U.S. Delegation may draw on as the CD organizes 
itself.  Once substantive work begins, Washington will 
provide as necessary statements and talking points on 
the range of issues on the CD's program of work. 
 
-- Chairs of Working Groups:  Chairs should be capable 
individuals who can bring the necessary competence and 
diplomatic skills to the groups which they are selected 
to lead.  As a general rule, each prospective chair also 
should be assessed on that government's track record in 
the specific subject area of the working group in 
question.  The United States considers countries under 
sanctions, such as the DPRK or Iran, to be politically 
disqualified; otherwise, in principle no country should 
be arbitrarily excluded from providing a qualified 
chair.  In that regard, there should be no express or 
tacit prohibition on any NATO member presiding over any 
CD body for any given issue.  Yearly rotation of chairs 
is acceptable.  The geographic allotment of CD chairs, 
though not the preferred norm for the U.S., nonetheless 
will be acceptable if there is a broad consensus for 
such an arrangement, and opposition might cause 
difficulty from among key parties. 
 
-- Rollover:  The CD must formally re-establish its work 
program by consensus each year.  However, in order to 
maintain momentum, given the limited time left in the 
2009 session, USDEL should seek a CD report that 
includes a recommendation that the term of the chairs 
selected in 2009 be continued during 2010.  The report 
also should recommend early action by the CD in 2010 to 
renew the work program in CD/1863 and resume substantive 
work.  In pursuit of these options,  USDEL should keep 
Washington apprised of developments, in particular, any 
sense that pursuing these outcomes jeopardizes an early 
resumption of substantive work in the CD next year. 
Further, the Delegation should explore with like-minded 
states opportunities to hold a ceremonial start to FMCT 
negotiations in 2009.  While not a requirement for the 
USG, such a start would help create facts on the ground 
and discourage states from blocking consensus on the 
program of work in January. 
 
-- Procedural issues:  As the only true negotiation on 
the work program, FMCT logically should be allocated 
most of the meeting time, and likely will require the 
establishment of a number of sub-groups.  However, for 
certain countries other CD agenda items remain 
priorities and they will insist on a certain amount of 
time to discuss those issues.  We assume that 
substantive work should not begin until January, thus 
giving the USG time to work out positions on the 
different issues.  However, the Delegation may be 
flexible on this issue, as long as the intent remains to 
discuss, rather than negotiate on, non-FMCT agenda 
items.  USDEL should advocate the recent practice of 
dedicated, specified sessions to deal with those issues, 
but should argue against the establishment of non-FMCT 
subgroups, as such action would give working groups with 
non-negotiating mandates equivalent status to the FMCT 
working group. 
 
-- P-5 Outreach:  It has been proposed that the P-5 pre- 
negotiate a common message for the broader community on 
the FMCT.  Washington believes that developing a common 
P-5 concept covering broad FMCT concepts such as the 
overall goals of the Treaty, how it should be 
characterized (as nonproliferation, disarmament, or a 
combination), etc. has merit.  The P-5 should not, 
however, try to take common positions on specific 
elements that will be the subject of the negotiations 
(scope, verification, stocks, entry into force, etc). 
The Delegation may participate in P-5 efforts to develop 
a common message for use with key states within the CD, 
and with a broader audience in contexts such as the 
margins of the UNGA First Committee, but the delegation 
should keep expectations low on such a statement, given 
China's possible reluctance to agree to a strong text. 
The texts of such messages may be agreed ad ref to 
capitals. 
 
 
CLINTON