VZCZCXRO5616
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #9827/01 1611859
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 101836Z JUN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4726
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 5445
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 7764

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 059827 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: LY PARM PREL CWC OPCW
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC):  TRANSPARENCY 
ON LIBYAN RABTA FACILITY CONVERSION AND DESTRUCTION 
FACILITY CONSTRUCTION 
 
REF: A. 2009 THE HAGUE 000295 (MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS 
        OF THE 56TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION) 
     ¶B. 2007 THE HAGUE 001851 (WRAP-UP FOR THE 50TH 
        EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION) 
     ¶C. 2008 STATE 058476 (CONVERSION OF THE RABTA CWPF) 
     ¶D. 2008 TRIPOLI 000662 (JULY 28-30 RABTA PRODUCTION 
        SITEVISIT) 
     ¶E. 2009 STATE 038618 (GUIDANCE FOR THE 56TH 
        EXECUTIVECOUNCIL SESSION) 
     ¶F. 2009 THE HAGUE 000296 (EC-56 DONORS MEETING AND 
        DESTRUCTION INFORMALS) 
     ¶G. 2009 THE HAGUE 001021 (MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS 
        OF CSP-13) 
     ¶H. 2009 THE HAGUE 000143 (EC-55 DESTRUCTION 
        INFORMALS) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request for the U.S. Delegation in 
The Hague and for Embassy Tripoli; see paragraphs 9 through 
¶11. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (U) There are two major tasks under the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) that Libya has yet to complete: conversion 
of the former Rabta Chemical Weapons Production Facility 
(CWPF) for the production of pharmaceuticals, and destruction 
of the remaining stockpile of declared chemical weapons 
(approximately 25 MT of mustard agent and 860 MT of chemical 
agent precursor chemicals).  Libya,s transparency on the 
status of both tasks has been an issue for some time.  This 
cable addresses specific actions the United States should 
take to address these transparency issues as follow-up to 
meetings with the Libyan delegation during the April 2009 
56th Session of the CWC,s Executive Council (EC) (Ref. A). 
 
-- Rabta Conversion -- 
 
¶3.  (U) The conversion of former Rabta CWPF to the production 
of pharmaceuticals and the combined plan for its conversion 
and verification were approved in 2004.  At that time the 
protective sandbag-covered wall that partially surrounds the 
facility was identified as a specialized structure and was 
scheduled for removal in the approved plan.  A request to 
retain the wall was first tabled by Libya during the 
destruction informals and with U.S. and UK delegations on the 
margins of the 50th EC Session in September 2007 (Ref. B). 
Since then Libya has approached U.S., UK, and Technical 
Secretariat representatives requesting support for a 
correction to the approved Rabta conversion plan allowing for 
retention of the sandbag wall in order to provide protection 
for the operation of the pharmaceutical facility and exposed 
equipment from the extreme desert environment. 
 
¶4.  (U) In 2008 the United States proposed transparency 
measures and requested Libyan commitment to continue 
transparency with the EC before the United States could 
support retaining the wall (Ref. C).  These transparency 
measures included a U.S. request that Libya provide more 
detailed information via a paper to the EC at the earliest 
possible date.  Libya has yet to provide the paper, as such, 
but has addressed the details to varying degrees as part of 
its subsequent presentations during EC destruction informals. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In 2008 U.S. and UK delegations visited the Rabta 
facility to observe the characteristics of the sandbag wall 
and the progress made in the conversion (Ref. D).  Based on 
the U.S. delegation,s 2008 visit to the Rabta facility, we 
agree that the Libyan assertion of the protective 
characteristics of the sandbag wall against sandstorms, etc., 
is legitimate.  Further, we agree that the retention of the 
sandbag wall does not pose a threat to the object and purpose 
of the Convention (Ref. E). 
 
¶6.  (SBU) U.S. and UK delegations reengaged the Libyan 
representatives during the April 2009 Session of the EC in an 
attempt to resolve this open issue and improve the quality of 
information provided to the EC on the status of the 
conversion (Ref. A).  U.S. and UK reps reiterated that both 
States Parties would support a correction to the combined 
plan that would allow retention of the wall provided that 
Libya: provides more detailed presentations at the EC 
 
STATE 00059827  002 OF 004 
 
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC):  TRANSPARENCY 
ON LIBYAN RABTA FACILITY CONVERSION AND DESTRUCTION 
FACILITY CONSTRUCTI 
destruction informals; provides sound justification for 
making the correction; and permits the U.S. and the UK to 
review the correction before submitting it to the Technical 
Secretariat. The Libyan delegation reacted positively to this 
proposal and to suggestions for expanding its interactions 
with other States Parties for additional transparency and 
support of its proposed plan correction. 
 
-- CW Destruction -- 
 
¶7.  (U) The deadline established by the CWC Conference of the 
States Parties for destruction of Libya,s mustard stockpile 
is December 31, 2010.  Destruction of the remaining inventory 
of precursor chemicals is to be completed no later than 
December 31, 2011.  Libya is obligated to report to the 
Council on a 90-day cycle on its destruction activities and 
schedule.  Libya continues to meet this reporting obligation 
through submission of the obligatory reports and 
presentations during the destruction informals, which have 
included some information on the status of destruction 
facility construction. 
 
¶8.  (U) Libya,s plan is for its CW destruction facility to 
be located on two sites; the first is for repackaging of 
leaking containers within the current, remote storage site; 
and the second is the primary destruction facility (the Rabta 
Toxic Chemicals Destruction Facility (Rabta CWDF), where 
destruction will take place), to be located in the general 
vicinity of the Rabta plant undergoing conversion.  Libya,s 
recent reporting to the Council has focused on the 
repackaging operations, and has not included much information 
on the primary destruction facility, (e.g., Ref. F). 
December 2008 was the last time Libya provided specific 
information on the Rabta CWDF site (Ref. G).  This lack of 
transparency on the status of the destruction preparation is 
of increasing concern, and is being addressed, along with the 
Rabta conversion sandbag wall issue, through a non-paper. 
 
-------------- 
ACTION REQUEST 
-------------- 
 
¶9.  (U)  The Department requests that U.S. Delegation to the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 
and Embassy Tripoli, respectively, deliver the non-paper in 
paragraph 11 to the appropriate Libyan representatives in The 
Hague and in Tripoli, making clear that the non-paper is 
being delivered in both places, and report the response. Both 
the U.S.  Delegation to the OPCW and Embassy Tripoli should 
provide an info copy of the non-paper to their UK contacts 
and inform them of the dual delivery in The Hague and Tripoli. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) When delivering the non-paper, both the Delegation 
to the OPCW and Embassy Tripoli should emphasize the 
following strategic themes: 
 
- The United States appreciates Libyan efforts to provide the 
Executive Council with current information on the status of 
the Rabta conversion and preparations for CW destruction. 
 
- There are two related areas where there is need for greater 
transparency: 
-- resolution of the outstanding issue on retention of the 
sandbag wall as a part of the Rabta conversion; and 
-- the status of Libya,s preparation for CW destruction at 
the Rabta Toxic Chemicals Destruction Facility. 
 
- Regarding retention of the sandbag wall: 
-- the United States agrees with the protective effect of the 
sandbag wall, and that its retention does not pose a threat 
to the object and purpose of the Convention; 
-- the United States is prepared to support Executive Council 
approval of retaining the sandbag wall if Libya commits to 
certain transparency measures; and 
-- we suggest that a working session be held in The Hague 
immediately preceding to the 57th Session of the Executive 
Council (EC-57) to review all aspects Libya's destruction 
informals presentation for the Session (e.g., Rabta 
conversion and destruction facility construction status) and, 
if available, to review a draft conversion plan correction 
request to allow the sandbag wall,s reteTsui-Ling Yus, as 
well as other States Parties, remains keenly interested in 
the progress made toward destruction of Libya,s CW 
stockpile; 
-- since CSP-13 (December 2008), there has been little 
information provided to the EC on the status of construction 
at the Rabta Toxic Chemicals Destruction Facility or the 
fabrication of destruction equipment being conducted 
elsewhere; and 
 
STATE 00059827  003 OF 004 
 
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC):  TRANSPARENCY 
ON LIBYAN RABTA FACILITY CONVERSION AND DESTRUCTION 
FACILITY CONSTRUCTI 
-- thus, the United States requests that Libya provide States 
Parties with a clear update on its preparations for CW 
destruction and an update on its Rabta CWDF planning and 
construction status at each EC Session, including projected 
start-up dates during the informals prior to EC-57. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Text of Non-Paper: Transparency on the Status of 
Libya,s Rabta Conversion and Preparations for Completing 
Chemical Weapons Destruction 
 
The United States appreciates Libya,s continued effort to 
provide the Executive Council (EC) with current information 
on the status of the Rabta conversion and preparations for CW 
destruction. 
 
There are two related areas, however, where the United States 
sees a need for greater transparency, and would like to 
address these through this non-paper: 
-- resolution of the outstanding issue on retention of the 
sandbag wall as a part of the Rabta conversion; and 
-- the status of Libya,s preparation for CW destruction at 
the Rabta Toxic Chemicals Destruction Facility. 
 
-- Retention of the Sandbag Wall -- 
 
Based on the U.S. delegation,s 2008 visit to the Rabta 
facility to observe the progress made in its conversion and 
the characteristics of the sandbag wall, the United States 
agrees that Libya,s assertion of the protective 
characteristics of the wall against sandstorms, etc., is 
well-founded.  Further, the United States agrees that the 
retention of the sandbag wall does not pose a clear threat to 
the object and purpose of the Convention. 
 
For these reasons, the United States is prepared to support 
EC approval of a correction to the conversion plan allowing 
retention of the sandbag wall provided that the Government of 
Libya commits to the following: 
 
- that a clear, complete, and legally sound justification of 
the requested revision of the approved plan be included as 
part of the correction request; 
 
- that the United States and the UK are provided an 
opportunity to review and concur in the content of the draft 
correction request before it is submitted to the EC for 
consideration; and 
 
- that Libya commit to provide the EC at each session, 
beginning with the 57th Session of the EC (EC-57) and until 
the Rabta conversion is complete, with a presentation at the 
informals in at least as much detail as its EC-53 
presentation and meeting all four of the criteria defined by 
our May 2008 non-paper, which is attached for reference. 
 
The United States suggests that a working session be held in 
The Hague immediately preceding EC-57 (e.g., July 9 and 10, 
2009) to review all aspects of Libya's destruction informals 
presentation for the Session (e.g., Rabta conversion and 
destruction facility construction status) and, if available, 
to review a draft conversion plan correction request to allow 
the sandbag wall,s retention. 
 
-- Progress on the Rabta Toxic Chemicals Destruction 
Facility-- 
 
The United States remains keenly interested in Libya,s 
progress toward destruction of its CW stockpile. 
 
Since the December 2008 Conference of States Parties 
(CSP-13), when Dr. Hesnawy discussed the Libyan CW 
destruction planning with the U.S. Delegation, there has been 
little information provided on the status of infrastructure 
construction at the Rabta Toxic Chemical Destruction Facility 
or the equipment being produced by the Italian firm SIPSA. 
 
During the informal consultations prior to EC-55 in February 
2009, the Libyan delegation promised an update on CW 
destruction facility progress at the informals prior to 
EC-56.  That update did not occur. 
 
The United States, therefore, requests that Libya provide a 
detailed update on its Rabta Toxic Chemicals Destruction 
Facility planning and construction status, and projected 
start-up dates during the informals prior to EC-57. 
 
-- General Considerations -- 
 
To be most effective, future Libyan presentations, both 
 
STATE 00059827  004 OF 004 
 
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC):  TRANSPARENCY 
ON LIBYAN RABTA FACILITY CONVERSION AND DESTRUCTION 
FACILITY CONSTRUCTI 
during the destruction informals and to the Council, should 
provide States Parties with sufficient detail to understand 
the progress that has been made toward completion of the 
Rabta conversion in December 2009, and construction of the 
Rabta Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility in time to meet 
established intermediate and final destruction deadlines, 
including: 
 
- a clear, updated picture of what has been accomplished 
relative to the schedules already provided to the Council; 
 
- specific information on any changes or unanticipated delays 
in planned activities and their impact, if any, on meeting 
the conversion and destruction deadlines; 
 
- actions taken to overcome these problems; 
 
- a summary of progress in the physical conversion of Rabta 
with respect to changes in existing facilities, and the 
addition and installation of new equipment; and 
 
- a summary of progress made on Rabta Toxic Chemicals 
Destruction Facility infrastructure construction and the 
status of the equipment fabrication. 
 
We suggest that the Libyan delegation continue consultations 
with other interested delegations to clarify the need for 
retaining the sandbag wall and to secure support for the 
correction to the conversion plan. 
 
We also suggest that Libya provide representatives from key 
delegations on the EC and regional groups with an opportunity 
to visit the Rabta in order to see first hand the progress 
made on Rabta conversion and the need for retaining the 
sandbag wall, and the progress being made on construction of 
the Rabta Toxic Chemicals Destruction Facility. 
 
End text of non-paper. 
 
¶12.  (U) The point-of-contact for this action is Tom 
Ferguson, ISN/CB, (202-647-9650, fergusontl@state.sgov.gov). 
CLINTON