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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHYN #1170/01 1791323
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 281323Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2205
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0043
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0054
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0192
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1645
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

S E C R E T SANAA 001170 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP:AMACDONALD AND INR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2019 
TAGS: PGOV KDRG CASC PREL YM
SUBJECT: SALEH PRESSES FOR MEETING WITH OBAMA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (S/NF) On June 27, President Saleh urged the Ambassador to 
hurry preparations for a state visit to Washington, 
suggesting it would help remove obstacles impeding the 
transfer of Yemeni GTMO detainees to Saudi custody.  On 
internal issues, Saleh dismissed concern over unrest in 
Yemen'ssouthern governorates, and seemed confident of his 
government's ability to keep the Houthi conflict n the north 
tamped down.  In contrast to the ROY's public position, he 
conceded the likelihood tat al-Qaeda rather than Houthi 
rebels was behindthe recent abduction of aid workers in 
Sa'ada.  Ed Summary. 
 
Meeting with President Obama 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) President Salh reiterated to the Ambassador on 
June 27 his deire to visit Washington in order to meet with 
Prsident Obama.  The Ambassador noted that the consenus in 
Washington was that the appropriate time fr the presidents 
to meet would be once the transer of Yemeni detainees in 
Guantanamo to the Saud rehab program was underway.  "If you 
speed up peparations for my visit, we can speed up 
preparatons for the detainees' return," said Saleh.  Earlir 
in the meeting, Saleh reiterated his willingnes to have the 
Yemeni detainees placed in the Saui rehabilitation program 
but noted that Saudi ing Abdullah had expresses opposition 
to the idea.  He added that Prince Mohamed bin Naif and 
Minister of Interior HRH Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz support 
the plan, however, and will continue to work to persuade the 
King.  The Ambassador told the President that regardless of 
the state of play with th Saudis, the Obama Administration, 
and the Presient himself, was grateful for his willingness 
tohave the detainees transferred to the Saudi progra. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) Saleh then unveiled a new proposal that the 
returning detainees be housed in the fomer U.S. Embassy in 
the old city of Sana'a.  Thebuilding, which is now owned by 
tourism conglomeate Universal Group, is located in the heart 
of he capital and is being converted into a boutique otel. 
Saleh immediately picked up the phone and clled Alwan 
al-Shaibani, the Chairman of Universa Group, and asked how 
soon the renovation would e complete.  Saleh suggested that 
the Ambassadortour the building as soon as possible. 
(Comment: It seems unlikely that Saleh was entirely serious 
about the idea.  The location, in the heart of a ongested 
area, would be difficult to secure.  Th suggestion is 
probably more demonstrative of th President's flamboyance 
than any real effort tofind a solution to the problem of 
locating a secue facility for the returning detainees.  End 
Comment.) 
 
No Danger in the South 
---------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) The Ambassador then asked for the President's 
assessment of recent developments in Yemen, noting concern at 
senior levels of the USG over the multiple challenges facing 
the regime.  Saleh said that there was "no danger" in the 
south, merely the same voices expressing the same discontent 
from 1994.  Saleh asserted that there is an ongoing dialogue 
with the southerners and that they will be allowed to express 
their views.  He clarified, however, that the ROYG would not 
tolerate violence, sabotage or language that is "against 
unity."   Saleh asserted that most of the Yemeni citizens in 
the south support unity and that those who did not had only 
"a few websites, Al Jazeera and some telephones."  The 
Ambassador pointed out the recent events in Tehran have shown 
a disenfranchised population with telephones and the internet 
can have a profound impact. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) Saleh asserted that the Southern Movement had 
staged a demonstration and killed people in order to blame 
their deaths on the ROYG.  He also accused daily newspaper 
al-Ayyam of "spreading a culture of hatred."  He added that 
by preventing al-Ayyam from publishing, the ROYG had stopped 
"75 percent" of the unrest.  The Ambassador reminded Saleh of 
the USG's "great concern" about any steps that obstruct the 
independent media. 
 
Sa'ada 
------ 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) Saleh said the ROYG is committed to resolving the 
Houthi crisis without returning to war.  He asserted, 
however, that Abdulmalik al-Houthi, the leader of the 
rebellious movement, wants war.  He complained that Houthi 
rebels had killed two Yemeni soldiers and captured 24 others. 
 The 24 hostages were returned but not the construction 
equipment that they had with them, according to Saleh. 
(Note:  The return of the 24 military hostages was reported 
in Yemen's media.  End Note.) 
 
¶7.  (S/NF) On the issue of the kidnapped/murdered German, 
British and Korean aid workers, Saleh said there were two 
likely scenarios: first that it was a terrorist act committed 
by al-Qaeda and second, that is was committed by Houthis and 
was related to drug-smuggling activities.  The Ambassador 
noted that the al-Qaeda theory seemed most compelling.  Saleh 
responded by noting that he has directed ROYG security 
services to move against al-Qaeda leaders if the opportunity 
presents itself.  The Ambassador noted that Embassy elements 
are currently cooperating with the National Security Bureau 
on this effort.  Saleh asked that this cooperation 
accelerate, saying that the terrorists had received "orders 
from Afghanistan" to attack either Saleh's plane or his 
motorcade. 
 
Salah's Demeanor 
---------------- 
 
¶8.  (S/NF) While Saleh appeared slightly more wound up than 
usual, he did not/not appear particularly distracted or 
otherwise unable to focus on the issues at hand, as some 
reports lately have suggested.   The only behavior he 
displayed that appeared at all different was that his 
interventions were delivered in extended statements that made 
it difficult for his official interpreter to keep up. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (S/NF) Saleh made it clear once again that he is 
exceedingly eager to meet with President Obama.  It is likely 
that he believes the prestige of such a meeting would 
increase his political capital, allowing him to better handle 
the various crises that beset his country.  While this 
meeting might be appropriate in the foreseeable future, we do 
not/not believe the invitation should be extended as long as 
Saleh continues to temporize in the face of Yemen's multiple 
crises.  End Comment. 
SECHE