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DE RUEHMO #1508 1601440
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091440Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3717
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 2794
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 4272
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001508 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2019 
TAGS: PREL UNSC PGOV NK RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA SUPPORTS DRPK UNSCR TEXT, SEEKS CLARITY ON 
ENFORCEMENT ROE'S 
 
REF: STATE 59864 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle; reasons 1.4(b/d). 
 
¶1. (C) Russian DFM Aleksandr Borodavkin called in Ambassador 
Beyrle late June 8 (Moscow time) to discuss the current draft 
UNSCR under consideration in New York condemning North Korea 
for its recent nuclear tests and missile launches. 
Borodavkin opened by noting that, in principle, Russia is 
ready to support a strong resolution.  Indeed, he voiced 
support for the current draft text, while noting that China 
continues to express some concerns with certain language. 
 
¶2. (C) However, Borodavkin continued, the possibility that 
force might be used (in particular, U.S. naval force) to 
interdict ships suspected of transporting materiel prohibited 
under terms of the resolution has given Moscow pause.  Before 
Russia agrees join consensus on the present text, or one 
similar to it, the GOR wanted to be certain that all UNSC 
members, especially the P-5, understand the potential 
consequences of that action.  Furthermore, the GOR would 
appreciate clarification from the U.S. on the "rules of 
engagement" it would apply to enforce the resolution.  For 
example, if ships steaming for North Korea refuse to heed the 
call of U.S. naval vessels to divert to ports other than in 
North Korea for inspection, under what conditions would force 
would be employed?  What sort of consultation with higher 
authorities would take place?  Borodavkin explained that the 
GOR felt compelled to ask these questions in light of the 
DPRK's unpredictable behavior, threats to use force itself 
and references to its mutual military assistance agreements 
with the PRC. 
 
¶3. (C) Borodavkin emphasized repeatedly that the Chinese, 
"better than the rest of us," understand the North Koreans. 
He noted that Russia wanted to be completely certain that the 
Chinese were being consulted not just on the text, but on the 
consequences of the resolution, especially if it should 
result in the use of force.  He understood this to be an 
"abstract discussion and an abstract request," that some 
might think to be of a technical nature, but for Moscow it 
represents real concern over how the situation might evolve. 
Beyrle assured Borodavkin that we are consulting with the 
Chinese intensively, but urged him to engage with us based on 
Russia's view of its own interests, not possible Chinese 
objections. Borodavkin emphasized that Russia shares the 
objective of a North Korea without nuclear weapons.  That 
said, North Korea has already twice reneged on its 
commitments.  Ambassador Beyrle agreed, and noted that, at 
this point, it would be extremely difficult to rebuild trust, 
and thus a suggestion in the resolution that foresaw DPRK's 
return to the NPT was a non-starter. 
 
¶4. (C) Finally, Borodavkin wanted to make clear that the 
language in the draft resolution, its possible adoption and 
implementation cannot serve - and will not be acknowledged by 
Russia - as a precedent for Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI) discussions or action.  The circumstances the 
international community now faces with regard to North Korea 
are unique and of a special nature that a strong response is 
appropriate.  Borodavkin handed over a non-paper (in Russian) 
concerning the resolution and Russia's request for certain 
assurances concerning possible use of force.  We have faxed 
that to EUR/RUS. 
 
¶5. (C) Comment: Borodavkin emphasized the desire of Moscow to 
cooperate to convey a strong message to North Korea 
concerning its recent nuclear and missile tests.  Concerns 
that North Korea may escalate tensions, or perhaps even 
employ force itself, seem to be motivating Russian caution, 
not confrontation, on adopting the draft resolution. 
Borodavkin called Ambassador Beyrle mid-morning June 9 to 
reinforce Moscow's strong interest in receiving, ASAP, more 
detail on ROE's governing high-seas interdiction by U.S. 
vessels.  Additional clarity from us on this question will 
likely move Russia closer to accepting the language in the 
existing draft SCR.  End Comment. 
BEYRLE