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Viewing cable 09LAPAZ867, BOLIVIA: NEIGHBOR RELATIONS NOT SO NEIGHBORLY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09LAPAZ867 2009-06-10 22:16 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy La Paz
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLP #0867/01 1612216
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 102216Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0988
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 9060
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 6442
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0416
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 7626
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4672
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0522
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 5008
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6319
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 7290
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 2054
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 1796
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000867 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR ENVR BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: NEIGHBOR RELATIONS NOT SO NEIGHBORLY 
 
REF: A. LIMA 810 
     B. LIMA 794 
 
Classified By: A/EcoPol Chief Joe Relk for reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Bolivian President Evo Morales and his 
ruling Movement Toward Socialism party (MAS) are enmeshed in 
diplomatic flaps with neighbors, including: a growing feud 
with Peru over asylum approvals for four former GOB ministers 
and allegations of GOB support for a June 5 Peruvian 
indigenous uprising in which two dozen police were killed; an 
illegal GOB police arrest in Paraguay; and GOB anger 
concerning Brazil's apparent decision to grant asylum to 118 
Bolivians fleeing GOB prosecution related to the September 
2008 Pando conflict.  Meanwhile, Chilean diplomatic sources 
affirm that while the GOB's relationship with Chile continues 
to improve, Chile will ultimately not grant what the GOB 
really wants: a corridor to the Pacific.  While Morales is 
known for fanning the flames of international disputes to his 
domestic political advantage, this time the disagreements do 
not appear to be playing to his benefit.  End summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Peru: Extraditions, Border Disputes, and Revolution 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2. (U) Relations between Bolivia and Peru's governments have 
been steadily declining for over a year.  Morales and 
Peruvian President Alan Garcia are engaged in a long-running 
tiff, marked by a June 2008 episode in which Morales called 
Garcia "fat" and "not very anti-imperialist."  Garcia replied 
by asking publicly why Morales "just doesn't shut up."  In a 
more recent March 26 outburst, President Morales accused 
Garcia of filing a claim at the International Court of 
Justice (IJC) regarding Peru's maritime border with Chile for 
"personal and partisan political gain," saying "perhaps he 
has become so fat that it has affected (his thinking)." 
While the GOP has stressed that the sole purpose of the IJC 
case is to remove a significant barrier to further economic 
integration with Chile, for the GOB the filing is an 
irritant, as it ignores Bolivia's desire to regain territory 
lost in the War of the Pacific and may delay in GOB 
negotiations with Chile to regain access to the Pacific. 
Regarding the case, Morales said that, "I have information 
that the Peruvian government knows that it is going to lose 
the demand...  They made the demand in order to punish 
Bolivia." 
 
3. (C) In a conversation with Poloff, diplomatic contacts at 
the Peruvian embassy denied Morales' accusations that the 
case was done to "punish Bolivia," but confirmed they did not 
expect a final decision by the IJC for up to five years.  One 
of the diplomats, who served in Chile for several years, 
opined that he could not imagine Chile ever giving Bolivia 
territorial access to the Pacific ocean. 
 
4. (C) Adding fuel to the fire, in early May four 
ex-ministers who served under former Bolivian President 
Gonzalo "Goni" Sanchez de Lozada fled to Peru and sought 
asylum, which the GOP granted.  (Note: The GOB is actively 
moving forward in a Bolivian Supreme Court case against Goni 
and several ex-ministers for the deaths of approximately 60 
people in October 2003.  End Note.)  Morales called Garcia 
"vulgar" for granting the asylum (even though the UN High 
Commission on Human Rights actually found the individuals had 
a well-founded fear of persecution in at least two of the 
cases) and called for the ex-ministers' immediate 
extradition.  GOB-aligned social groups in El Alto threatened 
to retaliate by expelling up to 10,000 Peruvian city 
residents, according to Peruvian community leader Jose Luis 
Quintana, but later "suspended" the decision.  Peruvian 
embassy sources noted that for all the GOB's extradition 
demands, the GOB has refused to extradite dozens of suspected 
Peruvian terrorists.  The contacts confirmed they did not 
believe the ex-ministers, much less Goni, could receive a 
fair trial in Bolivia. 
 
5. (U) In the latest conflict, President Morales on May 29 
delivered a letter to an indigenous congress in Puno (an area 
in southern Peru bordering on Bolivia), in which he said: 
"Our struggle does not end.  From resistance we are moving 
forward to rebellion, and from rebellion to revolution.  This 
is the time for the second and definitive independence."  The 
GOP interpreted the text as a call for indigenous peoples to 
rebel against the Garcia government, especially as the 
comments came during a two-month strike by thousands of 
indigenous protesters in northern Peru opposed to GOP 
measures related to the proposed U.S. - Peru Free Trade 
Agreement.  A GOB spokesman said that Morales could not be 
held responsible, because the letter was not addressed 
specifically to indigenous Peruvians but to Congress members. 
 However, the organizer of the Congress had earlier announced 
that the purpose of the congress was to "elect a Peruvian Evo 
Morales." 
 
6. (C) On June 5, the strike erupted into violence when 
approximately 500 indigenous strikers killed up to two dozen 
police officers, executing many of them after they had 
surrendered (reftel A).  The GOP blamed Morales for inciting 
the violence, and Peruvian government contacts claimed the 
GOB supported the social groups involved in the violence 
(reftel B).  GOB spokespersons heatedly denied any 
connection.  Media reports on June 9 stated that seven 
suspected strike participants were detained by Peruvian 
police in Puno with 9,500 USD.  The men were reportedly 
unable to explain how they had come to possess the relatively 
large sum of money. 
 
7. (U) On June 10, news sources quoted Peruvian Ambassador 
Hugo de Zela Hurtado as saying that Peru would likely make a 
formal statement to the Organization of American States and 
the UN decrying Morales' interference in internal Peruvian 
affairs.  Other news sources suggested Peru could withdraw 
their Ambassador in Bolivia as a mark of protest.  News 
sources also reported that approximately 100 members of 
MAS-aligned social groups protested in front of the Peruvian 
embassy on June 9, with social leaders blaming the Peruvian 
government for the deaths of over 30 indigenous individuals. 
Campesino leader and Morales ally Isaac Avalos called 
President Garcia a "genocidal murderer." 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Brazil: Asylum for 118 Bolivians? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8. (U) Local media reported June 7 that Brazil's National 
Council for Refugees agreed to give asylum to 118 Bolivians 
allegedly involved in the September 11, 2008 conflict in 
Bolivia's Pando department (state) in which an estimated nine 
campesinos and two department workers died.  The Brazilian 
government has not officially confirmed this decision. 
Initial press coverage of the issue was spurred by the June 5 
statements made by Brazilian Minister of Justice, Taso Genro, 
who defended the granting of refugee status to the Pandinos 
based on the argument that "these are common people, workers, 
businessmen.  It does not matter to us whether they are 
fleeing from conflicts from the (political) left or the 
right."  It is not clear whether or to what degree the 
Brazilian Council is working with the UN High Commission on 
Human Rights (UNHCR) in offering the asylum.  Bolivian Vice 
President Alvaro Garcia Linera on June 8 called upon the 
Brazilian government to act within the framework of justice 
and of international treaties concerning refugees.  He said 
the GOB would deliver "pertinent information" about the case 
in hopes that the Brazilian government would not grant 
asylum.  MAS Congress Deputy Gustavo Torrico said "there has 
been an excessive abuse and trampling of the UNHCR's rules on 
granting asylum.  If the UNHCR does this act, they are 
protecting assassins, violators of human rights." 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Paraguay: Illegal Troop Incursions 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
9. (U) After President Morales called Paraguayan President 
Fernando Lugo June 4 to assure him that GOB police forces had 
not entered Paraguayan territory to make an arrest in a May 
16 robbery case, GOB Government Minister Alfredo Rada 
admitted June 9 that it appeared Bolivian police had in fact 
done so, and apparently with the cooperation of a Paraguayan 
military official.  Paraguayan Vice President Federico Franco 
had rejected the GOB's denials, saying: "I believe more in 
what (Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Benitez) told us.  He 
provided a detailed report after having been in the place... 
It is a very serious matter for two reasons.  First, the 
violation  of our territory and then the participation of one 
our army officials.  This is why we agreed with the 
Commander-in-Chief's decision to institute legal 
proceedings." 
 
10. (U) As part of an apology to the Paraguayan government, 
Rada explained that the Bolivian border police commander had 
not correctly reported where the arrest took place, and that 
he had been fired for doing so.  President Morales will 
discuss the incident further with President Lugo during an 
upcoming visit to Asuncion June 12. 
 
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Chile: No Access to the Pacific 
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11. (C) The Chilean Consul confirmed to PolOff that while 
relations had improved between the GOB and the Chilean 
government, GOB desires for a corridor to the sea would 
likely never be realized.  The Consul said Presidents Morales 
and Bachelet speak so regularly Chilean MFA officers call 
Morales her "phone buddy."  Economic and military exchanges 
are up, he continued, and even an official exchange of 
Ambassadors could be forthcoming. "We are practically an 
Embassy already, we will already have military, police, and 
press attaches this year; it is only a matter of time (until 
exchange of formal and full diplomatic missions)." 
 
12. (C) The Consul said during the first year of the Morales 
Administration bilateral relations were "difficult at a 
working level."  Chileans would offer what they felt were 
generous compromises to the Bolivians, only to have the 
Bolivians "demand everything," he said.  "You have to 
recognize that Evo Morales is not used to diplomatic 
negotiation, he is used to a much tougher form of 
negotiation" learned as a cocalero labor union leader.  "Once 
we understood how they operate, we realized that complete 
intransigence was always the starting point" regardless of 
the proposal.  When the Chileans adopted less reasonable 
opening positions and a more conciliatory tone, the Consul 
said they gained some respect with their Bolivian 
counterparts and "started making progress." 
 
13. (C) Although the Consul said the GOC "won't agree to 
divide Chile" in order to provide Bolivia access to the 
Pacific Ocean, he said establishing a Bolivian port enclave 
in Arica was "possible."  He discounted consideration of any 
other port location.  The Chileans, he asserted, would pursue 
a strategy of slowly rolling out agreements on less 
contentious issues (water rights/Silala River, border 
demining, economic engagement) in order to placate the 
Bolivians on the issue of regaining access to the Pacific. 
He said the Chileans would try to "make reasonable arguments" 
to the Bolivians in the meantime that it is not in their own 
best interests to regain lost territory "that they cannot 
manage."  He argued that if the Bolivians got what they 
wanted, a swath of territory linking them to the ocean, they 
"couldn't afford to build up or maintain" the transportation 
infrastructure needed to properly service a connection to a 
port.  He said the Bolivians would do better economically to 
accept a deal with the Chileans for port access, with the 
Chileans financing road and rail improvements.  He recognized 
the sea access issue had the potential to reverse bilateral 
progress, but hoped that visible benefits from improved trade 
relations would soften the Bolivian position over time. 
 
14.  (SBU) However, Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca 
appears to be running out of patience concerning sea access, 
stating June 4 that "the time for truth" on the matter with 
Chile has arrived.  Although he also recently highlighted 
good relations with Chile and said he was "satisfied " with 
efforts during the first three years of the Morales 
Administration to build trust, he added that the time for 
resolution of Bolivia's desire for sea access issue should be 
at hand and that "no foreign factors will hinder that desire." 
 
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Comment 
- - - - 
 
15. (C) President Morales has made a regular habit of 
inflaming relations with other countries to rally his 
domestic political support, whether by "playing the victim" 
or cultivating a posture of "Bolivia vs. the world."  This 
time, however, the political costs seem to have outweighed 
any benefits.  While the GOB's relationship with Peru has 
been deteriorating for some time, "friendlier" countries such 
as Brazil and Paraguay took a surprisingly firm stand against 
the GOB.  Additionally, although relations with Chile have 
significantly improved, it seems ill-disposed to grant 
Morales' dream of regaining access to the sea.  If Bolivia 
seeks, with Venezuela, to export its socialist revolution to 
Peru, it may be advised to mend fences with its other 
neighbors first.  End Comment. 
URS