VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKU #0624/01 1751324
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241324Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3530
INFO RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 000624 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP, S/CT AVERILL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2019 
TAGS: PTER ENRG PREL PINS KCIP ECON KU
SUBJECT: KUWAITI VIEWS ON CRITICAL ENERGY MOU 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 541 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 32 
     ¶C. 08 STATE 126863 
 
Classified By: Economic Counselor Oliver B. John for reasons 1.4 (b & d 
). 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary and Key Points 
 
-- The NSB is happy with USG-GoK cooperation thus far and 
believes that it is in both countries' best interest to 
continue it. 
 
-- The NSB would be happy to sign the amended MOU. 
 
-- Kuwait is willing to cover expenses for USG personnel 
visiting Kuwait under the CEIP MOU. 
 
-- Kuwait is not willing to pay salaries for U.S. officials. 
The NSB "can't sell that." 
 
¶2. (C) Econcouns met with Kuwait National Security Bureau 
(NSB) Vice President Shaykh Thamer Ali Sabah Al-Salem Al 
Sabah and his team on June 22 to discuss GoK changes to the 
draft Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection MOU.  Shaykh 
Thamer stated that he welcomed the cooperation with the USG, 
adding that it served the interest of both nations.  He said 
that Kuwait had already addressed many of the recommendations 
arising from the two visits of USG assessment teams. 
 
¶3. (C) Econcouns asked for clarification on Kuwait's change 
to section 8 of the draft MOU from "the State of Kuwait is to 
pay for all costs for services performed,(" to "each party 
shall bear all the expenses for services provided to it by 
the other party."  Shaykh Thamer replied that the GoK had 
been perfectly happy with bilateral cooperation, but wanted 
to be responsive to the USG's interest in having an MOU.  The 
subsequent inclusion of Section 8, which had not been in the 
original USG draft, had "raised eyebrows"  as had the 
additional language referring to section 572 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act and advance payment.  The GoK's substitute 
language, he said, meant that Kuwait would cover living 
expenses, transportation, etc. for USG visits to Kuwait and 
that the USG would provide reciprocal treatment to Kuwaiti 
visitors.  "I fully expect that most meetings will be in 
Kuwait," he added, "We are not looking at improving U.S. 
facilities' security."  (Note: as envisaged by Shaykh Thamer, 
this appeared to reflect the kind of reciprocal Qtality 
that the Kuwaitis excel at.  End note.)  He explained, 
however, that Kuwait would not pay the salaries of USG 
personnel.  There was no law in Kuwait permitting prior 
payment and it would run into parliamentary opposition.  "I 
can't sell that."  He stressed that this was a "government 
decision not just an NSB decision."  He added that the annual 
Gulf Security Dialogue took place without any discussion of 
salary payments. 
 
¶4. (C) Shaykh Thamer suggested that Kuwait was not likely to 
need further assessments and that a few USG recommendations 
on good companies to work with would be useful.  He added 
wryly that he could have contractors lining up to conduct 
studies for free, merely on the hope of getting follow-on 
contracts to provide security upgrades.  Econcouns responded 
that the USG had a great deal of expertise on critical 
infrastructure protection and that "you get what you pay 
for."  Shaykh Thamer reiterated that improving the protection 
of Kuwait's oil export facilities was in the best interests 
of both countries, and that he hoped there would be a way to 
continue cooperation.  Econcouns explained the difficulty in 
moving forward absent a clear funding mechanism, but promised 
to consult with Washington.  (Note: Before Shaykh Thamer 
arrived, NSB International Relations Director, Shaykh Fawaz 
Al-Sabah asked, when the USG would be ready to sign the 
agreement and appeared disappointed as the conversation 
started to highlight the difficulties with the GoK revised 
text.  End note.) 
 
¶5. (C) EconCouns and Shaykh Thamer briefly discussed the 
other GoK changes to the document, particularly on the coming 
into force section.  Shaykh Thamer said that after an 
exchange of diplomatic notes, the document could be signed by 
both sides, without parliamentary approval. 
 
¶6. (C) Shaykh Thamer briefly discussed improvements to oil 
sector security.  He said that the GoK was in the process of 
adding more security, including bomb sniffing dogs, more 
people on the ground to conduct searches, and blast proof 
walls to the Shuaiba refinery.  There are already around 280 
cameras at Shuaiba alone, he said proudly.  He noted that the 
most challenging change had been to coordinate the efforts of 
all of the organizations involved in providing security.  "We 
examined it, and everyone thought it was their 
responsibility, and it therefore was no one's 
responsibility."  The GoK's response was to create the higher 
coordination committee to coordinate efforts, which Shaykh 
Thamer said was working well.  "National Security (Bureau) is 
in charge.   (Note:  Shaykh Fawaz subsequently told Econcouns 
that the new NSB President Shaykh Mohammed Al-Khaled Al Sabah 
(a former Minister of Interior) was bringing new energy to 
the position and was responsible for improving the Ministry 
of Interior's cooperation with the NSB. End note.) 
 
¶7. (C) Comment:  Shaykh Thamer's response was much more 
dismissive than when Econoffs met with him in January to pass 
the USG revised text.  We briefed him clearly on the payment 
issue at that time and though he made no commitments, he 
seemed unconcerned.  Given the constant drumbeat of 
parliamentary criticism of government spending, his comment 
that the GoK, not just the NSB, had determined that it would 
not pay salaries rings true.  We believe that the GoK would 
love to have a deliverable for the Amir's possible visit to 
the U.S. in late July, but as presently structured, this does 
not appear to be it.  Assuming it remains in the USG's 
interest to help the Kuwaitis to continue improving oil 
infrastructure security, post sees two possible ways forward: 
a) look for ways to cooperate absent a formal MOU 
sidestepping the question of payment; b) do a better job of 
marketing USG "fee based consulting services."  The 
long-standing FMS program shows that Kuwaitis are willing to 
pay for training and support, but need to be convinced that 
they are getting value for money.  The second approach is 
likely to be a long process, however. 
 
********************************************* ********* 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at: 
 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it 
********************************************* ********* 
JONES