VZCZCXRO7200
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #0497/01 1521001
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011001Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9684
INFO RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH PRIORITY 5885
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0305
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 000497 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, PM/RSAT, PM/WRA, PM/PPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019 
TAGS: KPKO MARR MASS MOPS PREL PGOV OTRA VM
SUBJECT: WAY FORWARD ON DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH VIETNAM 
 
HANOI 00000497  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael W. Michalak, Reasons 1.4 (b and d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The United States and Vietnam are moving to a 
new level of defense cooperation not previously seen in our 
bilateral relationship.  While progress in some areas is 
slower than we would like, we have now expanded our 
engagement to the point where setting priorities will be key 
to our continued success.  We are focusing on building 
relationships that are bearing fruit particularly in the 
areas of maritime security, search and rescue, peacekeeping, 
medical exchanges, and humanitarian assistance, while IMET 
training is slowly expanding the number of Vietnamese defense 
officials with English language capability and exposure to 
the U.S. defense establishment.  Our first-ever U.S.-Vietnam 
Security Dialogue in October 2008 laid the groundwork for 
further progress.  Government of Vietnam (GVN) officials 
agree that we need more concrete progress in the upcoming 
second round, but they have not yet provided specifics. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials note that they 
wanted early talks (only eigh 
t months after the first round) to consult with the U.S. 
before the ASEAN Regional Forum meetings in July, the final 
ARF gathering before Vietnam assumes the chair of ASEAN at 
the beginning of 2010.  End summary. 
 
The U.S.-Vietnam Relationship 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Our bilateral relations with Vietnam continue to 
broaden and mature, spurring economic, social and 
technological development that has eased the path for a 
limited expansion of personal freedom for the people of 
Vietnam.  Vietnam is taking a greater role in international 
and regional affairs, as reflected in its current 
non-permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council and its 
upcoming chairmanship of ASEAN in 2010.  GVN leaders 
understand that the United States plays a direct role in 
creating the conditions for their nation's success and are 
committed to advancing the bilateral relationship.  MFA and 
MFA-affiliated track-two scholars have voiced an interest in 
consulting with the United States in advance of Vietnam's 
assuming the ASEAN Chair in the beginning of 2010; according 
to the MFA, this is a primary reason why the GVN pushed to 
have the second round of security talks before the ASEAN 
Regional Forum meets in July. 
 
¶3. (C) Our strengthening relations are also due to Vietnam's 
realization that the United States is an important force in 
maintaining a stable geopolitical environment in which even 
"small" countries like Vietnam are assured their independence 
and freedom of action.  As such, Vietnam's leaders speak 
positively and optimistically about the future of 
U.S.-Vietnam ties.  Differences over human rights remain, 
however, and lingering fears that the United States supports 
the overthrow of the current regime continue to complicate 
the relationship.  The Ministries of Defense and Public 
Security, both of which participate in the dialogue, are 
particularly suspicious of the United States and of our 
deepening bilateral ties.  Fear of a Chinese counter-reaction 
also colors Hanoi's reactions to our proposals in the 
security realm. 
 
Growth of U.S.-GVN Defense Cooperation 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The GVN is in the midst of a shift of its defense 
posture from inward to outward looking.  Historically, the 
primary missions of People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) were 
defense of the homeland, regime, and revolution, essentially 
a continuation of its posture from the conflicts with the 
French and the United States.  With increasing international 
engagement, the MOD and PAVN are now slowly changing their 
perspective to include security cooperation with others - a 
shift that only recently started and is still ongoing.  As a 
result, our defense relations have advanced at a measured 
pace, but reflect the overall positive shift in the 
relationship.  We conduct professional military exchanges 
with the PAVN in a limited but growing range of areas 
including military law, military nursing, medical readiness 
exercises, public affairs, search and rescue, meteorological/ 
oceanographic (METOC) prediction, and disaster preparedness. 
PAVN officers have been invited as observers to Cobra Gold 
for the past four years an 
d routinely attend U.S. Pacific Command-sponsored 
multilateral conferences.  Since 1997, over sixty GVN 
 
HANOI 00000497  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
officials, including more than thirty PAVN officers, have 
attended courses and seminars at the Asia Pacific Center for 
Security Studies (APCSS).  PAVN also now sends observers to 
the annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) 
exercises. 
 
¶5. (C) Since 2003, U.S. Navy ships have made five port visits 
to Vietnam, including most recently a November 14-18, 2007 
visit by two mine countermeasures ships, the USS Guardian and 
the USS Patriot, at Haiphong port.  In June 2008, Vietnam 
participated in the Pacific Partnership mission of the USNS 
Mercy.  In 2005, Vietnam agreed to participate in the 
International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). 
 In 2007, we accelerated the pace of IMET and provided a 
language laboratory in Hanoi using IMET funds.  In 2008, IMET 
expanded mil-mil contacts through a U.S. mobile training team 
visit for military medical techniques training.  The GVN also 
continues to send well-qualified candidates to English 
language training and English language instructor training to 
the Defense Language Institute (DLI). 
 
¶6. (C) This nascent but multi-faceted defense and security 
relationship has matured into an important aspect of our 
overall relationship.  Closer cooperation in defense 
activities is attainable but will require persistence and 
patience.  The second U.S.-Vietnam Security Dialogue is 
another opportunity to deepen this relationship and expand 
our cooperation. 
 
Building on Progress Since the First Dialogue 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Prioritizing our security engagement will get results. 
 Pressing forward full steam ahead in too many areas is more 
likely to result in GVN interlocutors who are confused, 
distrustful of our intentions, and more apt to drag their 
feet on any engagement.  At present, the most promising area 
of our cooperation is maritime security and search and 
rescue.  Our engagement on this is growing rapidly and offers 
spillover into a number of other areas - humanitarian 
assistance, UXO clearance, defense academy exchanges, to name 
a few.  EXBS too is an area where our engagement has paid off 
with a GVN commitment to move forward.  Progress on 
implementing Vietnam's declared intention to participate in 
the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) has been slower 
and the GVN still lacks a clear understanding of how FMF 
works. 
 
Search and Rescue: Progress and Promise 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Search and Rescue (SAR) cooperation has taken off, 
with a senior GVN delegation observing a U.S. SAR exercise in 
Hawaii and visiting U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters in 
Washington and the a U.S. Coast Guard training facility in 
Yorktown next month.  Based on the steps towards a joint 
exercise laid out by the GVN at the October 2008 dialogue, we 
should seek GVN invitation to observe a Vietnamese SAR 
exercise with a view to begin SAR exercise planning before 
the end of 2009.  We can express appreciation for their open 
discussions with the PACOM SAR team that visited in April and 
encourage the GVN to continue discussions with the U.S. on 
ways we can further our cooperation. 
 
GVN Ready to Engage on EXBS and Megaports 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The GVN has shown a remarkable willingness to 
cooperate on the Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) 
program.  Prime Minister Dung also recently gave the go ahead 
to begin negotiations on an agreement with DOE on Megaports. 
We should express appreciation for the open and frank 
discussions the MOD and Vietnam Marine Police shared with the 
U.S. Coast Guard Assessment team in March and encourage the 
GVN to continue to develop and expand its relationship with 
the U.S. Coast Guard.  We should also express appreciation 
for the hospitality shown to the Department of Energy team 
that conducted the Megaports assessment visit and encourage 
Vietnam to begin negotiations with DOE immediately. 
 
Pushing for Progress on Peacekeeping 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) In March, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security 
Studies held a successful peacekeeping workshop with 
 
HANOI 00000497  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
participants from MFA, MOD, and MPS, leading to a greater 
understanding at the working level of peacekeeping and what 
participation might mean for Vietnam.  We should brief the 
GVN on the benefits and challenges associated with becoming a 
troop-contributing country to UN peacekeeping operations to 
continue to expand their knowledge of overall international 
peacekeeping concepts and processes, stressing the 
longstanding participation of other ASEAN nations. 
 
¶11. (C) At our invitation, MOD will send Major General 
(select) Do Van Tac, Deputy Director for the Operations 
Department, General Staff to the GPOI Capstone 
exercise--Garuda Shield in June 2009. Having a senior officer 
directly responsible for the development of Vietnam's PKO 
capabilities observing the exercise will help to build 
confidence in Vietnam's future role in peacekeeping 
operations and GPOI activities.  We should congratulate 
Vietnam for accepting the invitation and encourage Vietnam to 
continue planning for real participation in peacekeeping and 
GPOI.  Further, we should seek Vietnam's commitment to send 
active participants (vice observers) to the 2010 GPOI 
exercise.  While the GVN is unlikely to commit on this 
occasion, we should raise the issue of their participation 
early and often. 
 
Getting the Most Out of Ship Visits 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) In June 2009, the GVN issued a national guideline 
that enabled a team from the Joint POW-MIA Accounting Command 
(JPAC) aboard the USNS BRUCE HEEZEN to conduct at-sea search 
operations for Missing in Action (MIA) remains within 
Vietnam's territorial seas, a major step we should note with 
appreciation. 
In April, the GVN agreed for the first time to accept our 
invitation to fly-out to a visiting U.S. aircraft carrier off 
the coast of Vietnam.  The visit resulted in pages of 
positive publicity and was a resounding success, paving the 
way for future visits of this nature.  We should note the 
benefits of such visits for both sides and seek GVN support 
for a follow-up visit when possible. 
 
¶13. (C) In the past we have pushed Vietnam to allow more U.S. 
ship visits as a tool to increase out engagement, but with 
our GVN interlocutors citing the need for changes in law to 
allow more than one visit per year we do not believe this is 
likely to happen in the short or medium term.  Instead, we 
should press for more substantive activities during the ship 
visits we do have - not only more joint community outreach 
activities, but more mil-mil activities and increased 
operational engagement.  We should also seek GVN views on the 
possibility of a Vietnamese Navy ship visit to a U.S. port. 
 
Pacific Partnership and Health Diplomacy 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Meanwhile, we continue to build on the success of 
past Pacific Partnership missions and expect to host Pacific 
Angel later in 2009.  We should seek GVN commitment to begin 
planning for Pacific Partnership 2010. 
 
¶15. (C) Health diplomacy via medical exchange also continues 
to be a key factor in our engagement.  We should preview the 
U.S. Navy Surgeon General's proposed visit (tentatively 
scheduled for July) to engage in a dialogue with the MOH and 
MOD regarding medical cooperation opportunities on offer from 
Navy medicine.  Vietnam Military Medical Department also 
plans to send a senior-level military delegation comprised of 
three regional commanders (Lieutenant Generals) and senior 
representatives from the Military Medical Department to 
Hawaii in November 2009 to observe U.S. screening procedures 
for soldiers deploying overseas.  The exchange will be funded 
by DOD PEPFAR and special emphasis will be on HIV/AIDS 
prevention.  We should welcome Vietnam's initiative in 
seeking out these engagement opportunities and encourage them 
to continue these efforts. 
 
Humanitarian Mine Action/UXO Clearance 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (C) The GVN has made strides in cooperation and 
coordination with the establishment of the Vietnam Bomb and 
Mine Action Center (VBMAC) in February.  The Center is now 
the civilian coordinating authority for UXO clearance, mine 
risk education and assistance to victims nation-wide. 
 
HANOI 00000497  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
However, much work remains to be done - a national strategy 
would assist Vietnam in gaining much needed donor funds, the 
data from the USG-funded Landmine Impact Survey is still not 
accessible, and VBMAC does not yet have the capacity to live 
up to its mandate.  We should applaud the creation of VBMAC, 
ask for its priorities for assistance and capacity building, 
and encourage the GVN to develop a national strategy for mine 
action.  We should also seek simple, transparent USG and NGO 
access to the Landmine Impact Survey data.  Finally, and in 
response to past GVN requests for assistance with underwater 
clearance, we should preview potential cooperation between 
the U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) and MOD on underwater 
explosive ordnan 
ce disposal and mine countermeasures and seek GVN agreement 
to receive a PACFLT assessment team to discuss potential 
cooperation in more detail. 
 
Security Assistance:  FMF 
------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) MOD's leadership is still hesitant to accept its 
first $500K in FY09 FMF and has expressed a policy of not 
accepting military related funding to purchase military 
equipment from any country.  We have informed them about the 
potential of using FMF like IMET for training (English 
language instructors, medical, military-related skills 
training, etc.), to purchase more language labs, or to hire a 
certified U.S. English instructor to come to Vietnam to 
teach.  The MOD still does not yet have a clear understanding 
of how FMF works.  We need to better educate the leadership 
and explain FMF in such a way that it is understood as a 
credit or value amount of military equipment that the U.S. 
will give to Vietnam, rather than a lump sum of cash to be 
handed over for military purchases. 
 
Defense Academy Exchanges 
------------------------- 
 
¶18. (C) A number of senior MOD officers have expressed their 
desire for an increased number of academic exchanges between 
our two militaries.  We should press the GVN to begin 
discussing the establishment of an official exchange program 
between the U.S. and GVN service academies and senior staff 
colleges.  Given our growing cooperation on maritime 
security, an exchange with the U.S. Coast Guard Academy would 
be an ideal starting point.  We should highlight that for the 
upcoming academic year at U.S. military academies, Vietnam is 
a priority country and could send a cadet to each of our 
military academies, provided they put forward competitive 
candidates.  While Vietnamese candidates must compete with 
other countries for a slot, Vietnam's chances of having a 
cadet accepted are better than ever.  DAO Hanoi will be 
working with ERD to determine the best way forward. 
 
A Word of Caution: Priorities and Patience 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶19. (C) We are regularly reminded by our GVN counterparts 
about the measured pace that they wish to take when we seek 
to expand our defense cooperation, and we must take this into 
account and seek avenues and areas of cooperation where the 
GVN and MOD are most enthusiastic while pressing forward on 
issues of key interest.  Overall, we see a positive long-term 
future in our continued engagement with Vietnam on defense 
and security issues.  The upcoming Security Dialogue is 
another key event to move our cooperation forward and 
continue the process of turning a former enemy into a valued 
partner. 
MICHALAK