VZCZCXYZ0006
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0521/01 1761450
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 251450Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8735
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4637
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1808
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0816
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5988

S E C R E T GENEVA 000521 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-II): 
(U) AFTERNOON MEETING JUNE 23, 2009 
 
REF: A. GENEVA 00511 (SFO-GVA-II-001) 
     ¶B. GENEVA 00514 (SFO-GVA-II-002) 
     ¶C. 04 GENEVA 1026 (BIC-I-001) 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-II-004. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  June 23, 2009 
                Time:  3:45 - 4:45 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) U.S. and Russian Delegations resumed work on the 
draft Joint Understanding.  The meeting focused on the U.S. 
response to the draft text tabled by Russia on Monday, June 
22, 2009, (REF A).  A/S Gottemoeller introduced the proposed 
draft by saying that the U.S. Delegation had listened very 
intently and studied very carefully the answers the Russian 
Delegation had provided during the morning session (REF B). 
As a result, the U.S. Delegation was tabling a U.S. non-paper 
(see paragraph 22) that was a combination of the Joint 
Understanding the United States had tabled in Moscow on June 
15, the Russian response provided the day prior, and some 
revisions by U.S. lawyers that would make the text more 
consistent with accepted legal style.  Gottemoeller explained 
that the text was not a bracketed text, but rather a working 
document and proceeded to review the text paragraph- 
by-paragraph.  Antonov thanked the U.S. Delegation, saying it 
was clear that the U.S. Delegation had worked very hard and 
he could see that the United States was trying to find 
compromise and eliminate the difficult points.  This was a 
step in the right direction but in some areas was not 
sufficient.  Two areas that were especially bothersome for 
the Russian Delegation were the issues involving the 
"commitment" to continue to pursue new and verifiable 
reductions and the fact that the United States had not 
included Russia's proposal on radical reductions. 
Gottemoeller countered that it was clear that both Presidents 
Obama and Medvedev had already made the decision to proceed 
with additional reductions beyond the replacement of the 
START Treaty, given their statements in London, Prague and 
Helsinki.  In addition, the U.S. Delegation was not rejecting 
Russia's proposal on radical reductions, rather the U.S. 
formulation stipulated a "to not exceed" level leaving the 
determination of the final numbers for negotiation at a later 
time. 
 
--------------------------- 
U.S. TABLES COMPROMISE TEXT 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S) Antonov welcomed the U.S. Delegation back to the 
Russian Mission and turned the floor over to Gottemoeller. 
Gottemoeller explained that the U.S. Delegation had been 
listening very intently to the Russian Delegation's response 
to U.S. questions during the morning meeting.  In addition, 
the United States had carefully read the Russian proposal and 
was prepared to provide a compromise text.  The non-paper the 
United States was presenting was a combination of our joint 
 
language based on the document the United States had provided 
in Moscow on June 15, the Russian-proposed text and some 
stylistic changes by our lawyer. 
 
¶5.  (S) Beginning with the preamble, Gottemoeller proceeded 
to review the document paragraph-by-paragraph, explaining how 
the U.S. Delegation had arrived at the proposed text.  With 
regard to the preamble, the United States was accepting the 
Russian-proposed language on strategic offensive arms as it 
was in line with the statements of April 1.  There was a 
minor change to the language on concluding a Treaty by the 
lawyer to use the phrase "is to" vice "will" to ensure that 
the document is seen as a political statement rather than as 
a legally-binding instrument. 
 
¶6.  (S) Gottemoeller explained that paragraph one was really 
the core of the Joint Understanding for both Parties as we 
needed to have a clear idea about what we were counting when 
establishing numbers.  The U.S. Delegation had listened very 
carefully during the morning to the responses to its 
questions and had looked at the history and previous 
discussions of what could comprise the elements of this 
paragraph.  Gottemoeller then read the paragraph and asked 
Taylor to explain how the U.S. Side developed its formulation 
on Strategic Nuclear Warheads (SNWs) and how it had arrived 
at its proposal to address the limitation on warheads. 
 
¶7.  (S) Taylor began by saying that the United States 
recalled Koshelev's admonition to the U.S. Delegation during 
the past two Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC) 
meetings to review the proposals Russia had presented during 
the early sessions of the BIC, as well as Antonov's call to 
look at the history and previous discussions of what should 
comprise the elements of this paragraph. 
 
¶8.  (S) Taylor stated that, in many BIC meetings, both Sides 
have discussed how it intended to define SNWs.  As recently 
as the last two BIC sessions, Russian BIC Head of 
DelegationKoshelev had urged the United States to look at 
early BIC discussions concerning definitions.  Taylor 
acknowledged that the U.S. Side had done so and found a 
Russian proffered definition from BIC I in April 2004. 
Taylor relayed that the U.S. Side studied this proposal anew 
and determined we could use the Russian formulation to define 
SNWs.  Taylor read from the BIC-I Russian-proposed Plenary 
Statement on Categories of SNWs (REF  C). 
 
¶9.  (S) Taylor highlighted that the original Russian-proposed 
definition of SNWs allowed the Russian Side to not include 
warheads associated with heavy bombers to count against their 
Moscow Treaty limits because they were not located at storage 
facilities on the airbases.  In order to address those 
warheads, the U.S. Side modified the Russian definition to 
include weapons storage areas associated with heavy bomber 
airbases.  Taylor concluded by stating that the U.S. Side had 
taken the majority of the Russian BIC definition to develop 
its proposed SNW definition.  He then provided a copy of the 
BIC-I language, in Russian and English, to the Russian Side. 
 
¶10.  (S) Gottemoeller stated she wanted to make clear that it 
was her view that there had been much valuable work done 
immediately following the signature of the Moscow Treaty and 
she supported looking at that work to see if it could support 
our work today.  This could be very important for our future 
 
work. 
 
¶11.  (S) Gottemoeller went on to explain that the U.S. 
approach was to cite a warhead limit not to exceed 1675 and 
the associated launcher limit not to exceed 1100.  This 
creative approach would give the negotiators the room 
necessary to arrive at an agreed number.  This was not meant 
as a rejection of any lower limits, rather an opportunity to 
negotiate and follow Antonov's notion of "creative ambiguity." 
 
¶12.  (S) Gottemoeller read the new U.S.-proposed paragraph 2 
(calculating limits), emphasizing that the provisions for 
calculating the limits would be drawn from both the START 
Treaty and Moscow Treaty, as appropriate.  With the 
reinsertion of the U.S. paragraph on counting, Gottemoeller 
explained that the U.S. had removed the Russian proposal to 
include "counting procedures" that had been included in 
paragraph 3 (definitions, data exchanges, etc.), and 
paragraph 3 was now otherwise as Russia had proposed, with 
the deletion of counting procedures. 
 
¶13.  (S) In paragraph 4 (each Party determines its force 
structure), Gottemoeller explained that the U.S. lawyer had 
changed "will" to "is to" to conform to U.S. legal style. 
With respect to paragraph 5 (interrelationship of offensive 
and defensive arms), the United States was proposing to use 
the word inter-relationship vice inter-dependence when 
speaking about the provision on strategic offensive and 
strategic defensive arms.  Paragraph 6  (banning ICBM and 
SLBM in non-nuclear configuration) was changed to drop the 
prohibition on non-nuclear configurations of ICBMs and SLBMs, 
by providing for a provision on such configurations.  (Begin 
comment:  Such provision could include transparency and 
confidence-building measures.  End comment.)  Paragraph 7 
(basing SOA on national territory) was a reformulation of the 
Russian-proposed text, but the U.S. accepted the Russian 
approach.  Paragraphs 8 (Implementation Body), 9 (Patterns of 
Cooperation), and 10 (Duration) were Russian-proposed text 
the U.S. Delegation was prepared to accept.  The first 
unnumbered paragraph (Commitment to pursue further 
reductions), following paragraph 10, had a couple of small 
edits by our lawyer based on the fact that we as negotiators 
could not "conclude" a treaty.  Only our Presidents could do 
so, but the negotiators could finish their work on the treaty 
text. 
 
¶14.  (S) With regard to the paragraph on further reductions, 
the U.S. Side understood that Russia wanted to delete the 
provision; however, it was an important paragraph.  This was 
not so important to the negotiators, but it was important in 
a much larger context.  Gottemoeller explained that the U.S. 
Delegation had taken language from the broader Presidential 
Joint Statement in London and modified it for the Joint 
Understanding.  With that, Gottemoeller stated that the U.S. 
Delegation had worked hard to address the concerns raised by 
the Russian Delegation and hoped that the text would address 
those concerns.  It was clear that the Delegations were 
coming closer together in our goal of an agreed text. 
 
---------------------- 
U.S. DELEGATION'S 
HARD WORK ACKNOWLEDGED 
BY RUSSIAN DELEGATION 
---------------------- 
 
 
¶15.  (S) Antonov stated that he could see that the U.S. 
Delegation had worked hard and it was clear that the U.S. was 
trying to find compromises and eliminate the difficult 
points.  These were good steps in the right direction; 
however, they were not sufficient.  It went without saying 
that they would have to look at the text carefully. 
 
¶16.  (S) Regarding the U.S. proposal to use the Russian 
proposal from BIC, Antonov said he was very happy that Russia 
was finally able to convince the United States of the value 
of its proposal, even five years late.  Antonov stated that 
the U.S. logic was convincing with respect to the last 
paragraph, because all the details were in the Presidential 
Joint Statements.  He would read it all very carefully later 
that evening. 
 
¶17.  (S) Antonov said he was confused with the U.S.-proposed 
wording in the "commitment" paragraph.  Did it mean that the 
negotiators had another obligation to begin negotiations on 
another treaty?  Antonov said he was a simple Siberian 
bureaucrat, moving forward with little steps.  He makes a 
small step and looks behind his back to see if all is okay. 
He wanted his President to say he was satisfied with his work 
and that he had accomplished his task.  We should wait for 
instructions on what the new treaty should deal with before 
assuming an obligation to negotiate another treaty. 
 
¶18.  (S) Antonov said that he was not rejecting the U.S. 
proposal but that he had to have time to study it.  Besides 
the general comments he had made, Antonov was concerned that 
Russia's proposal on the radical reductions in delivery 
vehicles was not addressed in the U.S. proposal. 
 
------------------ 
WAY AHEAD IS CLEAR 
------------------ 
 
¶19.  (S) Gottemoeller stated that our Presidents have already 
decided to press ahead with more reductions based on their 
recent statements.  In the context of the London Statement of 
April 1, President Obama stated that this was only the 
beginning of a step-by-step process.  Additionally, on April 
6 in Prague, President Obama made a statement on further 
reductions.  Within a very short time, President Medvedev 
made some important comments on the eventual reductions in 
nuclear weapons in Helsinki.  So from London, to Prague, to 
Helsinki, we have two Presidents who have made political 
decisions to proceed with further reductions.  In her view, 
this would be the only nuclear arms reduction agreement that 
would be signed by the two Presidents prior to the 2010 NPT 
Review Conference.  So this would not only be a unique window 
into our intent with regard to our current reductions, but 
the potential for further reductions.  As to the other 
comment regarding reduction in SDVs, we did not reject the 
lower limits.  This will give the negotiators time to work 
 
¶20.  (S) Antonov confirmed that the two Presidents should 
sign the treaty prior to the 2010 NPT Review Conference 
 
(RevCon), but they could make another statement that they 
intend to negotiate some other instrument.  Or they could 
say, on the eve of the NPT Revcon, that they have taken the 
decision together on what would be done next.  Gottemoeller 
responded that the two best opportunities, for NPT Article VI 
 
purposes, would be when the two Presidents sign the Joint 
Understanding in Moscow and when they sign the treaty. 
Antonov closed by saying that the Russian Delegation would 
work to try and harmonize our position and reduce differences 
in the document. 
 
¶21.  (U) Below is the text of the U.S. non-paper discussed 
and provided to the Russian Delegation during the meeting. 
The non-paper incorporates elements from the U.S.-proposed 
draft Joint Understanding and the Russian-proposed draft. 
While the non-paper was provided in line-in line-out form to 
the Russian Delegation, the paper provided below represents 
the U.S. Delegation's proposal in an unbracketed form. 
 
¶22.  (S) Begin text: 
 
                              Non-paper of the U.S. Side 
                              in response to the 
                              Paper of the Russian 
                              Side of June 22, 2009 
 
                              June 23, 2009 
 
                      JOINT UNDERSTANDING 
 
     The President of the United States of America and the 
President of the Russian Federation have decided on further 
reductions and limitations of their nations' strategic 
offensive arms and on concluding at an early date a new 
legally binding agreement to replace the current START 
Treaty.  The new treaty is to contain the following elements: 
 
     ¶1.  A provision to the effect that each Party is to 
reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms, so that seven 
years after entry into force of the treaty and thereafter, 
the aggregate number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles 
(deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and their 
associated launchers, deployed submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy 
bombers) does not exceed 1100 for each nation.  In addition, 
the aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads 
on deployed SLBMs, and warheads on deployed heavy bombers, as 
well as warheads in storage depots associated with air bases 
(airfields) where heavy bombers are based, is not to exceed 
1675 for each nation. 
 
     ¶2.  Provisions for calculating these limits are to be 
drawn from the START Treaty and the Moscow Treaty, as 
appropriate. 
 
     ¶3.  Provisions on definitions, data exchanges, 
notifications, eliminations, inspections and verification 
procedures, as well as confidence building and transparency 
measures, as adapted, simplified, and made less costly, as 
appropriate, in comparison to the START Treaty. 
 
     ¶4.  A provision to the effect that each Party is to 
determine for itself the composition and structure of its 
strategic offensive arms. 
 
     ¶5.  A provision on the interrelationship of strategic 
offensive and strategic defensive arms. 
 
     ¶6.  Provisions on intercontinental ballistic missiles 
 
 
and submarine-launched ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear 
configuration. 
 
     ¶7.  A provision on basing strategic offensive arms 
exclusively on the national territory of each Party. 
 
     ¶8.  Establishment of an implementation body to resolve 
questions related to treaty implementation. 
 
     ¶9.  The provisions of the treaty will not apply to 
existing patterns of cooperation in the area of strategic 
offensive arms between a Party and a third state. 
 
     ¶10.  A duration of the treaty of ten years, unless it is 
superseded before that time by a subsequent treaty on the 
reduction of strategic offensive arms. 
 
     The two Presidents direct their negotiators to finish 
their work on the treaty at an early date so that they may 
sign and submit it for ratification in their respective 
countries. 
 
     The two Presidents have also directed that the treaty be 
accompanied by a commitment to continue to pursue new and 
verifiable reductions in their nuclear arsenals in a 
step-by-step process. 
 
     Done at (City), this (date) day of (month), 2009, in two 
originals, in the English and Russian languages. 
 
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
(President B. Obama)              (President D.A. Medvedev) 
 
End text. 
 
¶23.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- U.S: 
 
    -- U.S. Non-Paper in response to the Paper of the Russian 
Side of June 22, 2009. 
 
¶24.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
A/S Gottemoeller 
Amb Ries 
Mr. Brown 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. Couch 
Mr. Dunn 
Mr. Elliott 
Mr. Fortier 
Col Hartford 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Siemon 
Mr. Taylor 
Mr. Trout 
Dr. Warner 
Mr. French (Int) 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
Amb Antonov 
Mr. Koshelev 
Mr. Belyakov 
Mr. Ilin 
Mr. Luchaninov 
Mr. Malyugin 
Mr. Neshin 
Col Novikov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Smirnov 
Gen Venevtsev 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
¶25.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
STORELLA