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S E C R E T GENEVA 000520 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-II): 
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, RUSSIAN FEDERATION-HOSTED 
LUNCH, JUNE 22, 2009 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-II-002. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  June 22, 2009 
                Time:  1:30 - 3:00 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) The Russian Delegation hosted a lunch on June 22, 
2009, at the Russian Mission.  U.S. Delegation members 
engaged members of the Russian Delegation in discussions on a 
variety of topics pertaining to the START Follow-on 
negotiations that included:  Russian President Medvedev's 
Amsterdam Statement of June 20, 2009, issues associated with 
the Joint Understanding, confusion of the Russian Delegation 
regarding how the Russian-proposed numerical limits were 
derived, and differentiating between nuclear and non-nuclear 
warheads.  The general impression of the U.S. Delegation was 
that the Russian Delegates were less formal than on other 
occasions and were not reluctant to engage on substantive 
issues, indeed they sought it out. 
 
-------------------- 
PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV'S 
AMSTERDAM SPEECH 
-------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S) Gottemoeller and Antonov discussed the statement made 
by Russian President Medvedev in Amsterdam on the previous 
Saturday, June 20, 2009.  Antonov said that he had written 
the statement as an attempt to begin solidifying the Russian 
position and to make several points very clear:  (1) the 
Russian President has a positive assessment of the 
negotiators' work (which was especially important for 
Antonov); (2) the Presidents gave us instructions to finish 
by the end of the year, and we should do so (the most 
important point in the statement to Antonov); and (3) we 
should achieve effectively verifiable, realistic reductions, 
and the reductions in strategic delivery vehicles should be a 
"significant factor" below those in the START Treaty.  He 
said he realized that there were differences between the U.S. 
and Russian positions on reductions and how to get out of 
this situation would be a major question for the negotiators. 
 Antonov emphasized that he was serious about the 
negotiations and wanted them to succeed. 
 
------------------- 
ISSUES WITH THE 
JOINT UNDERSTANDING 
------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Antonov told Gottemoeller that the Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) was starting to slow-roll the negotiations. 
Gottemoeller said that reinforced hints she had gotten during 
the June 15-16 meetings in Moscow. 
 
¶6.  (S) Malyugin told Siemon and Buttrick that, since the 
previous evening (June 21), the Russian Delegation had been 
 
 
working on six different drafts of the Joint Understanding. 
In fact, Antonov had been changing the language of the Joint 
Understanding at the table while he was presenting it to the 
U.S. Delegation.  He said that only Antonov's approval of the 
Joint Understanding was required.  Malyugin relayed that part 
of the problem associated with the Russian-proposed draft was 
based on the MOD's concern with counting rules.  He said that 
the U.S. Delegation had asked a very good question regarding 
the issue of counting rules based on "attribution."  Russia 
was not proposing the START-like counting rules of 
"attributing" a certain number of warheads to each system, 
but was proposing the Moscow Treaty rules of associating 
strategic nuclear warheads.  He said the Russian Delegation 
had not realized that the term "attribution" meant START 
counting rules to the U.S. Side.  Malyugin also said that 
there was flexibility with regard to how the United States 
and Russia should describe the inter-relationship between 
strategic offensive and strategic defensive systems in the 
START Follow-on Treaty. 
 
¶7.  (S) Malyugin told Buttrick that the Russian-proposed 
version of limitations on locating strategic offensive arms 
outside national territory was a "basing" issue, not a 
"locational" issue.  Buttrick asked if Russia was proposing 
the START language regarding basing strategic offensive arms 
outside national territory,  Malyugin said that was what was 
intended by Russia's language in the paragraph contained in 
the Joint Understanding.  Buttrick confirmed with Malyugin 
that Russia's proposal would allow for temporary stationing 
of heavy bombers outside national territory with 
notifications as permitted under START. 
 
¶8.  (S) Belyakov asked Elliot for clarification regarding the 
meaning of specified locations for warheads "associated with" 
bomber bases.  Elliott explained the U.S. concept that if one 
Side acknowledges that it has strategic heavy bombers, then 
it was logical that they must also acknowledge the need to 
store nuclear warheads for those bombers and that they must 
also specify the associated storage area in which the nuclear 
warheads were stored, to provide for verification.  The only 
other alternative was to declare and verify that the 
strategic heavy bombers were no longer equipped for nuclear 
delivery. 
 
¶9.  (S) Referring to the Russian desire to remove the 
commitment to promptly initiate negotiations toward 
concluding a subsequent treaty with further reductions, 
Koshelev told Ries that, with such low numbers of delivery 
vehicles that will exist after the START Follow-on Treaty, 
Russia was wondering when the United States thought other 
countries should be brought into any negotiations  For 
example, the Chinese probably have 300 delivery platforms, 
which was close to the 500 number the Russians were proposing. 
 
¶10.  (S) Luchaninov told Brown that the Russian Delegation 
had been quite surprised, although favorably so, at the 
positive reaction that Gottemoeller had conveyed during the 
meeting earlier in the day concerning the contents of the 
Russian draft Joint Understanding. 
 
----------------- 
WHAT'S BEHIND THE 
RUSSIAN NUMBERS? 
 
 
----------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) Ryzhkov told Trout and Couch that he did not know 
the origin of the 500 delivery vehicle number or the 1675 
warhead number that Russia had proposed for the new treaty. 
He said that the Russian Delegation had only been informed 
that those would be the numbers proposed. 
 
¶12.  (S) Venevtsev informed Trout and Couch that he did not 
know the method of counting used to develop the Russian 
proposal to limit delivery vehicles to 500 and warheads to 
1675, but rhetorically asked, "Isn't 1675 less than the 
Moscow Treaty?"  He then grinned and asked, "Isn't the 500 
delivery vehicle number a nice round number?" 
 
¶13.  (S) Siemon and Buttrick explained to Venevtsev that the 
reason the U.S.-proposed number of 1100 strategic nuclear 
delivery vehicles (SNDVs) was higher than the Russian number 
of 500 SNDVs was due to how the United States structured and 
deployed its current strategic forces.  Siemon asked 
Venevtsev how he envisioned that the United States and Russia 
could narrow the gap between the U.S. and Russian SNDV 
numbers.  Venevtsev stated that "arms control was not cheap. 
The U.S. will need to reduce the number of submarines and 
silos." 
 
¶14.  (S) Ryzhkov told Trout and Couch that SS-18 silos that 
did not have missiles deployed in them would not count toward 
the 500 delivery vehicle number since Russia proposed to only 
count delivery vehicles and not the launchers.  When asked 
whether Russia could accept gravel put into silos and cuts of 
only heavy bomber fuselages as a means for removing those 
items from accountability, Ryzhkov replied that easier, less 
costly methods of elimination were needed and that such 
approaches could be considered.  He opined that START had 
over fulfilled in the measures required to eliminate items. 
 
¶15.  (S) Ries asked Koshelev what he thought would be the 
most difficult part of the negotiation, to which he replied 
"counting rules."  The Russians were very concerned about 
U.S. up-load capacity and would need to have confidence that 
the numbers reflected what the United States actually had. 
This would be difficult to get done quickly, and might mean 
that the new treaty would not be finished by the time START 
expires, which would necessitate a political statement.  He 
added that he hoped working groups would be established as 
they would be needed to resolve tough problems. 
 
¶16.  (S) Trout asked Venevtsev whether there was enough time 
to complete the difficult tasks necessary to implement a new 
treaty by December 5, to which Venevtsev asked what 
difference it made since negotiations on the new treaty would 
continue regardless.  When Trout noted that all verification 
measures would terminate without the START Treaty in force, 
Venevtsev said that would not be a problem.  He did not 
believe either Party would move very fast to change the 
military situation.  He noted that Warner kept telling him 
that many U.S. strategic force decisions would have to wait 
until after the results of the Nuclear Posture Review are 
announced.  When Trout said in that case the START Treaty 
would be in the same condition as the Conventional Forces in 
Europe (CFE) Treaty, Venevtsev strongly insisted that they 
were completely different.  START had served its purpose, but 
 
 
CFE still had a purpose. 
 
------------------------------- 
DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN NUCLEAR 
AND CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS 
------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (S) Venevtsev told Couch that there was "no such thing 
as a conventionally armed ballistic missile." 
 
¶18.  (S) Malyugin asked Buttrick and Siemon how the Sides 
could distinguish between a nuclear or conventional warhead 
being tested on a new ICBM.  Siemon clarified that this issue 
was a problem that was still in the concept development phase 
and that the United States was still thinking through 
solutions to it.  Siemon also acknowledged that the Sides 
could not even distinguish these differences with telemetry. 
When Malyugin asked how Russia could tell if a missile was 
nuclear or non-nuclear once it is launched, Buttrick 
suggested that perhaps some form of transparency could be 
developed within the context of the operations in the Joint 
Data Exchange Center (JDEC).  Malyugin thought the idea of 
using the JDEC for confidence building might prove useful. 
He also said that a U.S. approach to counting conventional 
ICBMs and SLBMs within the SNDV limit would be a move in the 
right direction; however, not counting warheads under the 
warhead count was a problem for Russia. 
 
-------------------------- 
VISA PROBLEMS PREVENT 
NEGOTIATIONS IN WASHINGTON 
-------------------------- 
 
¶19.  (S) Buttrick and Siemon raised with Venevtsev the issue 
of continuing the dialogue between the U.S. and Russian 
Delegations to conclude agreement on the Joint Understanding 
for the Moscow Summit beyond June 24.  Siemon asked about 
holding the meetings in Washington.  Venevtsev quickly 
dismissed Washington as a venue because of problems 
associated with obtaining visas.  He said that it normally 
takes members of the Russian Government over a month to get 
visas.  He relayed that, during one of his trips to 
Washington, it took five weeks, and then it was returned to 
him with a multi-entry visa that was only good for a 3-day 
period. 
 
------------------------- 
OTHER TIDBITS OF INTEREST 
------------------------- 
 
¶20.  (S) Koshelev briefly commented to Ries on Iran.  Russia, 
he said, had been careful in its relationship with Iran 
because it was concerned about the potential for Iran 
supporting Islamic extremist movements in Russia.  That said, 
Russia was certainly concerned about Iranian nuclear 
ambitions and thought concerted action was the best way to 
address the problem.  Russia did not favor additional 
economic sanctions because of a fear that Iran would 
retaliate by ceasing cooperation with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  Koshelev opined that we could 
not afford to have this happen since it was only via IAEA 
inspections that we knew details of Iranian nuclear programs. 
 He added that Russia's commercial interests in Iran had 
 
 
diminished significantly but this was not true of certain 
European countries. 
 
¶21.  (S) Fortier spoke with Koshelev and Ryzhkov about 
liquid-propellant SLBM eliminations at Krasnoyarsk.  Fortier 
recounted that the problem of eliminated SS-N-18 and SS-N-23 
SLBM airframes not being displayed in the open, as required 
by START, was discussed and successfully resolved during past 
JCIC sessions.  However, there were now indications that the 
problem may have started again.  Ryzhkov thanked Fortier for 
bringing it to his attention and pledged to have his staff 
look into it.  He believed there were new workers at the 
Krasnoyarsk plant who may not be aware of the Treaty-required 
procedures, but he would ensure that they were quickly made 
aware of them.  Ryzhkov claimed that managers at the plant 
had been fired as a result of the previous incident. 
 
¶22.  (S) Venevtsev told Buttrick that Sergey Kashirin, 
recently from the Arms Control Office in the MFA and a 
regular attendee at the JCIC and the early START Follow-on 
sessions, was recently informed that he was being reassigned 
to the Russian Embassy in Armenia.  He said that Kashirin was 
looking forward to the new assignment, and that he should be 
moving from Moscow some time this fall. 
 
¶23.  (S) Koshelev mentioned to Ries that the Russian 
Delegation was very grateful for U.S. Head of Delegation 
Gottemoeller's recognition earlier that day of the Russian 
Day of Memory and Sorrow.  The commemoration of the day when 
the Great Patriotic War began for the Soviet Union with the 
Nazi invasion and remembering the large number of human 
losses sustained during that war was important to Russia. 
 
¶24.  (U) Participants. 
 
U.S. 
 
Ms. Gottemoeller 
Amb Ries 
Mr. Brown 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. Couch 
Mr. Elliott 
Mr. Fortier 
Col Hartford 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Kron 
Mr. Siemon 
Mr. Taylor 
Mr. Trout 
Dr. Warner 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
Mr. French (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Amb Antonov 
Mr. Koshelev 
Mr. Belyakov 
Mr. Ilin 
Ms. Ivanova 
Mr. Luchaninov 
Mr. Malyugin 
 
 
Mr. Neshin 
Col Novikov 
Mr. Rudenko 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Semin 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Vasiliev 
Mr. Venevtsev 
Ms. Brokhovich (Int) 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
Mr. Gayduk (Int) 
 
¶25.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
STORELLA