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S E C R E T GENEVA 000514 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-II): 
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, JUNE 23, 2009 MORNING 
SESSION 
 
REF: A. GENEVA 00511 (SFO-GVA-II-001) 
     ¶B. STATE 60487 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-003. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  June 23, 2009 
                Time:  11:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) Russian HOD Antonov began the meeting by saying that 
the Russian-proposed edits of the U.S. Joint Understanding 
tabled in Moscow were an attempt to harmonize the Russian and 
U.S. approaches as much as possible and to maintain 
"constructive ambiguity" in some areas, for later 
negotiation.  He added that it is unlikely that we would 
resolve all differences in definitions.  As for the 
definition of Strategic Delivery Vehicles, Antonov said that 
the Russian use of the term included ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy 
bombers and the Russians understood that the U.S. wants to 
include the associated launchers.  United States HOD 
Gottemoeller responded that the U.S. was drawing from 
existing START definitions where possible.  Antonov added 
that it made sense for the Sides to "nail down" definitions 
and that the Russians agreed to use START terms where 
possible. 
 
¶4.  (S) Gottemoeller asked Antonov to explain how, if the 
term "launcher" were to disappear from the treaty, the 
Parties would be able to verify the limits on missiles. 
Antonov said that he could not answer right away but noted 
that there had been a question on sub-limits on launchers. 
All he could say was that the Russian Side was prepared to 
discuss this during the negotiations.  Warner reminded 
Antonov that the U.S.-proposed Joint Understanding was 
formulated using the existing START text as the Russian 
Delegation had suggested.  Trout said that since the Russian 
definition of Strategic Delivery Vehicles did not include 
launchers, did the Russian-proposed limit of 500 Strategic 
Delivery Vehicles include both deployed and non-deployed 
missiles.  Neither Antonov nor Ilin could answer the question 
and deferred it to a later meeting. 
 
¶5.  (S) Gottemoeller asked Antonov why the Russian draft used 
the term "interdependence" when addressing strategic offense 
and defense when President Medvedev had used the term 
"relationship" with regard to strategic offensive and 
defensive arms.  Antonov replied that "interdependence" 
better reflected what the Russians want in the treaty and 
reminded Gottemoeller that Medvedev said Russia would only 
make reductions if the United States addressed all of 
Russia's concerns.  Gottemoeller replied that the U.S. 
position remained clear that there would only be a single 
mention of defensive arms in the treaty and that would be in 
the preamble. 
 
¶6.  (S) Elliott explained that the United States cannot agree 
 
 
to the Russian proposal to ban ICBMs and SLBMs with 
conventional warheads and that the U.S. believed appropriate 
verification and transparency measures could be developed to 
satisfy Russia's concerns. 
 
¶7.  (S) Gottemoeller explained that it was important for both 
Sides to understand how delivery vehicles and warheads were 
counted.  Warner provided a detailed explanation of how the 
U.S. had more than 300 START-accountable missile silos, 
submarine launch tubes, and heavy bombers that cannot be used 
to deliver nuclear weapons and that such "phantom" delivery 
vehicles need to come "off the books."  Gottemoeller added 
that there were situations with regard to Russia's forces 
where such "phantom" delivery vehicles also existed.  The 
United States and Russia structured their forces differently 
and the U.S. needed more delivery vehicles to maintain its 
force structure while the Russians needed fewer delivery 
vehicles to maintain essentially the same number of warheads. 
 
--------------- 
OPENING REMARKS 
--------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Antonov welcomed the U.S. Delegation back to the 
Russian Mission for day two of the third round of 
negotiations.  He expressed his hope that the Russian 
proposal for the Joint Understanding (REF A) did not ruin the 
U.S. Delegation's afternoon but was sure we had a good 
discussion.  Antonov stressed that the U.S. should not try to 
read between the lines of the Russian proposal and there was 
not a hidden bottom-line in their position.  The Russian 
proposal tried to provide maximum details while preserving 
"constructive ambiguity."  Additionally, the Russian Side 
thought the Joint Understanding would give the Presidents an 
opportunity to help the Delegations take a step forward and, 
after a break, the Delegations could continue the 
negotiations in a more deliberative atmosphere (Begin 
comment:  That is, not having the Moscow Summit deadline. End 
comment).  Antonov concluded by stating that the Russian Side 
was prepared for a constructive discussion of both proposals. 
 
¶9.  (S) Gottemoeller confirmed that the U.S. Side had a busy 
but not ruined afternoon.  She mentioned she had re-read 
Russian President Medvedev's Amsterdam statement and noted 
that it provided a good guide for the Delegations' 
discussions.  She highlighted Medvedev's challenge that the 
new treaty be a "totally objective, absolutely specific and 
at the same time binding agreement." 
 
¶10.  (S) Gottemoeller proposed that the U.S. Side take the AM 
session to ask questions to clarify the Russian position on 
its proposed Joint Understanding (Ref A).  She proposed that, 
in the afternoon session, the U.S. Side could return with a 
draft text combining both Sides' positions.  Antonov accepted 
this proposal. 
 
------------------------------ 
U.S. DELEGATION QUESTIONS ON 
RUSSIAN-PROPOSED CHANGES TO 
U.S. DRAFT JOINT UNDERSTANDING 
------------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (S) Gottemoeller began by addressing numbered paragraph 
 
 
 
1 in the Russian text regarding its formulation on central 
limits of Strategic Delivery Vehicles.  Specifically, she 
pointed out that, in the original U.S. draft proposal (Ref 
B), the U.S. Side used language from the START Treaty 
("Deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers"); in the 
Russian text, it appeared they only addressed the Strategic 
Delivery Vehicles without the associated launchers.  She 
asked the Russians what was their point in dropping the START 
terminology in regard to launchers. 
 
¶12.  (S) Antonov responded that it was highly improbable that 
both Sides would resolve all the issues concerning 
definitions prior to the July Summit.  He noted that, in the 
U.S.-proposed Joint Understanding, the U.S. Side used the 
term "operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads" and 
that terminology was not used in Moscow Treaty.  He also 
highlighted that the problem of creating that definition had 
been around for many years.  Antonov noted that previously we 
had been close on such a definition but failed to reach 
agreement.  He deferred any detailed discussion of coming up 
with a definition to an experts working group at a later 
time.  He concluded his point by stating that it was possible 
to come up with an agreed definition and the Russian Side 
wanted to work constructively on developing a common 
definition as soon as possible, but it might require a new 
term or change in the content of the definition. 
 
¶13.  (S) Antonov stated that the Russian proposal used the 
general term of Strategic Delivery Vehicle to describe the 
central limit of the new treaty.  He reiterated, from the 
Russian text, that the Russian Side defined that term as 
"intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers." 
 
¶14.  (S) Gottemoeller asked whether the Russian Side included 
the launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the 
launchers of submarine-launched ballistic missiles in their 
definition or did the Russian Side suggest that the general 
term "strategic delivery vehicle" be used in the new treaty? 
Antonov stated that the Russian Side was still preparing an 
answer to that question and was prepared to discuss this 
during the  course of the negotiations. 
 
¶15.  (S) Gottemoeller said the U.S. Side had used START 
terminology whenever and as far as possible.  She asked what 
had changed since START went into force to make the Russian 
Side not want to use the same terminology in regard to the 
limit on missiles and their associated launchers?  Antonov 
responded, stating that it did not make sense to try to nail 
down definitions at this time but he agreed START terminology 
should be used, with the caveat that Gottemoeller had taught 
him about the "hybrid" and, therefore, it is not easy to 
decide when the START terminology was appropriate or 
necessary.   He stated that the Russian Side was ready to 
work with the U.S. Side on the issue of strategic delivery 
vehicles and to take into account U.S.-proposed terminology 
on this issue.  In any case, the Russian Side was open to any 
idea in the interest of arriving at a mutually-acceptable 
solution. 
 
¶16.  (S) Picking up on the mention of hybrid approaches, 
Gottemoeller stated that concept extended to transparency and 
verification measures that may have to go beyond what was in 
 
 
START.  She asked if associated launchers disappeared from 
the new treaty, how did the Russian Side propose to verify 
the limit on missiles without a limit on launchers? 
 
¶17.  (S) Antonov responded that he was in a more advantageous 
position because President Medvedev's Amsterdam statement 
gave him specific instructions that the new treaty needed 
"effectively verifiable" measures, adding that perhaps 
President Obama would make a statement that could change the 
situation.  Antonov said that he completely supported 
Gottemoeller's remarks on transparency and openness, noting 
that this had been the problem the Russian Side had with the 
previous U.S. administration.  He claimed that all the 
measures he was talking about now included aspects of 
transparency, openness and verification measures.  But, as to 
whether there would be limits on launchers, the Russian Side 
was not prepared to talk about it at this time.  Experts 
could find the answers to verification problems as they 
developed the detailed Treaty text. 
 
¶18.  (S) Gottemoeller answered that the U.S. Side's view was 
that the new treaty covered Deployed Missiles and their 
associated launchers and Operationally Deployed Strategic 
Nuclear Warheads.  Warner stated that, in the U.S. original 
non-paper on the Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty, the 
U.S. central limit was on operationally deployed strategic 
nuclear warheads.  Warner continued that the Russian Side had 
effectively argued limiting warheads alone was not enough. 
There had to be limits on launchers.  The U.S.-proposed Joint 
Understanding went back to the original START language as the 
most effective way to capture the entire assembly. 
 
¶19.  (S) Antonov replied that the Russian side was still 
getting used to the hybrid concept, and each Side had its own 
logic on how to develop the new treaty.  He relayed that, 
after extensive discussion within his Delegation, the Russian 
Side thought its formulation was best, but he recommended 
postponing further discussion on the issue at this stage to 
allow a more detailed discussion by experts later, adding 
that he did not want the U.S. Side to think that he was 
ignoring the U.S. logic. 
 
¶20.  (S) Antonov also recognized that the first paragraph of 
the Joint Understanding was the critical paragraph, but aaid 
he did not see how the Sides would be able to resolve the 
complexities before the Summit.  Antonov acknowledged how 
difficult it was for the U.S. Side to come up with numbers 
for the Joint Understanding and stated that it was also 
difficult for the Russian Side.  However, for the Russian 
Side, the decision was made at a much higher level. 
 
¶21.  (S) Gottemoeller responded that the same higher levels 
expected the negotiations to resolve the numbers issue and 
provide figures in the Joint Understanding.  She emphasized 
how important it was to determine how the limits would be 
counted under the new treaty to understand what actually was 
being limited.  She stated that the U.S. Side would come back 
in the afternoon with more thoughts on the matter. 
 
¶22.  (S) Antonov answered, stating that Medvedev's Amsterdam 
speech dictated that Strategic Delivery Vehicles needed to be 
reduced by a significant factor vis-a-vis the START levels, 
and that associated warheads needed to be below the Moscow 
 
 
Treaty.  Antonov continued that perhaps at this stage of the 
negotiations it would be better to keep this language very 
general vice specific numbers. 
 
¶23.  (S) Gottemoeller moved on by reiterating that she 
believed more concrete options were needed for the Presidents 
and that the U.S. Side looked forward to further discussions 
to define Strategic Delivery Vehicles. 
 
------------------- 
MORE U.S. QUESTIONS 
------------------- 
 
¶24.  (S) Gottemoeller asked about the Russian terminology in 
their proposed Joint Understanding concerning the limit "1675 
warheads associated with" the Strategic Delivery Vehicles. 
What was the relationship between warheads and delivery 
vehicles? 
 
¶25.  (S) Again, Antonov said this would be a topic of further 
discussion, but that the Russian Side had begun to accept the 
idea of a hybrid treaty and decided to take one parameter 
from START and one from the Moscow Treaty.  He also stated 
that, to the Russian Side, the reduction of delivery vehicles 
was more important in the context of the reduction of 
strategic offensive arms. 
 
¶26.  (S) At this point Trout noted that, in the 
Russian-proposed text, the Russian definition of strategic 
delivery vehicles did not include launchers.  He asked 
whether the proposed Russian limit of 500 Strategic Delivery 
Vehicles included deployed and non-deployed missiles?  Ilin 
responded that the Russian Side would think it over and 
provide a written reply. 
 
¶27.  (S) Gottemoeller pointed out that, for the U.S. Side, 
definitions, data exchanges, notifications, eliminations, 
inspections, and verification procedures for the new treaty 
would be adapted from the basis of the START Treaty.  She 
asked whether the Russian Side intended using the START 
Treaty as a basis? 
 
¶28.  (S) Antonov agreed that the Russian Side wanted to take 
the maximum from START as the basis for these measures, to 
see what was appropriate, but that both Sides would need to 
figure out together how to make them less costly.  However, 
Antonov said that his formulation would not prejudge this 
work, so he did not think it was possible to give specific 
answers while the Sides were just beginning their work.  He 
added that the presentation of the Russian "vision" paper 
should have demonstrated where the Russian Side had taken 
whole sections and elements from START. 
 
------------------------------ 
NEW RUSSIAN POSITION ON THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGIC 
OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ARMS 
------------------------------ 
 
¶29.  (S) Gottemoeller reserved the right to return to the 
paragraph on counting rules, but first stated that she would 
ask a simple question.  In the Russian-proposed text on a 
provision about the relationship between strategic offensive 
 
 
and defensive arms, why did the Russian Side use the term 
"interdependence" when Medvedev in his Amsterdam speech used 
the term "interrelationship?" 
 
¶30.  (S) Antonov replied that the Russian Side did not have 
philologists on its Delegation, but he thought 
interdependence was a better choice of words and captured the 
essence of the issue.  The Russian Side wanted the term 
interdependence to highlight that it could accept proposed 
reductions only if Russian concerns were removed, noting that 
Medvedev's comment about removing Russian concerns referred 
to missile defense. 
 
¶31.  (S) Gottemoeller responded that the U.S. thought it had 
addressed Russian concerns by agreeing to address the issue 
in the preamble of the new treaty on the understanding that 
was to be the only reference to the issue. 
 
¶32.  (S) Antonov replied that there may be a problem as the 
Russian Side no longer felt that preamble language was 
enough.  Again, he wanted to defer this discussion until the 
future, but he wanted to understand what the U.S. objections 
were to the Russian proposal.  He wanted the opportunity to 
understand the U.S. logic and what the differences were.  He 
thought maybe the U.S. did not have a clear position yet, 
since it had not elaborated its objections.  He emphasized 
that the Russian proposals would only address the 
interdependence of strategic offense and strategic defense 
and not be about missile defense.  He recognized that Russian 
concerns about the "'third site" missile defense deployments 
would not be addressed in the START Follow-on negotiating 
venue.  The U.S. proposal on preamble language was a step in 
the right direction but not enough. 
 
¶33.  (S) Gottemoeller stated that she thought the U.S. had 
carried through on addressing Russian concerns by having the 
Director of the Missile Defense Agency, LTG O'Reilly, visit 
Moscow to discuss missile defense and the Joint Data Exchange 
Center as well as the prospect that it could be a topic of 
discussion for the Presidents at the July Summit 
 . 
¶34.  (S) Gottemoeller turned to Elliott to provide a further 
explanation of the U.S. position on the Russian-proposed ban 
on non-nuclear warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs.  Elliott stated 
that the U.S. could not agree to the Russian-proposed ban on 
ICBMs and SLBMs armed with non-nuclear warheads.  He 
acknowledged the Russian concerns and stated that the U.S. 
believed appropriate verification measures could be developed 
for such deployed ICBMs and SLBMs that would confirm that 
nuclear warheads are not deployed on missiles declared to 
have solely non-nuclear strike capabilities. 
 
¶35.  (S) Antonov replied that the Russian Delegation had 
prepared an official document on the issue but had not 
received anything back from the U.S. Delegation.  He also 
stated that the Russians were not prepared at this time to 
say that the U.S. explanation has removed Russian concerns. 
He said that the two Delegations should calmly discuss this 
matter so that each could understand each other's logic, 
emphasizing that this was one of the most critical problems 
in the future treaty.  As soon as Russia is able to see that 
the U.S. is able to remove Russian concerns "on treaty 
paper," it will remove many concerns and it will be easier to 
 
 
resolve other outstanding issues because it will demonstrate 
that the United States is prepared to have a constructive 
relationship based on "equal security." 
 
---------------------- 
CONTINUING THE 
DISCUSSION ON COUNTING 
RULES AND EXEMPTIONS 
---------------------- 
 
¶36.  (S) Gottemoeller said she wanted to return to the issue 
of counting rules and why the U.S. thought that the second 
paragraph of the Joint Understanding must include the basis 
for calculating limits.  She noted that, originally, when the 
United States arrived at its numbers it noted that it was 
very possible to not include certain systems in the count. 
She then turned to Warner to continue the presentation he 
made in Moscow. 
 
¶37.  (S) Warner noted that the U.S. Strategic Nuclear 
Delivery Vehicles, as delivered in the START January 
Memorandum of Understanding and noted by the Russian Side at 
the small group meeting in Moscow on June 15-16, was 1198. 
Warner highlighted that this number included many delivery 
vehicles that were no longer in use by the U.S. Side.  He 
noted the following that the United States mentioned in its 
elements paper. 
 
- 100 Empty Silos. 
 
- 51 B-52 G models that have been cut apart and are no longer 
flyable. 
 
- 4 B-52 H models that are in similar condition. 
 
- 96 Launch tubes associated with 4 Ohio-class submarines 
that have been modified so they cannot carry or launch SLBMs. 
 
- 66 B-1s in the process of being converted to a non-nuclear 
role that cannot be used in the delivery of nuclear armaments. 
 
- 17 B-1s that will remain in long-term storage at 
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, AZ. 
 
- Adding these systems together totaled 334 systems that 
START accounts for that the U.S. cannot use for the delivery 
of nuclear armaments. 
 
- Warner pointed out that subtracting this number from the 
approximately 1200 START-accountable delivery systems showed 
that the U.S. could not accept a Strategic Nuclear Delivery 
Vehicle limit below 870.  He then highlighted that the actual 
U.S. requirement was approximately 900 Strategic Nuclear 
Delivery Vehicles when taking into account how the U.S. 
operationally deploys its Strategic Nuclear Warheads. 
 
¶38.  (S) Gottemoeller concluded these comments by pointing 
out that each Side had two very different arsenals.  The U.S. 
Side pursued the de-MIRVing path as laid out in the START II 
Treaty (in relation to the ICBM force), but the Russian 
Federation did not pursue such a path.  She noted that this 
was not a comment on Treaty obligations since the START II 
Treaty never entered into force, but she wanted to highlight 
 
 
that there were structural differences in the two arsenals. 
It was up to each Side to structure its arsenal to meet its 
requirements and each Side would need to understand that in 
the future.  It was the hope of the U.S. Side that the 
Russian Side would understand that the United States wanted 
to remove unused systems under the new treaty. 
 
¶39.  (S) Gottemoeller concluded by pointing out that the 
Russian Side also had approximately 300 "phantom" 
START-accountable delivery vehicles that could be removed 
from the new treaty, citing a number of empty SS-18 ICBM 
silos and empty SLBM launch tubes on Typhoon submarines and 
Bulava test platforms. 
 
¶40.  (S) Both Sides agreed to conclude the morning session 
and return to the Russian Mission in the afternoon. 
 
¶41.  (U) Documents exchanged.  None. 
 
¶42.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Ms. Gottemoeller 
Amb Ries 
Mr. Brown 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. Couch 
Mr. Dunn 
Mr. Elliott 
Mr. Fortier 
Col Hartford 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Siemon 
Mr. Taylor 
Mr. Trout 
Dr. Warner 
Mr. French (Int) 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Amb Antonov 
Mr. Koshelev 
Mr. Belyakov 
Mr. Ilin 
Mr. Luchaninov 
Mr. Malyugin 
Mr. Neshin 
Col Novikov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Venevtsev 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
¶43.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
STORELLA