Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09GENEVA511, START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-II):

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09GENEVA511.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09GENEVA511 2009-06-24 14:52 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Mission Geneva
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0511/01 1751452
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 241452Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8704
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4611
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1782
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0790
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5962
S E C R E T GENEVA 000511 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-II): 
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, JUNE 22, 2009 SESSION 
 
REF: A. STATE 60487 
     B. MOSCOW 1347 
     C. STATE 50910 
     D. STATE 61832 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-II-001. 
 
2.  (U) Meeting Date:  June 22, 2009 
                Time:  11:00 A.M. - 1:15 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
3. (S) U.S. and Russian Delegations initiated the third round 
of formal negotiations on the START Follow-on (SFO) Treaty on 
June 22 in Geneva.  The focus of the meeting was Russia's 
presentation of its proposed changes to the U.S. draft Joint 
Understanding for signature by the Presidents at the July 6-8 
Summit in Moscow (REF A).  Russia's main proposals were to: 
 
     - Change "strategic nuclear forces" to "strategic 
offensive arms" throughout the text; 
 
     - Limit strategic offensive arms to an aggregate of 500 
strategic delivery vehicles and 1675 warheads; 
 
     - Delete the U.S.-proposed counting rules, but specify 
that counting procedures would be included in the new Treaty; 
 
     - Include a provision that each side would determine for 
itself the composition and structure of its strategic 
offensive arms; 
 
     - Include a provision on the relationship between 
strategic offensive and defensive arms; 
 
     - Ban the deployment of non-nuclear warheads on 
strategic delivery vehicles; 
 
     - Limit the deployment of strategic delivery vehicles to 
each country's national territory; and 
 
     - Delete the U.S.-proposed statement regarding a 
commitment to initiate subsequent negotiations on a treaty to 
further reduce total nuclear weapon stockpiles. 
 
-------------------- 
U.S. OPENING REMARKS 
-------------------- 
 
4.  (S) Gottemoeller welcomed the Russian Delegation and 
acknowledged that June 22 was the Day of Sorrow and 
Remembrance, which marked the day Nazi Germany invaded the 
Soviet Union.  She joined with the Russian Federation in 
remembering the Soviet citizens who lost their lives during 
the Second World War, and recognized the contributions made 
by the Soviet Union in defending against the Nazi invasion. 
She then made the following remarks: 
 
- Significant events had occurred since the START Follow-on 
meetings held on June 15 and 16 in Moscow.  This included the 
declaration made by President Medvedev in Amsterdam on June 
20, which was straightforward and provided a good basis for 
continued negotiations in Geneva. 
 
- In addition, as notified during the meetings in Moscow, 
Gottemoeller on June 18 provided an information briefing to 
Members of the U.S. Senate.  She was joined by Dr. Jim Miller 
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Dr. George Look 
from the White House, Rear Admiral Phil Davidson from the 
Joint Staff, Mr. Kurt Siemon from the Department of Energy, 
Ambassador Ken Brill, and Mr. Terryl Kron, who had 
participated in the START Follow-on negotiations previously. 
 
- It was clear that there was high-level Congressional 
interest in the START Follow-on negotiations, including from 
Republican Members of the Senate.  Some Senators expressed 
concern that the negotiations were proceeding too quickly; 
others believed that they were proceeding too slowly. 
 
- During the briefing, Gottemoeller noted the bilateral and 
bipartisan roots of the current negotiations.  These included 
the Joint Statement made by Presidents Bush and Putin in 
Sochi in April 2008, and the subsequent meeting of Presidents 
Bush and Medvedev in the summer of 2008.  These bipartisan 
roots were important as they would facilitate ratification of 
the new treaty. 
 
- Regarding President Medvedev's statement in Amsterdam, 
there was hardly anything with which the United States could 
disagree.  Therefore, the U.S. Delegation had high hope for 
progress during this phase of the negotiations. 
 
- Neither the Department of State nor the White House 
provided any public statement in response to President 
Medvedev's declaration.  Instead, the United States was 
intent on listening to the additional information provided by 
the Russian Delegation and proceeding with confidential 
discussions. 
 
5.  (S) Gottemoeller noted that Secretary Clinton and 
Minister Lavrov would meet later during the week.  (Begin 
note:  This comment was made before it was known that the 
SecState would not be traveling.  End note.)  She hoped to be 
able to report substantive progress to them ahead of time. 
She then reviewed the agenda for the current round of 
negotiations, the objective of which was to agree to a Joint 
Understanding, ad-referendum-to-governments, for signature by 
the Presidents at the July 6-8 Summit.  To reach that 
objective, she proposed the Russian Side provide its reaction 
to the U.S. draft Joint Understanding the morning of June 22 
and then the U.S. Side would review the Russian proposal and 
return the morning of June 23 with a response.  Finally, she 
stated that the U.S. Delegation would provide the U.S. 
response to the papers the Russian Federation provided during 
the May 19-20 negotiations in Moscow (REF B) as well as 
answers to questions the Russians had raised regarding the 
U.S. non-paper on "Elements of a START Follow-on Agreement" 
(REF C). 
 
----------------------------- 
RUSSIAN OPENING REMARKS, WITH 
FOCUS ON PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV'S 
 
JUNE 20 DECLARATION 
----------------------------- 
 
6.  (S) Antonov expressed appreciation for remembering the 
Soviet citizens who died during the Great Patriotic War, and 
added that history showed that the United States and Russia 
could win when they worked together.  He added that if the 
two countries could agree on further reductions of strategic 
offensive arms, or efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation 
regime, it would reflect a positive contribution for the 
future.  The United States and Russia must do their best to 
obtain results that are acceptable to each other. 
 
7.  (S) Moving to the task at hand, Antonov agreed with the 
outline and objectives for the June 22-24 negotiations, and 
confirmed the importance of the Sochi declaration made by 
Presidents Bush and Putin, as well as the recent declaration 
made by President Medvedev, in providing a context for the 
current negotiations.  He was pleased with the assessment 
Gottemoeller provided regarding President Medvedev's 
declaration and noted, in particular, that she had said there 
was "hardly anything" with which the United States could not 
agree.  The President's declaration helped define the 
specific problems that required resolution with the United 
States, and was consistent with previous statements made 
concerning the reduction of strategic offensive arms.  The 
President made the declaration proceeding from the Russian 
Federation's position as a nuclear weapons state and 
permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, mindful of 
Russia's commitments under Article VI of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).  Antonov noted the positive 
assessment made by the President with regard to the START 
Follow-on negotiators, highlighting that the negotiations so 
far were substantive and constructive, and were off to a good 
start.  Finally, the President reaffirmed the objective of 
completing a new treaty by the end of the year.  Antonov made 
the following points. 
 
Begin points: 
 
     - Negotiations showed that the United States and Russia 
had much in common.  The constructive environment that 
existed would also help and must be preserved. 
 
     - President Medvedev made clear that the new treaty must 
contain real and effectively verifiable reductions.  The 
President also confirmed the approach agreed with President 
Obama to reduce warheads below Moscow Treaty levels.  The 
Russian Federation was further prepared to reduce strategic 
delivery vehicles by a significant factor consistent with the 
provisions of the START Treaty. 
 
     - President Medvedev's declaration showed Russia's 
seriousness with regard to future reductions, but also 
defined what the basis for further reductions must be. 
 
     - Russia recalled the U.S. paper on "Elements of a START 
Follow-on Agreement" (REF C), as well as the information 
provided during the meetings in Moscow on June 15-16 (REF D), 
in which the United States referred to the START Follow-on 
agreement as a "bridge" or "transition" agreement to be 
followed by more radical reductions in the future.  Russia 
did not consider the START Follow-on agreement to be a 
"bridge" but rather a long-term substantive agreement with 
 
milestones for reductions in strategic offensive arms. 
 
     - The START Follow-on Treaty should reflect a 
significant step toward the goal of a world free of nuclear 
weapons, and the results of the negotiations should represent 
U.S. and Russian leadership in this regard.  The START 
Follow-on Treaty should strengthen security and confirm to 
the world the U.S. and Russian commitment to their NPT 
Article VI obligations.  The START Follow-on Treaty should 
serve as something the United States and Russia could point 
to when asked at the 2010 NPT Review Conference what they had 
done. 
 
     - Another key point contained in President Medvedev's 
declaration was that Russia could not agree with U.S. 
ballistic missile defense plans, and that a START Follow-on 
agreement was only possible if the United States addressed 
Russia's concerns.  The President highlighted that the 
relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms 
needed to be reflected in the START Follow-on Treaty.  The 
United States and Russia would not resolve Russian concerns 
on ballistic missile defense within the context of the START 
Follow-on negotiations; this would be done through other 
mechanisms.  Again, however, the relationship between 
strategic offensive and defensive arms needed to be 
recognized within the context of the START Follow-on Treaty, 
and ballistic missile defense would impact the ability to 
make reductions in strategic offensive arms. 
 
     - The U.S. paper provided in Moscow on June 15 (REF D) 
recognized the relationship between strategic offensive and 
defensive arms, and stipulated U.S. readiness to reflect this 
in the new treaty.  This was a step in the right direction, 
but it was not enough to remove Russian concerns. 
 
     - Russia had expressed its concerns about conventional 
strategic offensive arms, which posed a problem with regard 
to strategic stability.  The Russian Federation sought a ban 
on non-nuclear strategic offensive arms.  Transparency 
measures would not remove all of Russia's concerns. 
 
     - Finally, the President was clear about limiting the 
deployment of strategic offensive arms to each country's 
national territory.  The U.S. non-paper coincided with this 
view. 
 
End points. 
 
8.  (S) Gottemoeller thanked Antonov for the additional 
insights with regard to President Medvedev's declaration, 
noting that they would help in the negotiations.  She 
appreciated that President Medvedev had assessed the 
negotiations positively so far, and noted also his 
instructions to finish the work by the end of the year. 
Gottemoeller agreed that it could be done, although she noted 
it would be difficult. 
 
9.  (S) Gottemoeller drew attention to the portion of 
President Medvedev's declaration that stated reductions in 
strategic delivery vehicles should be several times below 
START levels.  In this regard, it was important to be 
specific about counting rules for these reductions. 
 
10.  (S) Regarding Antonov's comment on the concept of a 
 
"bridge" agreement, Gottemoeller clarified that the START 
Follow-on Treaty would be an important, self-standing 
agreement that would govern the relationship between U.S. and 
Russian strategic nuclear forces for a significant period of 
time.  It would represent a serious step toward the vision of 
a world free of nuclear weapons.  As discussed before, the 
United States believed that there should be a commitment to 
seek further reductions, though it might be discussions 
instead of formal negotiations on additional reductions. 
 
--------------------------- 
RUSSIAN-PROPOSED CHANGES 
TO U.S. JOINT UNDERSTANDING 
--------------------------- 
 
11.  (S) Antonov began his review of the U.S. draft Joint 
Understanding (REF A) by stating that the draft Joint 
Understanding helped clarify the U.S. position.  Russia did 
not understand, however, why the U.S. draft did not reflect 
the key concerns expressed by the Russian Federation.  The 
fact that Russian concerns were not being addressed could 
mean the United States did not understand Russian concerns, 
in which case Russian negotiators needed to do a better job 
explaining Russian concerns.  Alternatively, it could be that 
the United States did not want to listen.  If this were the 
case the United States and Russia would not be able to reach 
an agreement.  The Joint Understanding needed to reflect the 
position of the two Presidents, and should include language 
concerning:  (1) the relationship between strategic offensive 
and defensive arms; (2) non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs; and (3) 
limitations restricting the deployment of strategic offensive 
arms to national territory.  Regarding numbers, the Russian 
Federation proposed limiting strategic offensive arms to an 
aggregate of 500 strategic delivery vehicles and 1675 
warheads associated with them. 
 
12.  (S) Before turning to specific changes, Antonov 
explained that the Russian Federation's approach to the Joint 
Understanding was to simplify the text because it would not 
be possible to resolve all of the U.S. and Russian 
differences on specific issues in time for the July Summit. 
He stated that, with regard to a commitment on additional 
future reductions, Russia did not support this idea.  It 
would be premature without knowing the agreed limitations on 
strategic offensive arms that would be included in the START 
Follow-on; for example, additional "radical" reductions may 
not be appropriate immediately if the START Follow-on limited 
strategic delivery vehicles to 500 or less.  Further, such a 
commitment could not be made without taking into account the 
nuclear forces of other countries.  Finally, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Legal Department reviewed the text and 
concluded that if the Joint Understanding stated that the 
United States and Russia would "initiate new negotiations," 
it incorrectly implied that we had not yet had any such 
negotiations, which could be viewed as inconsistent with our 
NPT Article VI commitment.  Instead of including a commitment 
on additional reductions in the Joint Understanding, this 
idea could be pursued later, perhaps between the delegations' 
legal advisors, while the immediate focus remained on the 
START Follow-on Treaty.  Antonov presented the following 
Russian-proposed changes to the U.S. draft Joint 
Understanding, noting that the Russian approach was to 
include, where appropriate, language that was consistent with 
the April 1 Joint Statement: 
 
 
     - Opening paragraph:  Change to "The President of the 
United States of America and the President of the Russian 
Federation have decided on further reductions in and 
limitations of their nations' strategic offensive arms and on 
prompt conclusion of a new comprehensive and legally-binding 
agreement to replace the START Treaty, to include the 
following elements:" 
 
     - Paragraph 1:  Change to "Each Party will reduce and 
limit its strategic offensive arms so that seven years after 
entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter their aggregate 
numbers of these arms do not exceed the agreed levels of 500 
strategic delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) 
and 1675 warheads associated with them."  Delete 
subparagraphs A and B. 
 
     - Paragraph 2:  Delete in its entirety.  The United 
States and Russia were not likely to agree on counting rules 
before the summit.  Further, such detail was a technical 
matter and should not complicate important political 
statements.  A reference to counting rules could be added to 
U.S.-proposed Paragraph 3. 
 
     - Paragraph 3:  Renumber as Paragraph 2 and change to 
"Provisions on counting rules, definitions, data exchanges, 
notifications, eliminations, inspections and verification 
procedures, as well as confidence building and transparency 
measures, adapted, simplified and made less costly in 
comparison with the START Treaty." 
 
- New Paragraph 3:  "Each Party will determine for itself the 
composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms." 
 
     - New Paragraph 4:  "Provision on interrelationship 
between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms." 
Antonov emphasized that this was drawn from President 
Medvedev's June 20 declaration, but that Russia did not 
anticipate that the Joint Understanding would solve the 
problem of ballistic missile defense. 
 
     - New Paragraph 5:  "Provision banning ICBMs and SLBMs 
in non-nuclear configurations." 
 
     - New Paragraph 6:  "Provision imposing restrictions on 
deployment of strategic offensive arms exclusively on each 
party's territory." 
 
     - Paragraphs 4 and 5:  Renumber as Paragraphs 7 and 8. 
 
     - Paragraph 6:  Renumber as Paragraph 9 and change 
"strategic nuclear forces" to "strategic offensive arms." 
 
     - Retain unnumbered paragraph that stated "The two 
Presidents direct that the treaty be promptly negotiated so 
that they may sign and submit it for ratification in their 
respective countries." 
 
     - Delete unnumbered paragraph that referenced commitment 
to initiate negotiations on a subsequent treaty. 
 
     - Retain remaining paragraph indicating date and 
location of joint signature. 
 
13.  (S) After requesting that certain proposed changes be 
repeated for clarification, Gottemoeller concluded the 
meeting by requesting the Russian-proposed changes in 
writing.  Antonov replied they would be provided in the 
afternoon. 
 
------------------- 
RUSSIAN-PROPOSED 
JOINT UNDERSTANDING 
------------------- 
 
14.  (S) Below is the official translation of the 
Russian-proposed Joint Understanding.  As Antonov suggested, 
when he agreed to provide the Russian-proposed text in 
writing, Russia's written document included some minor 
changes as compared with the version presented orally.  None 
of these changes affected substantive points, however. 
 
Begin text: 
 
                                Official Translation 
 
                                CONFIDENTIAL 
                                To be Turned over to the 
                                U.S. Side 
 
                                Paper of the Russian Side 
                                June 22, 2009 
 
                      JOINT UNDERSTANDING 
 
     The President of the Russian Federation and the 
President of the United States of America have decided on 
further reductions in and limitations of their nations' 
strategic  offensive arms and on concluding at an early date 
a new legally binding agreement to replace the current START 
Treaty.  The new treaty will contain the following elements: 
 
     1.  A provision to the effect that each Party shall 
reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms so that seven 
years after entry into force of the treaty and thereafter the 
aggregate numbers of strategic delivery vehicles 
(intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers) do not exceed agreed 
levels of 500 and 1675 warheads associated with them. 
 
     2.  Provisions on the counting procedure, definitions, 
data exchange, notifications, elimination, inspections and 
verification procedures, as well as confidence building and 
transparency measures, adapted, simplified, and made less 
costly, as appropriate, in comparison to the START Treaty. 
 
     3.  A provision to the effect that each Party will 
determine for itself the composition and structure of its 
strategic offensive arms. 
 
     4.  A provision regarding the interdependence 
((Translator's Note:  here the Russian text uses the word 
"vzaimozavisimost'" ("interdependence"), rather than 
"vzaimosvyaz'"  ("relationship"), which was used in the June 
20 Amsterdam declaration by President Medvedev and in other 
Russian documents)) of strategic offensive and strategic 
defensive arms. 
 
     5.  A provision banning intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles in a 
non-nuclear configuration. 
 
     6.  A provision on basing strategic offensive arms 
exclusively on the national territory of the Parties. 
 
     7.  Establishment of an implementation body to resolve 
questions related to treaty implementation. 
 
     8.  The provisions of the treaty will not apply to 
existing patterns of cooperation in the area of strategic 
offensive arms between a Party and a third state. 
 
     9.  The duration of the treaty shall be established as a 
period of ten years, unless it is superseded before that time 
by a subsequent treaty on the reduction of strategic 
offensive arms. 
 
     The two Presidents direct their negotiators to work out 
the treaty at an early date so that they may sign and submit 
it for ratification in their respective countries. 
 
     Done at (City), this (date) day of (month), 2009, in two 
originals, in the Russian and English languages. 
 
FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
(President D.A. Medvedev)   (President B. Obama) 
 
End text. 
 
15.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- Russia: 
 
    -- Russian-proposed Joint Understanding, dated June 22, 
2009. 
 
16.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
A/S Gottemoeller 
Amb Ries 
Mr. Brown 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. Couch 
Mr. Dunn 
Mr. Elliott 
Mr. Fortier 
Col Hartford 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Siemon 
Mr. Taylor 
Mr. Trout 
Dr. Warner 
Mr. French (Int) 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Amb Antonov 
Mr. Koshelev 
Mr. Belyakov 
 
Mr. Ilin 
Mr. Luchaninov 
Mr. Malyugin 
Mr. Neshin 
Col Novikov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Smirnov 
Gen Venevtsev 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
17.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
STORELLA