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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2019 
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIV:  (U) HOD MEETING ON B-1 HEAVY BOMBER 
CONVERSION AND BASING OF U.S. HEAVY BOMBERS AND UKRAINIAN 
POSITION ON EXPIRATION OF START, JUNE 10, 2009 
 
REF: A. STATE 54967 (U.S. RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
        AIDE-MEMOIRE ON CONVERSION OF THE B-1 
        HEAVY BOMBER) 
     ¶B. RUSSIAN FEDERATION AIDE-MEMOIRE ON RUSSIAN 
        CONCERNS OVER U.S. ACTIVITY INVOLVING 
        CONVERSION OF B-1 HEAVY BOMBERS FOR 
        NON-NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND THE BASING OF 
        SUCH BOMBERS DATED OCTOBER 20 2008 
     ¶C. RUSSIAN FEDERATION AIDE-MEMOIRE ON RUSSIAN 
        CONCERNS REGARDING UNITED STATES 
        COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF 
        THE START TREATY DATED MARCH 10 2009 
     ¶D. STATE 58439 (JCIC-XXXIV-GUIDANCE 002) 
     ¶E. GENEVA 1005 (JCIC-XXXIII-017) 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXIV-013. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  June 10, 2009 
                Time:  3:30 - 5:00 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting was held at the 
U.S. Mission on June 10, 2009, to discuss the conversion of 
the B-1 heavy bomber to a heavy bomber equipped for 
non-nuclear armament, basing of U.S. heavy bombers, and the 
Ukrainian position on the expiration of START.  The United 
States, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine were represented. 
 
¶4.  (S) The U.S. Delegation explained that the conversion 
should render the aircraft incapable of carrying nuclear 
armaments but should not render the aircraft incapable of 
carrying conventional armaments.  The U.S. Delegation also 
showed a photograph depicting a forward weapons bay before 
the conversion process is completed and explained what was 
actually done to convert the weapons bay.  The Russian 
Delegation stated that they understood the conversion process 
of the B-1 heavy bomber, but were not certain that the 
process could not be quickly reversed.  They also offered 
that they had been provided a copy of the photograph that the 
U.S. Delegation had shown.  The U.S. Delegation stated that 
the key to progress on this issue would come in a mutual 
understanding of the term "incapable of carrying" and 
encouraged discussion of the U.S.-proposed Draft Joint 
Statement provided to the Parties on June 5, 2009 (REF A). 
The Russian Delegation said it would study the issue during 
the intersession and provide a recommendation on how the 
issue could be resolved. 
 
¶5.  (S) On the issue of the Ukrainian position regarding 
expiration of the START Treaty, Nykonenko read a lengthy 
statement expressing Ukraine's view that START should be 
extended to provide the time necessary for negotiations of a 
follow-on agreement and asserted Ukraine's right to be a part 
of any follow-on treaty. 
 
--------------- 
SAME OLD ISSUES 
 
 
--------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) Koshelev opened the meeting, stating that the issue 
of conversion of the B-1 heavy bomber had been discussed in 
detail at JCIC-XXXII and JCIC-XXXIII.  In addition, Russian 
concerns had been stated in two aides-memoire dated October 
20, 2008 and March 10, 2009 (REFS B and C).  Russia continued 
to have concerns about the U.S. process to convert the B-1 to 
a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments because 
Russia still believed the B-1s that had undergone the 
conversion process retained the capability to carry nuclear 
armaments. 
 
¶7.  (S) Koshelev said that the United States was applying a 
new concept or definition that was not provided for in the 
Treaty.  He added that the requirements of Section VI, 
Paragraph 11, of the Conversion or Elimination (C or E) 
Protocol were quite clear that "all weapons bays equipped to 
carry nuclear armaments be modified so as to render them 
incapable of carrying nuclear armaments."  (Begin comment: 
Koshelev, when referring to a "new concept," was referring to 
the capability to operationally deploy or deliver a nuclear 
weapon.  End comment.) 
 
---------------- 
WE NEED TO SEE 
BEFORE AND AFTER 
---------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Koshelev recalled the July 10, 2008 inspection at the 
Davis-Monthan C or E Facility and stated that the 
distinguishability exhibition provided did not give the 
inspectors the opportunity to view both a non-converted B-1 
and a converted B-1.  Specifically, inspectors had seen 
partially disassembled pylon attachments from a non-converted 
B-1 and could not distinguish them from the converted pylon 
attachment joints.  By not providing this distinguishability 
and technical analysis, Russia could not determine the 
conversion methods used by the United States.  Additionally, 
Koshelev stated that the Russian Federation was not convinced 
that the attachment joints from the converted and 
non-converted aircraft had external and functional 
differences. 
 
------------------- 
AIR BASE DEFINITION 
------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Koshelev reiterated Russia's concerns with basing 
heavy bombers of different categories at the same base.  He 
said this practice conflicted with the requirements of 
Paragraph 23 of Article V.  While the Russian Federation did 
not have an issue with the presence of B-1 aircraft at 
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, it did not believe they should 
be based there.  Koshelev said that the Russian Federation 
was still studying the U.S. non-paper, "On Conversion of the 
B-1 Heavy Bomber Equipped for Nuclear Weapons to a Heavy 
Bomber Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments," dated May 27, 
2009 (REF D). 
 
-------------------------- 
LET US EXPLAIN WHAT WE DID 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) Taylor stated that the Parties appeared to have 
 
 
different viewpoints on "irreversibility."  Koshelev 
immediately replied back that he had not used the term 
"irreversibility" and that, in fact, this was not the issue. 
Taylor responded that he believed this was an issue that came 
out of a working group from the previous JCIC session (REF E). 
 
¶11.  (S) Taylor proceeded to deliver the U.S. explanation and 
interpretation of the B-1 conversion process.  He referred to 
Paragraphs 10 and 11 of Section VI of the C or E Protocol 
which contains the "incapable of carrying nuclear armaments" 
clause.  He argued that this clause did not mean that nuclear 
weapons cannot physically fit inside the weapons bay. 
Likewise, the term "carrying nuclear armaments" did not 
simply mean the ability to load or to hold an object the size 
and weight of a nuclear weapon. 
 
¶12.  (S) Taylor assured the other Parties that the United 
States had no plans or intentions of returning the B-1 to a 
nuclear role.  Once converted, the B-1 could no longer be 
used for the delivery of nuclear armaments. 
 
¶13.  (S) Taylor said that the United States was prepared to 
work with the other Parties to develop an understanding on 
the intent of the term "no longer capable of carrying" and 
that if there were to be a resolution of this issue, the 
Parties needed to develop a practical solution that did not 
entail the removal of the capability for the B-1 to deliver 
non-nuclear weapons. 
 
¶14.  (S) Taylor added that, if such a practical solution 
could be reached for the weapons bay issue, a solution could 
also be reached for the pylon attachment joint issue. 
 
¶15.  (S) Taylor addressed the July 10, 2008 Data Update 
Inspection at the Davis-Monthan C or E Facility by adding 
that although at a distance the pylon attachment joint for a 
B-1 that had been converted and a B-1 that had not been 
converted appear similar, they served a different function. 
He assured the Parties that there were indeed physical 
differences which make the pylon attachment joint unusable 
for the pylons for LRNAs. 
 
¶16.  (S) Taylor turned to the issue of basing and stated that 
there had been no change in the location where B-1 heavy 
bombers were based.  For accountability purposes, the B-1s 
were being attributed to Davis-Monthan when the conversion 
process was initiated. 
 
¶17.  (S) Taylor emphasized that the Treaty provided for the 
conversion of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments 
other than LRNA to the category of heavy bombers equipped for 
non-nuclear armaments and that definitions for these terms 
existed. 
 
¶18.  (S) Taylor welcomed Russian views on what conversion 
procedure would meet Treaty requirements in their mind. 
 
----------------- 
YOU HAVE A PHOTO? 
----------------- 
 
¶19.  (S) Koshelev said he believed that the United States had 
the correct approach to solve this issue, but there were some 
 
terms in the Treaty that had dual interpretations.  An 
understanding between the Parties must come from focusing on 
 
 
a common understanding of terms.  He reiterated Russia's 
concern that the B-1 could still be quickly returned to a 
nuclear role. 
 
¶20.  (S) Ryzhkov asked about a photograph that had been 
promised in the U.S. Delegation Paper, provided to the 
Parties on June 5, 2009, that stated that the U.S. Delegation 
would show a photograph depicting the B-1 weapons bay prior 
to conversion (REF A).  Taylor provided the photograph for 
the Parties to review and Hanchett explained the various 
items in the photograph to include explaining the conversion 
process, identifying the various elements within the weapons 
bays that were modified during the conversion process. 
Taylor called for a break to let the Parties examine the 
photograph. 
 
¶21.  (S) After a short break, during which the Parties 
reviewed the photograph, Ryzhkov noted that he already had 
the photograph since it was provided during the 
pre-inspection briefing at the distinguishability exhibition. 
 
------------- 
MORE HOMEWORK 
------------- 
 
¶22.  (S) Koshelev stated he understood that the 
distinguishing characteristic of the B-1 that made it 
incapable of carrying a nuclear armament is the removal of a 
unique cable and a cap placed over its lead to the weapons 
bay.  Despite this, the Russian Federation was still not 
convinced that those cables could not be reinstalled just as 
quickly as they were removed.  He said this is a good example 
of where our interpretations diverge and warrant a more 
concrete understanding of the term "incapable of carrying." 
He again pointed out that the United States had a good 
approach to alleviate Russian concerns and that Russia would 
like to think about this and other possible methods as 
"homework" and respond at a later date. 
 
¶23.  (S) Taylor stated that it was important to reach a joint 
understanding of the term "incapable of carrying" and that 
this was the vital piece to making progress.  He added that 
he welcomed Russian ideas and looked forward to hearing their 
thoughts. 
 
¶24.  (S) Koshelev echoed Taylor's statement and noted that it 
was clear where U.S. and Russian opinions diverged, but by 
sitting down together we could solve this issue.  He added 
that he understood the U.S. interpretation of "incapable of 
carrying," but again asked what the time required would be to 
re-convert the B-1 back to a nuclear role.  Koshelev asked 
for any additional points Taylor had made be provided in 
written form.  Taylor agreed to provide them.  The additional 
points, in the form of a U.S. Delegation Paper, are provided 
below.  (The Delegation Paper was provided on June 12, 2009 
to the Russian Delegation.) 
 
Begin text: 
 
                                    JCIC-XXXIV 
                                    U.S. Delegation Paper 
                                    June 10, 2009 
 
       Additional Points on Conversion of the B-1 Heavy 
     Bomber Equipped for Nuclear Weapons to a Heavy Bomber 
 
 
               Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments 
 
- If the parties can develop a practical solution for the 
weapons bay issue, the United States is confident that the 
Parties could also move to a practical solution for the pylon 
atachment joint issue. 
 
- Regarding the data updae inspection that occurred on July 
10, 2008, at avis-Monthan, Russian inspectors made an 
observaion that the pylon attachment joit for the B-1 that 
had not been converted appeared to be identical to the 
modified pylon attachment joint.  The United States offers 
the fllowing comments: 
 
     1) There may be some simiarity in viewing the modified 
pylon attachment jint and unmodified pylon attachment joint 
from adistance.  The modified pylon attachment joints seve 
a function which is different from that of th unmodified 
pylon attachment joints. 
 
     2) Te United States assures the other Paties that 
there are physical differences which make the pylon 
attachment joint unusable for the pylons for long-range 
nuclear ALCMs. 
 
- On the issue of location, basing, and attribution of 
converted B-1 heavy bombers, the United States notes that 
there has been no change in the location where the B-1 heavy 
bombers are based.  For administrative purposes, the heavy 
bombers are being attributed to Davis-Monthan when the 
conversion process is initiated.  They will remain attributed 
to Davis-Monthan until the conversion process for all B-1 
heavy bombers is complete. 
 
- The Treaty provides for the conversion of heavy bombers 
equipped for nuclear armaments other than LRNA to the 
category of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. 
 Additionally, the Treaty contains a definition for a heavy 
bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.  The implication 
of these provisions is that the Treaty allows for the 
converted heavy bomber to retain a capability to 
operationally deploy non-nuclear armaments. 
 
- The United States would welcome Russian views on what 
conversion procedures would meet the Treaty's requirement 
that a converted heavy bomber be "incapable of carrying" 
nuclear armaments, while retaining the capability of carrying 
and operationally deploying non-nuclear armaments. 
 
End text. 
 
¶25.  (S) Shevtsov stated that there was a broad range of 
perspectives on this issue.  In a narrow view, "incapable of 
carrying" could just mean operationally incapable.  In this 
case, certain cables have been removed.  In an extreme view, 
it could mean bomb bay doors being welded shut, for example, 
which would make the bomber "physically incapable" of 
carrying nuclear armaments, but would also make the bomber 
obsolete.  He pointed out transparency based on promises 
required trust, but the "guarantee" required physical 
incapability.  Shevtsov concluded there was a compromise that 
was possible, but it may not be achievable within the time 
remaining under START. 
 
¶26.  (S) Taylor concluded by reemphasizing the importance of 
 
 
reaching a joint understanding of "incapable of carrying." 
He said the task before the Parties was to find a compromise 
and that "where there is a will, there is a way."  He added 
that he hoped we could continue these discussions during the 
intersessional period.  Koshelev said the Russian Delegation 
would study the issue during the intersession and provide a 
recommendation on how it would resolve the issue. 
 
---------------------- 
WE WANT TO BE INVOLVED 
IN THE FUTURE 
---------------------- 
 
¶27.  (S) Nykonenko delivered the Ukrainian statement on START 
expiration.  He promised to provide a written copy to all 
Parties.  The official translation of the Ukrainian statement 
follows. 
 
Begin text: 
 
                                    Official Translation 
 
                                    JCIC-XXXIV 
                                    Non-Paper of the 
                                    Ukrainian Side 
                                    June 10, 2009 
 
     The Ukrainian side placed on the agenda the issue of 
Ukraine's position in connection with expiration of the 
Treaty. 
 
     On the substance of the issue, the Delegation of Ukraine 
is authorized to state the following: 
 
     ¶1.  Ukraine is in favor of extending the Treaty -- its 
mechanism has proven its effectiveness throughout the fifteen 
years of its existence.  Such a decision ensures a favorable 
time frame for thorough preparation of the new Agreement. 
 
     ¶2.  Having signed the Lisbon Protocol in May 1992, 
Ukraine acquired the status of a START successor state to the 
USSR as a full-fledged party, i.e. it not only assumed 
obligations, but also obtained certain rights.  Ukraine's 
unprecedented contribution to nuclear disarmament and its 
active participation in reducing strategic offensive arms 
confirmed our country's status as a reliable and predictable 
partner. 
 
     ¶3.  The situation that has now emerged, where, in 
essence, Ukraine is excluded from the intensive negotiating 
process being conducted by Russia and the U.S., which should 
result in conclusion of an agreement to replace the START 
Treaty, is not only of great concern to the leadership of 
Ukraine, but is also becoming a subject of widespread 
discussion in political circles and among the most 
politically active segment of Ukraine's population. 
 
     ¶4.  Ukraine has been quite sensitive about the decision 
of the U.S. and Russia to begin negotiations to work out a 
new agreement in a bilateral format.  Ukraine, which 
possesses significant potential in terms of missile 
technology production and has sufficient experience in 
nuclear disarmament verification activities, believes that it 
is fully entitled to participate actively in the new treaty. 
 
 
     ¶5.  Moreover, since it has a legal right to develop 
non-nuclear strategic offensive arms, Ukraine believes that 
because the new agreement is expected to deal with the 
category of "non-nuclear strategic weapon delivery vehicles," 
it is possible for Ukraine, from both a formal and a legal 
point of view, to participate in the new agreement as a party 
to the treaty. 
 
     ¶6.  Ukraine urges the interested parties to engage in a 
constructive dialogue with a view to ensuring that there is 
maximum transparency and that the interests of all the 
Parties to the START Treaty are taken into account to the 
fullest extent on the issue of strategic offensive arms 
control, and Ukraine believes that its absence among the 
Parties to the new international agreement in this area could 
cast doubt on the effectiveness of the Treaty being 
negotiated. 
 
     ¶7.  The Ukrainian side believes that the proposal in the 
statement by the Belarusian side at the meeting of the 
Commission on June 8, 2009, on adoption of a document that 
would reflect each Party's contribution to implementation of 
the Treaty is timely and appropriate.  We also believe it 
would be advisable to reflect in that document the prospects 
for our further cooperation in reducing strategic offensive 
arms. 
 
     ¶8.  In connection with the foregoing, Ukraine once again 
tables its proposal to hold an additional working session of 
the JCIC in order to discuss and adopt decisions on the 
outstanding issues, including those raised by the Ukrainian 
side. 
 
End text. 
 
¶28.  (S) Koshelev thanked the Ukrainian Delegation and noted 
that their issues were both within the scope of the JCIC and 
outside the scope of the JCIC.  He mentioned that the Russian 
Delegation would explore these issues and comment on them at 
a later time. 
 
¶29.  (S) Taylor also thanked the Ukrainian Delegation and 
informed them that the U.S. Delegation would take these 
issues back to Washington for study.  He stated that these 
issues required serious thought and, therefore ,the United 
States would reserve comment at this time. 
 
¶30.  (S) The U.S. Delegation also provided a U.S. Delegation 
Paper containing the modalities of the Minuteman III 
demonstration.  That text of the paper follows. 
 
Begin text: 
 
                                   JCIC-XXXIV 
                                   U.S. Delegation Paper 
                                   June 10, 2009 
 
       U.S. One-time Demonstration of the Minuteman III 
                      ICBM Front Section 
 
     The United States has decided to organize a one-time 
demonstration of the Minuteman III front section.  This 
one-time demonstration will be conducted outside the 
obligations of the Treaty and will not be counted against the 
quotas of inspections allocated to the other Parties.  The 
 
 
 
United States will inform the Parties to the Treaty through 
Diplomatic channels of the date of the demonstration. 
 
     The procedures used to conduct the demonstration will 
mimic procedures listed in Annex 3 of the Inspection 
Protocol.  After separation from the ICBM, the front section 
will be transported to a Specially Allocated Site where 
members of the Observing Team will be permitted to view the 
space inside the lower portion of the front section to 
determine that it cannot contain items corresponding to 
reentry vehicles. 
 
     Shrouding of sensitive elements may be present and will 
not impede any determination that additional reentry vehicles 
cannot be located within the space of the lower portion of 
the front section of a Minuteman III ICBM. 
 
     The United States stresses that no additional devices or 
equipment will be used during the one-time demonstration. 
 
     The U.S. expectation for the results of the 
demonstration will be a factual report documenting the 
conduct of the demonstration, including procedures used and 
what the Observing Team observed. 
 
     The Minuteman III ICBM RVOSI demonstration is a one-time 
event and will not be a demonstration of a new method of 
presenting the Minuteman III ICBM front section for use 
during future RVOSIs.  The demonstration is intended to 
foster confidence and predictability in the existing 
Minuteman III RVOSI procedures. 
 
     The United States does not intend that any new 
procedures specific to this one-time demonstration will be 
codified. 
 
     The United States expects that satisfactory conduct of 
the demonstration will allow the Parties to resolve this 
issue, that the Parties will record this result in 
Coordinated Statements at a JCIC session following the 
demonstration or through diplomatic channels, and that this 
issue accordingly will be removed from the JCIC agenda. 
 
     Details concerning the modalities of the demonstration 
are as follows: 
 
     ¶1.  The United States will select the ICBM base for silo 
launchers of ICBMs at which the demonstration will be 
conducted. 
 
     ¶2.  The Observing Team will designate the silo launcher 
of ICBMs containing the Minuteman III front section for the 
demonstration. 
 
     ¶3.  The procedures set forth in Annex 3 to the 
Inspection Protocol will be followed up to the point of front 
section separation.  The procedures set forth in paragraph 1 
of Annex 2 to the Inspection Protocol will be used to view a 
silo launcher declared not to contain a Minuteman III ICBM 
should that be encountered. 
 
     ¶4.  Following completion of the demonstration, a 
narrative report will be prepared documenting the conduct of 
the demonstration, including what procedures were used and 
what the Observing Team observed. 
 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
¶31.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- U.S. 
 
    -- U.S. Delegation Paper Containing Additional Points on 
Conversion of the B-1 Heavy Bomber Equipped for Nuclear 
Weapons to a Heavy Bomber Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments, 
dated June 10, 2009 (provided to the Russian Delegation on 
June 12, 2009); 
 
    -- U.S. Delegation Paper containing Questions from the 
United States Delegation to Help Resolve U.S. Concerns on 
SS-27 RVOSI Procedures, dated June 9, 2009; and 
 
    -- U.S. Delegation Paper on the U.S. One-Time 
Demonstration of the Minuteman III ICBM Front Section, dated 
June 10, 2009. 
 
- UKRAINE: 
 
    -- Ukrainian Paper, Ukraine's Position on the Expiration 
of the START Treaty, dated June 10, 2009. 
 
¶32. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Taylor 
Mr. Beddoes 
Ms. Bosco 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. Couch 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Dunn 
Mr. Edinger 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Hanchett 
Mr. Johnston 
LT Lobner 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Stein 
Mr. Vogel 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
Dr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
BELARUS 
 
Mr. Ugorich 
Mr. Ponomarev 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Mr. Koshelev 
Mr. Bolotov 
Ms. Ivanova 
Mr. Kashirin 
Ms. Kotkova 
Col Petrov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Schevtchenko 
Mr. Serov 
Mr. Smirnov 
 
 
Mr. Vorontsov 
Col Zaytsev 
Mr. Dashko (Int) 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
UKRAINE 
 
Mr. Nykonenko 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Mr. Chernyavskiy 
MGen Fedotov 
Mr. Shevchenko 
 
¶33.  (U) Taylor sends. 
STORELLA