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S E C R E T GENEVA 000468 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2019 
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIV:  (U) HOD MEETING ON COURTLAND MISSILE 
ASSEMBLY FACILITY AND RS-24 NEW TYPE, JUNE 9, 2009 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 40874 (JCIC-DIP-02-002) PROVISIONS IN 
        ADVANCE OF DATA ON THE LV-2 SPACE LAUNCH 
        VEHICLE 
     ¶B. RUSSIAN FEDERATION AIDE-MEMOIRE ON RUSSIAN 
        CONCERNS REGARDING U.S. COMPLIANCE WITH 
        CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE START TREATY 
        DATED MARCH 10 2009 (E-MAILED FROM 
        MOSCOW-NO REPORTING CABLE) 
     ¶C. GENEVA 466 (JCIC-XXXIV-015) 
     ¶D. STATE 58439 (JCIC-XXXIV-GUIDANCE 002) 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXIV-012. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  June 10, 2009 
                Time:  10:30 - 11:30 A.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the 
U.S. Mission on June 10, 2009, to discuss Russian concerns 
with the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility and the U.S. 
concerns associated with the Russian declaration of a 
prototype of a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM).  All Parties were represented. 
 
¶4.  (S) The Russian Delegation reiterated its position on 
Courtland as a production facility and planned to review the 
additional information provided this session by the U.S. 
Delegation (REF A).  The U.S. Delegation stated U.S. concerns 
with Russia's prototype RS-24 ICBM and expressed hope that 
the Russian Delegation would soon provide additional 
information on its plans to test and deploy the prototype 
ICBM.  The Russian Delegation assured the Parties that all 
Treaty obligations would be met when the testing and 
development of the prototype was complete. 
 
----------------------- 
THEY ARE WHAT THEY WERE 
----------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Koshelev opened the HOD Meeting and offered that the 
issue of the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility was first 
discussed at JCIC-XXXI.  He thanked the U.S. Delegation for 
the additional document provided on April 23, 2009 (REF A), 
and the U.S. Delegation Paper containing a U.S. response to 
the Russian aide-memoir of March 10, 2009 (Ref B), that had 
been provided on June 9, 2009 (Ref C).  He reviewed the 
points made in the Russian Federation aide-memoire from March 
10, 2009.  He noted that there had not been time for the 
Russian Delegation to analyze the paper provided the previous 
day by the U.S. Delegation.  He noted that the United States 
had not yet responded to Russian questions; specifically, 
Russia still questioned the declaration of Courtland as a 
production facility, the definition of a target vehicle as a 
submarine launch ballistic missile (SLBM), and what to do if 
a target vehicle was encountered by Russian inspectors. 
 
¶6.  (S) First, Koshelev stated Courtland did not conform to 
the START Treaty definition of the term "production facility" 
 
 
and the activities as briefed were not consistent with 
paragraph (a) of the START definition for "production 
facility." 
 
¶7.  (S) Second, Koshelev explained that the Russian 
Federation did not think it was correct for a target vehicle 
incorporating a Trident I first stage SLBM to be considered a 
Trident I SLBM.  He paraphrased paragraph 3(a) of Article III 
of the Treaty on the first stages of a particular type of 
SLBM.  He repeated that a target vehicle was not a Trident I 
SLBM and there was no category for target vehicles.  He 
continued that, if any missile with the first stage could be 
referred to as an SLBM of that type, there would be a 
conflict with confirmation of type in terms of technical 
characteristics. 
 
¶8.  (S) Lastly, Koshelev said there remained a question of 
what a Russian inspection team would do when encountering a 
target vehicle.  He opined that the United States should have 
identified and provided inspection procedures to the other 
Parties.  Koshelev asked the United States for further 
clarification. 
 
¶9.  (S) Taylor assured all Treaty Parties that the activities 
conducted at the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility were in 
compliance with Treaty requirements.  He pointed out the 
related portions of the Treaty definition for "production 
facility" which states that "for ICBMs or SLBMs, a facility 
at which first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, 
stored and transported in stages are assembled."  He reminded 
all Parties that the United States maintains, stores, and 
transports the Trident I SLBM in stages, so that when a 
Trident I SLBM first stage was encountered, it was considered 
to be a Trident I SLBM. 
 
¶10.  (S) Taylor described the activities at Courtland at 
which Trident I SLBM first stage motors were accountable as a 
Trident I SLBM and would undergo activities consistent with 
work done at production facilities, including stage assembly. 
 He stated that Trident I SLBM first stages assembled at the 
Courtland Facility would be incorporated into launch 
vehicle-2 (LV-2) space launch vehicles and that these LV-2 
would begin exiting the Courtland Facility in the near future. 
 
¶11.  (S) Taylor reiterated that the LV-2 would be accountable 
under the START Treaty as a Trident I SLBM; it was the 
Trident I SLBM first stage that was the item of 
accountability in accordance with START, Article III, 
paragraph 3(a).  He quoted the Treaty and reminded the 
Parties of the Diplomatic Note (REF C) that provided the LV-2 
technical information.  Taylor concluded that an LV-2 target 
vehicle, if encountered by Russian inspectors, would be 
considered a Trident I SLBM first stage. 
 
¶12.  (S) Koshelev asked his Russian Delegation experts if 
they were satisfied with the U.S. response.  Ryzhkov answered 
that they planned to study the document that was provided and 
comment in detail during the intersession.  Taylor clarified 
with additional points and explained that it would be a 
similar situation if U.S. inspectors encountered a START or a 
START I space launch vehicle.  Both space launch vehicles 
were SS-25s in terms of accountability, notifications, and 
other obligations of the Treaty.  In similar fashion, when 
Russian inspectors encountered a Trident SLBM in a loading 
tube and requested that it be removed, they determined type 
of SLBM by viewing and measuring the first stage only. 
 
Ryzhkov asked whether telemetry would be provided for an LV-2 
flight test and Taylor assured him that all Treaty 
obligations would be met and all Treaty notifications would 
be provided. 
 
------------------- 
WHEN, OH WHEN, WILL 
THE PROTOTYPE BE 
------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S) Taylor addressed the second agenda item, stating 
that issues associated with Russia's prototype of a new type 
of mobile ICBM (RS-24) were discussed extensively since 
JCIC-XXIX.  He added that, although the Russian Federation 
had provided some information, Washington still had concerns 
with regard to the Russian Federation's plans for testing and 
deployment of the new prototype ICBM.  Taylor noted that, 
during the last JCIC session, the United States provided a 
written copy of those concerns to be taken back to Moscow for 
consideration.  Taylor cited statements in the Russian press 
by both the chief designer of the RS-24 ICBM and the 
commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces indicating that the 
RS-24 ICBM would enter service by the end of 2009.  He stated 
that the United States continued to await a response 
regarding the Russian Federation's plans for the testing and 
deployment of the RS-24 ICBM. 
 
¶14.  (S) Koshelev said he consulted with Russian missile and 
legal experts and wanted to stress that the RS-24 was still a 
prototype ICBM.  He stated that the missile's final technical 
characteristics were not finalized.  He indicated that, when 
the development of the prototype of the RS-24 was complete, 
the Russian Federation would provide all of the information 
required by the Treaty.  Koshelev cautioned that the media 
should not be relied upon since some statements were made for 
political reasons and may not be based on fact.  He reminded 
the Parties that he was the Russian Federation's authority 
and would provide the official report on this issue.  He 
closed saying he would do his best to provide the information 
to help the United States understand, or as his foreign 
minister says, allay concerns. 
 
¶15.  (S) Shevtsov raised the point that Russia had many 
variants and asked whether there was a special name or index 
for the new type of missile under development.  Koshelev 
said, again, that when the Russian Federation had the 
information they would provide it to all Parties, as required 
by the Treaty. 
 
¶16.  (S) On the margins of the meeting, Hanchett provided a 
U.S. Delegation paper to Ryzhkov containing the U.S. response 
(REF D) to the Russian Aide-Memoire of December 23, 2008 on 
Telemetric Information for the Minuteman III ICBM flight test 
on August 13, 2008, and two interpretive data sheets to 
correct interpretive data sheets that had errors. 
 
¶17.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- U.S.: 
 
    -- U.S. Delegation Paper from JCIC-XXXIV of June 9, 2009, 
U.S. Response to Russian Aide-Memoire of December 23, 2008, 
on Telemetric Information for the Minuteman III ICBM Flight 
Test on August 13, 2008. 
 
¶18.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Taylor 
Mr. Beddoes 
Ms. Bosco 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. Couch 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Dunn 
Maj Edinger 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Hanchett 
Mr. Johnston 
LT Lobner 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Stein 
Mr. Vogel 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
BELARUS 
 
Mr. Ugorich 
Mr. Ponomarev 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
 
Mr. Nurgozhayev 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Mr. Koshelev 
Mr. Bolotov 
Ms. Ivanova 
Mr. Kashirin 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Petrov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Serov 
Mr. Shevtchenko 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Vorontsov 
Col Zaytsev 
Mr. Dashko (Int) 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
UKRAINE 
 
Mr. Nykonenko 
MGen Fedotov 
Mr. Shevchenko 
Dr. Shevtsov 
 
¶19.  (U) Taylor sends. 
STORELLA