VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0467/01 1631305
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 121305Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8626
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4574
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1739
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0747
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5915

S E C R E T GENEVA 000467 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2019 
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIV:  (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON UPDATED 
PHOTOGRAPHS FOR THE SS-27 ROAD-MOBILE ICBM, SS-25 
ELIMINATIONS AND SS-27 RVOSI, JUNE 9, 2009 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXIV-011. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  June 9, 2009 
                Time:  3:30 - 5:00 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) A Working Group (WG) meeting was held at the Russian 
Mission on June 9, 2009, to discuss the U.S. request for 
updated SS-27 road-mobile ICBM memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) photographs, SS-25 Elimination Procedures and SS-27 
Reentry Vehicle On-site Inspection (RVOSI) procedures.  All 
Parties were represented except Belarus. 
 
¶4.  (S) The U.S. Delegation stated that current MOU 
photographs of the road-mobile SS-27 ICBM in its launch 
canister no longer corresponded to the configuration of these 
missiles as they currently exit the Votkinsk Portal 
Monitoring Facility (VPMF).  The United States requested 
updated photographs to assist monitors and inspectors in 
differentiating RS-24 and SS-27 ICBMs in the future. 
 
¶5.  (S) The Russian Delegation said that it had thoroughly 
examined the issue prior to arriving in Geneva and noted that 
SS-27 ICBMs leave the production facility in various 
configurations.  Monitors could use the current MOU 
photographs in conjunction with measurement procedures to 
confirm the item of continuous monitoring.  As such, Russia 
did not see the need to provide an updated MOU photograph. 
 
¶6.  (S) The U.S. Delegation acknowledged the Russian 
Federation's cooperation in bringing its SS-25 ICBM 
elimination procedures into compliance with the Treaty, 
noting that 54 SS-25 ICBMs, including their entire 
self-contained dispensing mechanisms (SCDMs), had been fully 
eliminated and are considered removed from accountability. 
The U.S. Delegation requested clarification as to when the 
Russian Federation intended to eliminate the remaining 109 
SCDM casings declared eliminated by Russia prior to 2008. 
 
¶7.  (S) The Russian Delegation responded that it intended to 
eliminate the remaining SCDM casings; however, there is no 
set timeline as the eliminations could occur prior to or even 
after Treaty expiration.  If any casings are eliminated prior 
to Treaty expiration the Parties would be notified in 
accordance with the Treaty. 
 
¶8.  (S) The Parties also discussed potential solutions to the 
shroud used by Russia during SS-27 RVOSIs which impedes U.S. 
inspectors from ascertaining that the SS-27 does not have 
more than one reentry vehicle.  The United States posed a 
series of questions to better understand Russian concerns and 
drew from previously resolved RVOSI issues as examples of 
methods that could be used for potential resolution of the 
current issue. 
 
¶9.  (S) The Russian Delegation responded that it is prepared 
to work toward resolving the issue but if there was an easy 
 
 
solution it would have already been resolved.  Ryzhkov stated 
that the SS-27 ICBM is a different system, and provides a 
different set of obstacles.  The procedures that had been 
developed for SS-25 RVOSI were not applicable to SS-27 RVOSI. 
 The Russian Delegation said it was not prepared to answer 
specific questions posed by the United States and requested 
that the U.S. Delegation provide its questions in writing. 
 
¶10.  (S) The Ukrainian Delegation supported a previous 
Russian argument that telemetric information from flight 
tests could be used to confirm that the SS-27 ICBM can only 
be equipped with one warhead and military experts would not 
want to deploy a system that had not been tested beyond its 
capabilities.  The U.S. Delegation suggested that applying 
this logic would resolve Minuteman III issues as well, which 
seemed to result in a consensus to dismiss Ukraine's 
suggestion. 
 
--------------------------- 
WHAT'S THE BIG DEAL?  SCDMS 
CAN'T FLY ON THEIR OWN 
--------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) Couch opened the WG Meeting on June 10, 2009, and 
said the United States would like to acknowledge the Russian 
Federation's cooperation in bringing its SS-25 ICBM 
elimination procedures into compliance with the Treaty. 
Since January 2008, 54 SS-25 ICBMs, including their entire 
self-contained dispensing mechanisms, had been fully 
eliminated.  The United States concurred with the removal of 
these missiles from accountability.  During JCIC-XXXIII, the 
United States asked the Russian Federation for clarification 
on whether the treaty-required elimination procedures would 
be applied to the 109 SS-25 ICBMs declared eliminated by 
Russia prior to 2008. 
 
¶12.  (S) Couch reminded the Russian Delegation that, in its 
JCIC-XXXIII Closing Plenary Statement, the Russian Federation 
said it intended to seek the possibility of eliminating the 
casings of the instrumentation compartments of the 109 SS-25 
ICBMs in question.  However, no progress had been made on 
this issue since that time.  Couch said the United States 
continued to seek clarification as to when the Russian 
Federation intended to eliminate the remaining SCDM casings, 
and requested a timeline for those eliminations. 
 
¶13.  (S) Ryzhkov stated that Russia carried out requirements 
adopted in January 2008 in the spirit of goodwill by 
presenting these casings to U.S. inspectors during 
elimination inspections at Votkinsk.  In response to the U.S. 
question, Ryzhkov declared to all Parties that the Russian 
Federation intends to eliminate the remaining SCDM casings 
belonging to missiles that Russia had already eliminated. 
Ryzhkov explained that there were delays in the dismantlement 
of these casings which are done outside of Votkinsk.  The 
delivery of these items for elimination would occur at a 
later date and, if it occurred prior to expiration of START, 
then the Parties would be notified in accordance with the 
Treaty. 
 
¶14.  (S) Couch acknowledged that Russia said it planned to 
eliminate the remaining SCDM casings, but requested further 
information regarding the schedule.  Ryzhkov responded that 
the Parties have already been notified and did not believe 
that the issue was as sensitive  as it had been made out to 
 
 
be.  Ryzhkov stated that a SCDM casing cannot fly by itself. 
 
¶15.  (S) Couch reiterated that the United States would like 
to know if the eliminations would occur within the framework 
of START or after the Treaty expires.  Ryzhkov answered that 
a portion of the casings could be eliminated prior to START 
expiration and others after, but Russia is not looking to 
store them for future use. 
 
----------------- 
HOW MANY WAYS CAN 
I SAY "NO DEAL?" 
----------------- 
 
¶16.  (S) Couch said the U.S. Delegation previously informed 
the Russian Delegation that the current MOU photographs of 
the SS-27 ICBM launch canister no longer corresponded to the 
configuration of these missiles as they currently exited VMPF 
and requested more updated MOU photographs to better assist 
U.S. monitors and inspectors in differentiating RS-24 and 
SS-27 ICBMs in the future.  However, updated MOU photographs 
have not yet been received and U.S. portal monitors continue 
to document differences in SS-27 launch canisters in 
inspection reports.  The United States would like to know 
whether the Russian Federation would provide updated MOU 
photographs of the SS-27 ICBM launch canister. 
 
¶17.  (S) Ryzhkov responded that the Russian Federation had 
studied this issue in detail prior to arriving in Geneva and 
understood U.S. concerns.  Ryzhkov stated that the Treaty 
provides two methods for confirming an item of continuous 
monitoring:  viewing and measuring the dimensions.  The 
results of measurements conducted by U.S. monitors 
corresponded to the data provided in the MOU for the declared 
type.  Therefore, measurements allowed monitors to confirm 
that canisters contain an SS-27 ICBM. 
 
¶18.  (S) Ryzhkov said the Russian Federation had thoroughly 
reviewed comments made in U.S. monitoring reports noting the 
differences regarding the presence and absence of cables and 
boxes on the exterior portion of the missile canister. 
Ryzhkov noted that missiles leave the production facility in 
various configurations and that exterior components were not 
necessarily consistent features.  It was the Russian 
Federation's opinion that using the current MOU photographs 
in conjunction with measurements provides sufficient 
information to confirm that the item of continuous monitoring 
is of the declared type.  The Russian Delegation cited that 
all U.S. official monitoring reports had confirmed that the 
item of continuous monitoring was of the type declared and as 
such Russia does not see the need to provide an updated MOU 
photograph. 
 
¶19.  (S) Ryzhkov stated that the Russian Federation was not 
prepared to provide a photograph for all the various canister 
configurations.  He showed a photograph of an SS-27 launch 
canister and highlighted potential differences in various 
configurations stating that such differences did not change 
the type of missile.  Smirnov noted that these differences 
were not modifications, but only changes to configurations. 
Ryzhkov said that final assembly is carried out at bases for 
strategic offensive arms adding that SS-27 launch canisters 
have a common configuration once deployed and that U.S. 
inspectors could confirm this during data update inspections. 
 Ryzhkov drew upon a previous analogy used to explain 
 
 
differences in confirming transporter-erector launchers. 
Ryzhkov said that, just because one Mercedes does not have an 
antenna for example, it does not change the type of vehicle; 
it is still a Mercedes. 
 
¶20.  (S) Couch responded to Ryzhkov's reference to viewing 
and measuring.  He said monitors compared the item declared 
to the appropriate MOU photograph.  Couch acknowledged the 
Russian Delegation's explanation, but reiterated that an 
updated MOU photograph may help to resolve the problem. 
Couch stated that it was the totality of differences that 
caused concern.  He then spoke of the differences noted by 
U.S. portal monitors using the following points. 
 
Begin points: 
 
-- The United States would like to inform the Russian 
Federation of the following list of differences in SS-27 
launch canisters that have been observed by portal monitors 
and documented in inspection reports: 
 
-- The pair of black cables on the forward end of the 
non-unique identifier (UID) side were missing. 
 
-- Two white cables running from and under the first box from 
the left on the forward end of the non-UID side and running 
lengthwise down the canister under the cable raceway were 
missing. 
 
-- The two large raceways visible on the non-UID side of the 
canister, toward the top of the canister, were separated by a 
gap roughly 2/3 down the canister toward the launch assist 
device in the MOU photographs.  The gap was noticeably 
smaller on the inspected launch canister. 
 
-- Extending from the second box on the non-UID side were 
three large conduits not present in the MOU photographs. 
 
-- On top of the canister and running the length of the 
canister to a point above the UID, monitors observed a long 
narrow rectangular raceway over ten supporting boxes and then 
another long narrow rectangular raceway over nine additional 
supporting boxes with four cables attached to the forward end. 
 
-- The white cable running from the second box from the right 
on the forward end of the UID side to the launch assist 
device end of the UID side was missing. 
 
-- On the UID side extending from the first boxes forward of 
the launch assist device were 14 cables not visible in the 
MOU photographs. 
 
-- Just forward of the first box forward of the launch assist 
device were eight cables not visible in the MOU photographs. 
 
-- A new box was present just aft of the UID and is not 
visible in the MOU photographs. 
 
End points. 
 
¶21.  (S) Ryzhkov reiterated that the Russian Federation could 
not provide photographs for each potential launch canister 
configuration and a photograph with each component would not 
help either because the missile would still leave Votkinsk in 
various launch canister configurations.  Ryzhkov stated that 
 
 
Russia understood that the issue may create an awkward 
situation for monitors but they are experienced enough to 
differentiate between systems. 
 
¶22.  (S) Fortier explained that one of the problems is that 
the only updated SS-27 road-mobile ICBM MOU photograph 
provided by the Russian Federation was that of the missile 
deployed on the launcher as opposed to a photograph of the 
SS-27 ICBM in its launch canister.  This also created 
problems for U.S. inspectors confirming missile canisters at 
Plesetsk.  (Begin note:  The two photographs together provide 
views of opposing sides of the missile canister.  End note.) 
 
¶23.  (S) Ryzhkov noted U.S. concerns and said he would take 
them back to Moscow for consideration. 
 
----------------- 
RUSSIA LETTING 
THE CLOCK RUN OUT 
----------------- 
 
¶24.  (S) Couch set the stage for the discussion on resolving 
U.S. concerns with SS-27 RVOSI procedures by proposing an 
open dialogue with the Russian Delegation to brainstorm 
potential solutions.  He stated that the United States did 
not presume to tell Russia how to conduct an RVOSI, only to 
facilitate the process of resolving the issue. 
 
¶25.  (S) Couch said the United States believed that the 
responsibility for proposing solutions that would resolve 
U.S. concerns rested with the Russian Federation, not only 
because it was the obligation of the inspected Party not to 
hamper the inspecting Party in ascertaining that the front 
section contained no more reentry vehicles than the number of 
warheads attributed to missiles of that type, but also 
because Russia, not the United States, understood the 
sensitivities involved with the SS-27 system.  The United 
States repeats its readiness to work seriously, and in good 
faith, with Russia to resolve this issue to the satisfaction 
of both Parties.  The United States would be willing to 
explore possible SS-27 RVOSI solutions that took into account 
whatever sensitive know-how exists on that system that has 
led to the use of overly large covers. 
 
¶26.  (S) Ryzhkov agreed to allow the U.S. Delegation to 
commence the meeting by asking questions.  Fortier stated 
that the first issue is to understand the need for the 
oversized cover.  During discussions on the SS-25 RVOSI 
issue, the Russian Delegation said that the large 
barrel-shaped cover was needed to protect sensitive know-how. 
 Was this the case with the very large conically shaped cover 
currently being used during SS-27 RVOSIs?  Ryzhkov responded 
that Russia never said that a large cover was needed to 
protect sensitive technology.  The shape of the shroud 
depended on the design of the missile and this missile was 
different than others.  Ryzhkov responded that he was not 
prepared to answer the question, Russia would need to talk 
with the missile's designer.  Ryzhkov offered that the SS-25 
RVOSI procedures that had been agreed on would not be 
applicable to the SS-27 RVOSI.  Ryzhkov could only respond 
that the Russian Delegation  was prepared to work the issue 
and requested that the United States provide its questions in 
writing to avoid confusion. 
 
¶27.  (S) Smith said that Russia had expressed concerns with 
 
 
the space beneath the Minuteman III (MM III) front section. 
If we were to compare the space beneath the MM III front 
section with the space under the SS-27 cover, we would find 
the space under the SS-27 cover to be much larger.  With that 
in mind would it be possible to use a more conformal cover? 
During the SS-25 RVOSI demonstration, the Russian Federation 
used a conformal cover over the single reentry vehicle and 
then demonstrated the construction of the large barrel-shaped 
cover and showed how it was placed over the reentry vehicle. 
Was it possible to conduct a demonstration of the SS-27 front 
section using a similar conformal cover over the single 
reentry vehicle in order to show U.S. observers the 
relationship between the large cover and the single reentry 
vehicle, as well as the rationale for the use of the large 
cover? 
 
¶28.  (S) Ryzhkov responded that the deployed SS-27 ICBM 
road-mobile and silo configurations were designed before the 
missile entered into service, so it would be difficult to 
change the technical specifications.  If it were easy to 
solve this problem, Russia would have resolved it already. 
As evidenced by the morning meeting on the MM III RVOSI 
issue, the U.S. Delegation had been studying the issue for 
quite a while and had potentially found a solution.  (Begin 
note:  Ryzhkov was attempting to bring the discussion to a 
close.  End note.) 
 
¶29.  (S) Dunn said it was Russia that proposed to hold a WG 
session to discuss the issue further.  The Russian Delegation 
indicated during the morning Heads of Delegation meeting that 
it had considered the issue further and had some suggestions 
or new information to provide.  Dunn asked whether this was 
correct and, if so, was the Russian Delegation prepared to 
provide that information during this meeting? 
 
¶30.  (S) Ryzhkov replied that all people think alike, ask 
themselves the same questions and follow the same line of 
reasoning.  This issue could be approached from various 
angles.  Ryzhkov said one approach may involve changes to 
provisions governing the configurations of shrouds.  He added 
that RVOSIs are sensitive and that we had to come to serious 
agreement.  Russia began studying resolution to the SS-27 
RVOSI issue long after the United States began its study of 
the MM III issue.  Only in the final stage of the Treaty's 
life had we reached a possible settlement.  Ryzhkov repeated 
that the Russian Federation understood U.S. concerns and 
would wait for its written questions on the matter. 
 
¶31.  (S) Fortier asked how an experienced Russian inspection 
team chief. such as Colonel Petrov, would deal with this 
situation during a reentry vehicle inspection when he peered 
down into a silo or looked at a road-mobile launcher and saw 
only a large teepee covering the entire opening of the launch 
canister where the front section was supposed to be, knowing 
that his job was to confirm that the front section contained 
no more reentry vehicles than the one warhead attributed to 
it.  Ryzhkov referred to the Russian proposal to use the 
Karousel Radiation Detection Equipment (RDE).  That proposal 
showed Russia was ready to resolve the issue in question 
unilaterally.  Maybe, in the future, the Parties  could 
explore such methods to improve inspection procedures. 
Ryzhkov opined that, on one hand, more sensitive means and 
measures could help in confirming the number of warheads and 
on the other hand avoid disclosing sensitivities.  To answer 
the question, Petrov would need to use his arsenal of 
 
 
knowledge to fulfill his duties. 
 
¶32.  (S) Shevtsov supported a previous Russian argument that 
telemetric information from flight tests could be used to 
confirm that the number of reentry vehicles deployed on the 
SS-27 ICBM did not exceed the number of warheads attributed 
to it.  The issue with the SS-27 is different than the issue 
with the Trident II, in that Trident II telemetry information 
identified more warhead releases than the number of warheads 
currently attributed to that system.  The SS-27 ICBM flight 
test and telemetry information did not indicate releases of 
more than one warhead.  Shevtsov asked whether a system would 
be operationally deployed without the appropriate flight 
tests.  He opined that this question is the root of the 
issue.  Military experts would not deploy a system that had 
not been tested beyond its capabilities.  Shevtsov said the 
United States should pose this question to U.S. military 
experts. 
 
¶33.  (S) Fortier replied that, according to this logic, there 
would be no need to conduct the MM III demonstration. 
Shevtsov responded that the MM III is much like the Trident. 
Fortier responded that the SS-27 ICBM is similar to the RS-24 
prototype ICBM, to which Shevtsov agreed.  Smirnov also 
agreed. 
 
¶34.  (S) Stein said that both Parties understood the need to 
protect sensitive technologies and to conduct flight tests 
prior to deployment.  He acknowledged that the conduct of 
RVOSIs for particular systems differs in practice.  Stein 
noted that the Russian Federation had resolved issues 
associated with SS-25 and SS-18 ICBM RVOSIs and asked the 
Russian Delegation to consider adopting some of the concepts 
used to resolve those issues, such as a more conformal cover, 
in thinking about the SS-27 RVOSI issue. 
 
¶35.  (S) Ryzhkov replied that it took three JCIC sessions to 
think through the nuances and invent devices to resolve the 
SS-25 issue.  However, the SS-27 ICBM issue is more complex. 
The procedures used for the SS-25 ICBM RVOSI issue could not 
be used to resolve the SS-27 ICBM RVOSI issue. 
 
¶36.  (S) The Russians agreed that it is their responsibility 
to propose a solution to the problem.  Smith returned to his 
earlier question and asked if Ryzhkov's response implied that 
a more conformal cover could not be used.  Ryzhkov responded 
that he could not answer that question, but would get back to 
the U.S. on it. 
 
¶37.  (S) Couch concluded the discussion stating that over the 
years the JCIC had a successful track record of resolving 
RVOSI issues, such as the SS-25, SS-18 and Trident II, and 
the United States was working hard to reach resolution of the 
MM III issue.  The United States only asked that the Russian 
Delegation take the next step in resolving the SS-27 issue. 
 
¶38.  (U) Documents exchanged.  None 
 
¶39.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Couch 
Mr. Beddoes 
Lt Col Comeau 
 
 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Dunn 
Maj Edinger 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Hanchett 
Mr. Johnston 
LT. Lobner 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Stein 
Mr. Vogel 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
 
Mr. Nurgozhayev 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Bolotov 
Ms. Ivanova 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Petrov 
Mr. Shevtchenko 
Mr. Smirnov 
Col Zaytsev 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
UKRAINE 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
MGen Fedotov 
Mr. Shevchenko 
 
¶40.  (U) Taylor sends. 
STORELLA