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S E C R E T GENEVA 000462 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2019 
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIV:  (U) HOD MEETING ON SS-27 RVOSI, PK 
SILO CONVERSIONS AND ONE-TIME DEMONSTRATION OF MM III FRONT 
SECTION, JUNE 9, 2009 
 
REF: A. STATE 057616 ANC/STR 09-411/143 (UNITED STATES 
        NRRC NOTIFICATION CANCELLING PK SILO 
        CONVERSION) 
     ¶B. STATE 8779 ANC-STR 08-660/3 (UNITED STATES NRRC 
        NOTIFICATION PK SILO CONVERSION) 
     ¶C. RUSSIAN FEDERATION AIDE-MEMOIRE ON RUSSIAN 
        CONCERNS REGARDING UNITED STATES 
        COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF 
        THE START TREATY DATED MARCH 10 2009 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXIV-010. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  June 9, 2009 
                Time:  10:30 - 11:45 A.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the 
Russian Mission on June 9, 2009, to discuss U.S. concerns 
with SS-27 RVOSI covers, the re-declaration of Peacekeeper 
(PK) Silo Launchers, and the conduct of a one-time 
demonstration of the Minuteman III (MM III) front section. 
All Parties were represented. 
 
¶4.  (S) The United States reiterated its concerns that the 
reentry vehicle (RV) covers used by the Russian Federation 
during RVOSIs were overly large and prohibited U.S. 
inspectors from ascertaining that the SS-27 did not contain 
more than its one attributed warhead.  The Russian Delegation 
repeated its desire to resolve this issue and stated that 
Russian experts were ready to meet in a working group at any 
time.  Both Parties agreed to meet in a working group later 
in the day. 
 
¶5.  (S) Regarding the re-declaration of PK silo launchers, 
the Russian Delegation repeated Russia's concerns about the 
conversion of 50 PK silo launchers at F.E. Warren AFB, 
Wyoming  to MM III silo launchers and the lack of 
notifications that should have been provided in accordance 
with the Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Protocol.  The 
U.S. Delegation stated that a Format 143 had been sent, on 
June 4, 2009 (REF A), that rescinded the conversion of these 
silo launchers and considered the issue resolved.  The 
 
Russian Delegation agreed the issue was resolved. 
 
¶6.  (S) On the issue of MM III ICBM RVOSI, the U.S. 
Delegation stated that it had determined that the U.S. could 
conduct a one-time demonstration of the front section and 
outlined the specific procedures that would govern its 
conduct. 
 
------------------ 
A BIG COVER SHAPED 
LIKE A TEEPEE 
------------------ 
 
¶7.  (S) Taylor opened the HOD meeting, held at the Russian 
Mission on June 9, 2009, and reiterated U.S. concerns that 
 
 
 
the very large covers used by the Russian Federation during 
SS-27 RVOSIs prohibited U.S. inspectors from ascertaining 
that the number of reentry vehicles present on the front 
section did not exceed the one warhead attributed to the 
SS-27.  He stated that these concerns were increased by the 
similarities seen in the acceleration profiles between the 
SS-27 and the prototype RS-24 that had been flight-tested 
with multiple RVs.  He further highlighted press accounts 
from inside Russia that continued to indicate plans to deploy 
the SS-27 with multiple warheads. 
 
¶8.  (S) Taylor explained that the United States believed it 
was the responsibility of the Russian Federation to propose 
solutions to this issue and that, during JCIC-XXXII, the 
Russian Federation had stated that it was looking for ways to 
address U.S. concerns.  He noted that since then the United 
States had not heard any proposals, and reiterated that the 
United States remained willing to explore possible SS-27 
RVOSI solutions that took into account whatever sensitive 
know-how had led to the use of very large covers. 
 
¶9.  (S) Koshelev thanked Taylor and replied that this issue 
was an old one on the JCIC agenda and that, despite the short 
time left before expiration of the Treaty, the Russian 
Federation was interested in resolving it.  He stated that, 
although the Treaty did not limit thesize of RV covers used 
during an RVOSI, he undertood the U.S. concerns about the 
covers' large sze, but qualified that statement saying that 
theRVOSI was the most sensitive inspection and any changes 
to procedures required great deliberation. 
--------------------- 
I'VE HEARD (AND MADE) 
TIS ARGUMENT BEFORE 
--------------------- 
 
¶10. (S) Koshelev explained that the SS-27 was designed 
tested and eployed with a single RV and that anSS-27 that 
carried multiple warheads did not exit.  Analysis of the 
telemetry data provided to te United States would confirm 
this. 
 
¶11.  (S) aylor responded saying that telemetry was not 
intended to verify the numbe of warheads on deployed ICBMs, 
rather it providd a snapshot in time of a single flight test 
of  single missile.  It did not address capability.  That 
was the reason for RVOSIs, to verify the numbrs of wrheads 
actually deployed. 
 
¶12.  (S) Talor recalled discussions about Russian concerns 
hat there were more than eight warheads on the Trient D5. 
One of the arguments the United States ha made was that 
telemetry analysis confirmed onlyeight warheads were 
present, and the Russian Fedration had responded with the 
same argument the United States was making now, that 
telemetry was not intended to verify numbers of warheads 
actually deployed. 
 
¶13.  (S) Koshelev acknowledged the irony of this discussion 
and quoted Dr. Ed Ifft (Begin note:  Former State 
Representative to the START negotiations.  End note.) saying, 
the position of both Parties were the same, they just tabled 
them at different times.  He stated that the implementation 
of the Treaty's provisions was important and lamented that 
the Russian Federation had not been creative enough in 
 
 
working to find a solution to this problem.  He again stated 
that his experts were prepared to discuss this issue in a 
working group. 
 
--------------------- 
SO WHAT ARE YOU 
DOING THIS AFTERNOON? 
--------------------- 
 
¶14.  (S) Next, Ryzhkov relayed the differences that existed 
between the discussions of Trident D5 telemetry and the SS-27 
and explained that the Russian Federation used the number of 
procedures for dispensing RVs and not acceleration profiles 
as the determining factor in telemetry analysis.  The Russian 
Federation believed there were more procedures for dispensing 
RVs than the number of warheads attributed to the Trident. 
He reiterated the point that the Russian experts were ready 
to discuss this in a working group. 
 
¶15.  (S) Taylor asked whether there was time to schedule a 
working group during this session and, specifically, could it 
be scheduled for the same afternoon. 
 
¶16.  (S) Koshelev agreed to schedule a working group later in 
the day so the experts could discuss the issue further. 
 
------------------------- 
THE PRODIGAL SILOS RETURN 
------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (S) Koshelev opened the discussion of the re-declaration 
of PK silo launchers, citing the Format 3 notification sent 
by the United States in August 2008 declaring the 50 PK ICBMs 
at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming, to be MM III ICBMs (REF B).  The 
Russian Federation was concerned that, despite claiming these 
silo launchers had been converted to MM III, not all required 
notifications had been sent in accordance with the C or E 
Protocol.  Additionally, during an RVOSI in September 2008, 
Russian inspectors were unable to confirm that any conversion 
had taken place. 
 
¶18.  (S) Koshelev acknowledged that, during the current 
session of the JCIC, the United States had provided a copy of 
the START Format 143 notification that was transmitted on 
June 4, 2009 that rescinded the Format 3 from August 2008 
(REF A). 
 
¶19.  (S) Taylor verified that the START Format 143 had been 
sent rescinding the Format 3 and that the United States would 
provide the appropriate information in the next six-month 
update to the Memorandum of Understanding.  He further stated 
that the United States regretted any confusion caused by this 
issue and considered the matter closed. 
 
¶20.  (S) Koshelev thanked Taylor for his explanation and 
acknowledged that technical mishaps occurred in even the most 
advanced bureaucratic systems.  The Russian Federation 
understood the U.S. position and also considered the matter 
resolved. 
 
--------------------- 
HOW LONG HAVE WE BEEN 
TALKING ABOUT THIS? 
--------------------- 
 
 
 
¶21.  (S) Koshelev opened the MM III RVOSI discussion and 
opined that no other issue had been under consideration so 
long without a solution.  However, in light of discussions at 
JCIC-XXXII and JCIC-XXXIII, Russia believed that the United 
States was ready to provide its plan for conducting a 
demonstration of the MM III front section. 
 
¶22.  (S) Koshelev stated that, in prior sessions, Russia had 
stated its concerns with the MM III RVOSI, that those 
concerns formed the basis of a plan for conducting a 
demonstration, and that he wanted to reaffirm the Russian 
position regarding a possible demonstration. 
 
¶23.  (S) Koshelev confirmed that Russia was ready to 
participate in a one-time demonstration of the MM III front 
section that would confirm that the space in the lower 
portion of the front section could not contain objects of 
similar dimensions to a reentry vehicle.  He acknowledged 
that any procedures used in such a demonstration would not 
lead to new procedures in future RVOSIs, adding that without 
such a demonstration Russian concerns could not be resolved. 
 
---------------------------- 
DETAILS OF THE DEMONSTRATION 
---------------------------- 
 
¶24.  (S) Taylor stated that the United States had decided to 
conduct a one-time demonstration of the MM III front section 
that would take place outside of treaty inspection quotas, 
and that the United States would inform the other Parties of 
the date through diplomatic channels. 
 
¶25.  (S) Taylor explained that the procedures used to conduct 
the demonstration would mimic procedures listed in Annex 3 of 
the Inspection Protocol.  Specifically, after separation from 
the ICBM, the front section would be transported to a 
specially allocated site where inspectors would be permitted 
to view the space inside the lower portion of the front 
section to determine that it could not contain items 
corresponding to reentry vehicles. 
 
¶26.  (S) Taylor further explained that sensitive elements 
might be shrouded, but would not impede the observers' 
ability to determine that additional reentry vehicles could 
not be located within that space.  Finally, he stressed that 
no additional devices or equipment would be used during the 
one-time demonstration, and that the demonstration would not 
lead to new procedures for use in MM III RVOSIs. 
 
¶27.  (S) Taylor stated that the United States would expect a 
factual report to be prepared that documented the conduct of 
the demonstration, and included procedures used and what 
inspectors observed.  He further explained that the United 
States expected that a satisfactory demonstration would allow 
the Parties to resolve this issue, that the result would be 
recorded in coordinated statements, and that this issue would 
be removed from the JCIC agenda. 
 
¶28.  (S) Taylor provided the following points to explain the 
modalities of the demonstration. 
 
Begin Points: 
 
-- The United States would select the ICBM base for silo 
launchers of ICBMs at which the demonstration would be 
 
 
conducted. 
 
-- The observers would designate the silo launcher of ICBMs 
containing the MM III front section for the demonstration. 
 
-- The procedures set forth in Annex 3 to the Inspection 
Protocol would be followed up to the point of front section 
separation.  The procedures set forth in paragraph 1 of Annex 
2 to the Inspection Protocol would be used to view a silo 
launcher declared not to contain a MM III ICBM should that be 
encountered. 
 
End Points. 
 
¶29.  (S) Koshelev thanked Taylor for the business-like 
approach and asked that the United States provide the 
proposal in writing so the Russian experts could study it and 
respond appropriately.  He also asked Taylor whether this 
demonstration would be open to all Treaty Partners.  Koshelev 
asked that the details of the demonstration be provided in 
written form.  Taylor agreed. 
 
¶30.  (S) Taylor confirmed that it would be up to the other 
Parties to determine the make-up of the observer team and 
explained that the United States would provide the proposal 
in a written response to the Russian Aide-Memoire of March 
10, 2009 (REF C). 
 
¶31.  (U) Documents exchanged.  None. 
 
¶32.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Taylor 
Ms. Bosco 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. Couch 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Dunn 
Maj Edinger 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Hanchett 
Mr. Johnston 
Lt Lobner 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Stein 
Mr. Vogel 
Dr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
BELARUS 
 
Mr. Ugorich 
Mr. Ponomarev 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
 
Mr. Nurgozhayev 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Mr. Koshelev 
Mr. Bolotov 
Ms. Ivanova 
Mr. Kashirin 
 
 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Petrov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Serov 
Mr. Shevtchenko 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Vorontsov 
Col Zaytsev 
Mr. Dashko (Int) 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
UKRAINE 
 
Mr. Nykonenko 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Mr. Chernyavskiy 
MGen Fedotov 
Mr. Shevchenko 
 
¶33.  (U) Taylor sends. 
STORELLA